


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# **A Roadmap to Deploy New Nuclear Power Plants in the United States by 2010**

## **Volume II Main Report**



Prepared for the

**United States Department of Energy  
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology**

and its

**Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee  
Subcommittee on Generation IV Technology Planning**

October 31, 2001

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## Table of Contents

II-1: INTRODUCTION .....	1-1
Objective .....	1-1
Context and Scope .....	1-1
Current Situation.....	1-2
Roadmap Development and Interfaces .....	1-3
Roadmap Organization .....	1-5
II-2: BACKGROUND .....	2-1
Background Topics .....	2-1
U.S. Energy and Environmental Needs; Role of Nuclear Energy .....	2-1
Industry and DOE Nuclear Energy Initiatives .....	2-4
Readiness of Nuclear Energy to Contribute to New Generation.....	2-10
Background on Regulatory Processes.....	2-18
II-3: GENERIC GAP ANALYSIS .....	3-1
Key Near Term Deployment “Gaps” .....	3-1
Key Near Term Deployment “Issues” .....	3-7
Other Issues.....	3-10
Generic Gap Analyses.....	3-12
II-4: NTDG ECONOMIC ANALYSIS .....	4-1
Overview: The New Electricity Marketplace .....	4-1
Deregulated Electricity Supply – The New Marketplace .....	4-3
Nuclear Plant Realities.....	4-8
A Model for Nuclear Plant Competitiveness – Numerical Results .....	4-16
Key Factors Affecting Nuclear Plant Competitiveness .....	4-29
Special Cases.....	4-33
Summary.....	4-36
II-5: DESIGN OPTION EVALUATIONS.....	5-1
Introduction.....	5-1
GE/NE ABWR DESIGN .....	5-3
A. Criteria Evaluation.....	5-3
B. Gap Analysis .....	5-8
C. Overall Assessment .....	5-9
GE/NE ESBWR DESIGN .....	5-11
A. Criteria Evaluation.....	5-11
B. Gap Analysis .....	5-17
C. Overall Assessment .....	5-18
FRAMATOME ANP SWR-1000 DESIGN .....	5-21
A. Criteria Evaluation.....	5-21
B. Gap Analysis .....	5-28
C. Overall Assessment .....	5-29
WESTINGHOUSE AP1000/600 DESIGNS .....	5-32
A1. Criteria Evaluation: AP1000.....	5-33
A2. Criteria Evaluation: AP600.....	5-44
B. Gap Analysis for AP1000 and AP600.....	5-47

C. Overall Assessment: AP1000 and AP600 .....	5-52
WESTINGHOUSE IRIS DESIGN .....	5-59
A. Criteria Evaluation .....	5-59
B. Gap Analysis .....	5-62
C. Overall Assessment .....	5-66
PBMR PTY. PBMR DESIGN .....	5-69
A. Criteria Evaluation .....	5-70
B. Gap Analysis .....	5-79
C. Overall Assessment .....	5-81
GENERAL ATOMICS GT-MHR DESIGN .....	5-84
A. Criteria Evaluation .....	5-84
B. Gap Analysis .....	5-94
C. Overall Assessment .....	5-97
II-6: Conclusions and RECOMMENDATIONS .....	6-1
Conclusions .....	6-1
Recommendations .....	6-1
Generic Gap Recommendations .....	6-2
Design-Specific Recommendations: Need for a Dual-Track Strategy .....	6-9
Recommendations for a Phased Action Plan .....	6-10
Public-Private Partnerships: Implementing a Market-Driven Approach .....	6-16
DESCRIPTION OF APPENDICES AND ATTACHMENTS .....	1
Appendix A: Design Description, Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) .....	A-1
Appendix B: Design Description, ESBWR .....	B-1
Appendix C: Design Description, SWR 1000 .....	C-1
Appendix D: Design Description, AP 1000 .....	D-1
Appendix E: Design Description, AP 600 .....	E-1
Appendix F: Design Description, International Reactor Innovative And Secure (IRIS) .....	F-1
Appendix G: Design Description, Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) .....	G-1
Appendix H: Design Description, Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) .....	H-1
Appendix I: Cost Sharing Rationale .....	I-1
Appendix J: Near Term Deployment Roadmap Resource Needs .....	J-1
Appendix K: Background And Source Documents .....	K-1
Appendix L: References .....	L-1
Appendix M: Acronyms .....	M-1
Attachment 1: Mission of the Near-Term Deployment Group .....	1
Attachment 2: NTD Request For Information .....	1
Attachment 3: Nuclear Energy Institute's Vision 2020 .....	1
Attachment 4: NEI's Integrated Plan for New Nuclear Plants .....	1

## II-1: INTRODUCTION

### OBJECTIVE

The objective of this document is to provide the Department of Energy (DOE) and the nuclear industry with the basis for a plan to ensure the availability of near-term nuclear energy options that can be in operation in the U.S. by 2010. This document identifies the technological, regulatory, and institutional gaps and issues that need to be addressed for new nuclear plants to be deployed in the U.S. in this timeframe. It also identifies specific designs that could be deployed by 2010, along with the actions and resource requirements that are needed to ensure their availability. This near-term roadmap will also serve as input for a longer term and broader scope Generation IV Nuclear Technology Roadmap being prepared by DOE, as discussed below.

In order to meet this objective, at least one competitive nuclear energy generation option, NRC-certified and/or ready to construct, must be available for order by late 2003. Further, this Roadmap presents a plan to make available by 2010 a range of competitive, NRC-certified and/or ready to construct nuclear energy generation options of a range of sizes to meet variations in market need, in order to have multiple new plants on line by the end of the decade.

### CONTEXT AND SCOPE

DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology with the advice of the Generation IV Roadmap Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC) Subcommittee (GRNS), is developing a Nuclear Technology Roadmap for a long-term vision for nuclear energy for 2030 and beyond. The Generation IV Nuclear Technology Roadmap is focused on long-term, broad-scope objectives, including a wide range of technology options and applications and electricity generation missions. It is intended to engage and guide international cooperation in nuclear R&D, and will serve global as well as domestic markets.

In order to cope with near term needs for nuclear energy in the U.S., DOE has organized a Near Term Deployment Group (NTDG) (see Attachment 1, NTDG Mission). This group works cooperatively with the Generation IV program, and was tasked to develop a Near Term Deployment Roadmap ("NTD Roadmap") that will complement the longer term Generation IV Roadmap. The NTDG consists of 13 experts from the owner/operator, vendor, academic, and national laboratory communities, and reports directly to the DOE NTDG Manager and the GRNS. It maintains a dotted-line relationship with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Executive Task Force on New Nuclear Power Plants, assuring close cooperation with ongoing industry activities.

This NTD Roadmap proposes a strategy to enable deployment of new nuclear power plants by 2010 that could substantially resolve the growing energy supply deficit in the U.S. and provide for an appropriate and secure energy mix that will help achieve Clean Air Act requirements and reduce greenhouse gas production – without negatively impacting the U.S. economy. This Roadmap outlines the near term actions and resource requirements needed to support such a strategy. The scope of this Roadmap does not include consideration of the reactivation of old nuclear construction projects (i.e., completion of partially built plants), although it is recognized

that such efforts, if found to be cost-effective, could provide additional nuclear generation and help reinvigorate various elements of nuclear industrial infrastructure.

### **CURRENT SITUATION**

The U.S. depends on energy supply to maintain its economic strength and competitive position in the global economy. Americans have come to expect reliable, inexpensive, and environmentally friendly electricity. However, too little baseload capacity has been added over the last 1-2 decades, creating situations of inadequate supply (as in California) and the potential for escalating energy costs, which could seriously damage our economy. Addressing our strategic energy needs is an urgent matter, with clear and direct implications to our nation's security and economic strength, to our global competitiveness, and to worldwide environmental quality. Both aggressive conservation and new supplies must be pursued.

Existing nuclear plants are a major source of safe, clean, economical, and reliable electricity in the U.S and around the world. Nuclear energy provides this nation with 20 percent of its electricity, second only to coal, and provides 17 percent of the world's electricity. However, no new nuclear plant orders have been executed in the U.S. since 1979. Key factors that existed in the 1980s contributed to this situation:

- Coal and nuclear baseload generation construction in the 1970s and 1980s exceeded power needs. Over capacity reached 35 percent. The oil embargo and energy crises of the 1970s contributed to an economic downturn and high interest rates that drove up the construction costs of projects underway, and made new investment in major capital projects (e.g., coal and nuclear plants) prohibitive.
- An unstable licensing process at the NRC discouraged new plant construction.
- Institutional barriers related to lack of public support for expanded use of nuclear energy arose from reactions to the accident at TMI-2, and a lack of an assured means of disposing of spent nuclear fuel.
- Marginal performance by many operating nuclear plants caused extended shutdowns, low capacity factors, and rising operations and maintenance costs.

DOE and the industry saw a need in the 1980s for addressing performance issues at existing nuclear plants, and for maintaining the option to build new plants in the future. First and foremost, industry undertook a major and necessary effort to improve the performance of its current plants, assisted by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). That effort was vital to improved safety, NRC confidence in industry's capability and commitment, and the economic viability of nuclear utilities. It was a necessary prerequisite to building new plants.

DOE and industry then embarked on a joint program to enable a nuclear power option in the U.S. The Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Program ran from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s. It was funded on an industry/DOE cost-shared basis to conduct project specific engineering for four advanced designs, and addressed the institutional issues above. It placed a priority on standardization of designs and processes, and on establishing utility design requirements for future designs.

During this period, Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) improved the licensing process for new plants. They implemented a new regulation, 10 CFR Part 52, which provided an improved process for early site permitting, standardized design certification, and combined construction and operating license approval that increased public involvement in the early stages of the process, and improved the stability of the process as new plant projects approached completion. Ultimately, the NRC “certified” three standardized designs for construction in the U.S.: the General Electric Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR), the Combustion Engineering System 80+, and the Westinghouse AP600. (BNFL and Westinghouse have subsequently acquired Combustion Engineering.)

These three certified designs form an important foundation for near term deployment in the U.S. However, because of the deregulation of electricity generation in the late 1990s, and concurrent rapid growth in small natural gas-fired generating units that were well suited to this uncertain market environment, larger new baseload plants have not been built. Today, the need for new baseload plants (i.e., coal and nuclear plants) is becoming apparent. Both face economic challenges because of their size and cost. However, analyses by the Energy Information Agency (EIA) operated by DOE and by the industry show that nuclear energy could generate electricity at a competitive cost in the U.S.

DOE and industry agree that a parallel strategy is needed to address the need for new nuclear generation. This parallel strategy should consist of two elements:

1. Near term options with a demonstrable capability for deployment by 2010, consisting of certified ALWRs, enhanced ALWRs, and near term Generation IV options, and which can achieve clear economic competitiveness. This element is the subject of this Roadmap.
2. Longer term options that have the potential for major enhancements. These are under the purview of the DOE Generation IV Program.

This parallel strategy is embodied in both DOE’s “Long Term Nuclear Technology R&D Plan” (June 2000) and EPRI’s “Electricity Technology Roadmap, Volume II: Energy Supply” (January 1999). Both elements emphasize enhanced safety, reliability, standardization, and assured licensability, in addition to improved economics. Both elements will meet the regulatory requirements of the NRC and high-level goals set by industry for ALWRs in the early 1990s, and both are expected to substantially meet the new goals being established by the GRNS and DOE.

The conclusions and recommendations of this report center on overcoming two primary obstacles to near term deployment: validating the new regulatory processes for approving the siting, construction, and operation of new plants, and assuring the economic competitiveness of deployable designs. Many other gaps and issues are addressed, but these two are paramount to success.

### **ROADMAP DEVELOPMENT AND INTERFACES**

The NTDG issued an interim work product in May 2001, to respond to an urgent need for an immediate assessment of near term (FY2002/2003) funding needs, prior to completion of the

NTD Roadmap. That report was made available to the Administration and Congress, and has been incorporated into this final NTD Roadmap.

In order to develop this Roadmap, the NTDG solicited and assessed non-proprietary design-specific information from potential suppliers and/or potential customers of reactor technologies that meet the screening criteria listed below. The NTDG issued a Request For Information (RFI) on 31 March 2001 (see Attachment 2), requesting information on how each candidate technology meets each of the noted criteria, what specific technological and institutional gaps exist which must be addressed to allow successful commercialization of the technology, and the cost, schedule and deliverables that would be required. Eight nuclear plant designs were submitted to the NTDG for assessment.

### **Screening Criteria**

The NTD Roadmap evaluates eight designs against six specific screening criteria for near term deployment, as specified by the GRNS. These criteria are:

1. Credible plan for gaining regulatory acceptance - Candidate technologies must show how they will be able to receive either a construction permit for a demonstration plant or a design certification by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) within the time frame required to permit plant operation by 2010 or earlier.
2. Existence of industrial infrastructure - Candidate technologies must be able to demonstrate that a credible set of component suppliers and engineering resources exist today, or a credible plan exists to assemble them, which would have the ability and the desire to supply the technology to a commercial market in the time frame leading to plant operation by 2010 or earlier.
3. Credible plan for commercialization - A credible plan must be prepared which clearly shows how the technology would be commercialized by 2010 or earlier, including market projections, supplier arrangements, fuel supply arrangements and industrial manufacturing capacity.
4. Cost sharing between industry and Government - Technology plans must include a clear delineation of the cost categories to be funded by Government and the categories to be funded by private industry. The private/government funding split for each of these categories must be shown along with rationale for the proposed split.
5. Demonstration of economic competitiveness - The economic competitiveness of candidate technologies must be clearly demonstrable. The expected all-in cost of power produced is to be determined and compared to existing competing technologies along with all relevant assumptions.
6. Reliance on existing fuel cycle industrial structure - Candidate technologies must show how they will operate within credible fuel cycle industrial structures, i.e., they must utilize a once-through fuel cycle with low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and demonstrate the existence of, or a credible plan for, an industrial infrastructure to supply the fuel being proposed.

**Coordination with Longer Range Generation IV Roadmap**

Both the initial work product (FY2002/2003 Action Paper) and this NTD Roadmap have been coordinated with the longer term Generation IV Roadmap currently under development. These are complementary efforts. The NTD Roadmap has carefully limited its consideration to only those reactor design options that have clear potential to be operational by 2010. Equal discipline has been applied to the identification of technical and institutional gaps in these near-term design options, leaving longer-term issues (e.g., global sustainability, advanced fuel cycles, new technologies to enhance proliferation resistance and better manage nuclear waste), to the Generation IV Roadmap. Hence, this NTD Roadmap has not attempted to identify long-term research needs. It does identify short term R&D, as needed to close gaps, and related technical and programmatic resource needs (i.e., one-time costs) relevant to near term deployment that would be cost-shared between industry and Government.

The NTGDG works closely with other Working Groups in the broader Generation IV program to share information, exchange information and conclusions; and to ensure NTGDG work products are useful as an input to the longer-term Roadmap development.

**Coordination with Industry**

The NTGDG coordinates its efforts with those of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Executive Task Force on New Nuclear Power Plants, assuring close cooperation with ongoing industry activities. This interaction has helped the NTGDG develop a practical and appropriate plan for division of resources and responsibilities between DOE and industry. In general, most of the near term needs can be met through public/private partnership.

**ROADMAP ORGANIZATION**

This Roadmap consists of two parts, a “Summary Report” (Volume I) and this “NTD Roadmap” (Volume II). The NTD Roadmap is organized as follows:

**Chapter II-1: Introduction**

This Chapter provides the objective of this Roadmap, its context and scope as it relates to the current energy situation in the U.S., and a summary of the organization of the NTD Roadmap.

**Chapter II-2: Background**

Additional detail is given on the national energy situation, role of nuclear power, history of DOE and industry programs in support of new plants (including the ALWR program), and the Generation IV initiative. Detail is also provided on regulatory issues.

**Chapter II-3: Generic Gap Evaluations**

The generic gaps and issues are identified, along with solutions and resource requirements to close these gaps.

Chapter II-4: NTDG Economic Analysis

The conditions of the de-regulated electricity generation market are reviewed and the economics of future plants assessed.

Chapter II-5: Design Option Evaluations

Each design is evaluated including:

- Criteria assessments
- Design-specific gap and gap-closure analyses
- Overall assessment, including the timelines for deployment

Chapter II-6: Conclusions and Recommendations

This section provides an integrated/consolidated summary of key recommendations to close the design-specific and generic gaps. It also provides the basis for the recommendations in the Executive Summary of Volume I. This Chapter includes a separate set of strategic recommendations for accelerating new plant deployment via market-driven initiatives, primarily based on public-private partnerships. Finally, this section refers to recommendations for R&D and project-specific funding, based on a funding table (Appendix J), specifying all site-specific, generic, and design-specific funding requirements for all designs that NTDG judges should be candidates for industry-Government cost sharing for near term deployment.

Appendices:

- A. Design Description, Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
- B. Design Description, ESBWR
- C. Design Description, SWR 1000
- D. Design Description, AP 1000
- E. Design Description, AP 600
- F. Design Description, International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS)
- G. Design Description, Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)
- H. Design Description, Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR)
- I. Cost Sharing Rationale
- J. Near Term Deployment Roadmap Resource Needs
- K. Background and Source Documents
- L. Reference List
- M. Acronyms

Attachments:

1. Near Term Deployment Group Mission
2. Near Term Deployment Group Request for Information
3. NEI's "Vision 2020" – Strategic Objectives for Nuclear Energy's Future
4. NEI's "Integrated Plan for New Nuclear Plants"

## II-2: BACKGROUND

### BACKGROUND TOPICS

The purpose of this Background Chapter is to explain why a success oriented strategy for near term deployment of new nuclear energy plants is necessary and how it fits into a national energy policy. It will provide a perspective on the following four key issues:

1. The nation's energy and environmental needs that justifies this near term goal, and role of nuclear energy
2. The initiatives that DOE and industry have pursued to enable new nuclear plant orders in the U.S.
3. The readiness of nuclear energy to contribute to meeting the nation's energy supply needs
4. The key regulatory processes that are critical steps in the deployment of new nuclear plants

The authors of this report have concluded that a strong need exists for near term deployment of new nuclear power plants in the U.S. Hence, this Roadmap establishes a process and success-oriented strategy committed to reaching this goal. The NTDG has identified the technological and institutional gaps which must be addressed to allow successful commercialization of the near term deployment technologies, and the cost, schedule and deliverables that would be required. The NTDG has attempted to develop rather complete estimates of the resources (schedule and funding levels) required to close the gaps in time to meet the 2010 deployment goal. The intent of this effort has been to identify those actions and recommendations that are necessary and sufficient to deploying multiple nuclear power plants in the U.S. by the end of this decade.

### U.S. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL NEEDS; ROLE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

There is a growing consensus that the U.S. needs a balanced energy policy that both encourages conservation and adds new energy supply. Too little baseload capacity has been added over the last 1-2 decades, creating situations of inadequate supply (as in California) and the potential for escalating energy costs, which could seriously damage our economy. Further, fossil fuel price uncertainty and fossil fuel environmental impacts, including clean air considerations and the potential for global warming, are creating a renewed pressure to deploy alternative energy sources that are non-emitting, such as renewable energy and nuclear energy. Finally, recent events emphasize the need for stable and reliable domestic energy sources and for fuel diversity, so that dependence on imported energy can be reduced.

There are a total of 103 nuclear reactor units or plants operating at 65 sites in the U.S. today. Virtually all of these 103 U.S. nuclear plants will apply for a 20-year license renewal to help meet these energy demands. Increased environmental controls and potential fuel supply problems continue to put pressure on fossil energy costs. Renewable energy continues to find it difficult to make a sufficiently reliable and economic contribution to our national electricity supply. Hydropower can be relicensed in some situations, but significant growth in hydropower is unlikely. With energy demand growing and no easy answers, U.S. national energy policy must embrace a balanced portfolio of supply options that includes increased use of safe, reliable,

and emission-free nuclear energy. Energy conservation is very important, but increasing demand cannot be met by conservation alone.

Power reliability is becoming an extremely important consideration in the digital economy, and is increasingly becoming a factor in deciding where to site new businesses that require extremely high reliability – upwards of “six nines.” Reliable baseload generation is the foundation for high reliability, backed up by distributed sources and emergency generators.

Large amounts of bulk power are needed to power our major cities and industrial areas. Mass transit is necessary to mitigate air quality impacts, including increased greenhouse gas emissions, from carbon-based mobile sources. Other environmental protection systems, such as wastewater treatment and water purification, also require bulk electricity to serve the large, urban populations where 80 percent of Americans now live—not to mention to help meet electrical demands of a concentrated population. Nuclear plants offer an advantage to regions of the country with growing requirements for large amounts of bulk power.

Addressing our strategic energy needs has direct implications to our nation’s security and economic strength, to our global competitiveness, and to worldwide environmental quality. The need to build new nuclear plants is being discussed in the U.S., as well as in other countries. However, bringing new nuclear plant technologies to the marketplace is challenging – there are significant uncertainties associated with the complex regulatory and financing processes, which impact cost and schedule.

### **Electricity Supply in the U.S. and Nuclear’s Contribution**

U.S. electricity demand grew by 2.2 percent a year on average during the 1990s, and increased by 2.6 percent in 2000. Even if demand grows by a modest 1.8 percent annually over the next two decades—as forecasted by the U.S. Energy Information Administration—the nation will need nearly 400,000 megawatts of new electric generating capacity, including replacement of power plants that will close during that time. This capacity is the equivalent of building about 800 new mid-size (500-megawatt) power plants—or 40 new plants every year for the next 20 years. At 2.5 percent annual growth, which is closer to the growth rates experienced during the 1990s, the United States will require an additional 564,000 megawatts to meet new electricity demand and replace aging power plants that have reached the end of their useful life.

In California, shortages of electric generating capacity and rising natural gas prices have contributed to skyrocketing consumer electricity rates, the bankruptcy of one major electric company, and blackouts affecting millions of people and thousands of businesses—all at a cost of billions of dollars. California provides a vivid example of the societal impacts of failing to add new generation and transmission capacity, as well as the societal impacts of fossil fuel price volatility when capacity margins are thin. Similar electricity shortages are forecasted for other regions of the country during the next few years.

An historic contributor to U.S. economic strength has been its abundant and diverse energy supplies, resulting primarily from ample domestic supplies of a mix of competing fuels for generating electricity. A healthy economy requires stable, low cost, and reliable electricity, and

adequate reserve margins. These features are more difficult to achieve and maintain in a deregulated electricity marketplace. Federal and State Governments have concluded correctly that deregulation will benefit electricity consumers in the long run, but Government must assume greater responsibility, through market incentives, to ensure adequate reserve margins.

Nuclear energy is the second largest source of electricity in the United States, providing 20 percent of the nation's electricity, and our largest source of emission-free electricity generation, providing 70 percent of electricity in that category. License renewal of the nation's 103 operating nuclear plants is critical to maintaining this contribution to energy supply over the next two decades. But where will new capacity come from? Economic and environmental considerations will be key factors in new capacity decisions.

### **Environmental Issues and Nuclear Energy's Role in Emission Avoidance**

Nuclear energy has been a major component of achieving domestic air quality goals for over three decades. Between 1973 and 1999, nuclear plants avoided the emission of 32 million tons of nitrogen oxide, 62 million tons of sulfur dioxide and 2.6 billion tons of carbon. During this period, making electricity in nuclear plants avoided more tons of nitrogen oxide (NOX) than were eliminated through fossil plant controls under the Clean Air Act. In 2000 alone, nuclear plants avoided more than 4 million tons of sulfur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>), nearly 2 million tons of NOX, and 174 million metric tons of carbon equivalent. In the absence of current nuclear production, the difference between current U.S. greenhouse gas emission levels and our 1990 baseline established in the Framework Convention on Climate Change would double.

Future efforts to control greenhouse gases will require continued investment in emission-free technologies of all kinds, but particularly nuclear plants because of their sizable electric output, minimal environmental impact and siting capability near load demand. The vital role of emission avoidance is evident in the success of voluntary emission reduction programs to date. With approximately half the units reporting so far, nuclear plants are the single largest contributor to voluntary greenhouse gas emission reductions (40 percent of the program) under the Department of Energy's 1605(b) Program established under the 1992 Energy Policy Act.

Electric generating facilities have faced significant emission reduction requirements, especially because large, stationary sources of emissions are easier to regulate than small or mobile sources. But electric generating facilities that prevent air pollution to begin with—such as nuclear power plants—also have played a major role. For example, if the United States were to replace all its nuclear plants with pollution-emitting generation, our nation would have to take 135 million passenger cars off the road to keep carbon emissions from increasing.

Consider the importance of nuclear energy in three eastern states:

- In New Jersey, nuclear power plants accounted for 51 percent of total electricity generation in 1999. They also avoided substantial emissions: 80,000 tons of nitrogen oxide, 160,000 tons of sulfur dioxide and nearly seven million tons of carbon.

- Nuclear energy generated 47 percent of the electricity in Connecticut—avoiding the emission of 30,000 tons of nitrogen oxide, 70,000 tons of sulfur dioxide and nearly 3 million tons of carbon.
- Nuclear energy generated 26 percent of the electricity in New York, avoiding the emission of 110,000 tons of nitrogen oxide, 200,000 tons of sulfur dioxide and 8.5 million tons of carbon.

Many other states face the same issue to varying degrees. These states simply cannot meet the broad spectrum of clean air requirements unless they use nuclear energy for a substantial proportion of their electricity generation.

Also, the cost of NOX allowances – which electricity generators have to buy in order to run in California – increased dramatically through the summer months. Just the increase in the price of NOX allowances increased the price of electricity by \$39 a megawatt-hour between May and September, for a typical combined cycle gas-fired plant. Analysis shows that about a fourth of all new gas-fired power plants across the country are proposed for areas that are already classified non-attainment for ozone. So buying NOX allowances is going to become an even more significant cost component nationally.

The benefits to society from emission free and highly reliable nuclear energy are huge. Nuclear energy reduces our dependence on foreign sources of energy fuels, and reduces the demand on precious natural gas resources so critical to transportation and residential sectors, and to a wide range of manufacturing applications. Nuclear energy is good for the overall economy because expanded nuclear capacity allows currently operating coal plants to continue to operate longer, many to end-of-life, within federally mandated emissions limits, giving time to rebuild and modernize the generation infrastructure at a pace that does not drag the economy down. Nuclear energy use in the electricity sector also gives more time to work on environmental and energy solutions in the transportation sector.

### **INDUSTRY AND DOE NUCLEAR ENERGY INITIATIVES**

In cooperation with DOE, the utility industry, with support from EPRI, initiated the Advanced Light Water Reactor Program in 1983, focused on addressing all the technical obstacles and shortcomings of existing reactor designs. A primary technical objective of the program was to develop designs for future LWRs that were safer, more reliable, easier to operate, and less expensive than existing designs. A vehicle to assure this outcome was the development of the ALWR Utility Requirements Document by senior, experienced utility personnel in the U.S. and overseas that incorporated the lessons learned from decades of worldwide operating experience with LWRs and specifically defined owner-operator needs in light of that experience. In 1990, the nuclear industry issued a “Strategic Plan for Building New Nuclear Power Plants” to guide implementation of the overall program, which was updated annually through the final Strategic Plan in 1998.

This Plan integrated the technical and project-oriented “building blocks” from the DOE-EPRI ALWR program with the institutional and licensing building blocks under the responsibility of NEI. It established an industry-wide commitment to a very high level of standardization of

designs and plant processes for all future plants. Replacing this Strategic Plan in 1999 was NEI's "Strategic Direction for Nuclear Energy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", issued annually. One of the strategic "compass points" in this plan focuses on building the next generation of nuclear power plants.

DOE strategic planning documents have consistently supported maintaining a viable nuclear option. DOE-NE has a long history of supporting advanced reactor development. However, its programs to develop high temperature gas reactors and liquid metal reactors were terminated in 1994 and 1995 with much more work left to do. The ALWR program, jointly funded by DOE and industry, had its DOE funding terminated after 1997. Industry completed the unfinished ALWR work scope in 1998.

Despite funding limitations, these industry and DOE efforts resulted in major improvements in currently operating plant performance, an improved licensing process for new plants, and three advanced reactor designs, certified by the NRC in 1996-1998. These three standardized designs conform to U.S. utility requirements established in the early 1990s, and meet or exceed all U.S. safety regulations. They are simpler, safer and more robust designs, developed expressly to provide increased design margins, improved human factors, improved constructibility and maintainability, and improved economics over current plants.

The economic targets established for ALWRs, benchmarked against pulverized coal generating technology, did not account for the deregulation of electricity generation and for the major advances in the economy and performance of gas-fired combined cycle generation. As a result, even though currently operating nuclear plants are now the low cost producers of electricity across the country, ALWRs are currently only marginally economic. Deregulation has made large capital investment in new generating plants even more difficult.

### **Industry Willingness to Proceed in Partnership with DOE to Build New Plants**

A number of factors are combining today to demand options for new nuclear energy plants in the U.S. These demands are both near-term and long-term in nature. Key factors are:

- Growing concerns over the environmental impacts of fossil fuels, including both clean air issues and greenhouse gas issues, resulting in the need for a rapid expansion of non-emitting generation technologies (i.e., nuclear and renewables).
- Continued growth in energy demand and increasing awareness of the need for highly reliable baseload generation to balance the recent over-emphasis on peaking and intermediate capacity in many parts of the country. Even with an economic downturn in the short term, retirements of older fossil plants will nevertheless create a demand for new nuclear plants.
- Volatile natural gas prices and backlogs in gas turbine plant fabrication and construction.
- The inability to date of renewable energy (the only expandable non-emitting generating technology option other than nuclear) to make significant market penetration, despite significant research and development investment.

Although standardized reactor designs developed in the early 1990s were certified recently by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 10CFR52, they were designed to meet the needs of a regulated electricity market, in which costs had to be “prudent” and competitive with pulverized coal, the primary baseload alternative of the 1980s and 90s. For the deregulated markets of the new millennium, new nuclear plants must offer total life cycle generating costs (including financial risks) that are at least equal to those of any other alternative, including modern natural gas fired units.

The three certified reactor designs offer safety and reliability improvements over current technology, as well as improved life-cycle economic performance. Certified designs also have the advantage of being ready today – offering both construction schedule and regulatory certainty advantages. However, even with their superior production costs (as evidenced by current nuclear plant economic performance) future plants need to be made even more competitive in terms of their total costs (including capital costs) in order to penetrate all segments of today’s deregulated markets. Relatively easy and cost effective steps should be taken to lower busbar costs for these certified designs, while at the same time pursuing additional promising options with near-term potential to achieve lower capital costs, so these designs can compete favorably in all deregulated electricity markets in this decade.

### **DOE Status and Available Resources**

DOE programs and resources for advanced reactor development ramped down from ~\$125M in 1992 to zero in 1998. Due largely to the timely 1997 report by the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) on energy R&D needs, a consensus of energy policy makers emerged that nuclear energy supply R&D needed to be restored. In response to the PCAST report, DOE proposed and Congress funded two new nuclear energy R&D programs: the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI), initiated in FY 1999 to address longer-term issues facing nuclear energy, and the Nuclear Energy Plant Optimization (NEPO) program, initially funded in FY 2000 to focus on performance of currently operating nuclear plants. NEPO has been funded at \$5M for FY2000 and FY2001.

NERI has expanded since inception and was funded at \$35M for FY2001. The NERI encourages innovative scientific and engineering research at universities, national laboratories, and individual companies in such areas as advanced reactor and power conversion cycles, capital costs of future nuclear power plants, low output power and special purpose reactors, safety and proliferation resistance, and the continuing challenges associated with nuclear waste. Starting in FY2001, \$7M of the total NERI funding has been earmarked for international projects. NERI is a useful source of funds to help make progress toward some of the goals of this Roadmap. However, because of its limited funding and specific programmatic nature (proposer-driven innovations), NERI is not amenable to supporting work that must be directed in a timely manner to meet the specific R&D needs of near term deployment (i.e., market-driven needs as identified in this Roadmap).

In October 1998, the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC) was chartered by DOE to advise the agency on nuclear R&D issues. One of the subcommittees under NERAC is the Subcommittee on Long-Term Planning for Nuclear Energy Research. That Subcommittee

developed a “Long-Term Nuclear Technology R&D Plan,” published in June 2000. It covered all aspects of DOE-NE’s charter for R&D, including reactor development, medical isotopes, radiation sources, and space systems. Its section on Nuclear Power addressed R&D needs in:

- Advanced fuel cycles
- Plant operations and controls
- Modeling
- Probabilistic risk assessments
- Human factors
- Organizational performance
- Reactor technology and economics

The Long-Term R&D Plan recommended total annual funding at \$240M in 2005, assuming a ramp-up from now to 2005 to reach that funding level. Of the \$240M, about \$100M was proposed for R&D in the nuclear power categories listed above. To date, some limited action has been taken on these recommendations, primarily via NERI, the Nuclear Engineering Educational Research (NEER) Program, and FY2001 programs discussed below.

The Long-Term R&D Plan recommended R&D objectives and tasks for both Generation III and Generation IV technologies. For Generation IV demonstration projects, this funding extended beyond 2010. Details have been factored into the R&D agenda contained in this Roadmap.

Another NERAC Subcommittee is the Subcommittee on Operating Nuclear Power Plant Research, Coordination, and Planning, with responsibility to advise DOE on the conduct of R&D, including criteria for prioritizing research for operating nuclear power plants, with a focus on NEPO. Although focused primarily on current plants, it does have advisory responsibility for any R&D that could benefit both current plants and near-term ALWR options.

In August 2000, another NERAC Subcommittee was established: the Generation IV Roadmap Subcommittee (GRNS). This Subcommittee’s initial task was to reach consensus on a set of design goals for Generation IV reactors. In parallel, it has oversight over the development of a Generation IV Roadmap, authorized by Congress for FY2001. This effort is underway, and includes both Near Term Deployment and Generation IV planning.

Congress appropriated the following funds in FY2001 for advanced reactor development:

- Generation IV Technology Roadmap: \$4.5M  
(To create a plant to develop and deploy advanced nuclear power plant technology.)
- Small and Modular Reactors: \$1M  
(To provide a study to Congress regarding the viability of small reactors.)
- Commercial GT-MHR: \$1M  
(To chart a path to leverage Pu-burning GT-MHR technology to create competitive commercial plants.)
- ALWR: \$1M  
(To assess ways to make ALWRs more competitive and deployable in the U.S.)

Congress appropriated a total of \$12M in FY2002 for advanced reactor development:

- \$4,000,000 for completion of the Generation IV Technology Roadmap
- \$3,000,000 for advanced reactor development consistent with the longer-term recommendations of the Generation IV Technology Roadmap and to continue research begun in FY2001 on small, modular nuclear reactors.
- \$3,000,000 to share with industry the cost of new NRC licensing processes. (For these funds, Congress encouraged DOE to implement the recommendations of NERAC's NTD Group to support industry applications to the NRC for Early Site Permits, Combined Operating Licenses, and Design Certifications.)
- \$2,000,000 for fuel testing, code verification and validation, and materials testing at national laboratories in support of license applications for new reactor designs.

DOE and industry have a long history of cooperation and joint funding of nuclear energy R&D, as discussed in the industry status below. In October 1999, DOE and EPRI updated their basis for joint R&D planning and cost sharing, via a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation in Light Water Reactor Research Programs. The purpose of that MOU was to establish the guiding principles under which cooperative research programs between EPRI and DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology will be planned and conducted.

### **Industry Status and Available Resources**

Industry funded about 2/3 of the \$1B+ ALWR Program, over the course of its history from 1983 to 1998. These industry funds included about \$165M utility contributions via EPRI, and about \$480M to \$600M reactor vendor contributions (depending on how one counts in-kind contributions from international partners in vendor ALWR programs). This jointly funded program with DOE resulted in three NRC-certified ALWR designs, the General Electric Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR), the Combustion-Engineering (now Westinghouse) System 80+, and the Westinghouse AP600. This last design is a passive-safety mid size plant (~600 MWe); ABWR and System 80+ are large, 1300 MWe evolutionary designs. Both of these evolutionary designs (with minor design changes) have been built overseas in Japan and Korea, respectively. Also, an ABWR is under construction in Taiwan. These construction projects have enabled further engineering details to be completed for these certified designs for potential construction in the U.S.

The U.S. reactor vendors, Westinghouse and General Electric, have continued to develop enhancements to their ALWR Program designs. Westinghouse has completed significant engineering work on an AP1000 design, which incorporates taller fuel assemblies, larger steam generators and turbine-generators and a few other selected components from currently operating designs into the AP600. This power uprate utilizes AP600 design features and safety analysis wherever possible. With an identical plant "footprint," the additional costs for the upgrade are small compared to the overall capital costs, allowing for a major overall capital cost reduction. The U.S. NRC has initiated design review of the AP1000.

General Electric developed a Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (SBWR), a mid-size passive safety design, under the ALWR program. However, this design was not carried to sufficient

completion to obtain a U.S. NRC design certification. GE has continued SBWR development with European partners, with the objective of offering a larger plant and achieving similar cost reductions as are being identified for the AP1000. The resultant design, the ESBWR, incorporates the passive features of the SBWR into a 1380 MWe design that is essentially the same size as the ABWR and utilizes much of the ABWR's layout and balance of plant systems.

Other ALWR projects underway include the European Pressurized water Reactor (EPR) and the SWR-1000, both being developed by Framatome; and the Westinghouse BWR 90+ being developed with European partners, primarily in Finland and Sweden.

Significant progress on two commercial non-ALWR designs was achieved over the last decade, with most funding for this work coming from DOE: the General Electric PRISM reactor (a small, modular liquid metal-cooled reactor), and the General Atomics Gas-Turbine Modular Helium reactor (GT-MHR), a small, modular helium gas-cooled, direct cycle reactor.

During the last two years, U.S. interest has developed in another type of helium-cooled reactor, the Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor being developed by ESKOM, the South African national utility. The PBMR is smaller than the GT-MHR, but allows for on-line refueling and therefore very high projected availability. It is based on pebble-bed reactor technology developed in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. One U.S. utility, Exelon, is investing in this development effort, and market interest is expected to grow.

Since the formal completion of the ALWR Program in 1998, EPRI funding for advanced reactor development has been limited to a small portion of EPRI-wide Strategic Science and Technology (SS&T) funding for longer-term R&D needs. Total advanced reactor development funding at EPRI since 1998 has averaged \$2.5M/year. However, EPRI's senior nuclear utility advisory committee, the Nuclear Power Council, has indicated a desire to expand this effort using funds earmarked for long-term R&D. EPRI funds have been allocated to ALWR enhancements, including improved construction techniques and risk-informed regulation, and to helium reactor scoping studies.

Starting in 2001, the EPRI's Nuclear Power Council will have oversight over a larger strategic R&D budget (~\$3.7M), much of which will be available to advanced reactor development. With the additional resources available, EPRI has committed to cover all the generic expenses of NEI's activities under its Executive Task Force on New Plants, primarily in the areas of Early Site Permit, regulatory framework, and Part 52 licensing issues. These EPRI funds will also be used to support the development and execution of the "Strategic Bridge Plan". In addition, EPRI funds may be available to assist in implementing some of the actions identified by this Roadmap, in cooperation with DOE, likely through cost-sharing arrangements.

However, EPRI's role, as a non-profit organization, is constrained by available resources to focus primarily on generic activities, in support of NEI, utilities and suppliers, where common solutions provide broad benefits. The primary source of private sector funding to accomplish the goals of this roadmap will come from reactor designers, investors, and nuclear generating companies who will purchase new plants. The one-time costs of these investments also need DOE cost-sharing.

**READINESS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TO CONTRIBUTE TO NEW GENERATION****Performance of Today's Plants**

Nuclear energy has proven itself to be a safe, environmentally sound, economically competitive source of electricity for the United States and an indispensable component of our national energy mix. Nuclear energy plants in the U.S. lead the world in most categories of performance, and continue to improve.

In 2000, nuclear plants generated a record 754 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, 25 billion kilowatt-hours more than the previous year and 178 billion kilowatt-hours more than in 1990. Last year's record performance capped the best decade in the industry's history. The average production cost of electricity generated by nuclear power plants during 1999 was the lowest of all fuel sources. For the industry as a whole, nuclear production costs (operations, maintenance, and fuel costs) in 1999 of 1.83 cents per kilowatt-hour were lower than production costs for coal (2.07 cents per kilowatt-hour), natural gas (3.52 cents per kilowatt hour, even prior to natural gas price spikes) or oil (3.18 cents per kilowatt-hour).

The dramatic increase in electricity generation by America's nuclear plants is also one of the most successful energy efficiency programs of the past decade. Output increases are equivalent to adding 22 1000-megawatt power plants to our nation's electricity grid, without the impacts that would have occurred if new facilities had been brought on line to meet these needs. Although the lack of new nuclear construction since the 1980s often is identified as a sign of industry stagnation, in fact, the more efficient operation of existing nuclear electric generating facilities has been an environmentally beneficial alternative for making additional electricity.

The growth in nuclear electricity production is primarily the result of two factors. The first is that nuclear plants are operating more efficiently. Refueling times have decreased and once common unscheduled shutdowns are significantly reduced. The second factor is that many nuclear plants have undergone equipment uprates, allowing them to produce more electricity than was initially planned.

The total cost of producing electricity from current, well-managed nuclear plants is less than 2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh). This cost compares favorably with combined cycle natural gas plants at 3.5 to 4.5 cents per kilowatt-hour (assuming a gas price of \$3 to \$4 per million BTUs). Natural gas prices paid by electricity generators have been volatile in the past year, more than doubling over many months and causing serious regional economic repercussions such as in California. In contrast, nuclear fuel costs have been substantially less volatile.

Plant uprates, improved maintenance, reduced outage times and safety improvements are expected to continue to provide higher operating efficiency and additional electricity output from existing power plants. But these increases are finite, limited to the maximum capacity of each reactor.

**Nuclear Generation Essential to Protecting U.S. Air Quality**

As discussed in the previous Chapter, the benefits to society from emission free and highly reliable nuclear energy are huge. As utilities, investors, and energy planners make decisions on future electricity generation technologies, they will need to consider the environmental impacts of their choices. Nuclear energy protects the environment. As discussed below, the nuclear fuel cycle is well managed, its environmental footprint is very small compared to alternatives, and its total costs are already “internalized,” i.e., included in the cost of nuclear electricity.

**A Safe Waste Management Record**

Nuclear energy facilities, like other electricity sources, have waste streams and byproducts that must be managed safely. The environmental policies and practices at nuclear energy plants are unique in having avoided or prevented significant harmful impacts on the environment since the start of the commercial nuclear industry more than 40 years ago. Effective waste avoidance, minimization and management practices have successfully prevented or mitigated adverse impacts on water, land, habitat, species and air from releases or emissions in the production of nuclear electricity. Throughout the nuclear electricity production process, the small volumes of waste byproducts actually created are treated and released, or carefully contained, packaged and safely stored.

The safe handling and storage of used nuclear fuel is one of the most successful solid waste management programs in the industrial sector. Used fuel rods are stored in contained, steel-lined pools or in robust stainless steel containers at limited-access reactor sites.

As a result of improved process efficiencies, the average volume of waste generated at nuclear energy plants has decreased significantly in the past two decades. The high-level radioactive material in used fuel rods totals less than 20 metric tons per nuclear plant each year.

Although U.S. policy originally envisioned recycling reactor fuel to separate out the waste and reuse the remaining fuel, policy changes and high costs of recycle resulted in a plan to disposition the unseparated fuel in a deep geologic repository, leading to the site characterization project at Yucca Mountain. Research continues to develop improved processes for recycling used fuel—a long-term policy option that could provide strategic fuel reserves that can increase the future contribution of nuclear electricity to sustainable development. Whether or not that research is successful and is supported by a policy consensus, the fact remains that a federal spent fuel management program is necessary. Even if recycling of future spent fuel is implemented, nuclear wastes from today’s plants will still exist and require safe storage.

A presidential decision is scheduled for this year on the suitability of a federal repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The Yucca Mountain program is key to effective spent fuel management since cost-effective operation of nuclear plants calls for a centralized, permanent site to continue the environmentally preferable practice of isolated storage for used fuel. As a world leader in nuclear technology, the United States should also be a world leader in effective, long-term management of used fuel.

**Deregulation and Industry Consolidation**

Deregulation is allowing and accelerating the consolidation of the nuclear power industry that was already occurring and probably would have occurred anyway. Utilities with only one or two nuclear power plants have been realizing that it would be increasingly difficult to remain competitive without the resources and efficiencies of larger operators.

Consolidation in the nuclear industry is bringing many advantages that provide higher levels of safety and reliable performance at lower costs:

- A focused management is applied to plant operations
- Economics of scale through purchasing can be achieved.
- Financial risk can be spread over several plants.
- Talent and expertise in financial, technical and management areas can be pooled.
- Rapid response to a problem at one plant with highly qualified expertise.
- Bringing the best practices from all plants to each plant.

Ultimately, the cost of electricity from nuclear plants must be seen by investors as attractive with respect to return on investment, with reasonably low uncertainties, in order for nuclear to win in a competitive deregulated market investment decision. Nuclear designers and constructors have more work to do in making that case convincingly to likely owner/operators and investors.

Recent activity in the industry suggests some reactor design options that can rise to this challenge in the next year or two.

**Building New Nuclear Plants – Time to Market**

More and more energy policy leaders are coming to the conclusion that nuclear energy must play an increasingly important role in a new National Energy Policy. Although nuclear energy is not ready to assume this role today, the prospects for nuclear assuming this role by the end of this decade are excellent. It will take a few years for nuclear plant orders and construction because of the following constraints:

- Nuclear energy plants take many years to site, license and construct – the average time to market for a design that is already certified is likely to be about 7-8 years. Some new designs discussed in this Roadmap (not yet certified) have the potential to shorten this “time to market,” primarily through shortened construction times.
- No site permits and no regulatory approvals to construct a new plant exist today in the U.S. The processes to do this under new regulations have not been demonstrated.
- Although the economics of currently operating plants are excellent, the economics of new plants are more difficult, because of the relatively high capital costs of nuclear plants.

These obstacles can be overcome in sufficient time for new plants to be in operation by 2010. This Roadmap presents the actions and resources required.

### **Baseload Generation Economics**

Depending on market conditions, project overnight capital cost (including engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) cost, owners cost, and contingencies) need be contained at about 1,500 \$/KWe or less. Overnight capital costs of 1,200 \$/KWe or less should secure broad market acceptance. Today's NRC-certified ALWR designs do not meet this low cost threshold. However, some near term deployment options (both water-cooled and gas-cooled) have the potential to meet this cost target, and should be certified as soon as possible. Further, options to significantly reduce the capital costs of currently certified designs also exist.

The appearance of first proposals to build new baseload coal-fired capacity is significant because it indicates several things. (1) a readiness to build new large plants with higher capital costs like nuclear plants, (2) a recognition that we are beginning to need large new baseload, not just mid-sized and peaking units, and (3) a recognition that we should reduce our reliance on natural gas in the future. Fuel diversity has long been the great strength of the American electric power industry. These realities should be factored in to national nuclear energy strategy (see Chapter II-6).

Like renewable energy, conventional coal-fired power plants and advanced "clean coal" technologies, nuclear power is a capital-intensive technology. Large new nuclear power plants could cost as much as \$2 Billion each, and would thus represent a substantial investment risk for the company or companies that build them. Private companies would only undertake investments of this size if they were convinced that new nuclear power plants, once built, would be competitive with other sources of electricity.

In contrast to gas-fired electricity, a strength of our nation's nuclear energy program is the low cost of producing electricity at nuclear power plants and the stable forward pricing of electricity produced by nuclear power plants. The importance of this forward price stability was evident last year as sharp increases in natural gas prices resulted in significant increases in the price of electricity across the United States. The availability of a long-term, reliable and competitive fuel supply is a critical factor in achieving the excellent economic performance at nuclear power plants.

Carbon taxes to defray the costs of fossil fuel environmental mitigation (e.g., sequestration) would make nuclear energy the cost leader today, but it is not clear that an energy strategy based on such taxes will ever emerge, given their negative impact on the economy. Hence a generally accepted and conservative planning basis for near term deployment of nuclear energy plants by industry is that carbon taxes should not be assumed. Overall, the costs to bring nuclear energy into a competitively attractive market position without imposition of a carbon tax are much lower than the cost to the U.S. economy of imposing such a tax.

Clearly, no solution to our growing demand for new electricity generation is simple and inexpensive. Each option has its advantages and disadvantages. But on balance, nuclear energy's benefits cannot be ignored, and its potential to carry major responsibility for new capacity should be investigated.

### **Commitment to Standardization**

One of the lessons learned from the early years of nuclear energy development in the U.S. was that a lack of standardization among nuclear plants contributed to industry complexity, and imposed barriers to cooperation and efficiency. These impacts either added costs or blocked efforts to reduce costs because most joint initiatives for improvements in design or operation had to be customized to each plant. In 1991, as part of the development of the Nuclear Energy Industry's Strategic Plan to Build New Nuclear Power Plants, a Standardization Policy was developed under the leadership of INPO and EPRI, and endorsed by the chief executives of all U.S. nuclear utilities. That policy called for "life-cycle standardization", starting with the Utility Requirements Document (URD) that specified user design requirements for all reactor designers, followed by standardized engineering and construction for each design, and standardized operational programs, as feasible. This policy would allow for construction of standardized nuclear plant designs at significantly reduced costs, and for common procedures, training, parts, and engineering solutions to emerging issues.

The concept behind the industry's standardization policy was not to restrict future nuclear plants to a single design, since this would eliminate the benefit of competition in the marketplace and ultimately not serve the interests of energy consumers. Rather, the concept was to seek to manage the diversity of design options to the minimum necessary to match variations in market need, and to then achieve a high degree of standardization for each design in use.

### **The Administration's National Energy Policy**

The new National Energy Policy Report, issued in May 2001 by the National Energy Policy Development Group, led by Vice President Cheney, set out a comprehensive long-term strategy that uses leading edge technology to produce an integrated energy, environmental, and economic policy. It calls for improving conservation, modernizing our infrastructure, and increasing our energy supplies. It recognizes the vital role that nuclear energy must play, as the only large-scale energy supply option that does not produce greenhouse gasses or other harmful emissions.

With respect to nuclear energy, the report recommends that "the President support the expansion of nuclear energy in the United States as a major component of our national energy policy." Following are specific components of the recommendation:

- Encourage the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to ensure that safety and environmental protection are high priorities as they prepare to evaluate and expedite applications for licensing new advanced technology nuclear reactors.
- Encourage the NRC to facilitate efforts by utilities to expand nuclear energy generation in the United States by uprating existing nuclear plants safely.
- Encourage the NRC to relicense existing nuclear plants that meet or exceed safety standards.
- Direct the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to assess the potential of nuclear energy to improve air quality.
- Increase resources as necessary for nuclear safety enforcement in light of the potential increase in generation.

- Use the best science to provide a deep geologic repository for nuclear waste.
- Support legislation clarifying that qualified funds set aside by plant owners for eventual decommissioning will not be taxed as part of the transaction.
- Support legislation to extend the Price-Anderson Act.

The Report also includes two recommendations related to long-term goals in the development of advanced fuel cycles. These recommendations support longer-term objectives that are being examined by the Generation IV program.

### **The Nuclear Energy Institute's Vision 2020**

One week after the National Energy Policy was issued to the American public, the Nuclear Energy Institute announced the nuclear energy industry's "Vision 2020": 50,000 megawatts of new nuclear generating capacity added to the U.S. grid by 2020. In addition, the industry vision also includes achieving another 10 percent in efficiency gains and power uprates at today's plants, equivalent to an additional 10,000 megawatts of additional nuclear generating capacity.

This commitment to building new nuclear plants – roughly 50 of them, assuming an average size of 1,000 MWe each – may seem small in the bigger picture of U.S. energy supply needs. The entire 50,000 megawatts, along with the 10,000 megawatts of enhanced capability at today's plants, is predicted to only slightly expand the total percentage of U.S. electricity generation from nuclear from about 20 percent to about 23 percent. However, from industry's perspective, this goal is a major challenge:

- Many segments of U.S. nuclear infrastructure have atrophied during the nuclear construction hiatus of last two decades, especially our nation's fabrication, manufacturing, and skilled human talent pool.
- Although three new advanced plant designs that incorporate significant safety enhancements have been certified by the U.S. NRC and are ready to build, the next steps in the new regulatory process, the Early Site Permit process and the Combined Construction and Operating License, are untested and open to wide interpretation.
- Although the economic performance of the current fleet of nuclear plants has been outstanding in recent years, the economic competitiveness of new nuclear plants, because of their relatively high capital costs, is less clear. In a deregulated electricity marketplace, any new plant must be economically competitive. Some of the nuclear options discussed in this Roadmap may be economically competitive, depending on assumptions made regarding natural gas prices, stability of regulatory processes during construction, and local economic conditions (see Chapter II-4). Importantly, there are things industry and DOE can do to improve the picture.

Additional information on the industry's Vision 2020 can be found in Attachment 3.

### **NEI's Integrated Plan for New Nuclear Plants**

NEI has established an "Executive Task Force on New Nuclear Power Plants," comprised of industry leaders with a strong interest in forging ahead on efforts to enable new plant orders.

The Task Force members include utility executives from owner-operator companies committed to a long-term role for nuclear energy, executives from reactor vendors, architect-engineer firms, and EPRI. NEI and its Executive Task Force are focused on the business conditions and other factors impacting the economics of building new baseload generating plants in a deregulated electricity marketplace, such as tax and regulatory policy and investment strategies. NEI is developing a document to address these issues: an “Integrated Plan for New Nuclear Plants.” The plan includes:

- A number of initiatives to improve the economics of new nuclear power plants;
- Programs to create a stable licensing regime and reduce regulatory uncertainties;
- A series of initiatives to build support for new nuclear power plants among policymakers, the media and local communities around prospective sites for new nuclear power plants.

For an electricity-generating company, new nuclear power capacity – if economical enough to enter the market – represents:

- A reliable source of electricity with low "going-forward" or "dispatch" costs
- A high level of forward price stability and protection against the fuel price volatility that impacts gas-fired power plants (e.g., as a result of fuel supply problems)
- Protection against possible escalation in environmental requirements imposed on fossil-fueled power plants. For companies already operating coal-fired or gas-fired power plants, new nuclear capacity reduces the cost of clean air compliance that might otherwise be imposed on that coal- and gas-fired capacity.

Additional information on NEI’s Integrated Plan for New Plants can be found in Attachment 4.

### **Availability of Suitable Near Term Nuclear Energy Options**

There are a number of excellent design options that could be deployed this decade. These options are examined in detail in Chapter II-5 of this Roadmap. In summary, potential near term options include, but are not limited to:

1. Two Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) designs that have been certified recently by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for referencing in a Combined License (COL) application, which would authorize their construction and operation. (Note that three designs have been certified by NRC, but one [System 80+] was not submitted for consideration to the NTDG.)
2. Two 1000+ MWe passively cooled ALWRs that are power uprates of already certified designs (or from substantially complete passive ALWR designs), but that have not yet been certified.
3. Two modular direct cycle high temperature helium-cooled reactors that are under development.

Probabilistic Risk Assessment studies show that these designs have substantially lower core damage frequencies than existing plants that are already highly safe, and offer many advantages,

in terms of additional reliability, simplicity-of-operation, and safety margin. Key to success of any near term option will be a clear indication of sufficient market interest to actually deploy it.

Plants in the first group of options above are designed for sixty years of operation, and some of them have already been constructed overseas. These plants are available for purchase today, but their competitiveness is significantly affected by very uncertain projections of long-term fossil fuel prices, particularly for natural gas. If natural gas prices returned to those of a year ago and prevailed long into the future, the cost of electricity from new nuclear plants could be higher than from gas-fired plants, making them less competitive. Further reductions in nuclear costs could overcome this fossil fuel price uncertainty. Since the primary cost factor for nuclear energy is its capital cost, substantial attention must be given to identifying cost-effective means to reduce these capital costs and construction schedules, and to improving process efficiencies, e.g., in procurement and construction management. In defining these improvements, it is essential that levels of safety and reliability be maintained, and that existing design certifications remain valid.

Plants in the second group of options above are power uprates of previously certified designs or substantially complete passive ALWR designs that have not yet been certified. These designs are expected to achieve substantially improved economics over the life of the plant (expected reductions on the order of 30 percent for life cycle generating costs), providing very promising cost competitiveness with fossil-fueled plants in the deregulated marketplace.

Plants in the third group of options above are helium-cooled and graphite moderated. They include small modular units in the 100-300 MWe range that differ primarily in their fuel forms and refueling design. They offer the potential for enhanced safety through reliance on TRISO-coated fuel particles that can sustain very high temperatures without damage. These designs are at a less complete stage of development than ALWRs and have a smaller operating experience basis to build on, but have potential to achieve low construction and life-cycle costs, equal to or better than ALWRs. One of these designs, the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) currently enjoys particular market interest from a large U.S. nuclear utility.

### **Nuclear Safety and Public Confidence**

Safety at our nation's nuclear power plants has been achieved and remains at record high levels. There has not been any nuclear plant event that has jeopardized public health and safety due to the release of radiation in the United States. In 2000, the median number of unplanned reactor shutdowns industry wide was zero for the third straight year, and 59 percent of U.S. reactors had no automatic shutdowns. In addition, the number of significant events at U.S. nuclear power plants declined to an average of 0.03 in 2000, compared to 0.44 in 1990. Significant events include a degradation of important safety equipment, a reactor shutdown with complications, or operation of the plant outside technical specifications.

Today's energy shortfalls are increasing public support for building new nuclear power plants, according to public opinion surveys conducted in January and July 2001. The national survey of 1,000 adults found those in favor of "definitely building more nuclear energy plants in the future" increased from 42 percent in October 1999 to 63 percent in July 2001. The increase was

largest in the West, where those in favor increased from 33 percent in October 1999 to 63 percent in July 2001.

Federal and state legislators and local government officials, as well as the national news media, also are re-examining nuclear energy, and many support an increased reliance on nuclear energy. A key reason for increased public support of nuclear energy is the public's growing appreciation of the environmental benefits of nuclear energy.

Surveys over the last decade have consistently shown that national leaders underestimate the level of public support for nuclear energy. National leaders generally support nuclear energy as much as their constituents do, but presume support among their constituents is much lower than it really is.

But perceptions are changing as energy and environmental policy rises in importance. Here are some recent quotes by national leaders regarding the role of nuclear energy:

Vice President Richard Cheney addressed the Nuclear Energy Assembly in May 2001 and said the following: "We think the [National Energy] policy provides a reliable, affordable and environmentally sound policy going forward with respect to our future. Part of that, obviously, we think also ought to involve nuclear energy. It's important that we focus on that in the future, just as we recognize that nuclear power is a very important part of our energy policy today in the United States. One out of five homes in America today runs on electricity generated by nuclear energy; that American electricity is already being provided through the nuclear industry efficiently, safely, and with no discharge of greenhouse gases or emissions, and we want, as a matter of national policy, to encourage continued advancements in this industry, improve safety and efficiency at nuclear plants, safe disposal of nuclear waste, and perhaps even technology that reduces the amount and toxicity of waste going forward."

Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, in a speech before the Economic Club of Chicago in June, said that nuclear energy is "an obvious major alternative" for electricity production in the United States; and "Given the steps that have been taken over the years to make nuclear energy safer and the obvious environmental advantages it has in terms of reducing emissions, the time may have come to consider whether we can overcome the impediments to tapping the potential more fully."

### **BACKGROUND ON REGULATORY PROCESSES**

Part 52 was introduced in the late 1980s since the existing system had become unpredictable and extremely inefficient because of the way the process was structured. The need to wait until construction of the plant was completed before an operating license was granted put the owners at enormous financial risk and offered intervenors broad opportunity to delay or thwart startup of the plant. In addition, the administrative, legal and procedural process was implemented in practice in a manner that focused the process on issues that had minimal public health and safety significance. Part 52 is intended to make the process of licensing a nuclear power plant more predictable, more efficient, and more objective. It focuses the process and attention on issues that are substantive and have public health and safety significance. The Part 52 process is also

intended to get more information to the public at an earlier stage so that the public is better informed.

### **Early Site Permit Applications**

Early Site Permits (ESPs) are the subject of Subpart A of 10CFR Part 52. An ESP issued by the NRC provides approval of a site for one or more nuclear power plants (NPPs), without actually applying for approval to build the NPP yet – which would require filing a separate application for a Construction Permit (CP) or a combined license for construction and operation. Approval of an ESP is advantageous in several ways to prospective NPP construction applicants. It permits planning of construction at the approved site in advance of a decision to construct. For construction on existing nuclear sites, advance approval and “banking” of ESPs allows for the flexibility to build new NPPs at the sites in areas of greatest energy demand. Since power suppliers typically “bank” sites for potential fossil-fueled projects that might be proposed in competitive bids to supply electricity, it is also important that potential nuclear projects have a number of banked sites to compete in such bids to supply power. In the case of an ESP for multiple units, it would allow construction of a later unit or units after undertaking the first. The latter case would be important for plants of standard design, and in particular, for plants of modular design for which 4 to 10 units might comprise the final full output of the multiple plant site. Subpart A identifies and sets forth conditions and requirements for such applications.

There is no experience or precedent for nuclear plant ESPs. In order to enable near term plants, it is necessary to initiate planning and to prepare actual ESP applications for review and approval by the NRC. Carrying the process through to conclusion, including the disposition of potential challenges by intervenors, will show the way to successful and expedited applications in the future. Further, there is a need to review the requirements of Part 52, Subpart A, to ensure they are up-to-date, anticipate applicant circumstances, and reflect other rule changes.

### **Combined Construction and Operating Licenses**

The Combined Construction and Operating License (COL) for nuclear facilities is also provided for in Part 52. It is a concept that evolved from review of past experience and consideration of means for improvement, especially with respect to construction schedule. It allows for timely public access to relevant information, thorough review, and approval to build and operate before construction starts. In contrast, throughout the period of NPP construction in the U. S. in the 1960s-1980s, the Atomic Energy Acts required two applications, first an application for the CP, and, when construction was nearly complete, the application for a plant Operating License (OP). This two-step sequence was not a problem initially. As time and events moved on, however, it became a problem because of procedural and legal challenges requiring excessive time and effort to resolve. Delay of a production plant under construction increases finance charges, and defers revenue. The COL concept addresses this issue, by calling for review and resolution of all issues related to the plant design and intended operation, and a Commission decision on granting a COL, before construction begins. Applicants may reference a pre-approved design and a pre-approved site, thereby limiting the issues remaining to be resolved in the COL, thus offering an opportunity to applicants for a single, conclusive review with the benefit of greater certainty that

the plant will start up on schedule. Of course, it is necessary to carry a project through the process in order to prove the value of the concept in practice.

There were reasons for the two-step process in the early days. Typically site preparation and construction began before completion of design, and the CP accommodated this process. One of the results was that a lot of information became available in the course of final design and construction that had received little or no attention in the review of the CP application. Not infrequently, reviews at the time of consideration of the OL application uncovered safety questions that required time and effort to answer. Frequently, major design changes and construction rework ensued. However, as the design process matured, it became apparent to the industry, the regulators, and Congress that the effect of this old CP/OL process was to postpone consideration of important issues and the making of key decisions too late in the project – decisions that could be dealt with much more effectively at the beginning. Further, from the standpoint of interested members of the public, a new process would allow for much better public participation early on, when it is useful and can be easily incorporated into the design and licensing process. In other words, beginning construction before completion of design created more problems than it solved. It was to everyone's advantage, including the public's, to take this new COL approach.

There is an important factor related to review of design and construction detail late in the project. Intervenors used the opportunity presented to cause further delays by questioning the regulatory review through litigation. These questions rarely surfaced any significant safety issues, but added major delays to the project, which added significantly to final plant construction costs.

The intent of the COL process is to require resolution of important site, design, construction, and operating issues at the beginning of the project, when the application is under consideration by the NRC. Another advantage is that public input and concerns are provided when they can be most effectively addressed – just prior to the granting of an ESP, DC, or COL – not after plant construction is complete when potential remedies are limited or prohibitively expensive. Stakeholders in the development of Part 52, including environmental groups, recognized that this shift in the timing of public interaction and applicant accountability was necessary and appropriate. The process does not allow waiting until the end of the project to raise new questions. In other words, the process is front-end loaded, instead of the reverse – as it was in the early days. There is, of course, a downside as discussed above, i.e., the need for major front-loaded investments, such as in design engineering, public education and interactions. These costs are formidable, but the benefits in terms of stability of the process and assurance that public concerns about safety are resolved prior to construction are preferable by comparison to the unpredictable delays that accompanied nuclear plant projects in the past. This front-end loaded characteristic is very compatible with the concept of standardized designs.

Since the COL process has not been tested, there are a number of related technical and process issues that are not resolved. Referencing a certified design in a COL application leaves some site-specific technical issues to be resolved (e.g., ultimate heat sink design) and a number of process and operational issues not addressed in the DC (e.g., construction inspection requirements, emergency planning requirements, security requirements). These issues need to be identified and resolved in a timely manner, generically, if possible, prior to the first COL

application, or at least during that application. For issues that cannot be resolved generically for all future plants, a generic resolution applicable to a family of plants using a standardized design is highly preferable to applicant-by-applicant treatment.

In addition to concerns about the predictability and timeliness of these processes, other important questions have emerged recently regarding the sequencing of ESP, DC and COL applications and approvals. Part 52 allows for significant flexibility (e.g., the option of applying for a COL without a pre-existing ESP or a pre-existing DC, as long as the necessary information to review the design and the site are provided in the COL application). This option appears to be attractive to applicants who will need some type of prototype demonstration as part of their design approval. Also emerging as important questions are ones that relate to the ability and practical limits to overlapping these processes. For example, it now appears that the COL application for a given site could be submitted shortly after an ESP application is submitted, allowing for concurrent review and near-simultaneous approval by NRC. These options need more analysis.

### **Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)**

ITAAC are required by Part 52 as a key step in assuring that a design that is granted a combined license for construction and operation is actually constructed in accordance with the provisions in the design submittal (Safety Analysis Report) that was reviewed and approved by the NRC, and in accordance with the provisions in the design certification and COL. These ITAAC are verified by testing and analysis during construction but prior to the authorization to load fuel. ITAAC developed for the certified designs were subject to public comment in the design certification proceeding and will be incorporated in any COL that reference the certified design. A constructed plant can load fuel and go into commercial operation following a finding by NRC that all the ITAAC have been satisfactorily completed.

### **Development of a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Regulatory Framework**

Today's reactor regulatory process is based on the same concepts and principles as it was 35 years ago: deterministic design-basis events. As operating experience has increased new insights and information have been transformed into new prescriptive requirements. These new requirements have been layered on top of existing regulations without an overall comparison of the safety benefit against the resources required to implement the requirements.

The current regulations have provided for an adequate level of protection of public health and safety. Yet, operating experience and risk analyses insights have revealed that the process could be significantly enhanced by increasing regulatory focus and attention on some requirements, while other requirements could be significantly reduced or eliminated. The adoption of a complete risk-informed, performance-based approach would significantly enhance the protection of public health and safety through increased licensee and NRC attention and focus on safety significant matters.

In a competitive generating market, plant safety must continue to be of paramount importance. Nearly 30 years after PRAs were first used to evaluate reactor designs and operations, tools and processes are available that would allow the NRC to provide licensees additional flexibility in

the manner in which they can implement the regulations, while at the same time improving the protection of public health and safety. A risk-informed, performance-based process will allow licensees to implement, and NRC staff to oversee, the regulations in a more efficient and effective manner, which will improve safety.

In 2001, the NRC completed its watershed transition to a risk-informed, performance-based oversight process for current plants. To further enhance efficiency and safety focus and ensure continuity between NRC oversight and underlying regulations, efforts are underway to risk-inform administrative, operational and technical regulations and the associated implementing guidance that govern the design and operation of nuclear plants. Progress to date on risk-informing regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 for existing plants has been sporadic, due to several factors:

- Current plants are already designed, built and have established operating programs that are difficult and costly to revise,
- The regulations are interwoven in a fashion that makes targeted changes difficult, and
- Many of the regulations have detailed, prescriptive requirements that do not allow alternative approaches or the consideration of improvements in technology.

In parallel with efforts aimed at current plants, work has begun on new, risk-informed, performance-based regulatory framework for future plants. To avoid the difficulties involved in risk-informing the existing regulations for current plants, an entirely separate regulatory framework is envisioned for future plants. In addition, unlike the existing regulations that are based on “light water reactor” technologies, the new framework will encompass varying reactor designs, reactor technologies, insights from 40+ years of reactor operating experience, and advances in analytical techniques and technologies.

Development of a risk-informed, performance-based regulatory framework is important for licensing, construction, and operation for future plants. Current regulations have been modified so many times that they are extremely complex and contain numerous outdated and extraneous requirements. A risk-informed, performance-based regulatory framework can incorporate decades of experience with licensing, design, construction, and operation of more than 100 plants in the U.S., emphasizing elements that are important to safety, removing requirements that do not affect or improve safety, and incorporating improvements in safety technology and analyses over the same period. The improvements include insights developed with more safety data and with probabilistic risk assessment, improvements in systems and component design and performance, and improved system configurations that have reduced core damage frequencies and produced engineered safety systems that are more reliable. The Design Basis Accident methods of regulatory evaluation that evolved in the early years of the industry, along with the regulations, guides, and directives, do not give full credit to the safety and performance advantages of new technologies. Key principles that should be embodied in a new risk-informed, performance-based regulatory framework include:

- The structure must support the NRC’s mission of “adequate protection of public health and safety” and support the current safety goals.

- The framework must take advantage of the 30+ years of deterministic licensing experience as well as relatively new risk-informed insights, and build on the risk-informed regulatory activities that have been implemented.
- The new structure should focus on safety significant issues, processes, and equipment, and eliminate requirements in current regulations that do not address nuclear safety
- The framework should be flexible enough to accommodate new reactor designs as well as existing design certifications.
- The framework should improve predictability and stability of regulation, and result in a more efficient and effective regulatory review and approval of designs, license applications and regulatory oversight of plant operations consistent with the safety significance of the issue. This will set safety-focused priorities, make more effective use of resources, decrease new plant lead-times, and reduce financial exposure and risks attributable to regulatory uncertainty of the past.
- The framework should incorporate a defense-in-depth concept based on prevention and mitigation consistent with the degree of uncertainty with significant consequences to public health and safety.

It must be noted that new technical regulations should not impact existing Design Certifications or those designs obtaining certifications under the present regulations. This ensures the continued validity of these existing certifications for near term application.

Because a complete new regulatory framework will not be in place before 2005, the initial round of new plant licenses is likely to be based largely on existing regulations. However, to the degree that new risk-informed, performance based regulations are established at the time of a new plant licensing proceeding (e.g., DC, COL), the applicant may wish to take advantage of new regulations to improve the safety focus of an aspect of the design or relevant operational requirements. It is expected to be possible for new plants licensed before the new regulatory framework is fully in place to adopt portions of the framework (e.g., enhanced operational or administrative requirements) once they are established.

A new plant regulatory framework should provide a generic process and a set of regulations that specify safety objectives, but permit flexibility in how the objectives are achieved. This is important as the next generation of power reactors may include a variety of plant designs where the “one size fits all” prescriptive regulatory approach is not appropriate. Setting top tier safety performance objectives is a more efficient approach that avoids having to promulgate a different set of regulations tailored to each class of design.

Finally, within the scope of efforts toward an improved regulatory framework for new plants are a number of opportunities for incremental improvements that do not need to wait for completion of the new framework. Some of these could be applied to already certified designs, especially at the COL stage. These opportunities relate to taking advantage of progress on risk-informing the regulations for current plants using “Option 2” and “Option 3” of SECY-98-300, to the extent applicable to new plants.

Option 2 for risk-informing regulations relates to changes that could be made to “special treatment requirements” without modifying the underlying regulations. The term “special

treatment requirements” refers to the regulations that govern structures, systems and components (SSCs) that are currently categorized as “safety related.” Option 2 proposes to modernize these requirements through an improved categorization of SSCs in terms of their true safety significance, and then establishing specific risk-informed requirements for each new category. The NRC and the industry have made significant progress on this initiative, and agree on which equipment has high safety significance and on how to treat it. They also agree on appropriate treatment of equipment that is non-safety-related.

However, there has been disagreement about how to deal with equipment and systems categorized since the early years of the industry as safety-related, but which have been proven to have low safety significance. The industry believes that commercial industrial standards, not more stringent nuclear safety standards, should be applied to such equipment. Commercial industrial standards are widely used in the nuclear industry, as well as other industries with similar or higher potential impact on public health and safety.

The cost savings for replacement parts at reactors, and for initial construction for new reactors, is substantial. For example, an industrial-grade 10-horsepower electric motor could be purchased for \$350. The same motor, purchased as a safety-related item, would cost 57 times that amount: \$20,000. The two motors perform the same function; but the cost difference is huge.

Similarly, an industrial-grade electrical circuit card could be purchased for \$1,160. The same circuit card, under nuclear standards, would cost \$5,700—five times as much as the industrial-grade item. Either component could perform the function for which it is intended.

The main difference in cost is the extent of the process used to verify the component's performance capability. Commercial industrial standards are entirely satisfactory for many applications with low safety-significance in nuclear power plants. In fact, they already are widely used in nuclear plants, and their use could be expanded substantially. Improved categorization and treatment of SSCs has been shown to be achievable in a manner that does not compromise safety, but allows for significant cost savings.

Option 3 for risk-informing regulations relates to actual changes to the technical regulations. For current plants, an approach is being taken that focuses on selected regulations in greatest need of updating, instead of a top-down rewriting of the entire body of regulations. It is quite possible that some of the selected efforts under Option 3 (e.g., revising large break LOCA requirements, revising concurrent LOCA and Loss of Offsite Power requirements) could be applied to new plants.

## II-3: GENERIC GAP ANALYSIS

This Chapter summarizes the gaps and issues that are generic to most or all NTD designs, and discusses solutions or required outcomes for each. Gaps and issues presented in this Chapter have resulted from both external inputs (from respondents to the NTD Request for Information (RFI) issued in April 2001, and internal deliberations among NTD Group members. All stakeholder inputs were carefully considered. The NTD Group then identified the high priority generic gaps for primary attention by industry and Government. The NTDG also identified some issues that were judged to be longer term in nature, and less critical to near term deployment.

The priority generic gaps focus on regulatory process issues that must be resolved promptly and demonstrated successfully to enable near term deployment of new designs, and on economic competitiveness, “time to market”, cost management, and investor arrangements. The need for an integrated and results-oriented National Nuclear Energy Strategy is also discussed.

For the purposes of this Roadmap, the term “Gap” applies to situations where a problem is judged to be a significant technical, institutional, or economic obstacle to near term deployment – one that needs to be reasonably well resolved in some manner to permit near term deployment of new nuclear energy plants in the U.S. by 2010.

For the purposes of this Roadmap, the term “Issue” applies to a condition or circumstance that is judged to be an important generic factor to the longer-term effectiveness of nuclear power, but not necessarily an obstacle to near term deployment. Issues need to be monitored and managed, and progress should be made on each to allow nuclear energy to reach its full potential. Some issues could eventually become obstacles in the longer term, if adequate progress is not made or conditions worsen. In some cases, issues may have been perceived as gaps by some, while on closer examination these issues are actually being managed effectively today to prevent them from becoming gaps.

This Roadmap does not intend to draw a sharp distinction between “Gaps” and “Issues,” since progress on all of them is important, and since 100 percent resolution is not required in any instance. Rather, this distinction is intended to suggest a qualitative difference in terms of priority, urgency, and resource allocation. As such, Chapter II-6 presents recommendations on the gaps identified below, but does not present recommendations on the Issues.

### **KEY NEAR TERM DEPLOYMENT “GAPS”**

The following five priority generic “Gaps” have been identified to receive primary attention of industry and Government to enable near term deployment.

#### **Gap 1: Nuclear Plant Economic Competitiveness**

The primary disincentive to choose nuclear power for very near-term new U.S. electricity generating plants is that the plant designs certified by NRC in the '96-'99 timeframe, and thereby the ones immediately available, require higher capital investment than do natural-gas-fired plants, which then requires these higher capital costs to be offset by lower fuel, operating, and

maintenance costs. Initially, while the return on and of the capital investment has to be included in the total cost of the electricity generated, these nuclear options would be more expensive than the natural-gas-fired alternative under today's financing arrangements. For the several decades of plant life remaining after the investment has been recovered, the nuclear option would be the much lower-cost option. This near-term/long-term trade-off is not currently marketable.

The life-cycle economic benefits of nuclear energy could become marketable as a result of potential government measures to address the carbon dioxide issue, measures such as a sequestration requirement or a tax on releases (or the converse, a tax credit for not releasing). Another possibility is substantial natural gas cost increases driven by rising demand, possibly aggravated by local delivery difficulties. Neither of these possibilities is likely in the near term, and the nuclear industry cannot and does not assume these outcomes in its planning process.

The responsible R&D approach is to identify this non-competitiveness during the investment recovery period as the prime hurdle the R&D should target to surmount, indeed eliminate. Then the external potentialities identified in the preceding paragraph and/or the long-term economic superiority of the nuclear option would constitute a strong deployment incentive.

This is primarily a "gap" that individual reactor designers must address for their own designs. Differing views exist among industry experts on the most likely way to get over this short-term economic hurdle. One view is that currently certified designs, with evolutionary cost improvements within the constraints of the certification, are the most likely path to near term success, especially if gas prices continue to increase. Another view is that a more innovative approach to defeating economies of scale with smaller plants must be undertaken, because smaller designs are more desirable choices in a deregulated business environment that works against large capital investment. These different views match, to a large degree, variations in deregulation across the country, and the expectation that small plants may fit better in states that have completed deregulation, while larger plants may fit better in states that have only partially implemented deregulation. These differing perspectives reinforce the need for choices – thus the imperative to pursue a dual track strategy that ensures both large and small plant options will be available. They reinforce the importance of this NTD Roadmap encompassing both tracks.

Critical to this market assessment is the overriding issue of "time to market" – a major consideration in new capacity decisions in a deregulated electricity marketplace. Investors simply cannot afford the risk of ordering a plant that will not go on line for 8-10 years, by which time other investors may have added new capacity in that region. Time to market is of course dependent on plant construction times, which are essentially fixed by the technology and have already been the subject of significant optimization through new technology (e.g., modular construction techniques, time dependent 3-D plant modeling (computer-aided design + time dimension = "4-D modeling"). However, from the standpoint of uncertainty, investment risk, and opportunities for significant improvement, the most important dependency in "time to market" is the NRC licensing process.

**Gap 2: Business Challenges of the Deregulated Electricity Marketplace**

Better models for ownership and financing are needed to provide sufficient flexibility and risk sharing among investors and vendors to cover the relatively high construction costs of nuclear plants, despite their relatively low operating and fuel costs. This gap is primarily the responsibility of industry to solve. NEI has the lead for the industry in identifying the opportunities for improved business arrangements to facilitate new orders, and in working with the Administration and Congress to get administrative procedures and laws changed where necessary. Most of the issues that industry is discussing with Government relate to current provisions that unnecessarily increase the uncertainty and business risk associated with investing in a nuclear power plant in a deregulated marketplace. Some of these issues are discussed under “Other Issues” below.

Also important to closing this gap for near term deployment of new nuclear plants are means of informing and “conditioning” the marketplace to be more receptive to the longer term investment benefits of baseloaded nuclear plants. Benefits such as longer operating lives that allow more return on investment (ROI), low and predictable production costs (due primarily to low fuel costs), high reliability and availability, and other advantages typically go undervalued in short-term market investment decisions. Investment risks associated with longer construction times, capital intensiveness, and larger plants can be managed by reducing uncertainty and placing these short-term investment issues in perspective with longer-term investment value.

The industry needs to develop the business plans and models to facilitate the financing arrangements that will be required to build new plants in a deregulated electricity marketplace. This is a responsibility of industry, and NEI is facilitating this process through its development of a “Integrated Plan for New Nuclear Plants.”

A key element of the industry plans to address this issue should be an effort to explore interest and build support for a consortium or consortia of owner/operators, vendors, architect/engineers, equipment suppliers and other investors, to share the risks and rewards of new plant ventures. The benefits of such consortia would be:

- Enhancing the technical and business expertise available through joint review of options and joint development of the generic aspects of an overall industry strategy and specific products of value to all participants (e.g., NEI guideline documents for ESP, COL, generic technology products)
- Leveraging resources, and enabling potential owner operators that are not ready to initiate an actual construction project to share resources with other owner operators who are ready for this step, thereby obtaining access to information that would help them later.

Enabling the formation of smaller and more focused consortia that would support the completion of engineering work and initial construction of specific designs, thereby creating the foundation for a “family of plants” infrastructure for specific designs.

**Gap 3: Efficient Implementation of 10 CFR Part 52**

10 CFR Part 52, created by the NRC in 1989 and affirmed by Congress in 1992 (EPACT), established three new licensing processes for future plants: Early Site Permit (ESP), Design Certification (DC), and Combined License (COL). These were judged as major improvements over the previous Construction Permit/Operating License process used for all existing U.S. plants. One of these processes has been demonstrated successfully: three standardized nuclear plant designs have been approved and “certified” for use in the U.S. However, these three certifications took 6-10 years each to complete, with many unanticipated process issues emerging to stall the process.

This gap has four key dimensions and solution objectives. The first three require essentially complete resolution to achieve near term deployment. The last one is not an obstacle to near term deployment, but deserves significant attention because of the opportunity it presents for major improvements toward more efficient and safety-focused regulation:

1. The DC process must be expedited to help resolve the “time to market” obstacle to nuclear plant orders in a deregulated market. In all instances of a design submittal that is complete and high quality, the DC process should take no more than three years, including the rulemaking phase. Experience gained from the first three DC rulemakings during the 1990s should provide a solid basis for achieving this goal. For DC applications that rely significantly on design information from a previously reviewed and/or certified design, the goal should be to complete the process in less than two years.
2. ESP and COL processes must be demonstrated successfully for new plants to be built. They must be shown to be stable and predictable processes that can be completed efficiently, in no more than 1-2 years each. Achieving this goal is equally important to resolving the “time to market” obstacle discussed above. The ESP process in particular allows companies to obtain pre-approval for numerous potential sites, reducing the time from project decision to commercial operation, should market forces determine the need for additional generating capacity. A strategic focus should be maintained in these application projects, beyond the minimum effort necessary to demonstrate the regulatory process. Industry and DOE should work to obtain multiple ESPs for nuclear projects, especially in areas of the U.S. with substantial projected power needs. With deregulation substantially in place, this means maintaining a sensitivity to market needs and using market incentives to get the right size plants built where the greatest needs are, from both an energy supply perspective and an emissions avoidance perspective.
3. Generic guidance needs to be developed to ensure efficient, safety-focused implementation of key Part 52 processes, including ESP, COL and ITAAC verification.
4. To increase investor confidence in predictable licensing and stable, efficient regulation, progress is needed toward a new regulatory framework for future plants. This effort would go beyond the ongoing efforts to risk-inform 10 CFR Part 50 for current plants, to establish a new regulatory framework that is fully risk-informed and performance-based. This effort promises to enhance the protection of the public health and safety by maximizing the safety focus and efficiency of future plant licensing and regulation. This will be a long term effort, with benefits accruing as various parts of the framework are completed and judged “ready for use” by applicants. Equally important is that progress

toward a new regulatory framework will increase the confidence of prospective applicants in the regulatory environment for new plants and encourage business decisions to proceed with new nuclear projects.

#### **Gap 4: Nuclear Industry Infrastructure**

Adequate industrial and human infrastructure exists today to build and operate a few new nuclear plants. But the ability of the industry to expand this infrastructure quickly enough to achieve the industry's new "Vision 2020" (50,000 MWe in new nuclear plant installed capacity) is not assured today.

In the area of human resources, the industry needs to begin to replace an aging workforce, and expand its employee base in the areas of skilled plant operators, maintenance technicians, engineers, project managers, and construction workers. With license renewal now a high probability for all of today's plants, the industry will need to train replacements in these areas for both currently operating plants and new plants. These new industry employees will be needed at both plant sites and manufacturing and engineering facilities.

The Federal Government will need new employees with nuclear skills as well. The NRC is facing an issue with an aging workforce that is at least as urgent as the industry's. The scientific and technical skills needed to license new nuclear power plants differ from those needed for oversight of today's nuclear plants—which has been the NRC's principal activity for the past 15 years—or in license renewal. To review applications for new licenses, the agency will need geologists, hydrologists, and other scientists. Current NRC staff may not have the appropriate expertise for this new function. To prepare for new nuclear power plant construction and operating license applications, the NRC should examine its staffing and determine how to fill any gaps in its expertise. Similarly, DOE, other federal agencies and national laboratories must ensure that they have the expertise and qualified staff for the development and staffing of future nuclear technologies.

Universities will need new faculty to conduct research and to educate future generations of nuclear professionals. Both DOE and industry support a multi-stakeholder effort to attract and retain top caliber nuclear talent, and have encouraged Congress to continue funding university programs in nuclear technologies, including continued support for their research reactors.

In order to retain and attract the top talent, it is imperative to create and sustain a favorable environment for nuclear energy that sends a clear message that nuclear professionals have expanding opportunities with bright futures. Industry and Government both have a part to play — through support of university programs involving nuclear technologies; through nuclear R&D funding; and through achievement of regulatory reform and investment in license renewal and new nuclear technologies. Each of these actions sends a message to young professionals who are making career decisions.

In the area of industrial infrastructure, the U.S. has lost much of its capacity for fabricating large long-lead nuclear components such as reactor vessels and steam generators, as well as specialized components for nuclear plants that must be manufactured and tested to special safety

criteria. In almost all cases, the necessary capacity exists overseas, and will be used in the early stages of an expansion of nuclear plant construction in the U.S. For cost reasons, much of this infrastructure will have to be reconstituted here in the U.S. Also, for some components, the worldwide capacity may not be adequate to support such an expansion. This appears to be the case with the global industrial capacity for the forging of large nuclear plant components such as the reactor pressure vessel's bottom and top heads.

### **Gap 5: National Nuclear Energy Strategy**

Until recently, the U.S. has not focused on a national energy policy and supporting strategy. The Administration and Congress are now working to develop and implement a strategy based on sound energy and environmental science, and supportive of our national economic objectives and limitations.

This presents an opportunity to establish a consensus for a national commitment to take advantage of nuclear energy's safety and environmental benefits, its low operating and fuel costs, its high reliability, and the U.S. position of technological leadership in advanced and even safer designs. Strategies for nuclear energy should be practical, results-oriented, and capable of implementation in the near term. To balance an urgent need to begin building new plants to meet our growing national need for emission-free electricity, a parallel effort should be undertaken to resolve longer term issues, especially ones related to the nuclear fuel cycle.

In a deregulated electricity marketplace, energy supply options should be able to compete fairly, without legal and financial obstacles (or special treatment provisions) erected for some technologies but not others. The nuclear industry has identified some circumstances where policies, statutory requirements, environmental regulations, R&D investments, and economic incentives regarding safety and environmental impacts may not be equivalent for nuclear energy and competing technologies. Both industry and Government should examine the various government policies, requirements, and funding programs, to correct areas of inequity. Also needing examination are areas of dual regulation, e.g., among NRC, EPA, FEMA, and OSHA.

Financing the development of new nuclear generation technology is difficult, since the wholesale power supply business is being deregulated and generation sources must compete in a highly competitive marketplace that is still evolving. Further, nuclear energy faces an untested licensing process that results in significant cost uncertainties. Virtually all of nuclear energy's environmental costs have been "internalized" by federal regulation (e.g., spent fuel disposal, cost of safety regulation, cost of routine emissions elimination), meaning that such costs are passed on to the electricity consumer in the case of nuclear energy, whereas comparable environmental costs for alternatives are carried by Government or deferred.

Federal R&D investments in the various alternative energy options are about an order of magnitude greater than nuclear energy supply R&D. It is highly appropriate for the Government to consider actions as part of the new National Energy Policy that recognize the need for a balanced investment strategy for new generation options that must compete in this new business environment. Such actions would encourage the deployment of new nuclear technologies – especially those offering improvements in licensability and economics. Although the industry

will carry the primary burden of this investment, incentives should include significantly increased federal investment in R&D and demonstration, and the deferral or defrayal of federally mandated demonstration costs and regulatory review costs associated with new nuclear technologies and untested regulatory processes (e.g., ESP, COL).

### **KEY NEAR TERM DEPLOYMENT “ISSUES”**

Based on the convention above, a number of “issues” have been identified that should receive appropriate attention by industry and/or Government to ensure progress and improved public understanding. These issues are already the subjects of significant attention and ongoing programs by both industry and Government, and thus no specific recommendations are provided in Chapter II-6 to address these issues. The following four key issues have received significant attention in RFI responses and/or the public arena:

- Nuclear Safety
- Spent Fuel Management
- Non-Proliferation
- Public Acceptance of Nuclear Energy

### **Nuclear Safety**

It is important to note that safety is not considered a hurdle to expanded use of nuclear energy. Today’s current plants are very safe and continue to improve. Challenges to safety systems have been reduced by a factor of three and safety significant events by a factor of ten. U.S. plants are ranked among the safest plants in the world by objective measures established by nuclear regulators and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). The certified “Generation III” designs have surpassed all regulatory and utility requirements for enhanced safety. Near Term Deployment options will continue to ensure high safety margins, because the superior reliability and performance standards demanded in the marketplace also ensure superior safety. It is also expected that various Generation IV options, many of which take fundamentally different approaches to achieving safety requirements, will match or exceed the levels of safety achieved by the already certified designs, if they can be deployed successfully.

The close scrutiny of the NRC and stringent licensing requirements requiring proof of safety through testing, analysis, and/or prototype demonstration, will ensure very high safety levels for all plants. Both NRC and industry engage in rigorous processes of identifying and resolving emerging safety issues, and will continue to do so for future plants. For example, the recent attack on the World Trade Center has raised concerns about the adequacy of sabotage protection at nuclear energy plants. Industry, NRC, and other responsible federal and state agencies are addressing this issue. A number of specific short-term actions have been taken, and longer-term options are under consideration. Near term deployment nuclear plants will benefit from this examination and will implement all actions deemed appropriate for existing plants. This and other experience with safety issues demonstrate that public concerns about safety need to be addressed by providing more accurate and timely information to the media regarding nuclear safety and how it is ensured and maintained.

### Spent Fuel Management

In the NTD RFI, it was noted that spent fuel management is considered to be a longer term global fuel cycle issue, and that it is being addressed by the Generation IV Roadmap. The judgment of the NTGD in promulgating the RFI was that adequate response exists today, or adequate progress is being made on this issue to allow near term new plant construction in the U.S.; and that it is not an appropriate issue for near term deployment gap analysis. However, two RFI respondents nevertheless identified the spent fuel management issue as an important generic gap, reflecting a sense among many in the public that nuclear spent fuel management policy should be resolved prior to new plants being built.

The NTGD believes that spent fuel management is part of a larger long term issue of nuclear fuel cycle optimization, and that today's scientifically preferred solutions (centralized above-ground storage and deep geologic repository) may evolve, and other solutions, such as recycling spent fuel, may become preferred options in the future. In every scenario and solution to this issue under discussion, centralized storage is required, whether above or below ground, and whether permanent or retrievable. There is a consensus among experts that centralized aboveground storage and deep geological repository are adequate solutions, if phased and implemented properly. Hence, the continued progress toward satisfactory implementation of these solutions provides a basis for near term deployment, based on the following considerations:

- New plants are designed to use nuclear fuel more efficiently, achieving higher burnups than current plants. Some fuel cycle designs produce significantly less spent fuel volume.
- New plants are designed to safely store all nuclear fuel on-site for the life of the plant.
- Scientific consensus supports deep geological disposal as the best way to isolate spent nuclear fuel. In fact, the National Academy of Sciences concluded in a June 2001 report that "today's growing inventory of high-level waste requires attention by national decision-makers" and that "after four decades of study, geologic disposal remains the only scientifically and technically credible long-term solution."
- The U.S. Government has been studying the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada for permanent underground disposal of high level nuclear waste for over 15 years – an isolated site that scientific experts claim is one of the best geologic sites for the safe storage of nuclear waste on earth. Adequate progress is being made by DOE toward the goal of determining that site could be licensed as a spent fuel repository.
- Studies of Yucca Mountain have now yielded the scientific information necessary for a decision by the Secretary of Energy that there are no technical or scientific issues that will prevent Yucca Mountain from serving as a permanent repository, thereby providing the scientific basis to support a recommendation by Secretary Abraham to President Bush and to Congress to proceed on licensing a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain.
- Options for ultimate safe storage and disposition of spent fuel at a centralized repository are capable of significant expansion to accommodate increased spent fuel volumes, sufficient to support license renewal of current plants and near term deployment of new plants.

However, a major expansion of nuclear generation will inevitably focus much more attention to nuclear fuel supply consumption and spent fuel management – on a global basis. Each nation using nuclear energy will need to develop its own capability to properly manage spent fuel and/or collaborate on regional or global spent fuel management regimes that properly address health, safety, non-proliferation, and material control issues. These long-term issues, because of their international nature, will require many years to resolve, and efforts should begin soon to address them. The DOE’s “Generation IV” program is doing that, by focusing on issues such as sustainability and nuclear fuel cycle optimization. These issues, however, should not have a detrimental effect on the near term deployment of new plants using current technology and regulations.

It is essential to the long-term future of nuclear power in the U.S. to complete the licensing and construction of a national repository for spent nuclear fuel and other government-generated high level wastes. No matter what nuclear technologies and fuel cycles are developed in the future to minimize the production of spent fuel, there will always remain a need for such storage capacity.

Also confirming this conclusion is a recent report by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD: “nuclear waste management is fully consistent with the principles of sustainable development, and this issue should not be considered a barrier to the continued development of nuclear power.”

### **Non-Proliferation**

In the NTD RFI, it was noted that non-proliferation concerns are considered to be longer-term global fuel cycle issues, and are being addressed by the Generation IV Roadmap.

Extraction of weapons-usable material from spent commercial fuel is extremely difficult and more costly than other methods, and is not an issue in the U.S. for either current plants or new plants being considered for near term deployment in the U.S.

As discussed earlier under the spent fuel management issue, major expansion of nuclear generation will inevitably focus much more attention to nuclear fuel supply consumption, spent fuel management, and strict maintenance of the global non-proliferation regime maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Each nation using nuclear energy will need to develop its own capability, adhering to international standards, to properly manage spent fuel and/or collaborate on regional or global spent fuel management regimes that properly address both health and safety issues and material control/proliferation issues. These long-term issues, because of their international nature, will require many years to resolve, and efforts should begin soon to address them. The DOE’s “Generation IV” program is doing that, by focusing on issues such as sustainability and nuclear fuel cycle optimization, as well as entering into international cooperative R&D through which international standards will evolve.

All of the design candidates considered for near term deployment utilize fuel cycles that do not recycle fuel. Therefore, they share the same strong proliferation resistance as existing reactors. As a result, these issues should not have a detrimental effect on the near term deployment of new plants using current technology and regulations.

**Public Acceptance of Nuclear Energy**

Many recent public opinion surveys show positive and growing public support for building new nuclear plants. “A new national survey finds that the dramatic increases in public support for nuclear energy have held at high levels, despite lower public concern about energy shortages. Almost two thirds of U.S. adults continue to support definitely building new nuclear power plants.” [Bisconti, September 2001] Gallup, and other major media surveys are finding similar results. This support is particularly true in regions of the country where energy supply has not kept up with demand (e.g., California), and in regions of the country concerned about the environmental impacts of fossil fuels. However, public opinion surveys also reveal a general lack of understanding of nuclear technology, a rudimentary understanding of how nuclear power plants work and the nature of nuclear fuel; and a lack of appreciation for the clean-air benefits of nuclear power, the safety accomplishments achieved by currently operating plants, and the enhanced safety of new plants. Further, success in obtaining ESPs will require effective communications with the public living in the areas of potential sites.

**OTHER ISSUES**

There are a number of gaps and issues that have been raised by the nuclear industry that industry believes should be addressed by the Federal Government in the near term that have an impact on new nuclear plant deployment. These gaps and issues are primarily legislative or institutional in nature (e.g., amendments to existing laws, tax policies). No DOE-funded tasks have been identified in this Roadmap to support these items because they have not been examined in sufficient detail to offer recommendations, and because some of them are judged to be outside the NTD assigned scope.

NEI and other industry organizations are studying these gaps and issues in light of the need to assure equity in Federal energy laws and policies. The text below comes primarily from Congressional testimony by industry leaders, and does not currently represent a recommendation to either DOE or its advisors for any particular initiative. However, the NTDG believes that all of these matters warrant closer examination by the Administration, Congress, and industry, in order to determine which ones are critical to near term deployment.

**Price-Anderson Act Renewal**

The U.S. public has more than \$9.5 billion of insurance protection if an accident were to occur at a commercial nuclear facility. This entire sum would be paid by the nuclear industry. The framework for this insurance coverage was established in 1957 by the Price-Anderson Act, which expires on August 1, 2002. The act requires each nuclear facility to have that insurance coverage to satisfy its statutory obligations. Neither taxpayers nor the Government pay for this coverage.

Like all the costs of electricity from nuclear power plants, the costs of Price-Anderson are internalized. That means the nuclear industry bears the cost of insurance, unlike the corresponding costs of some major power alternatives.

The Price-Anderson Act requires two levels of financial protection. The primary level provides liability insurance coverage of \$200 million—insurance that is purchased by the utilities. If this amount is not sufficient to cover claims arising from an accident, a secondary level applies. For the second level, electric companies that own nuclear power plants must pay a retroactive premium equal to their proportionate share of the excess loss. That amount is \$10 million per year, up to a maximum of \$88.1 million per reactor. Currently, 106 nuclear reactors participate in the secondary financial protection program—103 operating reactors and three closed reactors that still handle used nuclear fuel.

Industry has recommended that Congress renew the act this year to ensure that Price-Anderson coverage will be available to companies that are considering building new nuclear power plants. Renewal also is important to Energy Department contractors, which are indemnified under the Price-Anderson Act. Nuclear power plants are grandfathered under the act; DOE contractors are not. The continued operation—and, where necessary, the cleanup—of federal sites depends on timely renewal of the Price-Anderson Act's provisions.

### **Changes to Atomic Energy Act**

The industry has proposed several changes to the Atomic Energy Act to facilitate reform of the NRC and its regulatory processes to ensure the effective and efficient regulation of NRC licensees. Other changes are recommended by industry to remove unnecessary impediments that would inhibit the ability of nuclear power plant operators to make the transition from a cost-of-service market to a competitive market. The following actions recommended by industry to Congress for action could have a significant impact on near term deployment:

- Removing the requirement that the NRC conduct antitrust reviews. Other federal agencies conduct such reviews—notably the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Industry believes that an additional review by the NRC is unnecessary.
- Removing the restriction on foreign ownership of commercial nuclear facilities.
- Clarifying that the NRC has the discretion to determine the most appropriate form of hearing to hold in each circumstance and that the agency is not required to hold adjudicatory hearings for licensing proceedings unless it determines that such a proceeding is necessary.
- Clarifying that in the case of a combined construction and operating license for a nuclear power plant, the start of the operating license term is keyed to when operation begins, rather than when the license is initially issued.
- Clarifying that federal law preempts state insurance laws and constitutional provisions that would restrict insurers that satisfy NRC requirements from providing insurance to nuclear facilities.

### **Dual or Conflicting Regulation**

Dual regulation of nuclear standards should be eliminated, particularly by NRC and EPA, who use widely divergent approaches to standards setting with frequently conflicting results. This

situation creates significant uncertainties in projecting costs and schedules. These uncertainties adversely affect a wide range of decisions, including:

- Federal budgeting and site suitability for Yucca Mountain
- Mergers and acquisitions within the electric industry
- Expansion of nuclear energy through license renewal for today's plants and the licensing and building of new plants.

**GENERIC GAP ANALYSES**

The following are specific gap analyses addressing two of the five generic gaps listed above for which specific resource requirements are identified (Efficient Implementation of Part 52, and Economic Competitiveness). For each analysis, a short definition is provided for the gap, followed by a short description of the solution or outcome required. Then, projected resource requirements are identified to close the gap, listing the total resource needs, irrespective of source, estimated on an annual basis, from FY02 to FY10. For most of these gaps, the primary responsibility for addressing the problem lies with industry and the NRC. For the industry, NEI has the leadership role for both NRC interface and strategic policy matters. EPRI has primary responsibility for industry R&D on these generic issues, and works closely with NEI and NRC. Because of the strategic nature of these gaps, most frequently related to the challenges of dealing with complex federal requirements, DOE has an important role to play, via public-private partnerships, to help reduce federal obstacles unique to nuclear.

The resource requirements listed below are rolled up in summary form, along with design-specific resource requirements from Chapter II-5, in Appendix J to this Roadmap.

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**Generic Guidance for the ESP Process**

Gap: Efficient Implementation of 10 CFR Part 52

Solution or outcome required: Develop generic guidance on all aspects of the ESP process, including application format and content, and a standard schedule of Applicant-NRC interactions. ESP generic guidance documents will include an update to the industry’s Site Selection Criteria, and ESP guidance, to be approved by the NRC in advance of ESP filings, for preparation of an ESP Application Submittal.

Resource Requirements to close gap (G-1):

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	<u>TOTAL</u>
Source										
DOE										0
Industry	0.5	1	0.5							2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.5</b>							<b>2</b>

Note: All funding requirements in \$M

Responsibility:

Lead: NEI, working with potential applicants; NRC

Supporting: EPRI. Note that at the current time, industry can probably close this gap without direct financial assistance from DOE. Industry should inform DOE if this assessment changes.

### Early Site Permitting Demonstration

Gap: Efficient Implementation of 10 CFR Part 52

Solution or outcome required: Demonstrate NRC's ESP process for at least two "lead site" applications, and support up to two additional ESP applications (total of four) that demonstrate the ESP process for differing siting scenarios, e.g., existing nuclear sites, a possible "greenfield site," an existing non-nuclear industrial site or a site with an existing nuclear construction permit but no operating nuclear plant.

Resource requirements to close gap (S-1):

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	<u>TOTAL</u>
Source										
DOE	3	7	5							15
Industry	3	7	5							15
<u>TOTAL</u>	6	14	10							30

Note: All funding requirements in \$M.

Note that the resource requirements listed above are difficult to judge at this point, because the full range of siting scenarios that could require a focused demonstration for licensing purposes is not fully appreciated. The NTDG recommends that DOE cost sharing of ESP demonstrations be limited to the total number clearly required to demonstrate the licensing process for the range of likely siting scenarios, thereby establishing "pilots" or "templates" for others to follow. Also, DOE has an interest in encouraging the banking of sites in regions of the country that could experience critical power shortages. For planning purposes, the funding levels above assume joint industry-DOE funding of ESPs for two existing sites, one green field site, and one non-nuclear or prior CP site. This probably represents an upper bound to the total number of sites and total funding required to close this gap.

Responsibility:

Lead: NEI, working with potential applicants; NRC

Supporting: DOE and EPRI.

**Combined License (COL) Demonstration**

Gap: Efficient Implementation of 10 CFR Part 52

Solution or outcome required: Demonstrate NRC's COL process for each NTD design option to be supported in Phases 2 and 3. This demonstration may reference a pre-existing ESP and/or DC, or may encompass one or both. Because of the unique nature of the technical issues involved in the COL application for each design, the COL process must be demonstrated separately for each NTD design that proceeds to deployment. DOE funding would only be required for those NTD designs that actually draw sufficient market interest to proceed with adequate industry resources to complete the COL process, assuming DOE cost share.

Resource Requirements to close gap (S-2):

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	<u>TOTAL</u>
Source										
DOE		5	10	10	5					30
Industry		5	10	10	5					30
<b>TOTAL</b>		10	20	20	10					60

Note: All funding requirements in \$M.

For planning purposes, the assumptions used for these funding requirements are as follows:

- Total cost for a COL application and review for a certified design and approved site: \$10M (assumes major industry and NRC effort (see below) to establish generic guidance to address application form and content, ITAAC verification)
- Total cost for a COL application and review for an un-certified design: \$15M (COL scope only, not including design completion scope to support NRC's design approval. See Chapter II-5 for resource requirements for design completion.)
- For planning purposes, the assumed number of NTD designs that proceed with adequate industry resources to obtain matching DOE support is three certified designs and two uncertified designs.

These estimates could be low for total cost for each COL application, but are likely to represent an upper bound for total number of designs achieving adequate industry funding to proceed.

Responsibility:

Lead: NEI, working with potential applicants; NRC

Supporting: DOE and EPRI.

**Generic Guidance for COL and ITAAC Processes**

Gap: Efficient Implementation of 10 CFR Part 52

Solution or outcome required: Develop generic guidance on COL application form and content and processes for efficient, safety-focused COL review, construction inspection and ITAAC verification.

Resource Requirements to close gap (G-2):

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	<u>TOTAL</u>
Source										
DOE										0
Industry		1	1	1						3
<u>TOTAL</u>		1	1	1						3

Note: All funding requirements in \$M.

Responsibility:

Lead: NEI, working with potential applicants; NRC

Supporting: EPRI. Note that at the current time, industry can probably close this gap without direct financial assistance from DOE. Industry should inform DOE if this assessment changes.

**Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework for New Plants**

Gap: Efficient Implementation of 10 CFR Part 52

Solution or outcome recommended: Develop risk-informed performance-based regulatory framework for future plants, to include both design and operational requirements applicable to all future plants.

Resource Requirements to close gap (G-3):

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	<u>TOTAL</u>
Source										
DOE			2	2						4
Industry	0.5	1	1	1	.5					4
<u>TOTAL</u>	0.5	1	3	3	.5					8

Note: All funding requirements in \$M.

Responsibility:

Lead: NEI, working with potential applicants; NRC

Supporting: EPRI (initially); DOE (in FY04 and FY05). Note that at the current time, industry can probably complete all initial actions to close this gap without direct financial assistance from DOE. Cost-shared DOE assistance is envisioned to support detailed implementation (development of design-specific technical guidelines, as well as operational, programmatic and administrative guidelines). Industry should inform DOE if this assessment changes.

**Advanced Information Management; Virtual Construction Technologies**

Gap: Economic Competitiveness

Solution or outcome required: Develop advanced information management systems using open-architecture information technology, that can manage plant design, procurement, and operating data, and as-built conditions. Adapt advanced fabrication, modularization and construction technologies including time-sequenced virtual construction, to new plants. Integrate these information systems and apply them to future nuclear power plant construction and operation.

This solution develops the tools that will be used to reduce plant costs and time to market, described in more detail in the next task/solution.

Resource requirements to close gap (G-4):

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	<u>TOTAL</u>
Source										
DOE		1	2	2	1					6
Industry		1	2	2	1					6
<b>TOTAL</b>		2	4	4	2					12

Note: All funding requirements in \$M

Responsibility: DOE and EPRI, working with applicants

**Advanced Technologies to Reduce Design, Fabrication and Construction Time and Cost**

Gap: Nuclear Plant Economic Competitiveness

Solution or outcome required: Although the primary responsibility for making sure new designs are economic resides with the individual reactor designer, there are a number of generic technologies that can be developed to assist designers achieve the goal, and to facilitate greater standardization in the industry. This solution would build on the advanced information management system and 4D plant model developed above and apply it to plans, programs and technologies that reduce plant cost by reducing the time required to design and construct the plant, including long lead component fabrication and component manufacture.

Adapt advanced modularization and construction technologies to establish applicability to future nuclear power plant construction. Comprehensive electronic modeling of the plant to be constructed, automation of information gathering and management, and automation of repetitive deductive conclusion-deriving functions are the essence of several advanced construction technology candidates currently emerging.

Develop standardized advanced man-machine interface systems for plant safety and control, including advanced sensors, programmable controllers, fiber optics, self-diagnostics, and human performance technologies.

Develop an integrated configuration control system for managing nuclear power plant programs that integrates with the design basis of the plant to provide continuity through the life cycle of a nuclear power plant. This system would implement collaborative engineering architectures, hand-off design information in a manner that preserves the integrity of design basis information, and thereby improve the confidence in expedited construction. The benefit of an integrated configuration control system is significant reductions to construction and operating costs as well as increased safety.

Systematically evaluate other opportunities (in addition to those above) to reduce plant construction time. Evaluate technologies, techniques, and human resource opportunities.

Resource requirements to close gap (G-5):

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	<u>TOTAL</u>
Source										
DOE		4	4	4	2					14
Industry	2	4	4	4	2					16
<u>TOTAL</u>	2	8	8	8	4					30

Note: All funding requirements in \$M

Responsibility: DOE and EPRI, working with applicants

NOTE: The generic gaps associated with effective ownership and financing options for use in a deregulated marketplace, and industry infrastructure are viewed as industry responsibilities to address. NEI is responsible for these gaps and is working with utilities and suppliers to develop solutions.

## II-4: NTDG ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

### OVERVIEW: THE NEW ELECTRICITY MARKETPLACE

This chapter addresses the competitiveness of new nuclear power plants in the future deregulated electricity markets in the U.S. Under deregulation the basic definition of competitiveness has changed. New nuclear plant owners and developers have to consider not only economic superiority over other power generating technologies, but also meet the following deregulated market requirements:

- The ability to obtain over the mid- to the long-term market clearing prices that will cover not only the annual going forward (running) costs of the nuclear plant, but provide additional margin to return the initial investment and an adequate return on that investment.
- A short time to market, required both to respond to near-term market opportunities (high prices due to temporary supply shortage), and to reduce the risks and costs associated with long construction lead-times.
- Flexibility to adjust to the locational (nodal) nature of market prices and to the locational need for new plant projects. At each node the balance of local supply and local demand, as well as the availability of the electric transmission network to transmit power in or out of the region, will determine the nodal market prices and the need and timing for new capacity.
- Flexibility to adjust to time variations in market prices caused by the perception of availability of scarcity risks of fossil fuels to the marginal (price-setting) plants.
- The ability to satisfy the economics of the new plant as a cost and a profit center. New plants cannot depend on a parent utility to cover periods of financial shortfalls that may occur. Thus there exists a more pronounced need for a detailed risk analysis and for devising risk mitigation strategies before committing to a new plant project.
- The ability to meet the competition for new plant projects that is not just horizontal (between different types of power plants) but rather vertical (each plant competing individually against market prices). A utility or power developer will not only evaluate different generation options against each other to choose the least cost option, but will initially evaluate whether the projected regional and nodal forward market prices will provide adequate revenues to cover the full generation costs of each prospective plant.

Given the above market characteristics, how will new nuclear plants compete in the new deregulated markets? Nuclear plants have some advantageous and some negative attributes related to their role under the new market conditions.

- The capital investments in new nuclear plants are higher than required for most competing fossil-fired plants. This makes it more difficult to obtain the full funding package, under optimal financing terms, required for plant construction and startup.
- The construction lead-times for new nuclear plants are longer than the lead-times for fossil-fired plants. Nuclear plant lead-times in the U.S. are uncertain, in part since no new nuclear project has been initiated and completed in the U.S. for more than a decade. This uncertainty represents a risk to the potential investors who may require a premium

on the return they seek from their investments in prospective nuclear projects. The long lead-time implies that the economic conditions that justified project commitment may not be there when the plant reaches commercial operation.

- Nuclear power plants have very low marginal production costs and are called upon first to generate, thus assuring a constant revenue stream and generally large margins (between market prices and variable production costs) that are available to repay their initial investments.
- Nuclear production costs are very stable and are not subject to significant escalation pressures. Nuclear fuel costs are a small component of the production cost and are not influenced by market scarcity perceptions like fossil fuels. Thus nuclear production costs exhibit low time-dependent volatility, and are especially suitable for long-term stable bilateral contracts, which will be used increasingly in future electricity transactions.
- New nuclear plant vendors and prospective owners have embarked on programs aimed at controlling the investment costs in new plant projects, reducing construction lead-times to periods comparable with some fossil power plants, reducing the production costs below the best values achieved in currently operating nuclear plants, and assuring high annual capacity factors. These programs will improve the profitability and the attractiveness of future nuclear plants and will reduce the risks associated with committing to new plants.
- Under deregulation the assurance of safe operation has become a matter of first order economic necessity, rather than being an externally mandated regulatory requirement. The cost of regulatory-imposed reviews, shutdowns, and performance improvement programs in case of a safety breakdown has become prohibitive, to the point that safe operation, and strict compliance with regulations, are essential to guaranteeing a revenue stream and preventing corporate bankruptcy.
- The environmental liabilities (externalities) of nuclear power plants are relatively small portions of the production cost or total generation cost, and have been mostly internalized in their cost structure. The environmental liabilities of fossil-fired plants have only partially been internalized, resulting in uncertainty as to future emissions control and mitigation requirements and costs, and incremental risks related to uncertain total production and generation costs.

The decision to commit to a nuclear plant rather than a fossil plant will depend on the balance between the higher near-term economic risks associated with a nuclear plant, as compared with the higher lifetime economic risks associated with obtaining and burning fossil fuels. Nuclear plants represent greater front-end costs and risks, but are very attractive from a long-term operation perspective. Fossil-fired plants represent lower front-end risks but higher lifetime operating risks and reduced economic attractiveness over time. Short-term investors interested in relatively low risk projects of short duration may favor investing in fossil-fired plant projects. Longer-term investors, willing to absorb higher front-end risks for the sake of higher profit margins over longer periods later in the plant life, may consider nuclear plant projects, if the near-term disincentives can reasonably be mitigated.

## *DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY SUPPLY – THE NEW MARKETPLACE*

The deregulation of the electric utility industry has brought significant changes to the way the new markets work, as compared with the regulated markets. The following discussion reviews how the newly deregulated markets work, and how prospective new owners make their plant commitment decisions.

### **The New Market Structure**

The basic changes in the operation of the deregulated as compared with the previously regulated markets derive from three basic factors:

- The deregulated utilities are not limited to a fixed and contiguous service territory and are not operating under the obligation to serve their native load.
- The Equal Access provision of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Orders 888 & 889 which have deregulated the electric transmission industry, require open access (for a fee) to the interconnected bulk transmission network to any generator serving any load.
- The regulated markets allowed a balance between investments in capital-intensive base load plants and in low front-end cost peaking plants, through a stable rate of return regulation. The deregulated markets are geared more to short-term low capital cost generation options, to compensate for price volatilities and mitigate investment risks.

The major impact of these trends has been the localization or the “nodalization” of the market and of the market clearing prices obtained at each node. Locational market clearing prices are determined by the balance between the electricity supply bids and the demand bids submitted within each location or node. These unconstrained market prices, however, are modified by the availability of low cost power that could be transmitted from outside the region. Market prices are increased if transmission constraints prevent the wheeling in of low cost power, or are decreased if abundant low cost power generated outside the region can be wheeled in, assuming transmission line availability, rather than relying on local higher cost generation. A specific node may be considered attractive if it is connected by adequate transmission capacity to an adjacent node (or region) where electricity supply is constrained and high market prices are available. A new plant can then dedicate a part of its output to supply its native load demand, and export the rest of its output to the adjacent region with high prices. The balance between generation for local demand and for exports will constantly vary, and will depend on the relative values of market prices in each node and the availability (and cost) of the interconnecting transmission capacity. From a new plant owner’s perspective, the prices that count are the locational (constrained) market clearing prices, which take into account power transmission constraints and costs.

The market under deregulation is thus more complex than in regulated times. In order to understand the behavior of market prices, it is important to consider not just the generation nodes and the demand centers but also the transmission links connecting intra- and inter-regional supply and demand nodes. There is not much point in generating power without being able to ship it to market. It is quite possible that a plant will serve different demand nodes in different

seasons of the year. Securing transmission rights on the regional network, leading to the different demand centers likely to be served, is a major consideration in choosing a new plant location. It may be that the owner may have to buy transmission rights on a line leading to a demand center during the months when demand is increasing, power prices are rising, and other suppliers may wish to capture that market.

The regulated markets operated as integrated markets at the power pool level. Participants in those markets were the local utilities with the obligation to serve the load within their service territories, and a wide assortment of local distribution companies, that purchased energy on the wholesale market for their customers. Utility generation costs were determined by the state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs), based on rate of return evaluation for each approved capital investment project. Fuel and Operating and Maintenance (O&M) expenses were directly passed through to the ratepayers, or reviewed through a Performance Based Regulatory (PBR) approach. The integrated utility, which also owned the transmission and distribution (T&D) regulated services, attached T&D charges covering its approved expenses in these areas to the generation costs, and these, with various other approved charges such as General and Administrative (G&A) public service research and development, conservation measures, and Qualified Facilities contract payments, formed the basis of the electric retail rates charged to the consumers.

In the deregulated world, the services performed previously by the regulated utilities have been disaggregated. The distribution network and customers billing services have remained with the utilities. The transmission system has been restructured but not deregulated. The transmission grids, though still under the ownership of the utilities, are operationally controlled by an Integrated System Operator (ISO) organization that functions at the state level, like the California ISO or the New York ISO, or as a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO), like the ISO New England, the PJM Interconnection, or the Midwest ISO. The various ISOs and RTOs are regulated by the FERC in Washington DC, and not by their State regulatory agencies. In its Order No. 2000 of December 1999, the FERC has mandated the formation of several large RTOs that will cover the entire U.S. transmission network. The Open Access requirement allows non-discriminatory access into the transmission grid, and all users must pay an equal and non-preferential charge, as determined by the ISO/RTO, for shipping power through the grid.

The regulated utilities have been freed from their obligation to serve, and have lost the monopoly position they have held within their service territory. The utilities' obligation to serve its ratepayers has metamorphosed into the State obligation to oversee the adequate supply of energy services to all its taxpayers - the citizens of that State. The State exercises this authority through its Energy Commission or its PUC, by monitoring supplies available from non-regulated generators both from within and from outside the State, by regulating the remaining commitments of the regulated utilities, and, in the last resort, by direct intervention in the markets. An example of such patterns has occurred in California during winter 2000/2001. During that energy shortage episode the State forbade the export of electric energy out of California during Emergency Notice periods, attempted to regulate availability factors and outage plans of all plants in California, and have used the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) as the State agent to purchase large amounts of long-term power supply contracts (at fixed prices), using the State General Fund as the revenue source.

The major change brought about by deregulation has been the restructuring of the generation system. New power plants can now be constructed by the utility companies, by Independent Power Producers (IPPs) seeking to sell their plant output through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), and by private developers willing to operate their plants as merchant plants relying on the short-term or spot energy markets to sell their output. A large number of new plant owners now exist, some owning a single or a part of a plant, others representing a large domestic diversified IPP such as Calpine, or a large domestic as well as international power developer/producer such as AES. Both Calpine and AES represent a new type of private generating company with power plant assets spread over the entire country as well as abroad, and with total installed capacity (at 50,000 MWe or greater) larger than the largest formerly regulated utility in the U.S. The assorted older and new generators compete to sell their plants' output in the various energy markets developed in the deregulated world.

### **The Energy Markets – How They Work**

Several types of electric markets now exist. The most stable market arrangements are the long-term bilateral contracts between power producers and large-sized end users. Such contracts specify the amount of energy delivered over each time period and the price for each block of power sold. Price escalation indices may be included in the PPAs, to account for unexpected rise in the seller's fuel cost or total generation costs. Following the instability in the California energy market of fall 2000 and winter 2000/2001, bilateral contracts are recognized as the preferable type of transaction between power generators and consumers. The role of bilateral contracts at stable prices in the future supply mix will likely increase. Nuclear power plants are especially well suited for such bilateral contracts due to their stable, and low-volatility production costs and total generation costs. Shorter term but also stable markets are the Block Forward Markets, in which power is sold in the forward markets for a fixed time period (a month) at a fixed price. Power consumers may solicit forward power contracts for a specified energy block at a given price range (not to exceed). Various power producers may offer a portion or all their available capacity for future delivery at a price range (no less than). The market maker matches requests and offers, and ensures that the physical delivery and the financial commitments of both parties are met. These types of energy markets are desirable due to their stable supply arrangements and low volatility prices. These market arrangements gained only limited acceptance in the U.S. due to imperfect market design problems, but have gained greater prominence after the energy supply problems of winter 2000-2001.

The more typical energy markets that came into being after the onset of deregulation are the single auction Day Ahead (DA) and Hour Ahead (HA) markets. In the single auction markets, for each time period, energy users submit bids for the capacity they wish to obtain at prices not to exceed, and the power producers submit bids for the amounts of power they are willing to generate at prices not less than. The market maker matches the supply and demand bids and determines the price that clears that market. This price is defined as the Market Clearing Price (MCP) and is the single price that all end-users pay all generators for power delivered during that time period. In the DA market, 24 hourly bids are submitted in one package for all hours of the next day and single price auctions are simultaneously held for each hour, resulting, when the process is completed, in twenty-four hourly MCPs for the next day. In the HA market, separate hourly auctions, for a small number of hours, are held about six hours prior to delivery. Market

authorities try to channel a large portion of the demand into bilateral or block forward contracts. Most of the un-contracted demand is then met through the DA market and a small portion is provided through the HA market.

A special feature of the deregulated markets is the further modification of the single auction MCPs due to localized transmission network problems. In specific sub-regions within an ISO control area, which depend on power transmitted from other parts of the ISO, a supply-demand imbalance may occur, if due to line outages the grid cannot transmit in the power required to meet the localized demand. In that situation local higher cost plants might be called upon to generate to serve the local demand, while in other parts of the ISO territory, other plants, which normally would transmit power into the specific sub-region, will have to ramp down their capacity. The result is that localized MCPs in the affected sub-region may increase above the average single auction 'unconstrained' MCP, whereas in other parts of the ISO local MCPs may decline below the average MCP. Thus the transmission network can dynamically interact with the generation system to create regional or local MCPs, over some periods, which might vary from the unconstrained value. In the regulated world, the local utility, through its own reserve margin capacity, could resolve this problem. In the deregulated world, the coupling of the transmission and generation network is unique in its impact on local 'constrained' MCPs, and is the reason for the greater emphasis on transmission considerations in evaluating the prospects of investing in and constructing a new power plant. Under deregulation there is no obligation to provide reserve capacity, and such capacity is purchased as a separate service through a different auction process discussed below.

Due to the single auction price determination mechanism, those power producers with low production costs are likely to obtain, at least during peak demand hours, a large margin between the MCP received from the market and their own production costs. The accumulated price-cost margins provide the basis for the recovery of the fixed costs of the project, i.e., for the return of the initial investment an adequate return on that investment. Nuclear power plants, having inherently low production costs will accumulate the largest margins. The issue is whether the accumulated margins are large enough to provide returns of and on the initial investment, which is larger in a nuclear power project, as compared with a fossil-fired plant.

Both the DA and the HA markets represent forward energy markets. Other energy markets, which are essential for the proper matching of supply and demand, are the real-time energy markets. These markets have been developed to counter unexpected imbalances between the projected demand and available supplies. Such imbalances can occur due to unexpected or un-forecasted changes in the weather (a heat wave, a snow storm), due to forced outages in one or several generating plants that reduce the available supply, or due to transmission line outages, which constrain the inflow of required generation from outside the region. The real-time markets are cleared through the use of special pre-submitted 'adjustment' bids, through issuing generation orders to specially designated Regulation-Must-Run (RMR) plants, or through activating bids submitted in the various ancillary services (AS) markets.

Ancillary services represent the reserve energy markets, which in the regulated world were provided by the local utilities as a part of their overall obligation to serve the demand within their service territories at given reliability levels. With the removal of the obligation to serve, the

local utilities were also released from having to provide reserve capacity for unexpected supply-demand imbalances. Providing reserve capacity is now the responsibility of the ISO, and is managed through the operation of the AS markets. Several such markets exist, each one for the provision of a specific reliability service. The highest quality service is the Regulation service, in which the participating plants operate under automated generation control (AGC) exercised by the regional ISO. The ISO operators from their centralized control room can issue electronic instructions to specific plants to ramp their capacity up or down, as required to meet local demand fluctuations. The regulation reserve service is further subdivided into ‘regulation up’ and ‘regulation down’ services. Only plants with very fast response time and ramp rates e.g., gas turbines or combined cycle plants qualify for this most valuable service.

Other ancillary services include the spinning reserve and the non-spinning reserve services, in which the plants are synchronized to the grid and can be called upon to generate within minutes of being notified. Nuclear plants qualify for these types of ancillary services and may dedicate a portion of their capacity to participate in these markets. A longer duration (thus less valuable) reliability service is the reserve service, in which a plant may be called upon to generate within an hour. This AS is reserved to older existing fossil units, which are maintained for peaking or reserve services by local utilities. Other reliability services include the provision of voltage control and black-start capability, both required to maintain the operation of the transmission network. The provision of ancillary services or the designation as a RMR unit qualifies the plant to receive capacity charges for every hour the plant is designated for that service, in addition to receiving market prices for every hour the plant is called upon to generate. The combined income from capacity charges and energy prices will improve the plant's margins and its prospects for capital recovery. Thus, participation in the AS markets, even for a portion of the plant output, may represent a good business opportunity in the deregulated markets.

### **Economic Considerations in New Plant Projects**

Developers and investors in a specific power technology now consider the locational forward market clearing prices at several proposed plant sites, and analyze the adequacy of the price-cost margins likely to be obtained at those sites for capital recovery, as well as the adequacy of the transmission system for wheeling their output to high price demand centers. These are the real important considerations facing future nuclear plant owners.

Under deregulation, the new plant's only sources of revenues are its PPA, other merchant-type sales on the wholesale (spot) market, or sales of various ancillary services. The projection of these revenue streams is the first basic step in deciding on the advisability of building a new power plant, and what type of plant to construct. Such a projection will depend on analyzing the time-dependent energy supply and demand situations around the specific potential locations of the proposed power plant, and choosing the location, or node, where the highest sales revenue stream in relation to the local fuel prices and production costs can be identified. This differential between the nodal energy prices and fuel (production) costs, particularly in gas-fired generation, is termed the “spark-spread”, and it represents one of the major decision-making criteria in choosing and locating a new power plant. A developer will seek to locate a new plant in regions with high price volatility and limited in-bound transmission capacity, conditions which should exist for several years and which should guarantee him large margins, though at higher risks.

Regions with many plants operating under long-term PPAs, and with adequate transmission interconnections, will exhibit relatively lower, stable, and less volatile energy prices. Such situations are beneficial to the regional ratepayers, though not necessarily to a new plant developer.

From a private sector developer's perspective, particularly in a new power plant project, there exist several mechanisms to control the risks inherent in the project:

- The developer may seek a plant with a low capital investment requirement and with a short construction lead-time. The recent trends in building gas-fired combustion turbines, micro-turbines, and wind power generators all testify to the investors' desires to limit their exposure both with respect to total investment at risk, and regarding the time-at-risk, until a revenue stream is obtained.
- The developer may seek to reduce the equity portion of the total plant investment, increase the debt portion of the total up-front cost, and secure a high return on his investment, possibly including a risk premium, so as to compensate for the amount, and time of equity at risk.
- The developer may seek non-recourse (or, at worst, limited recourse) loan financing, in order to insulate his other projects from the project specific cost overruns or other non-performance events. In this type of loan arrangement the lenders have no recourse to other assets of the developer, outside of the project itself, in order to recover their loans.
- The most essential requirement for non- or limited recourse financing is a well-structured PPA, which specifies the amounts of power to be provided by the plant over the contract's period, and the obligation of the purchaser to take that power at the pre-determined contract price (a must-take contract). The sanctity of the PPA is the sole guarantee the developer has that his plant will produce a revenue stream from which to recover his own investment. A merchant plant developer not relying on PPAs will incur even greater risks on his investment, and will require stronger risk mitigation measures of the types mentioned above.
- The PPA can specify power prices equal to the projected locational MCPs at the plant site, or prices that are higher than market prices based on complex indexing formulae. The developer will evaluate the terms and conditions of the PPA, and his own expected production cost structure, in order to determine whether adequate margins will be generated from the future revenue stream, so as to allow the return of and on his investment.

### **NUCLEAR PLANT REALITIES**

The new nuclear plants now being proposed for near-term deployment in the U.S. have specific characteristics that distinguish them from other base load power technologies available in the market. Some of those characteristics are advantageous for nuclear plant deployment, while others may represent risks that are acceptable to a limited number of utilities or developers. In general, nuclear plants, particularly in the U.S. where no new nuclear projects were initiated for several decades, may represent commitment and construction risks. On the other hand, when in operation, nuclear plants offer significant economic benefits. The decision to deploy a new

nuclear plant will depend on the balance between the perceived short-term risks and the expected longer-term benefits. These issues are not just owner-specific but also depend on unique time-dependent local conditions, and on the way the project deal is finally structured among all the participants. The issues of nuclear-fossil competition, and competition against market prices were reviewed above. The specific issues related to the nuclear commitment decisions are addressed next, both qualitatively and with reference to representative numerical values.

### **Large Plant Size**

Most new nuclear plants or coal-fired plants are designed for unit sizes of 1,000 MWe or larger. Gas-fired plant alternatives are now commercially offered at smaller unit sizes. The largest nuclear plant available for near-term deployment in the U.S. is 1,350 MWe, while a European vendor offers new plants for deployment in Europe in the capacity range of 1,550 –1,750 MWe. The larger size is required to obtain economy of scale benefits and to reduce the capital costs expressed in \$/kWe units. Coal-fired plants are offered at unit sizes varying from 500 MWe to 1,300 MWe. Gas-fired combined cycle plants, which are the most widely used fossil generation technology now offered, are designed for a capacity range of 500-600 MWe. Gas-fired combustion turbines, used mostly for peaking applications, are offered in various equipment packages ranging in capacity from 100 MWe to 300 MWe.

The larger-sized nuclear plants, or coal-fired plants, while providing improved per kWe cost, have the drawback of exceeding demand growth in smaller-sized networks, or in slow load growth rate demand nodes. Large plants better fit fast expanding large-sized generation networks. In low growth markets, several years worth of demand growth are required before the need for large capacity addition materializes. In deregulated markets the addition of a large, low production cost, base load plant could significantly alter the marginal peaking plant that determines the locational or regional MCP. Thus the addition of a large nuclear or coal-fired plant may lower the MCPs and margins for all other plants participating in the regional single price auction market. These observations may change with the formation of the large RTOs mandated by FERC. These RTOs will represent very large electric systems and will require large capacity additions due to their size, even under low growth rate conditions. The impact of the large RTOs on locational MCPs is not yet clear. The formation of the RTOs will enhance the prospects for large base load plants that will likely operate under long-term PPAs. Both these trends will favor the commitments to large sized coal-fired or nuclear power plants.

Nuclear plant designers face the trade-off of increasing their plant size to obtain economy of scale benefits, or containing the growth of their plant capacity so as not to be locked out of smaller or slow growing markets. One way of finessing this dilemma is the development of modular nuclear plants based on the High Temperature Gas Reactor Technology (HTGR). The HTGR technology is amenable to smaller-sized modules of 110-285 MWe, which can be constructed, according to their developers, at unit costs similar to the unit costs of large Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRs). A large sized nuclear power station can be established from several small-sized modules constructed side by side, each operating as an independent plant. The smaller-sized modules may better match local load growth, and can be committed consecutively as the demand increases. Another benefit of the modular construction approach is the smaller total investment required for each module (compared with a large plant)

that makes obtaining financing easier and reduces return on investment requirements. An additional benefit is that the early modules can start generating power and provide an early, though partial, revenue stream, even before the final and full station capacity is installed. While these expected benefits have been studied for decades, there exists little experience in the large-scale commercialization of the HTGR technology, and in achieving significant modularization benefits related to small-sized nuclear plants. Such benefits could be realized only when a significant number of modules have been constructed. These issues have been addressed with ALWR technology, although in a more limited way, by the design and development of the AP600. It is not clear yet how will RTO formation affects the prospects for the smaller modular HTGR type nuclear plants.

### **Capital Intensiveness**

Nuclear plants, being large facilities and requiring massive radiation protection shielding and containment buildings, and heavy high pressure and corrosion resistant components, represent capital-intensive projects. A similar situation exists regarding coal-fired plants, which are also highly capital intensive, due to their large physical size, high pressure piping (particularly for supercritical units), and extensive pollution abatement equipment and facilities. Competing base load plant options such as gas-fired combined cycle plants having smaller sizes, being based on standard industrial components, and not requiring massive shielding, are less capital-intensive. Nuclear plants' engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) costs vary between 800 and 1,400 \$/kWe. When project contingency and owners costs at 20 percent of the EPC cost are added, an overnight cost range of 1,000-1,600 \$/kWe is estimated, excluding all time-related charges – escalation and interest during construction (IDC). At the high end of the range, for instance, assuming a capacity of 1,350 MWe and 1,600 \$/kWe, a total overnight investment of 2.16 Billion Dollars is required, excluding time-related charges which could add 25-33 percent to the total project cost, depending on the project duration. At the lower end of the range at 1,090 MWe capacity and 1,000 \$/kWe, an overnight cost of 1.09 Billion Dollars would be required.

Gas-fired combined cycle plants' EPC costs range between 450 and 650 \$/kWe, with contingency and owners costs increment of 5 percent of the EPC cost. At an intermediate value range of a 500 MWe plant capacity and 600 \$/kWe EPC cost, a total EPC cost of 0.30 Billion Dollars and an overnight cost of 0.32 Billion Dollars are computed. Combustion turbines require an even smaller up-front investment. At representative values for a 200 MWe plant with 300 \$/kWe EPC cost and 5 percent contingency and owners cost increment, a total project overnight investment of 0.06 Billion dollars would be required.

The above representative numbers demonstrate the greater capital intensiveness of a nuclear plant, and, by inference, also of coal-fired plants, as compared with gas-fired power plant alternatives. The larger up-front investment is more difficult to raise, and results in a larger amount of value-at-risk throughout the construction period, until the plant starts generating power and providing an incoming revenue stream. In order to better control the risks associated with this large financing package, the lending institutions may require a greater portion of the total investment to be provided by equity financing, and the investors may require a higher return on investment (ROI) rate. Both factors tend to increase the time-related charges and the total project investment.

Modular HTGR type plants aim at alleviating the front-end nuclear financing hurdles by constructing smaller-sized modules, one at a time. Each module will require a lower up-front total investment. At a representative values set of 110 MWe module size, 1,250 \$/kWe EPC cost and 20 percent contingency and owners cost increment, the total overnight cost is estimated at 0.16 Billion Dollars. This is significantly lower than the overnight investment requirement in a 1,000 MWe low cost nuclear plant or a 500 MWe combined cycle plant. This total investment is thus easier to arrange, and may require a lower ROI, even though the per kWe unit cost of the HTGR type module could be higher than the unit cost of the monolithic ALWR plant.

### **Longer Lead-Times – Slower to Market**

Nuclear or coal-fired project lead-times are longer than gas-fired plants' lead-times due to the larger physical size of the nuclear or coal-fired project, the greater complexity of the design and the construction effort, and the need to demonstrate construction quality assurance and detailed paper trails of equipment purchases and of on-site construction practices, to the satisfaction of the regulatory agencies. Gas-fired plant lead-times are shorter than nuclear or coal-fired plant lead-times due to the smaller scope of the construction projects, the use of industrial quality equipment, and less regulatory-driven pre-approvals and quality assurance requirements.

In general, the overall project construction phase is divided into three time periods:

- The project startup period consists of three distinct activities. During this period, detailed site related permitting is completed; site preparation work is initiated based on a limited work authorization; and procurement of long lead-time components such as pressure vessels and steam generators in nuclear plants and gas turbines and boilers in fossil-fired plants is initiated.
- The project on-site construction period that involved three major activity phases, broadly defined as civil work, mechanical work and electrical work. Civil work includes excavation, foundation and base-mat concrete pour, and the erection of plant buildings. The mechanical work phase includes equipment installation, pipe connections and welding, and the completion of all plant facilities. The Electrical work phase includes all electrical cable laying and connections, installation of all measurement devices, construction and connection of the control room and electrical equipment, e.g., transformer installation.
- The project startup and acceptance testing period includes the testing of completed systems and their turn over from the construction crews to the operation staff; fuel loading and the operational testing of the entire plant; connection to the grid and the ramp up of generation to rated capacity; and the warranty testing activities required to ascertain that the completed plant and all related equipment perform to specifications for pre-determined time periods, and meet warranty conditions.

The advanced nuclear plant designs now proposed for near-term deployment in the U.S. require three to three and one half years for the on-site construction work phase, half year for startup and operational testing, and one year for the project development phase. This results in a total lead-time of sixty months or five years. (This does not include NRC regulatory approvals (i.e., ESP,

DC, COL) which can add three or more years to total project lead-time.) Similar construction lead-times are projected for coal-fired plants. Combined cycle plants require shorter project lead-times consisting of one year for the up-front project development phase, and two years for on-site construction and startup. The total project requires thirty-six months or three years. Combustion turbines can be built with total lead-times of thirty months or two and one half years, consisting of one year for the project development phase, and one and one half years for on-site construction and startup.

The nuclear project lead-times mentioned here have been achieved and demonstrated abroad. There is no current experience of achieving such short lead-times in recent, and more modern, U.S. nuclear projects. Major nuclear industry programs, based on lessons learned in U.S. and foreign plant construction projects, are aimed at assuring the achievement of the projected short lead-times in future U.S. nuclear projects. The fossil plant lead-times discussed here have been demonstrated in several plants built in the U.S. and do represent real project experience. It should be mentioned that fossil plant lead-times in the U.S. have increased recently, due to longer project development phases than originally estimated, and longer wait periods for long lead-time equipment procurement due to shortage of manufacturing capacity.

Project lead-times have profound effects on total project capital investment requirements due to the accumulation of escalation charges and IDC throughout the construction period. Project lead-times also represent the major risk element in evaluating the prospects of committing to a new plant. Project risk is derived from three basic factors:

- The longer the plant is in construction before power is generated and a revenue stream is established, the longer the project financing is at risk, should the project fail. Thus longer construction projects require various mitigation strategies such as higher ROI on the equity portion of the investment and higher interest rate on the debt portion. The equity/debt ratio will be required to demonstrate higher equity fractions the longer the period that financing is at risk.
- The longer the project lead-time the more likely it is that the specific local conditions that gave rise to a project may change, thus reducing the economic justification for the project.
- In the deregulated markets the first plant that responds to a local need situation will reap the major economic benefit in terms of the highest, market price minus production cost, i.e., margin capture. That first plant, by virtue of its first entry into the market, will reduce the MCPs and margins for all follow-on other plants. This is the first-to-market syndrome.

It follows from the above discussion that nuclear plants or coal-fired plants with longer lead-times are at a disadvantage compared with gas-fired plants, due to the larger accumulation of time-related charges, due to potentially being late to market, and due to the risk of changing market conditions, on which the project profitability evaluation was originally made, before the project has reached commercial operation. Controlling and reducing project lead-time is an essential requirement for committing to a new nuclear or coal-fired plant. It remains to be seen whether the later in life economic benefits of nuclear projects make up for their greater up-front cost and risk. It is also unclear how RTO formation will impact first-to-market considerations.

### Long Operating Lifetime

Nuclear and coal-fired plants' operating lifetimes are longer than gas-fired plant lifetimes. Currently operating nuclear plants are undertaking license renewal programs that will extend their operating license to sixty years, or beyond. Advanced nuclear plants proposed for near-term deployment are designed, from the start, for a sixty years operating period, though they will require license renewal beyond the forty year licensed term of operation. The plant designs are robust enough to support possible life extension beyond this nominal plant lifetime. The basis for these long plant lifetimes is the large margins designed into the plant equipment, the stringent quality assurance programs required to prevent equipment failure with potential radiological exposure consequences, the better choice and improved understanding of construction materials and alloys, the overall robust plant construction required as a radiation protection measure, and the high level of annual maintenance activities designed to prevent equipment deterioration or failure.

Gas-fired plants' operating lifetimes are much shorter. Little experience has yet been gained in the long-term operation of gas-fired combined cycle plants, and nominal plant lifetimes are not expected to exceed twenty-five years. Beyond the nominal value, plants' lifetime could be extended through major equipment replacement programs such as turbine rotor and blades replacement. The cost of such replacement program, as a fraction of the overall plant cost, is a much higher than the fraction of nuclear life extension programs is in relation to the initial plant investment. The reasons for the shorter lifetimes of gas-fired plants are that plant equipment is designed to industrial standards rather than to the more stringent (and more expensive) nuclear standards, the plants operate at much higher gas burning temperatures thus increasing metal fatigue and shortening lifetime, corrosive contaminants in the gas stream cause equipment corrosion, accelerated by the high temperature operating regime, and the plants are not as rigorously inspected and maintained on an annual basis as nuclear plants are. In order to conduct equal comparisons of nuclear and gas-fired plants it is necessary to carry out the analysis over a long time period, on the order of fifty years, and consider all major capital improvement programs throughout this period, properly discounted to a reference time-point. The economic performance of a gas-fired combined cycle plant will deteriorate if all periodic equipment replacement costs will have to be accounted for in the economic analysis.

The consequences of longer plant lifetimes are that nuclear plants have longer time periods over which to accumulate increasingly larger margins which will be used to repay the original plant investment, pay all equipment improvement and replacement programs, pay all fixed costs such as taxes and G&A, provide the required ROI, and generate net profit to the owners. While early in life the available margin is used to repay the construction loan and depreciation charges, once these expenses are retired after the first twenty years of life or earlier, a larger fraction of the available margin can be dedicated to provide ROI and net profits. In the deregulated world the construction and operation loan has to be returned, with interest, over a shorter time period than in the regulated world. Whereas in the regulated world the construction loan repayment period for a capital-intensive nuclear or coal-fired plant could be stretched over a 30 years period, in the deregulated world that loan is expected to be repaid over a 20 years period, or less. Gas-fired plant loans are expected to be repaid within ten years, or less. The longer the plant's lifetime, assuming no major equipment replacement needs, the more time exists, after the construction

loan is repaid, to generate a return of and on the equity investment, and to further generate net profits.

A different situation exists with regard to a combined cycle plant. The construction loan is returned over a shorter time span, and the ROI is provided to the investors earlier in the plant's lifetime. Any additional funds generated have to be set aside against the need for a major equipment replacement program at the end of the nominally shorter lifetime. Investors who wish to obtain their expected ROI as soon as possible and move their capital to other projects would seek low capital-intensive power projects such as gas-fired power plants. Larger-sized investor organizations with longer capital recovery horizons can expect higher longer-term profits from nuclear power plants.

### **High Capacity Factors**

Nuclear and coal-fired plants operate at higher capacity factors than gas-fired combined cycle plants. Peaking gas turbines are planned for operation at low capacity factors. The operating nuclear plants in the U.S. now consistently achieve fleet-average capacity factors in the 90 percent range. An increasing fraction of the plants achieve higher than 90 percent capacity factors over several consecutive years. This achievement is a testimony to the rigorous operating and maintenance programs implemented in all U.S. operating plants. The U.S. experience is now duplicated in many other countries that operate nuclear power plants, indicating that the U.S. experience is not unique but rather the norm, and that transfer of good practices and best-in-class benchmarking programs can improve the performance of nuclear plants worldwide. New nuclear plants proposed for near-term deployment are capitalizing on this accumulated experience, and the plants are designed, a priori, with best practices in mind, for lifetime operation at capacity factors of around 90 percent (87-93 percent range).

Gas-fired combined cycle plants have not yet achieved such high capacity factors, due in part, to the short period of experience in the operation of such plants in the U.S., and in part due to lack of standardization in equipment supplies. It is not anticipated that combined cycle plants will reach capacity factors as high as nuclear power plants, for the same reasons that affect their shorter operating lifetimes as compared with nuclear plant lifetimes. Current combined cycle plants now suffer from the same ownership and vendor and plant models balkanization problems that have negatively affected the earlier U.S. nuclear power program. It is expected that as the gas-fired generation industry matures and plant ownership is concentrated in several large operating companies, that performance improvement programs will be instituted, which will improve the future capacity factors. It is now assumed that gas-fired plants will achieve lifetime averaged capacity factors in the 80-85 percent range.

The achievement of high capacity factors is essential for plant profitability since each MWh generated results in incoming revenues. As each plant is its own profit center, the revenue and the margin bases for profitability depend on energy sales by the plant itself, rather than profits accumulated elsewhere by the parent owner. It follows that as each plant generates more energy it lays the basis for its own profitability. The longer the plant can operate on an annual and multi-year basis, the more profitable it will become, if properly managed.

### Low and Predictable Production Costs

The major beneficial attribute of nuclear power plants is their low production costs. Nuclear production costs are not just low, but also are highly predictable, and exhibit low volatility over both the short and the long-term. The combination of low production costs, limited cost volatility, high capacity factors, and long operating lifetimes gives nuclear plants their distinctive economic advantage compared with fossil-fired plants over the long-term. Nuclear production costs for near term deployment plants are projected to be in the range of 10.0 \$/MWh, compatible with the cost range of the best currently operating plants in the U.S. This cost is made up of 5.0 \$/MWh O&M cost component and 5.0 \$/MWh nuclear fuel cycle cost component. Nuclear fuel cycle costs include a 1.0 \$/MWh contribution to the Federal Government for ultimate spent fuel disposal.

Gas-fired combined cycle plants exhibit higher production costs driven mostly by high natural gas prices. Combined cycle plant production costs are not very predictable due to the high volatility in natural gas prices, which was amply demonstrated in the fall 2000, winter 2000-2001 and spring 2001 seasons. Over that period natural gas prices first doubled from their historic values of 2.0 \$/MMBTU to 4.0 \$/MMBTU, then doubled and tripled again, and then exhibited shortage-related short-duration spot price peaks as high as 60 \$/MMBTU in the Southern and Northern California energy markets. Finally, at the end of the Winter heating season, with the onset of the mild weather Spring and Summer 2001 seasons, natural gas prices have tumbled to the 3.0-4.0 \$/MMBTU price range, depending on transmission costs and other local conditions. Gas prices are expected to increase again with the coming of the Winter 2001-2002 heating season, though this price increase may be moderated due to the economic downturn. Over the long run gas prices are expected to increase to the range of 3.5-5.5 \$/MMBTU, reflecting the increased demand in the U.S. and the lower than expected reserves in the North American continent. This range will be compatible on a per BTU basis with oil prices at 20-32 \$/Barrel, which seems to bracket the 25 \$/Barrel long-range price target of the OPEC oil cartel.

It is necessary to multiply the per BTU fuel prices by the combined cycle plants' heat rate (in units of BTU/kWh) in order to convert the fuel cost to electric energy cost component expressed in \$/MWh units. Depending on design and maturity, combined cycle plant heat rates vary between 7,500 and 6,000 BTU/kWh. For comparison purposes, assuming representative heat rate value of 7,000 BTU/kWh (multiply by a factor of 7.0), and further assuming a typical O&M cost figure of 2.0 \$/MWh, a natural gas price range of 3.5-5.5 \$/MMBTU will result in a combined cycle plant's production cost range of 26.5-40.5 \$/MWh. When compared with the expected nuclear plant production cost of 10.0 \$/MWh, the nuclear plant production cost advantage is significant.

Beyond the numerical production cost figures, which represent but current estimates, the more important observation is that combined cycle plants' production cost estimates are more volatile and prone to changes than nuclear production costs are. Based on the above representative values, at 3.5 \$/MMBTU natural gas price, 24.5 out of 26.5 \$/MWh, or 92 percent represent the fuel price component of the total production cost, which is less predictable and subject to changes. In nuclear production costs the fuel cost and the O&M cost components each represent about 50 percent of the total. Thus the volatile component of the nuclear production cost is both

smaller, on an absolute basis, and represents a smaller percentage of the total, than the volatile component of the combined cycle plants' production costs. The nuclear plant production cost advantage is not just the lower numerical cost figure, but also the smaller volatile cost component; hence the lower production cost risk.

### **A MODEL FOR NUCLEAR PLANT COMPETITIVENESS – NUMERICAL RESULTS**

This section deals with the numerical evaluation of the competitiveness of new nuclear plants, proposed for near term deployment, in the future energy markets. This section is divided into four parts. The first part reviews the methodology used in the economic analysis. The second part describes the computational model used. The third part reviews the base case results of the analysis, and the fourth part describes the sensitivity studies conducted around the base case.

#### **Projection of the Competitive Playing Field**

The approach taken in this study is to perform a parametric analysis of the range of economic competitiveness of advanced nuclear power plants in future market conditions. In order to do this, the total generation costs of future nuclear plants is compared against the total generation costs of gas-fired combined cycle plants, and gas-fired combustion turbines. A reasonable parameter range is defined as a base case, and then extensive sensitivity analyses are performed around the base case values. This analysis is not a definitive determination that could lead to a commitment decision for a specific plant at a specific location. Rather, a first order economic evaluation is performed that answers the question: "Is there a reasonable range of plant economic and performance parameters under which a future nuclear plant would be competitive in the market?" If, so then it makes sense for interested utilities or developers to perform detailed locational analyses of the competitiveness of specific plant designs, under specific deal terms. If not, then nuclear plants proponents will have to wait for different market conditions to evolve to the point that their designs will be competitive, or plant vendors will have to strive to modify their designs, so that they meet the economic conditions likely to prevail in the market.

The economic analyses performed here allow for three basic comparisons:

- A generation cost comparison between a nuclear plant and a combined cycle plant to indicate whether the nuclear plant represents an economical base load option on a lifetime generation cost basis.
- A base load cost-price comparison between market prices represented by the production cost of a combined cycle plant, and nuclear generation costs. The purpose of this analysis is to identify whether base load prices obtained cover nuclear production cost and provide a margin for the (partial) recovery of nuclear capital charges.
- A peak load cost-price comparison between market prices represented by the production cost of a combustion turbine, and nuclear generation costs. The purpose of this analysis is to indicate whether peak load prices, obtained mostly during the summer season, allow for full recovery of nuclear production cost, full recovery of nuclear capital charges during the peak prices period, and provide additional revenues to cover the portion of the

nuclear capital charges not recoverable from base load market prices during the remainder of the year.

In this stage of the analysis a reasonable parametric range is chosen that encompasses the specific plants data. Plant designers can interpolate among the base case and the sensitivity analysis computations, to identify the results most applicable to their own specific plant design data.

### **The Economic Analysis Model**

The economic model used in this study was originally developed for the U.S. Council on Energy Awareness (USCEA), one of the predecessor organizations of the current Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). This model was then transferred to Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC), where it was further developed and used for initial project profitability analysis. The model was then further extended by NEI and used in their economic evaluations related to advanced nuclear plant deployment. This model takes as an input a set of plant performance parameters and cost data, and a set of economic factors such as discount rate, inflation rate, cost of debt, return of equity, debt/equity fraction, interest during construction rate and debt repayment period.

The model can be exercised in either of two possible modes as follows:

- **Generation cost calculator:** The model computes annual fuel costs and annual fixed and variable O&M costs throughout the specified plant lifetime. The model computes annual fixed charges required to pay back the construction and operation loan as well as the interest on the loan, pay Federal and State taxes, and provide for plant depreciation and for decommissioning sinking fund, where appropriate. The model computes annual fixed charges required for the return of the equity investment in the plant, and using externally supplied ROI rate, the required annual return on equity. The model computes the year-by-year total generation costs i.e., the sum of the annual fuel costs, O&M costs, debt return charges, and equity repayment charges, throughout the plant's lifetime. The model then discounts and sums the stream of annual generation costs to yield levelized generation cost values.
- **Profitability calculator:** This is a reverse set of computations, which have been described earlier in this write-up. Given an externally supplied stream of annual market prices, the model peels off the computed annual fuel cost, annual O&M costs, annual debt return and tax related charges. For the remainder, the model then computes the internal rate of return (IRR), which will allow for the return of the equity portion of the plant investment, and provide a return on that investment. If the computed IRR is equal to or larger than the target ROI the utility or developer requires, the project could be considered profitable, on a first level of computations.

The model has been exercised in this study, mostly in the generation cost calculator mode, to provide generation costs of advanced nuclear power plants, gas-fired combined cycle plants and gas-fired combustion turbines, over a wide range of input parameter variations for each type of plant. The resulting sets of generation costs on an annual or lifetime-levelized basis were then

compared, to yield conclusions regarding the prospective profitability of advanced nuclear plants under near-term market conditions.

### **Nuclear Plant Competitiveness – Base Case Results**

A base case analysis comparing the generation costs of an ALWR, a gas-fired combined cycle plant and a gas-fired combustion turbine has been performed, using the NEI cost model. The basic assumptions of the analysis are reported in Tables 1 and 3. The results of the computations are reported in Tables 2 and 4, and shown in Figures 1 to 6. Some of the input variables used have been discussed above in the section on Nuclear Plant Realities. The more important variables that affect the relative competitiveness of the ALWR vs. the gas-fired plants are the natural gas price range, the ALWR capital cost range, and the returns required on the debt and the equity portions of the initial investment.

Future natural gas prices have been assumed in the range of 3.5 \$/MMBTU to 5.5 \$/MMBTU, increasing with inflation rate only (no real price escalation) throughout the plant lifetimes. A combined cycle plant heat rate of 7,000 BTU/kWh has been assumed, averaged over the 25 years of plant life. Gas turbine plant heat rate of 10,000 BTU/kWh has been assumed. The combined cycle plant is estimated to operate at a lifetime average capacity factor of 85 percent, and the gas turbine at an average peaking capacity factor of 30 percent.

In parallel with this gas-fired plants' cost/performance variability range, nuclear plant base capital costs were estimated to vary in between 1,000 and 1,200 \$/kWe, with an additional 20 percent cost adder for contingency and owners costs. Thus, an overnight capital cost range of 1,200-1,440 \$/kWe has been assumed here on a parametric basis. Nuclear plants are assumed to require an additional 30 Million Dollars cost increment for up-front licensing and project development activities, whereas the combined cycle plant and the gas turbine are expected to require only an additional 10 Million and 7 Million Dollars, respectively, for project development. The ALWR is assumed to have an improved heat rate of 9,600 BTU/kWh, to have a production cost of 10 \$/MWh (equally distributed between fuel and O&M costs), and to operate at an annual average capacity factor of 90 percent over a conservatively estimated, forty year lifetime.

In terms of financial parameters, nuclear plants are assumed to require a 40 percent equity fraction of their total investment. The combined cycle plant, being a more mature technology, will require a 30 percent equity fraction, and the gas turbine will require 20 percent. The ALWR investors are assumed to require a 15 percent, before taxes, return on their equity, and the investors in the gas-fired plants are assumed to require a 13 percent ROI. The ALWR construction loan (Debt Fraction) is assumed to be returned over a 20 years period and carry an interest rate of 10 percent. The gas-fired plant debt is assumed to be retired over a ten-year period and to carry an interest rate of 9 percent. All three types of plants are assumed to reach commercial operation by January 1<sup>st</sup> 2010, and the project initiation dates are adjusted accordingly. ALWR total lead-time is estimated at five years, including one year of project development prior to construction start. The combined cycle plant's total lead-time is three years, and gas turbine plant's lead-time is two and one half years, both including one-year of up-front project development activities.

The basic conclusion derived from this analysis, given the sets of input data described above and shown in Tables 1 and 3, is that for the range of gas prices expected here, and for the combined cycle plant performance parameters listed, ALWRs with overnight capital costs in the range of 1,100 –1,500 \$/kWe or higher, will represent a competitive base load generation option. Considering the production costs of the combined cycle plant to represent the market prices a nuclear plant will likely receive in the off-peak seasons of the year, and the production costs of the gas turbine as representative of market prices during the summer peak season, it is evident from the results shown in Tables 2 and 4, that ALWR will receive substantial margins above its production costs during the off-peak seasons, and high margins during the peak seasons. It is the accumulation of these margins that will be utilized to repay the plant investment and provide the required returns. The availability of adequate margins for capital cost repayment is the basis for nuclear plant profitability, and it accounts for the finding here of the ALWR being an economic option for base load generation.

First year generation costs for the ALWR and the two gas-fired plants are shown in Figure 1, for an ALWR with EPC cost of 1,000 \$/kWe and natural gas price of 4.0 \$/MMBTU, and in Figure 4 for an ALWR with EPC cost of 1,200 \$/kWe and natural gas price of 5.0 \$/MMBTU. First year costs are of importance, as they are higher than the levelized generation costs reported in Tables 2 and 4. Not only are the lifetime levelized costs higher than the corresponding ALWR costs, but the first year costs of the gas-fired combined cycle plant are higher than the corresponding ALWR costs. This is true for the range of natural gas prices and ALWR overnight capital cost cases evaluated in this section, even though the component makeup of the total generation costs are quite different. ALWR generation costs are capital charges dominated, while the combined cycle plant costs are fuel cost dominated, as seen in Figure 1. It is more difficult to receive market prices high enough to recover the full first year costs, or to cover the production costs and a significant fraction of the required capital charges. In time, as the annual generation costs decrease below the lifetime levelized values, adequate market prices can be obtained. It is, however, an issue as to how to operate the plant, with market prices below full cost recovery requirements during the first years of operation, and meet all the financial obligations to the debt holders and to the investors.

Two potential approaches to getting over the hurdle of the high first year's generation costs (in relation to market prices) include:

- Negotiating a PPA with higher than market price payments during the first years of the new plant's commercial operation, to be potentially repaid later in life.
- Levelizing the annual carrying charge payments over the new plant's lifetime, so that the high early in life investment repayments are reduced, and the low capital charges later in the plant's lifetime are increased. Such rescheduling of the annual carrying charges can be negotiated between the plant owners, investors, and the banks.

Options for resolving the price-cost mismatch early in life are discussed in a more quantitative way in the next section. The computations here indicate that this is as much of an issue for the gas-fired combined cycle plant as it is for the more capital-intensive nuclear plants.

<b>Table 1 - Input Data - Generation Cost Comparison - ALWR, CCGT &amp; GT</b>			
<b>ALWR 1,000 \$/KWe Base Cost, Natural Gas Price 4.0 \$/MMBTU</b>			
Base case	1000 \$/kw EPC	600 \$/kw EPC	300 \$/kw EPC
15 % IRR	40% Equity	Gas 4.0 \$/MMBTU	Gas 4.0 \$/MMBTU
6 months post construction hearings, startup	ALWR BaseCase	CCGT Base Case	GT Base Case
No production or mitigation credits		10 Years Debt Term	10 Years Debt Term
Project development start date	1-Jan-2005	1-Jan-2007	1-Jul-2007
Development time in months	12	12	12
Construction time in months or "manual"	42	24	18
Post-construction time in months	6		
Commercial operation date	1-Jan-10	1-Jan-10	1-Jan-10
Number of years before first capadd			
First capadd construction time in months			
Number of years before second capadd			
Second capadd construction time in months			
Escalation start date	1-Jan-2000	1-Jan-2000	1-Jan-2000
Inflation rate	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%
Project operating period in years	40	25	25
Discount rate	12.0%	12.0%	12.0%
Plant net electrical output in MWe	1,000	500	200
Net plant capacity factor (% or "detailed")	90.0%	85.0%	30.0%
Base EPC cost (\$'000)	1,000,000	300,000	60,000
Construction schedule "manual" or "auto"	auto	auto	auto
Startup and mobilization (\$'000)		5,000	5,000
First capital addition cost (\$'000)			
Second capital addition cost (\$'000)	-	-	-
Owner development costs & fee (\$'000)	60,000	10,000	7,000
Owner costs & contingency (% TCB)	20.0%	5.0%	5.0%
Owner post-construction costs (\$'000)			
Working capital: on or "off"	on	off	off
Equity share	40%	30%	20%
Term debt tenor (including any refinance)	20	10	10
Term debt interest rate	10.00%	9.00%	9.00%
Pre-refinance period			
Refinanced term debt rate			
Term debt repayment style (enter "M" or "P")	M	M	M
Closing costs (\$'000)	1,000	500	500
Upfront fees (% debt)	-	1.0%	1.0%
Debt service reserve (months)	6	6	6
Equity during construction (%)	40%	30%	20%
Interest rate during construction (IDC)	10.0%	9.0%	9.0%
Commitment fee rate	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%
Fuel price in \$ per MMBtu	-	4.00	4.00
Net heat rate in MMBtu per kWh	9,600	7,000	10,000
Fuel assembly rental costs (\$'000 p.a.)	39,420		
Fuel escalation rate	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%
Total or variable O&M (\$/MWh)	5.00	2.03	1.00
Custom periodic maintenance ("on" or off)	off	off	off
Fixed O&M and G&As (\$'000 per annum)			
D&D sinking fund amount (\$ million)	465		
Nuclear industry fees (\$/MWh)	1.00		
Income tax rate	35%	35%	35%
Tax depreciation period (avg.)	15	15	15
Declining balance rate (avg.)	1.50	1.50	1.50
Investment tax credit rate	-	-	-
Tax carry forward in years	3	3	3
Property tax	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%
Project levered after-tax IRR (enter value or '?')	15.0%	13.0%	13.0%
Power price (enter \$/MWh or 'detailed' or '?')	?	?	?
Power/variable capacity escalation rate	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%
Carbon emissions credits in \$/ton			
SO2 emission credits in \$/ton			
Nox emission credits in \$/ton			
Production sales credit in nominal \$/MWh			
Production tax credit in nominal \$/MWh			
Sales/tax credit validity period in years (if any)	5.0	5.0	5.0


<b>Table 2 - Computational Results - Generation Costs Comparison - ALWR, CCGT &amp; GT ALWR 1,000 \$/KWe Base Cost, Natural Gas Price 4.0 \$/MMBTU</b>				
		1000 \$/kw EPC	600 \$/kw EPC	300 \$/kw EPC
		40% Equity ALWR BaseCase	Gas 4.0 \$/MMBTU CCGT Base Case	Gas 4.0 \$/MMBTU GT Base Case
		10 Years Debt Term		10 Years Debt Term
First year generation \$ per MWh	Constant dollars	<b>44.9</b>	<b>45.8</b>	<b>64.2</b>
Capital cost		34.9	15.7	23.2
- of which : IRR		17.8	4.9	3.5
O&M cost		5.0	2.0	1.0
Fuel cost		5.0	28.0	40.0
<i>Initial years production credit (if</i>		-	-	-
Lifecycle generation \$ per MWh		<b>41.6</b>	<b>42.7</b>	<b>59.9</b>
Capital cost		31.6	12.5	18.7
O&M cost		5.0	2.0	1.0
Fuel cost		5.0	28.2	40.3
First year generation \$ per MWh	Nominal dollars	<b>55.2</b>	<b>56.3</b>	<b>79.1</b>
Capital cost		42.9	19.4	28.6
O&M cost		6.2	2.5	1.2
Fuel cost		6.2	34.5	49.2
<i>Initial years production credit (if</i>		-	-	-
Lifecycle generation \$ per MWh		<b>60.0</b>	<b>61.6</b>	<b>86.4</b>
Capital cost		45.4	17.5	26.2
O&M cost		7.3	3.0	1.5
Fuel cost		7.3	41.1	58.8

Nuclear plants represent a less volatile generation cost option and, thus a more suitable choice for long-term bilateral contracting with large customers interested in stable energy prices. This is evident from the results shown in Figures 1 and 2, and other similar tables and figures derived from the computations performed in the course of this study. Figure 2 shows the year-by-year breakdown of the ALWR generation costs, at 1,000 \$/kWe EPC cost. Figure 5 shows the year-by-year cost breakdown for a combined cycle plant burning natural gas at a price of 5.0 \$/MMBTU. The equity and debt related cost components are the largest contributors to the lifecycle costs. At a natural gas price of 4.0 \$/MMBTU, fuel costs represent 67 percent of the lifecycle generation cost of the combined cycle plant, as seen in Figure 3. O&M costs represent an additional 5 percent of the total cost. As gas prices increase to 5.0 \$/MMBTU, fuel costs account for 72 percent of the total lifecycle cost, with O&M costs contributing an additional 4 percent, as seen in Figure 6. Thus the volatile component of the combined cycle plant's lifecycle cost represents 70 percent or more of the total cost, given the range of the likely natural gas prices assumed here. This volatile cost component increases with the increase in natural gas prices.



The volatile percentage of the ALWR lifecycle cost, at an overnight cost of 1,200 \$/kWe, is computed as 24 percent, (12 percent fuel cost component and 12 percent due to O&M costs). Capital charges are determined at the commercial operation date, and the payment schedule established at that time is not subjected to change during the plant's lifetime. As nuclear

	1,200 \$/kw EPC	600 \$/kw EPC	300 \$/kw EPC
Base case	1,200 \$/kw EPC	600 \$/kw EPC	300 \$/kw EPC
15 % IRR	40% Equity	Gas 5.0 \$/MMBTU	Gas 5.0 \$/MMBTU
6 months post construction hearings, startup	ALWR BaseCase	CCGT Base Case	GT Base Case
No production or mitigation credits		10 Years Debt Term	10 Years Debt Term
Project development start date	1-Jan-2005	1-Jan-2007	1-Jul-2007
Development time in months	12	12	12
Construction time in months or "manual"	42	24	18
Post-construction time in months	6		
Commercial operation date	1-Jan-10	1-Jan-10	1-Jan-10
Number of years before first capadd			
First capadd construction time in months			
Number of years before second capadd			
Second capadd construction time in months			
Escalation start date	1-Jan-2000	1-Jan-2000	1-Jan-2000
Inflation rate	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%
Project operating period in years	40	25	25
Discount rate	12.0%	12.0%	12.0%
Plant net electrical output in MWe	1,000	500	200
Net plant capacity factor (% or "detailed")	90.0%	85.0%	30.0%
Base EPC cost (\$'000)	1,200,000	300,000	60,000
Construction schedule "manual" or "auto"	auto	auto	auto
Startup and mobilization (\$'000)		5,000	5,000
First capital addition cost (\$'000)			
Second capital addition cost (\$'000)	-	-	-
Owner development costs & fee (\$'000)	60,000	10,000	7,000
Owner costs & contingency (% TCB)	20.0%	5.0%	5.0%
Owner post-construction costs (\$'000)			
Working capital: on or "off"	on	off	off
Equity share	40%	30%	20%
Term debt tenor (including any refinance)	20	10	10
Term debt interest rate	10.00%	9.00%	9.00%
Pre-refinance period			
Refinanced term debt rate			
Term debt repayment style (enter "M" or "P")	M	M	M
Closing costs (\$'000)	1,000	500	500
Upfront fees (% debt)	-	1.0%	1.0%
Debt service reserve (months)	6	6	6
Equity during construction (%)	40%	30%	20%
Interest rate during construction (IDC)	10.0%	9.0%	9.0%
Commitment fee rate	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%
Fuel price in \$ per MMBtu	-	5.00	5.00
Net heat rate in MMBtu per kWh	9,600	7,000	10,000
Fuel assembly rental costs (\$'000 p.a.)	39,420		
Fuel escalation rate	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%
Total or variable O&M (\$/MWh)	5.00	2.03	1.00
Custom periodic maintenance ("on" or off)	off	off	off
Fixed O&M and G&As (\$'000 per annum)			
D&D sinking fund amount (\$ million)	465		
Nuclear industry fees (\$/MWh)	1.00		
Income tax rate	35%	35%	35%
Tax depreciation period (avg.)	15	15	15
Declining balance rate (avg.)	1.50	1.50	1.50
Investment tax credit rate	-	-	-
Tax carry forward in years	3	3	3
Property tax	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%
Project levered after-tax IRR (enter value or '?')	15.0%	13.0%	13.0%
Power price (enter \$/MWh or 'detailed' or '?')	?	?	?
Power/fixed capacity escalation rate	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%
Carbon emissions credits in \$/ton			
SO2 emission credits in \$/ton			
Nox emission credits in \$/ton			
Production sales credit in nominal \$/MWh			
Production tax credit in nominal \$/MWh			
Sales/tax credit validity period in years (if any)	5.0	5.0	5.0



Table 4 - Computational Results				
Generation Costs Comparison - ALWR, CCGT & GT				
ALWR 1,200 \$/KWe Base Cost, Natural Gas Price 5.0 \$/MMBTU				
	1,200 \$/kw EPC 40% Equity ALWR BaseCase	600 \$/kw EPC Gas 5.0 \$/MMBTU CCGT Base Case 10 Years Debt Term	300 \$/kw EPC Gas 5.0 \$/MMBTU GT Base Case 10 Years Debt Term	
First year generation \$ per MWh	<b>50.9</b>	<b>53.4</b>	<b>75.0</b>	Constant dollars
Capital cost	40.9	16.3	24.0	
- of which : IRR	21.1	5.3	4.2	
O&M cost	5.0	2.0	1.0	
Fuel cost	5.0	35.0	50.0	
<i>Initial years production credit (if any,</i>	-	-	-	
Lifecycle generation \$ per MWh	<b>47.3</b>	<b>49.8</b>	<b>70.0</b>	
Capital cost	37.3	12.5	18.6	
O&M cost	5.0	2.0	1.0	
Fuel cost	5.0	35.2	50.3	
First year generation \$ per MWh	<b>62.7</b>	<b>65.7</b>	<b>92.3</b>	Nominal dollars
Capital cost	50.4	20.1	29.5	
O&M cost	6.2	2.5	1.2	
Fuel cost	6.2	43.1	61.6	
<i>Initial years production credit (if any,</i>	-	-	-	
Lifecycle generation \$ per MWh	<b>68.2</b>	<b>71.8</b>	<b>100.8</b>	
Capital cost	53.5	17.4	25.9	
O&M cost	7.3	3.0	1.5	
Fuel cost	7.3	51.4	73.4	




overnight capital costs increase to 1,440 \$/kWe, the volatile cost component decreases to 22 percent (half fuel cost contribution and half O&M cost contribution). Nuclear plant's lifecycle costs are thus estimated here to be only one third as susceptible to market impacts as are the combined cycle plant costs. Nuclear plants incur an up-front cost uncertainty and risk but provide lifecycle cost stability. Gas-fired plants incur lower up-front cost uncertainty and risk, but represent a greater economic risk over their lifetime, due to their greater exposure to fuel



supply curtailments and market disruptions. This trade-off needs to be resolved by interested utilities and developers, depending on the overall corporate risk mitigation strategies, on specific locational factors, and on possible deal terms.



**Figure 6 - Lifecycle Generation Cost Breakdown by Component  
Combined Cycle Plant - Natural Gas Price - 5.0 \$/MMBTU  
Constant Year 2000 Dollars**



### **Nuclear Plant Competitiveness – Sensitivity Analyses**

The parameter range of the ALWR-gas-fired plants cost comparisons was extended in the Sensitivity Analysis part of this study, to investigate the envelope of nuclear plant competitiveness under various cost and performance conditions. The results of this section can be used for extrapolating of the range of nuclear competitiveness, identified in the previous section. Six input variables were changes parametrically, one at a time, and the generation costs of the appropriate plants were computed under the new assumptions. The results of these computations is the development of sensitivity values that indicate by how much will plant generation costs change, per unit change in an input variable. The input and output tables of the computer runs of the Economic Analysis Model are presented in a separate, stand alone version of this Chapter. The computational results are presented below, in decreasing order of sensitivity.

- **Change in Nuclear Plant Overnight Capital Cost**  
The Base (EPC) capital cost of a prospective ALWR was parametrically changed between 800 \$/kWe and 1,600 \$/kWe. An additional increment of 20 percent for contingency and owners costs was assumed in converting the EPC cost to an overnight capital cost. It is found that a change of plus/minus 100 \$/kWe in the ALWR capital cost results in a change of plus/minus 2.8 \$/MWh in the ALWR 40 years levelized generation cost. All other cost/performance characteristics of the ALWR are similar to the base case values shown in Tables 1 and 3.
- **Change in Natural Gas Price to a Combined Cycle Plant**  
Natural gas prices to a combined cycle plant were varied between 3.5 \$/MMBTU and 5.5 \$/MMBTU. The combined cycle plant's generation costs were computed, all other input

variables held similar to the values shown in Tables 1 and 3 above (7,000 BTU/kWh heat rate, 85 percent annual capacity factors). It is found that a change of plus/minus 1.0 \$/MMBTU will result in a change of the levelized generation cost of a combined cycle plant by plus/minus 7.0 \$/MWh.

▪ Change in Natural Gas Price to a Gas Turbine

Natural gas prices to a gas turbine peaking plant were varied between 3.5 \$/MMBTU and 5.5 \$/MMBTU. The gas turbine plant's generation costs were computed, all other input variables held similar to the values shown in Tables 1 and 3 above (10,000 BTU/kWh heat rate, 30 percent annual capacity factors). It is found that a change of plus/minus 1.0 \$/MMBTU will result in a change of the levelized generation cost of a combined cycle plant by plus/minus 10.0 \$/MWh.

▪ Change in Equity Investment Fraction in a Nuclear Plant

The equity fraction of the total investment in an ALWR is varied between 10 percent and 50 percent (nominal value of 40 percent). All other input variables were kept constant at the base case values of Tables 1 and 3. The sensitivity values are found to increase as nuclear plant's capital cost increases. It is found that at an EPC cost of 1,000 \$/kWe, a change of plus/minus 10 percent in the ALWR equity investment fraction results in a change of plus/minus 2.4 \$/MWh in the ALWR 40 years levelized generation cost. At an EPC cost of 1,400 \$/kWe, a change of plus/minus 10 percent in the ALWR equity investment fraction results in a change of plus/minus 3.9 \$/MWh in the ALWR 40 year levelized generation cost.

▪ Change in ROI Requirements for a Nuclear Plant

The ROI rate required for the repayment of the equity investment in a nuclear plant has been varied parametrically between 12 percent and 17 percent (nominal value of 15 percent). All other input variables were kept constant at the base case values of Tables 1 and 3. The sensitivity values are found to increase as the nuclear plant's capital cost increases. It is found that at an EPC cost of 1,000 \$/kWe, a change of plus/minus 1.0 percent in the ALWR ROI rate results in a change of plus/minus 2.0 \$/MWh in the ALWR 40 year levelized generation cost. At an EPC cost of 1,400 \$/kWe, a change of plus/minus 1.0 percent in the ALWR ROI rate results in a change of plus/minus 3.0 \$/MWh in the ALWR 40 year levelized generation cost.

▪ Change in the Debt Repayment Period for a Nuclear Plant

The repayment period of the debt fraction of the investment in an ALWR was varied between 10 years and 25 years. The nominal value is 20 years. All other input variables were kept constant at the base case values of Tables 1 and 3. The sensitivity values are found to increase the nuclear plant's capital cost increases. It is found that at an EPC cost of 1,000 \$/kWe, a change of plus/minus 5 years in the ALWR debt repayment period results in a reverse change of minus/plus 1.4 \$/MWh in the ALWR 40 year levelized generation cost. At an EPC cost of 1,400 \$/kWe, a change of plus/minus 5 years in the ALWR debt repayment period results in a reverse change of minus/plus 1.9 \$/MWh in the ALWR 40 year levelized generation cost.

▪ Change in Interest Rate on Debt on a Nuclear Plant

The interest rate on the debt fraction of the investment in an ALWR was varied between 8.0 percent and 12.0 percent. The nominal value is 10.0 percent. All other input variables were kept constant at the base case values of Tables 1 and 3. The sensitivity values are found to increase as the nuclear plant's capital cost increases. It is found that

at an EPC cost of 1,000 \$/kWe, a change of plus/minus 1.0 percent in the ALWR debt rate results in a change of plus/minus 1.3 \$/MWh in the ALWR 40 year levelized generation cost. At an EPC cost of 1,400 \$/kWe, a change of plus/minus 1.0 percent in the ALWR debt rate results in a change of plus/minus 1.6 \$/MWh in the ALWR 40 year levelized generation cost.

- Change in Debt Repayment Period for a Gas-Fired Combined Cycle Plant  
The levelized generation costs of gas-fired combined cycle plants are found to be less sensitive to variations in the debt repayment period than do the generation costs of an ALWR. This is due to the smaller fraction of the capital charges in the combined cycle plant generation cost, as shown in Figure 1. The repayment period of the debt fraction of the investment in a combined cycle plant was varied between 5 years and 25 years. The nominal value is 10 years. All other input variables were kept constant at the base case values of Tables 1 and 3. It is found that a change of plus/minus 5 years in the combined cycle plant's debt repayment period results in a reverse change of minus/plus 1.0 \$/MWh in its levelized generation cost.
- Change in Equity Investment Fraction of a Gas-Fired Combustion Turbine  
The equity fraction of the total investment in a gas turbine was varied between 10 percent and 50 percent. The nominal value is 20 percent. All other input variables were kept constant at the base case values of Tables 1 and 3. It is found that a change of plus/minus 10 percent in the gas turbine equity investment fraction results in a change of plus/minus 0.8 \$/MWh in its levelized generation cost. The lower sensitivity value found here, in comparison with the ALWR, is caused by the lower contribution of the capital-related charges to the total generation costs of a gas turbine.

The sensitivity values computed here can be used to identify the boundaries of nuclear plant competitiveness under changing market conditions. Two examples of such use are:

- Natural gas prices have declined by 1.0 \$/MMBTU to 3.0 \$/MMBTU, averaged over the lifetime of a combined cycle plant. This results in a reduction of the lifetime levelized generation costs by 7.0 \$/MWh. If ALWRs are to maintain their economic competitiveness as base load generation options against gas-fired combined cycle plants, then ALWR EPC costs have to decline by 250 \$/kWe ( $7.0/2.8 \times 100$  \$/kWe) to 750 \$/kWe, from the nominal value of 1,000 \$/kWe, all other factors being constant at the base case values.
- A utility-developer consortium is formed to construct several nuclear plants. The new corporate structure will require only 30 percent equity investment fraction in the ALWR projects (nominal value of 40 percent), the remainder being provided by bank loans. The equity partners do however require 17.0 percent ROI, rather than the base case value of 15.0 percent. The average EPC cost of the ALWR projects is estimated at 1,000 \$/kWe. These changes will result an overall increase of the ALWRs' 40 year levelized generation costs of 1.6 \$/MWh ( $-2.4 + 2 \times 2.0$  \$/MWh). Assuming that the generation costs of gas-fired combined cycle plants represent future market prices, likely to be received by the ALWR projects, then natural gas prices will have to increase by 0.23 \$/MMBTU ( $1.6/7.0 \times 1.0$  \$/MMBTU) above the nominal value of 4.0 \$/MMBTU over the plant lifetime, to sustain these ALWR funding structure changes.

### **Summary of the Sensitivity Analysis Studies**

The general observation derived from the sensitivity analysis performed here is that a correspondence exists between natural gas prices, average market prices, and the acceptable ALWR capital costs that the MCPs could support, as follows:

- Gas price of 3.0 \$/MMBTU will support ALWRs with overnight capital cost of 1,000 \$/kWe.
- Gas price of 4.0 \$/MMBTU will support ALWRs with overnight capital cost of 1,200 \$/kWe.
- Gas Price of 5.0 \$/MMBTU will support ALWRs with overnight capital cost of 1,440 \$/kWe.

The above results are understated (higher nuclear capital costs could be supported) since no correction has been made here for periodic equipment replacement in the combined cycle plant and major replacements at the end of its nominal 25 years operating lifetime.

The issue of nuclear competitiveness and the acceptable, or break-even, nuclear capital costs, depend on one's perception of future natural gas prices, and by extension (equivalence on a per BTU basis) of all fossil fuel prices, and the MCPs determined by the fossil-fired marginal plants. If one believes in low and abundant long-term natural gas prices – a 3.0 \$/MMBTU state of the world – this implies that competitive overnight nuclear capital costs should not exceed 1,000 \$/kWe. If one assumes uncertain fossil fuel prices due to declining reserves, political instabilities, and difficulty in laying additional gas pipeline capacity, then gas prices ought to be higher, and the break-even nuclear capital costs will increase correspondingly. The best estimate of future natural gas prices is in the range of 3.5 to 5.5 \$/MMBTU which will allow competitiveness with ALWRs with overnight capital costs in the range of 1,100 – 1,500 \$/kWe or slightly higher. If project developers believe in a 3.0 \$/MMBTU state of the world and build plants accordingly, then gas-fired electric capacity will increase significantly, thus increasing the demand for natural gas and driving gas prices higher, towards the 4.0 \$/MMBTU range. The implication is that while a nuclear plant capital cost of 1,000 \$/kWe is a worthy goal for the various design teams to shoot for, it is not clear that such cost will be required, given our understanding of the evolution of future fossil fuel prices. A more realistic range of acceptable nuclear overnight capital costs is 1,100 \$/kWe to 1,500 \$/kWe or slightly higher, depending on local market conditions.

### **KEY FACTORS AFFECTING NUCLEAR PLANT COMPETITIVENESS**

In addition to the major factors affecting the relative competitiveness of nuclear and fossil power plants, which were discussed in the two previous sections, there are several nuclear specific parameters that affect the deployment of nuclear plants in the U.S. during this decade. These factors are discussed next.

### **Licensing Cost and Time**

Project licensing and local permitting activities are part of the development activities undertaken after the commitment decision is made. The project owners are responsible for licensing at this stage. Following the commitment decision, the owners apply for a combined construction and operation license (COL), as well as seek other Federal and State environmental permits, and State determination of economic need. The cost to obtain these required licenses is assumed as 30 Million Dollars in our nuclear base case. This is a substantial sum, but relatively small compared with the EPC cost of an ALWR, which in many cases exceeds one Billion Dollars. The total licensing period of an ALWR prior to construction start is anticipated to be about three years, including both NRC licensing and local permitting. This is a significant time period (30-40 percent of total project lead-time), however its impact on the time-related charges is relatively small, since only a small amount of the EPC cost is expended during this period.

To test the sensitivity of nuclear generation costs to variations in project development cost and time, a set of parametric values of each of these input variables was run on the NEI Economic Analysis model. At all ALWR EPC values, a change of plus/minus 20 million Dollars will result in a plus/minus change of 0.5 \$/MWh in the 40 year levelized generation costs. A change in the licensing and project development period is found not to affect the ALWR's 40 years levelized generation cost, since the licensing costs are small compared to EPC costs, and since they appear concentrated as one time payment at the end of the licensing period and the start of the construction period.

The variations in licensing period and costs, though found to have relatively small impact on the nuclear generation costs, do have a much greater qualitative impact on project uncertainties. Changes in licensing requirements affecting both cost and time, create up-front uncertainties regarding the viability of the proposed nuclear projects. In real life the effect of such up-front uncertainty could be the willingness of the prospective owners to abandon the project. This is particularly so, since only small sums of money have been expended during the project development period, so that the net loss to the owners, at this point, is small. Thus, even though licensing cost and time are relatively small compared with the overall EPC expenses, the impacts of licensing uncertainties on project commitment and viability could be significant.

### **Construction Cost and Time**

The cost and time of the ALWR's construction (EPC) phase are the two variables that will have major impacts on its economic prospects, as compared with the only modest impacts found for changes in licensing cost and time. This is because the EPC costs represent the largest component of nuclear generation costs; thus changes to the EPC cost will have a direct linear impact on the plant lifetime costs. Changing the EPC period affect the accumulation of time-related charges - IDC and escalation - during the construction period. Since IDC and escalation accumulate exponentially rather than linearly, the longer the construction period, the more pronounced the increase in total capital requirements and in generation costs.

The economic impacts of changing the EPC cost and duration period have been investigated through a series of runs of the NEI Economic Analysis model, with separate parametric changes

to each input variable. The impacts of changing the EPC cost on the ALWR generation costs were reported in the previous section. A sensitivity value of 2.8 \$/MWh change in the ALWR's 40 year levelized generation cost was computed, per change of 100 \$/MWe in the EPC cost. This is a linear impact related both to EPC cost increase or decrease.

A separate series of runs was performed, varying the EPC period above and below the nominal value of 42 months (3 ½ years). The impacts on generation costs are non-linear. Increasing the EPC period will increase total generation costs, more than a similar reduction in the EPC period will decrease generation costs. Thus, increasing the EPC period by one year (to 4 ½ years) will increase the ALWR 40 year levelized generation cost by 4.9 \$/MWh. Reducing the EPC period by one year (to 2 ½ years) will decrease the levelized generation cost by 4.2 \$/MWh. The effect is more pronounced the further we modify the EPC period away from the nominal values. Increasing the EPC period by 18 months (to 5 years) will increase generation costs by 7.0 \$/MWh. Reducing the EPC period by 18 months (to 2 years) will decrease the levelized generation cost by only 5.2 \$/MWh. Further increases in EPC periods will have significant impact on generation costs. A 6 years EPC period (total project lead-time of 7 ½ years), will increase the 40 years levelized generation cost by 11.8 \$/MWh, above the nominal value of 47.3 \$/MWh, and will elevate it to values higher than the prevailing or projected energy market prices.

More than the quantitative impact on generation costs, changes (or projected changes) to the EPC cost and execution period, signify greater project risks to the plant owners and investors. Higher construction costs and longer project durations were important factors in canceling nuclear plant projects in the U.S. over the last two decades. The perception of uncontrollable nuclear project period represents a major hurdle to new plant commitment, to this day. Investors and developers could plan and initiate mitigation measures against long lead-times, so long as those periods were stable and well understood. It is rather the concern for lack of control over the licensing and EPC periods, which worries prospective new plant owners or developers. Thus understanding the economic impacts of EPC cost and schedule changes is important. Stabilizing EPC cost and duration is essential.

### **Nuclear O&M Costs**

Nuclear O&M costs significantly increased in the 1980s and early 1990s and became the dominant component of the production costs of the currently operating plants. Since the mid-1990s several joint industry programs have resulted in significant fleet-wide nuclear O&M cost reductions. These reductions were attributed to the improved nuclear capacity factors, to the incorporation of lessons learned from best-in-class plants, to O&M cost benchmarking programs, and to personnel reduction programs. Despite the significant improvement in nuclear O&M costs, the perception remains that these costs represent a major uncertainty factor affecting the prospects of future nuclear plants.

ALWRs were designed, from the start, for ease of maintenance, for equipment simplification and improved layout, and for optimized and lower plant personnel complement based on a from-the-ground-up functional analysis. These factors, coupled with the fact that the ALWRs are planned for lifetime operation at 90 percent or higher capacity factors, account for the low O&M costs

(5.0 \$/MWh) as compared with the current best values of about 8.0 \$/MWh. If it will be possible to achieve these low costs in near-term deployed plants, then O&M costs will become a relatively small contributor, accounting for less than 12 percent of total nuclear generation costs. The annual O&M budget at 5.0 \$/MWh is estimated at 39.42 Million Dollars, significantly less than the annual budgets of current plants, which vary between 80-100 Million Dollars. A sensitivity figure of 1.27 \$/MWh per change of 10 Million Dollars in the annual O&M budget of a future 1,000 MWe operated at 90 percent capacity factor, can be computed.


The low ALWR O&M cost estimates represent a risk, in that they have not yet been proven in a sustained manner in commercially operating plants in the U.S. Current U.S. LWR plant O&M costs have consistently declined since 1993, due to improvements in capacity factors, staff reductions, and more efficient operations. This experience is significant, but it covers a period of about ten years only, whereas ALWR plant lifetimes are projected to be sixty years. The optimized ALWR cost estimates have many margins eliminated from them. To that extent, the potential for cost increases due to less than optimal performance, over an extended period within the operating lifetime, cannot be ignored. On the other hand, future nuclear plants will likely be operated by large, well-experienced, nuclear utilities with several other plants under their management. Such utilities should be able to operate their plant fleets efficiently, and achieve low operating budgets.

### Market Prices

The economic prospects of future nuclear plants depend on receiving adequate market prices to ultimately cover all their generation costs. While this can be accomplished over the plant's operating lifetime, a problem still exists regarding high generation cost requirements early in life that might exceed likely market prices. One potential solution to this problem may include obtaining power purchase agreements above market prices during the early years of operation, this price subsidy to be returned later in life when adequate price-cost margins have accumulated. Such PPAs can be issued by a state or a regional agency, interested in diversifying its energy supply technology mix. In principle, such a PPA was issued by the State of California, in order to assure adequate energy supplies to California ratepayers. The DWR, which is the California agency charged with purchasing power on behalf of the State, reported in July 2001 commitments to purchase power until 2010, with average annual prices of 65 \$/MWh, when spot prices during those periods are estimated by the DWR to average 50 \$/MWh. Other types of power purchasing arrangements are contemplated by New York State and by the State of Georgia. Thus there exists at least one precedent for the issuance of a higher-than-market price PPA, which serves to fill an importance social or economic policy goal of the issuing agency.

A study of such market prices strategy was performed in cooperation with NEI, using the NEI Economic Analysis model. The results of these computations are shown in Figure 7. The basic assumption of this evaluation is that new ALWRs will receive market prices of 40 \$/MWh, in constant year 2000 Dollars, through their operating lifetime, except for the first ten years of life when those plants will receive higher than market prices. Various price increments above 40 \$/MWh were assumed parametrically. For a range of ROI values required by the investors, assuming 40 percent equity fraction, the question is, "What ALWR overnight capital cost could be sustained by this schedule of market price payments to the plant?" A typical result, as shown

in Figure 7, indicates that for a 1,200 \$/kWe and a ROI requirement of 15.0 percent, a PPA with a price increment of 15 \$/MWh will be required over the first ten years of life, in line with the California market price support. These PPA price increments can be returned by the ALWR owners later in the plant's life, after the construction loan has been returned and margin accumulation can be dedicated to equity repayment.



### SPECIAL CASES

The analysis of advanced nuclear plants also involves a few special cases and considerations. Some of these cases are reviewed here. In particular, the case of modular plants is reviewed, as well as, special considerations related to First Time Engineering (FTE) costs, and the differences between first of a kind (FOAK) and Nth of a kind (NOAK) plants.

#### Economic Analysis of Modular Plants

Modular, small-sized, advanced nuclear plants based on the HTGR Helium gas-cooled design concept, are considered by proponents to be more suitable to the current market realities, and thus more likely to be ordered commercially, than the larger-sized ALWRs. The major advantages of the modular plants include:

- Smaller-size which better matches low load growth situations or small generation systems. Additional units can be added at each station when the demand grows. These plants are likely to cause smaller price depressions when introduced into the supply mix.
- Construction in shorter time periods than the larger ALWR, making them more responsive to specific market opportunities, and giving them a better chance of being first-to-market.
- Smaller up-front investments, so that financing may be easier to obtain. These plants may represent smaller risk to the investors, thus requiring lower ROIs.
- Commercial operation could be reached in shorter lead-times than could be achieved with the larger-sized ALWRs. Thus a revenue stream may be generated at the station earlier than could be obtained in an ALWR project.
- For a given capacity addition a larger number of smaller modules will have to be manufactured, thus creating opportunities for series production and module cost reduction through learning and economy of scale in manufacturing. Modules could be produced in a centralized facility and shipped to different sites, thus enjoying the benefits of factory manufacturing, rather than on-site construction.
- Higher thermal efficiency particularly for some HTGR concepts, resulting in lower cooling water requirements, smaller amount of spent fuel production per unit of electricity generation, and lower O&M costs.

On the other hand, there exist very limited actual plant operating data to support the projections for improved economics of the modular HTGR plants. Several issues should be raised:

- The modular plants could be more capital intensive than the larger sized, monolithic, ALWRs. This is due to two factors: economy of scale effects will increase the per kWe cost of the smaller-sized modules, and modular, graphite moderated, HTGR type plants require large-sized vessels, in order to provide low core densities. The GT-MHR plant at about 300 MWe capacity required a pressure vessel as large as that of a 1,100 MWe BWR; the HTGR plants require several large sized vessels – for the reactor system, for the energy conversion system, and for the gas compression system; most vessels will be partially, or completely, constructed below grade for safety purposes. This increases the excavation and civil works costs. The cost of the factory-manufactured modules will be higher than the cost of field construction due to the higher labor hourly rates in the factory than in the field (this is partially mitigated by higher factory labor productivity).
- An analysis performed by GE/NE has indicated that the footprint of a 110 MWe PBMR module will be about equal to the footprint of a 1,300 MWe ABWR. Plant capital costs are, in part, proportional to the facilities' footprint and volume. Thus the similar footprints for the PBMR and the ABWR could imply high PBMR per kWe capital cost.
- There exist little commercial experience in the U.S. in full-sized long-term operation of a vertically oriented energy conversion module. This is particularly true of the GT-MHR, where the functions of the energy conversion and the gas compression modules are combined on a single shaft and housed in a single large dimension vessel. The HTGR commercialization plans call for transition to commercial-sized plants with limited scale-up and performance/ endurance testing of the energy conversion modules. These modules represent performance and cost risks that may not be fully factored into the plant capital cost estimates.

- There exist very limited records of HTGR operation at high and sustained capacity factors. High capacity factors are required, particularly for capital-intensive plants, to reduce the per MWh unit energy costs. Projections of thirty years or longer leveled capacity factors are not based on real life experience.
- There exist limited data on achieving consistently low O&M costs over extended operating periods. The HTGR plants' low O&M cost projections are based on functional analysis and on limited operating records. There thus exist a significant risk that such projections may not materialize for the early HTGR- type plants built.
- The U-235 percent enrichment of the HTGR fuel is higher than the U-235 enrichment levels of the current LWRs and future ALWRs (8-9 percent vs. 4-6 percent, respectively). Under the current realities of the U.S. Enrichment Complex, HTGR type fuel cannot be enriched in the U.S., thus, gas-cooled plant owners will have to rely on foreign enrichment services providers, operating a special purpose cascade. This represents a potential fuel availability risk that may require keeping larger reload inventories on-site and paying higher fuel inventory charges, thus increasing overall fuel cycle costs.
- The impacts of large sized RTO formation on the need for small and modular plants has not yet been evaluated. It is possible that centralizing network expansion planning in large RTOs will favor the development of large monolithic plants, rather than small modular plants.

The economic analysis of modular HTGR plants is more complicated than the analysis of large-sized ALWR projects. Each module has to be analyzed as a separate plant, from commitment to commercial operation and throughout its operation. The costs, energy generation, and revenues streams from each module, each starting at a different time point, should be combined, discounted, and leveled to one reference point, to derive the total lifetime-averaged generation cost of the HTGR station. Each module should be evaluated separately though a margin analysis, considering that later modules will obtain different market prices, will represent lower costs due to learning experience, and will represent lower risk, thus requiring a different ROI. This analysis is complicated further by consideration of the modular stations' common facilities. Are these common facilities costs charged to the cost of the first module, or to the averaged cost of the first group of modules built on site, or to the station averaged cost? Evidently, more analysis work is required for a modular plant than for a monolithic plant, though the analytical principles are common. The difficulties emerge when several module-specific analyses have to be properly combined into a station-averaged evaluation.

### **First Time Engineering and Differences Between FOAK and NOAK Plants**

First time engineering (FTE) is the generic design required to complete all detailed design drawings to the point of ready for procurement. FTE relates to the generic plant, not considering detailed adaptation to specific site conditions. The FTE effort for an ALWR-sized plant may require an expenditure of several hundred million Dollars, as demonstrated by the experience of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR), the only ALWR that has yet reached the FTE completion milestone by 2001. The advanced nuclear plant vendors all face the difficulty of securing financing for their FTE completion plans. Regardless of how funding is obtained, the vendors will have to recoup the cost of FTE completion from future plant sales.

This raises the issue of how to charge for the cost of FTE completion. Are all FTE costs to be charged to the first ALWR plant to be ordered, or to the first several plants, assigning a fixed FTE cost increment to each plant sold until all costs are recovered, or to a program of several orders issued by several prospective owners each paying his equal share of the total FTE cost whether he completes his plant construction or not? Different vendors will evolve different strategies for charging a portion of their FTE costs to new plant orders. This may create some equality in analysis issues. Some vendors will tend to assign most of the FTE cost to the first one or few plants sold. Other vendors may develop a multiple-plant-order strategy with each owner paying a fraction of the FTE cost. These strategies will thus affect the costs of the FOAK plants differently. Some prospective FOAK plants may be obligated with different fractions of the FTE costs than other plants. How do we evaluate different plant designs to be commercialized under different strategies on a common basis?

First-of-a-kind plants differ from Nth-of-a-kind plants in several ways:

- FOAK plants will get charged with portions of the design commercialization strategy expenses. NOAK plants represent mature plants unencumbered with commercialization costs.
- NOAK plants are expected to enjoy the benefits of a learning curve at the manufacturing plants, improved construction efficiency due to on-site replication, learning efficiencies between plants of the same owners, and multiple equipment order discounts. All these benefits will not apply to the FOAK plants.
- NOAK plants could be constructed with shorter lead-times than FOAK plants due to the accumulation of construction experience. Prospective investors will be better assured that the plant can be built, that it can be built on time, and that lead-times can be shortened further with experience. The shorter the plant lead-time, the smaller the time-related charges, the lower the total up-front capital investment and the levelized energy cost.
- NOAK plants will represent lower construction risks because of the overall experience gained in building all previous plants of the same design. Thus it is possible that obtaining project financing will be easier. This may result in potentially reduced equity fraction, lower ROI requirements, and lower interest rate on debt.

There are two sets of related problems discussed here: How to assign FTE costs (or fractions thereof) to FOAK plants, and how to distinguish between FOAK plant costs and NOAK plant costs. The resolution of these issues will affect the costs and prospects of the FOAK plants planned for early deployment in the U.S. and the prospects for new plant orders.

### **SUMMARY**

This summary section reviews and comments on the results of the economic computations performed in this study using the vendor-specific cost data. It then comments on the attributes of a success path for a new nuclear power plant project.

### **Economic Competitiveness of Reactor Designs Based on Vendor-Specific Data**

An economic analysis has been performed on the generation costs of several reactor designs, based on design-specific cost data provided by the vendors. The various cost components for each design were incorporated into the NEI Economic Analysis Model, and the Model computed the lifecycle costs for all designs. In general, designs closer to commercialization provided limited cost data, and designs early in their development process were willing to provide more detailed cost breakdowns. The submitted cost data relate to the NOAK plants, and are based on the assumption of success in the development, design and licensing activities of the various designs. The expectation of future market prices is the range of 35 \$/MWh to 55 \$/MWh. Inspection of the expected NOAK generation costs of the various reactor designs considered, versus the range of likely market prices indicates the following:

- The generation costs of all the reactor designs considered here are within the range of likely future market prices. Most of the generation costs fall within the more narrow range of market prices of 36 \$/MWh to 46 \$/MWh, or even below that range. Thus, nuclear plants are expected to be generally competitive on a total cost basis, with market prices likely to prevail in the U.S. in the future. As such, nuclear plants should be included as potential supply options in utility generation expansion studies.
- Should these lifecycle generation costs be achieved in future projects, nuclear plants will represent economic power supply options in specific market situations. More detailed and localized economic analyses will have to be performed to clarify whether a specific reactor design would prove to be a competitive choice in a local market under specific contracting arrangements.
- The deregulation of the energy markets did not price new nuclear plants out of the market. Given the low production costs of 10 \$/MWh and the lower marginal costs of 5 \$/MWh (fuel and variable O&M costs), adequate margins exist between nuclear production costs and market prices to allow an appropriate return on the investment. Nuclear designs currently under development, which will achieve the cost/performance data provided here, will be able to compete in the deregulated energy markets.
- Nuclear plants, at the low end of their lifecycle generation costs, present costs lower than the likely range of future market prices. Nuclear plants at the high end of the cost uncertainty range still fall within the band of likely market prices.
- The issue of costs in the early years of life should be evaluated further. It is possible that some reactor designs will be competitive in their specific markets from the first year of operation going forward. In other cases and based on local conditions, a specially structured PPA may have to be devised, to allow recovery of all costs in the early years of life.

### **Success Path for Future Nuclear Projects**

The above conclusions are based on the assumption that the cost/performance data presented by the reactor vendors are achieved. What will, however, be required in order to guarantee that the target costs are realized? In other words, what is the success path for a future nuclear plant project? Evaluation of the computational results obtained in this study, allows the following observations to be made:

- Nuclear plant construction lead-times should be contained at four years or less, and total project lead-times should be constrained not to exceed five years. Being first to market is important in a deregulated energy system. Longer lead-times will reduce economic competitiveness, result in changing market conditions, and will increase project risk.
- Resolution of licensing issues before project commitment is essential to ensuring acceptably short lead-times. Resolving the issues of economic need for the project, site licensing and permitting, and NRC safety regulatory approval of the design will be required, to prevent an open-ended licensing process when the plant is under construction and interest during construction accumulates.
- For the general U.S. market, project overnight capital cost (including EPC cost, owners cost, and contingencies) need be contained at 1,100 \$/kWe to 1,500 \$/kWe, depending on the expectation of future fossil fuel prices. The lower the plant capital cost achieved within the above range, the greater the competitive position and the profitability of a future nuclear project. Overnight capital cost figures within the high end of this range could prove economic in specific situations, depending on locally high and sustained market prices, or on specially structured PPAs. Most 1,000 MWe and higher capacity nuclear plants will require a total as-spent investment, expressed in current year Dollars, of about two Billion Dollars. This poses strong competition from other lower front-end cost options for bringing a similar capacity power block to market.
- Nuclear plant production costs (fuel and O&M expenses) should be held to 10 \$/MWh or less. The major advantages of nuclear power plants are their low and stable running costs, which makes them ideal for long-term bilateral contracts. In order to allow competitively priced contracts, production costs should be kept as low as possible to provide adequate margins for capital cost recovery and profits.
- Nuclear plants lifetime capacity factors should be sustained at 85 percent or higher, in order to maximize incoming revenues and the potential for margin capture. The longer the plant operating life and the higher the annual capacity factors, the greater the return on the investment.
- Achieving high safety performance is essential to the economic well being of the plant. Regulatory-mandated shutdowns and inspections will reduce incoming revenues, increase capital outlays for recovery and reduce plant profitability.
- Nuclear project developers and owners should locate their plants in specific locations likely to experience high and sustained market clearing prices. In general, locations where market prices can be forecasted to remain above 40 \$/MWh for at least the first ten operating years would be preferable.
- Nuclear plant owners should strive to anchor their generation in long-term bilateral PPAs of 10 to 20 years duration, based on the prevailing local market prices (at or about 40 \$/MWh). The major selling point of an operating nuclear plant is the very low volatility of its annual prices. This should allow competitively priced PPAs, which will provide adequate margin capture.
- Nuclear plant developers should strive to obtain the best financing package possible, based on all of the above. Typical values could include containing the ROI requirements to 15 percent or less, allowing debt repayment periods as much longer than 10 years as feasible, and reducing equity financing to 40 percent or lower. These factors are all

mutually dependent, and the most advantageous package should be negotiated actively and aggressively.

The most important observation derived in this study is that the deregulation of the energy markets did not eliminate the prospects for capital-intensive base load generation options such as nuclear and coal-fired plants. New nuclear plant designs have adjusted to the requirements of the new energy markets. Should the cost/performance targets now expected be demonstrated in real projects, then the long-term role of nuclear power in the future energy markets could be sustained and enlarged.

## II-5: DESIGN OPTION EVALUATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

This Chapter provides a more detailed evaluation of each of the designs submitted in response to the Request for Information (RFI), relevant portions of which are provided as Attachment 2. As noted in the RFI all information provided by the respondents is viewed as non-proprietary and as such may be limited in its content. As a result of the RFI process the NTDG received and evaluated eight designs submitted by five organizations. The designs and the submitting organizations are summarized in Table 5.1 below.

**TABLE 5.1 SUMMARY OF CANDIDATE DESIGNS**

<u>DESIGN</u>	<u>SUBMITTING ORGANIZATION</u>
A. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)	General Electric Nuclear Energy
B. ESBWR	General Electric Nuclear Energy
C. SWR 1000	Framatome ANP
D. AP1000	Westinghouse Electric Company
E. AP600	Westinghouse Electric Company
F. International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS)	Westinghouse Electric Company
G. Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)	Exelon Generation
H. Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR)	General Atomics

Each of the eight designs is briefly described in Appendices A through H as noted above, based on information provided by the submitting organizations. The key design features, plant layout, and operating characteristics are presented for each design.

In this Chapter, each design evaluation includes a brief summary of the respondent's reply on how their submitted design meets each the six NTDG criteria and the NTDG's assessment of that response, an analysis of the design specific gaps associated with the submitted design, and an overall assessment by the NTDG on the viability of each design to be deployable by 2010 based on the information provided. Each overall assessment includes a roadmap and timeline to deploy the particular design.

The NTDG acknowledges that this is not an all-inclusive list of currently available reactor designs. Other options exists that were either submitted late in response to the RFI and

subsequently were not evaluated, or were not submitted at all by their respective vendors. These other options include:

- System 80+
- Westinghouse BWR 90+
- EPR
- CANDU Designs

It is possible that one or more of these designs would be deployable by 2010, and therefore need to be factored into the overall conclusions and recommendations of this Roadmap. Factors worth considering regarding some of these designs follow:

### **EPR**

The European Pressurized water Reactor (EPR) is a very large (1545 MWe or 1750 MWe) design that was developed as a joint venture by French and German companies, Framatome and Siemens in the 1990s. The basic design was completed in 1997, working in collaboration with other European nations, and conforms to French and German laws and regulations. Significant cooperation took place during the 1990s between the European utilities developing user requirements for this design and the U.S. utilities leading the US ALWR Program and its Utility Requirements Document. The EPR was not submitted to the NTDG in time to support an assessment. Further, as with the SWR-1000, the designer, Framatome ANP, has not made a decision regarding entry into the U.S. nuclear market.

### **Systems 80+**

The System 80+ is a 1350 MWe PWR design developed by ABB-CE (prior to that company's acquisition by Westinghouse), and is ready for deployment. It conforms to the ALWR Utility Requirements Document, and was certified by NRC in May 1997. Plants based on the System 80+ design have been built in Korea. However, as of this time Westinghouse has chosen not to market the System 80+ design in the U.S. If conditions change, it could be made available for order.

### **CANDU**

Canada's CANDU reactor designs use multiple pressure tubes containing nuclear fuel assemblies in the active core region, which permit on-line refueling. Heavy water is pumped through the pressure tubes to remove heat and is also used to moderate neutrons in a low pressure vessel (the Calandra) that surrounds the pressure tube region. CANDU reactors have been deployed outside Canada (e.g., Romania, South Korea). Recent advances to this design use light water cooling but retain heavy water moderation in the Calandra. This approach holds significant promise for improved maintainability and economics. Most CANDU designs are in the medium (500-1000 MWe) size range.

It should also be noted that several of the options being evaluated as part of this near term deployment effort are also being evaluated separately as part of the Generation IV Reactor Roadmap initiative.

## GE/NE ABWR DESIGN

### A. CRITERIA EVALUATION

#### Criterion 1: Regulatory Acceptance

##### **Summary of General Electric Response**

The Advanced Boiling Water reactor (ABWR) was the first design reviewed and certified (on May 2, 1997) by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 52 (10CFR52). The ABWR has been licensed to Japanese standards and continues to be reviewed by Japanese regulatory authorities as new ABWR plants are deployed in Japan. The first two ABWRs constructed, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Units 6 and 7, are currently in their fifth cycle of operation and have met or exceeded operational and safety performance goals.

More recently, the ABWR received regulatory approval in Taiwan by the Atomic Energy Agency in the form of a Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report, issued in late 1998 and a construction permit for two ABWR units at the Lungmen site issued in March 1999. The plant construction project is about to resume in the fourth quarter of 2001, after having been suspended due to political problems in early 2001. The ABWR design has, by mid 2001, been reviewed by a team of European utilities, which have indicated that the ABWR is suitable for deployment in most of Europe, in terms of meeting European regulatory requirements.

##### **NTDG Assessment**

The ABWR has been licensed by the NRC to a full Design Certification status, and thus fully meets the requirements of Criterion 1. The ABWR has been licensed in two other countries, and found to be licensable in several European countries. Furthermore, the design has been completed and proven through the construction and operation of two units, and the construction of two other units (now ongoing). The NTDG judges that the ABWR meets the criterion of Regulatory Acceptance.

#### Criterion 2: Industrial Infrastructure

##### **Summary of General Electric Response**

The infrastructure is in place for the design, fabrication, and construction of two ABWR units in the Lungmen station in Taiwan. GE/NE has contracted with a global supplier network to deliver these ABWR units. Those countries that have a larger portion of the supply scope include Japan, U.S., Scotland, Germany, Spain, and the Czech Republic. Many of the suppliers are located in the U.S. The supplier chain is capable of supporting additional units in the U.S. and elsewhere.

ABWR mechanical components and hardware such as pumps, piping, valves, heat exchangers and tanks can be and are being produced in the U.S. for the current ABWRs under construction.

The same is true for the electrical components and instrumentation. The nuclear fuel, control rods and some reactor internals are also currently produced in the U.S. at GE/NE's nuclear fuel and components manufacturing facilities. Most components of the Turbine Island and balance-of-plant equipment can be produced in the U.S. The turbine generators for the two ABWRs built for Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) in Japan were manufactured by GE/NE at its turbine manufacturing facilities in Schenectady, New York. The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and large internal components used for both the Japanese and Taiwanese ABWRs were fabricated by Japan Steel Works and other vendors, which have maintained their capacity and expertise for fabrication and machining of these large components. Some European suppliers could be used to meet a higher demand. GE/NE is seeking to develop other suppliers to shorten the RPV supply schedule.

Foreign suppliers can and do meet U.S. codes and regulations, when needed, since most foreign countries follow identical or similar Codes such as ASME Section III, IX and XI, as well as U.S. NRC imposed regulations and regulatory guides. For the Taiwanese ABWRs, full compliance with U.S. Codes and Federal regulations, including the ASME code, is contractually required by Taiwan Power Company. When the ABWR was first designed for Japan and certified in the U.S., the dual country codes and regulations were followed, to satisfy both national requirements. The U.S. Utility Requirements Document (URD) was used as a guideline for the U.S. design and was relied upon heavily by Taiwan Power Company for their bid specifications.

### **NTDG Assessment**

A full-scope supply infrastructure now exists, capable of building a two-unit ABWR station in the U.S. or abroad for operation by 2010. This has been demonstrated by GE/NE and its Japanese partners, Toshiba and Hitachi as well as other suppliers, in actual construction projects in Japan and now in Taiwan. The ABWR has a proven track record of existing and well functioning supply infrastructure. GE/NE has indicated that it is working on creating options for expanding and diversifying its vendors supply network.

Future significant expansion of the supply infrastructure for the simultaneous construction of several ABWRs may require careful scrutiny by interested utilities, at that time.

A significant constraint now facing the expansion of the ABWR supply infrastructure, as well as that of all other designs, is the availability of industrial capacity for the forging of large-size nuclear plant components such as the RPV, and the pressure vessel's bottom and top heads. Currently only Japan Steel Company has maintained this manufacturing capability. GE/NE is working with other European and Asian large forging plants to remedy this potential constraint, should the demand require. This situation requires careful monitoring, as applied to future ABWRs or any other reactor concept proposed for deployment by 2010.

The NTDG judges that the ABWR meets the criterion of Industrial Infrastructure.

**Criterion 3: Commercialization Plan****Summary of General Electric Response**

The ABWR has already reached an advanced state of commercialization overseas. Several ABWRs to be constructed and operated by various Japanese utilities have been announced or are in the pre-project phase. The two Taiwanese units, expected to reach commercial operation in 2006 and 2007, are based on the ABWR design that has been licensed in the U.S. The ABWR is a contender for the proposed Fifth Nuclear Plant in Finland, which is expected to receive Government approval within the next 12 months and go into commercial operation around 2008.

The ABWR technology was developed and fully tested by GE, Hitachi, and Toshiba, and paid for by TEPCO in a multi-year program estimated to cost \$500M. There are some small variations in the Japanese, U.S. and Finnish designs necessary to meet local requirements but the underlying technology is the same. The GE/NE approach to new plant projects is not based on a simultaneous multiple unit commitment contract, required to reduce the per-unit design completion cost. They rely on a single- or two-unit ABWR project contracts, each being negotiated separately with the prospective client, each benefiting from learning effects associated with previous contracts.

An important element of the ABWR commercialization plan is the willingness of the supplier team, led by GE/NE, to assume an acceptable portion of the project risks. For the projects in Japan and Taiwan, GE/NE has contracted for its scope of work providing the customer with a fixed price and schedule. GE/NE now claims to have the confidence to firm price its scope of supply and the associated delivery schedule, and require similar arrangements from other team members for future projects. GE/NE states that its approach to ABWR commercialization in the U.S. is to discuss firm scopes of supply with interested utilities or generators and other appropriate third parties on an individual basis.

**NTDG Assessment**

The ABWR team has the qualifications to prepare, present, and implement a successful commercialization plan. The ABWR has a completed design with all first time engineering already completed and all the generic design drawings available. The ABWR has a reference plant for construction and a reference plant for operation. GE/NE has a proven track record, albeit not under U.S. conditions, of leading a project team that can provide most of the scope of supply of a complete ABWR station in several fixed price and firm delivery schedule contracts.

GE/NE's characterization to the NTDG of market projections and supplier arrangements is very limited. GE/NE has stated that it has had detailed discussions with several U.S. utilities potentially interested in the ABWR, however the details are held confidential for commercial reasons. Due to the limited discussion of possible commercial project arrangements, we are unable to comment on the details of the GE/NE offerings, however we consider that the ABWR can meet the criterion of the Commercialization Plan.

**Criterion 4: Cost Share Plan****Summary of General Electric Response**

No funding has been requested and is needed for ABWR design specific activities. GE/NE states that an ABWR project in the U.S. could be considered as an “Nth of a kind” (NOAK) project. The first time engineering and detailed design have already been completed. Cost sharing with the U.S. Government for ABWR design completion is not required.

Cost sharing with the U.S. Government is recommended for early site permits (ESP) and for combined construction and operation license (COL) applications, related to ABWR projects. These are generic industry initiatives, discussed in a separate section of this Volume.

**NTDG Assessment**

The ABWR design team has not requested any U.S. Government cost share plan for Design Certification or for first time engineering completion. Its ABWR product is now fully licensed and engineered. ABWR project specific engineering will be included in the commercial discussions with the prospective customers. The NTDG agrees with GE/NE that no design specific activities are needed.

A cost share approach to cover the generic U.S. ESP/COL licensing process is recommended. The NTDG judges that the ABWR meets the criterion on Cost Sharing Plan.

**Criterion 5: Economic Competitiveness****Summary of General Electric Response**

The ABWR is the only plant for, which there is actual project design and construction experience to support high-confidence firm prices and schedules. In assessing economic competitiveness, prospective investors will consider economic factors such as cost and cost uncertainty to complete the remaining engineering, construction cost and schedule, programmatic and safety risks, plant lifetime and projected operating, maintenance and fuel costs, projections of market conditions and alternative system generation costs. The cost to build a new ABWR can be estimated with confidence, since the design is highly detailed and firm prices for a high percentage of the equipment, materials, and construction have been committed for existing projects. GE/NE has developed a cost database of more than 500,000 entries that defines in great detail the cost of an ABWR. This is a highly detailed cost database now available for a new ABWR project prior to the start of construction.

The construction cost of a new ABWR in the U.S. will depend on overseas cost experience, on U.S. project unique elements, and on the success of the industry in realizing improvements in regulatory and licensing initiatives. GE/NE expects that the current ABWR could be constructed in the U.S. in the range of \$1400/KWe to \$1600/KWe for overnight cost (including owners costs and contingency), depending on various assumptions and conditions.

The ABWR units in Japan have demonstrated that ABWRs can be built rapidly. From first concrete to commercial operation took 48.2 months at K-6 and 48.6 months at K-7. If U.S. constructors adopt some of the techniques and lessons learned from Japanese construction, GE/NE estimates that the first ABWRs in the U.S. could reasonably be built in 48 months (first concrete to commercial operation).

Given the current economic trends created by the growth in demand for natural gas and given the environmental prohibitions and costs related to development of coal burning plants, the ABWR could be an economic alternative for future major additions of generation capacity. The risks of generation cost increases, such as have recently occurred in California and elsewhere, for natural gas fired plants, are not applicable for the ABWR, or other nuclear plants.

### **NTDG Assessment**

The ABWR cost estimates are based on a high degree of accuracy and real world experience. Future ABWR projects in the U.S. will demonstrate learning experience from previous overseas ABWR projects.

The NTDG agrees that economic competitiveness is a function of projected overnight capital costs, uncertainties and economic risk factors. The NTDG economic analysis, presented in Chapter II-4 of this Volume, indicates that the ABWR capital cost figures reported by GE/NE represent the high end of the economic competitiveness range, estimated as 1,000-1,400 \$/kWe. We conclude that the ABWR could represent an economic generation option in specific market situations at some locations in the U.S. and thus the ABWR design can meet the criterion of Economic Competition.

### **Criterion 6: Fuel Cycle Infrastructure**

#### **Summary of General Electric Response**

The ABWR is able to use the same fuel cycle industrial structure as conventional BWRs. The ABWR's fuel assembly design is the same as the fuel assembly design for the current BWRs. The ABWR can accept standard 8x8, 9x9 or 10x10 BWR fuel assemblies utilizing the once-through fuel cycle with low enriched uranium fuel. The ABWR could also accommodate mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide (MOX) fuel in the future if needed. The ABWR fuel design compliance with the fuel licensing acceptance criteria constitutes NRC acceptance and approval of the fuel design for initial core and core reload applications without further specific NRC review.

Currently, excess capacity exists worldwide to provide the fuel cycle services needed to fabricate BWR fuel. This situation will continue for the foreseeable future, assuming that capacity is not taken off line. Global Nuclear Fuels (GNF) has provided fuel fabrication for past and present overseas ABWR projects. General Electric Company (GE/NE) of America, and Hitachi, Ltd., and Toshiba Corporation of Japan, have established GNF, an integrated nuclear fuel joint venture

with fabrication capabilities both in the U.S. and Japan. This organization has decades of experience supplying fuel under strict QA requirements for current BWRs. Other organizations capable of supplying BWR fuel include Empresa Nacional del Uranio SA (ENUSA) with facilities in Spain, Framatome ANP with facilities in Germany and the U.S., and Westinghouse Atom AB of the British Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (BNFL) Group with facilities in Sweden. Cogema (France, Belgium) has developed capability to supply BWR MOX fuel.

An extensive fuel performance experience base has been amassed by GE/NE and known failure mechanisms have been systematically eliminated. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) goals for defect rates set in 1972, and again in 1990, have been achieved in practice with continuing decline in defects up to the present time.

The spent fuel pool in the ABWR reactor building can hold 10 years of discharged spent fuel plus one full core loading. Additional on-site storage of spent fuel can be added to the site layout if necessary, using wet or dry methods, without impacting the existing design.

### **NTDG Assessment**

No gaps exist in the fuel cycle supply infrastructure that will prevent deployment of ABWR in the U.S. by the year 2010. All licensing issues related to ABWR fuel design have been resolved by the NRC through the Design Certification process in the U.S., and by the Japanese nuclear regulatory agencies for application to their operating and future ABWRs.

Adequate ABWR fuel-manufacturing capacity exists in the GE/NE and the Toshiba and Hitachi Corporations joint manufacturing venture. The BWR Owners Group tracks the BWR fuel supply situation, and will encourage GE/NE and its partners to increase and upgrade their manufacturing capacity, should an ABWR related need arise. The BWR Owners Group will likely also review GE/NE plans for on-site dry cask storage of spent ABWR fuel.

Based on all the above we do not find any gaps in the fuel cycle infrastructure area that may hinder ABWR deployment in the U.S. by 2010. We are reasonably assured that no such gaps will emerge in the near future. The ABWR meets the criterion of the Fuel Cycle Industrial Infrastructure.

### **B. GAP ANALYSIS**

The NTDG has identified no design-specific gap that may hinder ABWR deployment in the U.S. by 2010. There exists one area of concern related to the economic competitiveness of the ABWR, for all possible scenarios and regions of the U.S. The ABWR, like other designs, may be constrained by the current availability of only one RPV forging vendor worldwide, Japan Steel Works.

**C. OVERALL ASSESSMENT**

The NTDG judges the ABWR can be deployed in the U.S. by 2010. The ABWR has obtained a Design Certification in the U.S. and has been licensed for construction and for commercial operation in Taiwan and in Japan. Two ABWR units have been in commercial operation for more than four years in Japan and two units are under construction in Taiwan.


GE/NE has proven that it can lead an international vendors team in submitting lump-sum contracts for the full scope of supply of a two-unit ABWR station, though at an overseas location. They have further demonstrated that they have a worldwide supply infrastructure capable of providing on-time components supply to meet their construction contract obligations. A supply chain exists now to provide ABWR fuel, which is similar to current BWRs fuel, to several ABWR plants. GE/NE has completed the first time engineering of the ABWR and they have a complete set of design drawings. They claim to have already recovered the costs of their first time engineering effort. A future ABWR project will have a reference plant for construction and a reference plant for operation.

Future construction projects, should the demand for future nuclear plants revive, may be constrained by having only one worldwide vendor for RPV and other large component forgings. Other vendors may be qualified in time, however a potential supply constraint situation exists. The capital cost figures reported for the ABWR are very reliable, based on actual plant construction experience (though outside of the U.S.). These cost figures represent the high end of the competitive range, as estimated by the NTDG. The ABWR could represent a competitive base load generation option in specific market situations in the U.S.

**Timeline for the ABWR**

The timeline for the ABWR follows.

ABWR Near Term Deployment Roadmap



## GE/NE ESBWR DESIGN

### A. CRITERIA EVALUATION

The ESBWR is a 4000 MWth (approximately 1380 MWe), Boiling Water Reactor (BWR), developed by GE/NE to improve the overall economics of the earlier 2000 MWth Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (SBWR). The ESBWR is derived from a long history of GE/NE BWRs, and incorporates many of the design features of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) and the now discontinued SBWR design.

The ESBWR has been developed by industry in a systematic eight-year long stepwise process, which has addressed changing market conditions. The overall program had initial oversight from a group of European utilities, which were joined in the last few years by U.S. utilities and their representatives. The current design and technology team has partners from Europe and the U.S. and is led by GE.

#### Criterion 1: Regulatory Acceptance

##### **Summary of General Electric Response**

The following are the basic attributes of the ESBWR design:

- Advanced simplified design,
- Passive safety systems,
- Extensive use of components developed for the ABWR,
- Extensive plant optimization with utility inputs,
- Based on SBWR technology which was reviewed by US NRC,
- Can utilize the infrastructure in place for ABWR,
- Extensive investment by industry to develop the design and technology, and
- Developed by an international design team.

Some of these issues are discussed below.

The ESBWR uses the same basic passive technology and simplified design of its SBWR predecessor. By incorporating additional innovations, the design has been scaled to a higher power level – 1,380 MWe. The ESBWR also enjoys a strong synergism with the ABWR, using many of the fully developed technologies such as the Fine Motion Control Rod Drive (FMCRD), materials and water chemistry, multiplexing and fiber optic data transmission, and control room design. Because of this synergism, the detail design, analysis, and Certification resource requirements for the ESBWR have been greatly reduced. The ESBWR passive system innovations are supported by an extensive experimental database and rely on heat transfer mechanisms that are well understood and modeled. By using passive coolant circulation and passive safety systems, the ESBWR achieves significant simplification while still meeting the current international requirements for safety and reliability.

The ESBWR does not have a Design Certification by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC).

GE/NE believes that the time required to license the ESBWR in the U.S. ought to be less than three years, excluding public hearing and rulemaking. The reasons for the expected short review period are the following:

- Synergism with the ABWR, which is already certified,
- Basis for the Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR) is in place since the ESBWR can capitalize in a major way on the already written SBWR's SSAR which had been submitted to and partially reviewed by the NRC and which is, in turn, fifty percent identical to the ABWR's SSAR,
- Safety testing program has been completed, with extensive additional tests since the prior relevant testing within the SBWR program,
- Technology reports will all be completed in time for the NRC licensing review,
- The design is now completed to the point required for review by the NRC for issuing a Certification license, and
- The NRC is currently reviewing for generic approval the GE version of the Transient Reactor Analysis Code (TRACG), which will be an essential tool in its Certification review of the ESBWR.

GE/NE requested support from the DOE through a cost-sharing program to complete the Design Certification documentation, present the application to the NRC, and proceed with a licensing review.

### **NTDG Assessment**

The licensing review period probably can be reduced to about three years for a relatively mature design such as the ESBWR. The three major points in favor of the shorter licensing period in the NTDG estimate are:

- The NRC is already partially familiar with the ESBWR given its earlier reviews of the ABWR and the SBWR,
- The extensive multi-year safety-testing program is already completed, and
- Some licensing documentation and design data at the level required for Certification are currently available.

Design Certification in time to allow ESBWR deployment in the U.S. by 2010 requires the following:

- A detailed licensing review plan that has been approved by the NRC. There is the need for NRC commitment to the target cost and timeline for a Design Certification review.
- Commitment by GE/NE to proceed with a Design Certification program, and
- Funding for the SSAR preparation, for a completed Certification application, and for a NRC licensing review.

Assuming that the commitments and financing gaps are resolved in a timely fashion, the NTDG considers that the ESBWR design can meet the criterion of Regulatory Acceptance.

### **Criterion 2: Industrial Infrastructure**

#### **Summary of General Electric Response**

The ESBWR design team plans on utilizing the existing ABWR industrial infrastructure in commercializing the ESBWR. The ESBWR will use components that are identical to or similar to the ABWR: similar size vessel, fine motion control rod drives, pressure suppression containment, fuel designs, materials and chemistry. Since the supply infrastructure for the ABWR already exists, the ESBWR will rely on an existing network of suppliers in Europe, the U.S. and East Asia.

Similar to the ABWR, the ESBWR team expects a large fraction of the components in various plant systems to be provided by U.S. suppliers. In the Nuclear Island, U.S. manufacturers will likely provide valves, pumps, piping and heat exchangers. In the Turbine Island, the turbine generator, the condenser and various heat exchangers could be domestically manufactured. Plant instrumentation and controls will also be built in the U.S. The ESBWR, like the ABWR, will depend on Japanese vendors for the manufacturing of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) forging, large internals, and control rod drives. The ESBWR, like all other Advanced Reactors proposed for deployment in the U.S. by 2010, will depend on a single Japanese vendor for RPV forging – Japan Steel Works. GE/NE has reported that it is exploring other RPV forging venues both in Europe and in Asia, which can be activated should the demand exceed the capacity of the current Japanese supplier.

#### **NTDG Assessment**

The NTDG agrees that the ABWR global supply infrastructure will likely provide the industrial base for the deployment of the ESBWR. The ESBWR like the ABWR and other Advanced Reactors planned for deployment by 2010 will all depend on a single supplier – worldwide –for the provision of RPV forging. Also, GE/NE's commercialization plans for the ESBWR call for the construction of several ABWRs before the deployment of the ESBWR commences. By the time the first ESBWR is committed, in the second half of this decade, additional ABWRs may then concurrently be under construction. The global ABWR/ESBWR supply chain may be constrained to meet an increased demand, and may have to be expanded on an accelerated basis.

In summary, the NTDG considers that the ESBWR meets the criterion of Industrial Infrastructure.

### **Criterion 3: Commercialization Plan**

#### **Summary of General Electric Response**

The ESBWR program plan for the last eight years has been an industry funded and supported plan to develop a passive BWR plant that is economical and meets the utility needs for a reliable

and safe plant. The overall plan presented –past and future – has several steps with decision points on whether to proceed to the next step. This plan includes the following steps:

- GE/NE will continue preparation of Design Certification documentation, and will present the completed application to the NRC review process when funding, through DOE cost-sharing program, is secured.
- Detailed engineering and any needed component testing will be initiated at the final stages of the Design Certification review. Funding sources and requests will depend on the then prevailing market conditions, and could include 50/50 cost share from DOE.
- GE/NE will keep informing its ESBWR utility review board of progress made in the Design Certification and engineering completion programs, and will solicit utility interest in developing the design.

The ESBWR team has completed the supporting technology programs and has completed the design in sufficient detail to conclude that it will meet the economic goals. GE/NE expects an ESBWR to be a commercially viable plant only if the First Of A Kind (FOAK) plant cost, including the ESBWR first time engineering costs, will be lower than the cost of a then fully commercialized Nth Of A Kind (NOAK) ABWR. They are not relying on multiple plant construction plans in order to amortize the engineering costs among several prospective clients.

The next steps in the plan are U.S. NRC design certification (2-4 years) followed by detailed design completion, commitment to a plant, plant specific licensing, and construction. The plans to offer a fully designed and economically competitive ESBWR product in the market has been a long, systematic and generally successful program and has been totally an industry effort, involving both European and U.S. utilities. Beyond Design Certification the plan relies on a robust nuclear marketplace, especially involving several ABWR's, to proceed to the next steps to commercialization. It relies on synergies with ABWR to keep first time engineering costs low and relies on the manpower and industrial infrastructure developed for ABWR.

### **NTDG Assessment**

The NTDG notes that the general commercialization strategy presented for the ESBWR has been successful in bringing the design and technology to its current state. The strategy is a reasonable approach for commercializing a large-scale industrial product such as the ESBWR, under the circumstances of a limited market, and with minimum resources for developing a new product. While the overall thrust of the strategy seems feasible for orderly deployment, there are issues, which must be addressed and accelerated to deploy the ESBWR for operation in the U.S. by 2010. These issues are:

- Early commitment to a Certification program.
- Timely completion of Design Certification.
- Acceleration of the first time engineering effort.

With the exception of timing and/or funding first time engineering, no major commercial factor exists, which would impede deployment of the ESBWR in the U.S. by 2010, should GE/NE proceed with an accelerated commercialization approach. A number of commercial decisions

and milestones will have to be met by all involved parties, to assure the ability to achieve deployment by the end of this decade.

GE/NE stepwise approach to commercialization depends on government cost-share for the Certification program, and will not initiate a detailed engineering and a component testing programs until the Certification review is almost completed, and until several ABWRs have been ordered. While this program minimizes reliance on U.S. Government funding support, it does not accelerate the commercialization schedule to allow deployment by 2010. The NTDG considers that should GE/NE proceed with the stepwise commercialization approach, it may not be able to deploy the ESBWR for operation in the U.S. by 2010, thus the criterion on the Commercialization Plan is not met.

#### **Criterion 4: Cost Sharing Plan**

##### **Summary of General Electric Response**

GE/NE has stated the need for U.S. Government funding to support a Design Certification application and review by the NRC. That funding would support the completion of an ESBWR SSAR, completion of technology reports, qualification of design analysis computer codes, preparation of application documents, and review by and interaction with the NRC's staff. The total cost of a Design Certification licensing program has been estimated by GE/NE to be 30 Million Dollars. GE/NE requests a 50/50 cost-share program with the U.S. Government. The period for this effort is estimated as 2-4 years.

GE/NE justifies U.S. Government cost sharing in its Certification application based on the fact that industry has taken the entire lead for the current eight-year program for designing a viable plant concept, technology development, and safety testing. GE/NE is also seeking government cost sharing for the completion of the ESBWR FTE detailed design.

##### **NTDG Assessment**

The NTDG agrees with GE/NE that it is justified in requesting U.S. Government support for its ESBWR Design Certification application, and that this cost share program is needed to support the deployment of the ESBWR in the U.S. The NTDG judges that careful attention must be given to assure that Design Certification and design completion are funded.

The limited U.S. Government funding requested is justified to develop this industry-funded design into a viable option, by minimizing the risk associated with U.S. Government mandated licensing approval.

A recent GE/NE decision to request U.S. Government cost-share for detailed engineering completion could shorten the ESBWR commercialization schedule to about 2010. The NTDG judges that the ESBWR meets the cost share criterion.

**Criterion 5: Economic Competitiveness****Summary of General Electric Response**

The approach of the ESBWR design team has been to reduce the number of systems and components in order minimize capital costs and annual operating expenses. The ESBWR nuclear island cost is estimated to be 50 percent of the cost of the nuclear island of its SBWR predecessor, and lower than the nuclear island cost of the ABWR. To keep the development costs low, systems components, processes, and technologies from the already developed and operating ABWRs are used extensively. This approach keeps first time design cost uncertainties low.

GE/NE did not provide any capital cost estimate figures for the ESBWR, however it claims that it has an internally generated cost estimate which support its claim for a lower cost for the ESBWR, compared with the ABWR. GE/NE has provided comparisons of several key ESBWR material quantities in relation to such requirements in other BWR designs. These comparisons provide evidence that the ESBWR is a simpler design than the ABWR and other BWR designs, and that it does not require some of the major components, such as the internal recirculation pumps, inherent in the ABWR design. These facts support GE/NE's assertions that the ESBWR should have a lower capital cost than the ABWR.

The ESBWR is being designed with the availability goal of 92 percent, concentrating on reducing the length of outages. Due to the simplicity of the systems and the reduction of components, the reliability, availability and maintainability should be improved over today's BWRs.

**NTDG Assessment**

The NTDG agrees with many of the qualitative assertions of GE/NE regarding the prospective economics of the ESBWR. Given the lack of any cost figures presented, and considering that the ESBWR design has not yet proceeded through FTE completion, it is premature to judge the overall economic competitiveness of the ESBWR. GE/NE has presented estimates of significant materials quantities reduction in the nuclear island of the ESBWR compared with the ABWR. It is not expected that similar large materials or cost savings can also be achieved in the turbine island and the balance of plant (BOP) area, which normally comprises about forty percent of the total plant cost. The ESBWR nuclear island cost advantage would be reduced by about forty percents when averaged over the entire plant.

There exists a reasonable qualitative basis for anticipating that the ESBWR can achieve a competitive position in the future U.S. nuclear market, and thus it can meet the criterion of Economic Competitiveness.

**Criterion 6: Fuel Cycle Infrastructure****Summary of General Electric Response**

The ESBWR fuel cycle uses standard BWR and ABWR fuel, with a slightly shorter configuration. No new fuel design demonstration and qualification program is required. The ESBWR could use the BWR/ABWR existing fuel manufacturing facilities, and the basic manufacturing capacity is already in place. The ESBWR design has allowed the reduction of the number of control blades and control rod drives (CRDs) as compared with its predecessor SBWR design. The use of a new core lattice design has further reduced the number of CRDs in the ESBWR.

The ESBWR is designed to effectively utilize the once-through uranium oxide fuel cycle. Longer cycle length and higher fuel burnup levels have been stressed in the core design development. The core support components and reactor vessel will allow for mixed oxide uranium-plutonium (MOX) fuel use, or the use of mixed fuel types such as uranium and thorium.

**NTDG Assessment**

Given reliance on standard BWR/ABWR fuel designs, there are no major developmental problems in the fuel area that may prevent deployment of the ESBWR in the U.S. by 2010. The use of wider control rod blades in the ESBWR core design, as compared with the ABWR control rods, will not require a redesign of the control rod drive mechanisms, nor will it impact their operation. The ESBWR meets the criterion of Fuel Cycle Industrial Infrastructure. No design-specific gap is identified.

**B. GAP ANALYSIS**

The NTDG has identified several design specific questions that need to be addressed for ESBWR deployment in the U.S. by 2010.

**Design Certification of ESBWR**

The NRC has not yet certified the ESBWR design. There remains some uncertainty as to how long it will take NRC to conduct any Design Certification review, and how long it will take the NRC specifically to review and approve the ESBWR license application. Another uncertainty is the timing of U.S. Government cost-share funding support for ESBWR Certification. If Certification funding is delayed to 2003, and GE/NE application is delayed accordingly, completion of the Certification process by 2005 may be delayed. A time breakdown of the proposed GE/NE request for 50/50 cost-share program is enclosed below.

Closure: Obtain Design Certification of the ESBWR from the NRC by the end of year 2005.

Estimated Cost: GE/NE estimates that the entire process through the granting of Certification will cost 30 Million Dollars and should require less than 3 years, given NRC's level of familiarity with the design, and GE/NE's level of preparations for design submittal to the NRC.

The Annual 50/50 government-industry cost-share budget request is provided below, in units of Million Dollars per year.

	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07
Industry	\$0	\$5M	\$5M	\$5M		
DOE	\$0	\$5M	\$5M	\$5M		

The proposed justification for DOE funding is that the ESBWR eight-year design and testing effort has been entirely financed by private industry and has not involved the DOE, but the licensing issues are specific to the U.S. Government and going through them the first time is a development effort appropriate for shared cost.

### **Funding First Time Engineering**

The ESBWR detailed first-time engineering (FTE) is incomplete. GE/NE recognizes that such funding will have to be provided from a variety of sources, in order to offer the ESBWR as a commercial product.

Closure: Complete FTE, including all detailed engineering not covered in other gaps/solutions, project development, vendor selection, and procurement specifications.

Estimated Cost: First time engineering effort for an Advanced Reactor like the ESBWR could cost several hundred million dollars, depending on the design concept, and on the percent engineering completion achieved by the time of the award of the Design Certification. No funding sources or schedule were identified by GE/NE in any level of detail. The decisions on how to close this gap will depend on progress on the earlier gap closures, on future ABWR sales, and on the development of the marketplace. Following is a rough estimate of anticipated FOAKE costs for ESBWR:

	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09
Industry	\$10M	\$40M	\$50M	\$40M	\$10M	
DOE	\$10M	\$40M	\$50M	\$40M	\$10M	

### **C. OVERALL ASSESSMENT**

The NTDG considers that the ESBWR possibly can be deployed in the U.S. by 2010. Its deployability by 2010 is limited by GE/NE plans to proceed with the commercialization of the design in a stepwise manner, as described above. GE/NE has requested a 50/50 cost-share

funding for Design Certification and FOAKE. The large resources deployed by industry to develop the technology and design justifies the requested funding.

There exist several factors favorable to early deployment of the ESBWR in the U.S. market:


- The design is an extension of other GE/NE BWR product lines, and represents a simplification and optimization of the entire BWR reactor family. It capitalizes on the design, component specifications and commercialization experience of its predecessor BWRs and ABWRs.
- The design represents a passive safety plant concept at a capacity size of a mature, evolutionary, Advanced BWR. It could enjoy the benefits of improved public acceptance and improved economics, related to the elimination of active components such as the internal recirculation pumps, used in the ABWR design.
- The NRC is already familiar with the design, and GE/NE has completed an extensive list of safety testing to confirm it. A significant percentage of the Certification application reports and documents already exist.
- GE/NE has proven experience in commercializing the ABWR and in establishing a global supply network, capable of negotiating lump sum contracting, and meeting delivery schedules. This will prove useful for ESBWR commercialization.
- Commonality in equipment and component specifications, such as the use of similar fuel designs and assembly configurations, could reduce the FTE completion effort and cost and ease the licensing process.

The NTDG considers that additional work has to be completed on the ESBWR, before its potential, as highlighted above, could be realized. In particular, we note the need to secure GE/NE commitment to proceed expeditiously with ESBWR licensing, the need to obtain a Design Certification from the NRC, and the requirement of completing the first time engineering design. GE/NE has proposed funding support to complete the Design Certification licensing and FTE completion. However, GE/NE does not plan to initiate a FTE program until the certification program is nearing completion. These factors raise uncertainty as to the feasible deployment schedule of the ESBWR, should the stepwise commercialization approach be pursued and, as such, the ESBWR is judged to be in the “possibly can be deployed” category for deployment in the U.S. by 2010.

### **Timeline for the ESBWR**

The timeline for the ESBWR follows.

ESBWR Near Term Deployment Roadmap



## FRAMATOME ANP SWR-1000 DESIGN

### A. CRITERIA EVALUATION

The SWR-1000 is a result of a long-term product development project of the Siemens KWU, part of the newly merged Framatome ANP (FANP). FANP has other product lines, such as the EPR, under consideration for potential introduction to the U.S. market.

#### Criterion 1: Regulatory Acceptance

##### **Summary of Framatome Response**

The SWR-1000 does not have a Design Certification from the U.S. Nuclear regulatory Commission (NRC). The design concept of the SWR-1000 was developed on behalf of German utilities that required that the design be licensable according to German law, and was reviewed by the experts of the German Government's Reactor Safety Commission (RSK). Framatome ANP is proposing to bid the SWR-1000 for Finland's fifth nuclear power plant. The concept was discussed with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in Finland. STUK stated that the SWR-1000 is basically licensable according to Finnish codes and standards. An assessment, conducted by the European utilities (EDF of France, TVO of Finland as well as certain German utilities) concluded in 2001 that the SWR-1000 design concept complies with the requirements of the European Utility Requirements Document (EUR) for Light Water Reactor (LWR) Nuclear Power Plants. The results of this assessment will be published in January 2002 as Vol. III of the EUR. FANP has completed design and safety related documents relevant to licensing and is continuing work on the design in preparation for the Finland fifth nuclear plant proposal. FANP states that its significant European licensing experience will be used in support of NRC Design Certification.

FANP expects the following main issues to arise as part of a design certification by NRC:

- Assessment of the neutron-physics and thermal-hydraulic design of the core under normal operational conditions.
- Confirmation of the course of design accident events using the passive safety features of the SWR-1000 only.
- Confirmation of the capability of these safety features to control a postulated severe accident with core melts.
- Confirmation of compliance by the SWR-1000 design concept with US regulatory requirements.

In order for a first SWR-1000 plant to start operation in the U.S. in 2010, construction must commence (with first concrete pour) in 2006. FANP assumes that U.S. Certification would require two years, though it is the general industry assumption that this process may require at least three years, particularly for a foreign design developed to different codes and standards than the NRC is familiar with. This schedule requires that the application to NRC, with all the required documentation, must be submitted by 2003.

FANP has provided a detailed proposed timeline for design certification, starting in July 2001 and assuming the start of the NRC review by February 2002, leading to Design Certification, including public hearing and rulemaking by 2005. However, as of the date of this report there has been no contact between Framatome ANP and the NRC concerning certification of the SWR-1000.

### **NTDG Assessment**

The NTDG concludes that there may be no serious technical hurdles that might prevent regulatory acceptance of the SWR-1000 in the U.S. There are, however, major schedule-related problems that unless expeditiously addressed, could make the licensing schedule proposed by FANP infeasible. These include:

- FANP has not yet committed to commercializing the SWR-1000 in the U.S. FANP has stated that they will not pursue Design Certification in the U.S. in a more proactive manner, until an internal corporate marketing study is completed in 2001.
- FANP did not yet have detailed interaction with the NRC to develop a Certification timeline. They have stated that they are only now in the process of studying 10CFR52 to determine what a realistic Certification schedule might be. FANP has not obtained any commitment from the NRC regarding the assignment of adequate licensing resources, or completion schedule.
- FANP has not yet committed corporate resources for SWR-1000 licensing review in the U.S. These resource requirements could be significant, considering that the German codes and standards used in the SWR-1000 design may have to be re-qualified and translated to NRC approved codes and requirements.

FANP provided limited information on the analytical tools and computer codes to be used to obtain NRC Certification. The SWR-1000 development, design, and safety work, have all been done in Europe. The development, qualification and approval of the safety analysis tools have traditionally taken the bulk of the effort required for NRC Certification of new designs. FANP will have to validate the computer safety codes used in the design of the SWR-1000 and their Quality Assurance standards, to fit the U.S. NRC's requirements. The effort required to convert all submissions and/or reanalyze to U.S. terms so that they can be evaluated using U.S. approved safety codes may be greater than FANP is estimating. Furthermore, given the current German Government policy on nuclear phase-out, future design development work on the SWR-1000 could be slowed down.

The NTDG concludes that with major resource commitment and expeditious schedule criterion 1- Regulatory Acceptance can be met. At this point in time it is too early to tell whether FANP would make such a commitment

**Criterion 2: Industrial Infrastructure****Summary of Framatome Response**

The development of the SWR-1000 has been based on experience gained from boiling water reactor (BWR) plants currently in operation, and incorporates the service-proven technology used at these plants. FANP anticipates no difficulty in finding suitably qualified and certified component manufacturers and suppliers. They believe this also applies to the new passive safety equipment to be used in the SWR-1000 (emergency condensers, containment cooling condensers and passive pressure pulse transmitters), which constitute relatively simple mechanical components (basically heat exchangers). Such components can be fabricated by certified manufacturers, qualified to the ASME Code, which are available in the U.S. and in Canada, Europe and Japan.

The state-of-the-art digital instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment to be used for the SWR-1000 will be manufactured by Siemens Corporation, which has already received approval from the U.S. NRC for its safety I&C platform TELEPERM XS.

FANP anticipates that with careful advanced planning and the timely placement of purchase orders to procure equipment, it should be possible to construct multiple units. For procurement of RPV, a suitable manufacturer still exists in Japan.

The largest nuclear-grade component with the longest lead-time is the RPV. The total time span involved in its manufacture is approximately 40 months and this will possibly require placing orders before ESP/COL is granted.

**NTDG Assessment**

FANP is relying on established industrial infrastructure in Europe for the building of BWRs, and that the worldwide nuclear capabilities of the FANP organization and its Framatome and Siemens subsidiaries are very substantial. A full-scope supply infrastructure exists, capable of building several BWRs in the U.S. or abroad for operation by 2010. However, FANP has not built a BWR in almost 15 years, so this particular infrastructure and the associated manpower may be unproven. Alternate sources of supply may be available to FANP, however no reliable information about that topic was provided.

In general, the potential gaps related to industrial infrastructure are judged to be resolvable for the deployment of an SWR-1000 in the U.S. by 2010. However, further significant expansion of the supply infrastructure for the simultaneous construction of several types of LWRs, may require careful scrutiny by interested parties, at that time. We consider that the SWR-1000 meets the criterion of Industrial infrastructure.

**Criterion 3: Commercialization Plan****Summary of Framatome Response**

FANP has begun to develop a commercialization plan for the SWR-1000. They believe the SWR-1000 can be ready for deployment in the U.S. by 2010, and will represent a nuclear energy option that is capable of generating power at a commercially attractive level.

Development of the SWR-1000 is based on three phases: a Conceptual Phase, a Basic Design Phase and a Detailed Design Phase. The Conceptual Phase started in 1992 and was completed in 1995. During that time the new concept of passive accident control was developed. In the subsequent Basic Design Phase, the SWR-1000 design was further developed and a preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) was generated. This PSAR is now available. In the course of this development work new technical issues arose, and the Basic Design Phase was extended to 2002 in order to address these new issues. All development work performed during the Conceptual and the Basic Design Phases has been jointly financed by the German nuclear utilities and by Framatome ANP.

The third and final phase, the Detailed Design Phase, should result in the completion of all plant design details, such that the SWR-1000 design will be ready for construction. This phase is mainly oriented towards participation in the Finland fifth nuclear power plant bid. The detailed design will reach a point by the fall of 2002 when a proposal can be submitted for an SWR-1000 in Finland.

The SWR-1000 could be ready in the spring of 2003 for commercialization in the U.S. market. The period up to 2005 will be utilized for obtaining Design Certification from the U.S. NRC. Another 15 months are then anticipated as being necessary for contract award and acquisition of a construction permit, with construction starting in 2006. This would be followed by a construction period of 48 months.

Framatome ANP is capable of building the SWR-1000 either as a main contractor who supplies the entire plant on a turnkey basis, or as the head of a consortium. Construction of an SWR-1000 in the U.S. would be facilitated by the fact that FANP already has a national company operating here – Framatome ANP Inc. –, which would be available for project execution.

**NTDG Assessment**

The SWR-1000 is only a potential entrant into the U.S. market, at this time. FANP has begun to evaluate the U.S. market in the second quarter of 2001. Until FANP completes its marketing studies, planned before the end of 2001, and recognizes the opportunities and the challenges in the U.S. nuclear environment, it is not clear that they will launch a commercialization drive for the SWR-1000 in the U.S.

The FANP commercialization plan now concentrates on winning the Finnish fifth nuclear plant contract to provide resources for completing the detailed design. There is yet no identified U.S. utility interest, which could provide impetus for detailed design completion and Certification in

the U.S. However, FANP has considerable resources and very close ties to U.S. utilities. The FANP statement that it will consider full scope turnkey contracts is considered a major positive element in gaining acceptance by U.S. utilities.

The NTDG judges the probability for successful SWR-1000 commercialization in the U.S. by 2010, and the likelihood of meeting the criterion of the Commercialization Plan, to be indeterminate, until a full commitment by FANP to commercializing the design is made.

#### **Criterion 4: Cost Share Plan**

##### **Summary of Framatome Response**

The SWR-1000 basic design has been developed in recent years on behalf of the German utilities. The majority of the development costs have been borne by these utilities and by FANP. The SWR-1000 incorporates passive safety systems, which are basically new, and which have been tested at large-scale test facilities to verify their functional capabilities and capacities. Most of the tests were funded with R&D funds from private industry as well as from the European Union (EU). Additional tests are currently underway to verify core melt retention inside the reactor pressure vessel in the event of a severe accident, and to test the functional capability of a passive boron shutdown system. These safety tests are funded by industry and by the EU.

U.S. Government funding is suggested by FANP for adaptation of the SWR-1000 design to U.S. regulatory requirements and to U.S. sites, as well as licensing in the U.S. – and the possible need for additional experimental or analytical design verification in U.S. laboratories, as a part of an NRC Design Certification program. FANP may, in the future, seek U.S. Government cost sharing for Design Certification Licensing and for ESP/COL application.

FANP further identifies the need for funding of future activities associated with the Detailed Design Phase of the SWR-1000 and experimental design verification. No specific request for U.S. Government cost sharing for these activities has been made.

##### **NTDG Assessment**

FANP has stated that they would initiate a U.S. Design Certification program by themselves, but would look for cost share in parity with past Design Certification submittals. They have not yet defined these needs for U.S. Government cost-share. FANP did not submit a total cost-share budget request, or an annual breakdown of that request. This lack of detail seems indicative of the preliminary status of FANP's licensing and commercialization plan.

The NTDG considers that it is indeterminate as to whether FANP meets the criterion of the Cost-Share Plan for the SWR-1000, pending FANP's commitment to commercialize.

**Criterion 5: Economic Competitiveness****Summary of Framatome Response**

Achieving a reduction in capital and power-generating costs was, in addition to increasing plant safety, one of the two main goals pursued in developing the SWR-1000. The following design features for SWR-1000 account for the projected lowers costs:

- Simplifications in system and component design and the short construction period of 48 months enable the specific capital cost to be lower by 30 percent compared with the capital costs of existing LWR plants of the same capacity
- Simplifications in plant design leads to lower maintenance cost since there are fewer components to be inspected, maintained, and repaired. The smaller number of ATRIUM 12 fuel assemblies may enable shorter refueling outages and higher plant availability. A study conducted by EDF predicted a long-term availability rating of 91.3 percent for the SWR-1000.
- Fuel cycle costs are reduced due to the use of larger fuel assemblies and due to the higher core design burnup of up to 65 GWd/tU.

Based on a first-of-a-kind (FOAK) plant built at a coastal (seawater) site without a cooling tower, the plant specific capital cost is estimated to be within the range of 1,150 – 1,270 \$/kWe. Cost data were reported in year 2000 U.S. Dollars. The smaller value is considered by FANP to be a realistic value, while the larger value is regarded as conservative. Cost savings attainable for a subsequent Nth-of-a-kind (NOAK) plant compared to those of the first-of-a-kind (FOAK) plant were estimated to be in the range of 15 to 20 percent.

**NTDG Assessment**

FANP was very responsive to the RFI regarding the cost and economic information for SWR-1000. However, it is unclear whether some of the data are appropriate to U.S. conditions. The data presented indicate that SWR-1000 could realize excellent economics, but they are based on limited recent construction experience, in the European context. The SWR-1000 could realize these favorable projected economics through major design simplification and equipment elimination programs. Until more design information is developed and the FTE is completed, and until the licensing status of, and the requirements for, the SWR-1000 in the U.S. are established, the economic projections under U.S. conditions cannot be considered definitive. Among other uncertainties, it is also not clear whether the cost of detailed design is factored into the initial U.S. FOAK plant's cost.

The low capital cost figures provided by FANP fall within the range of economic competitiveness of 1,000 – 1,400 \$/kWe, as estimated by the NTDG. The FANP cost projections for the SWR-1000 design can meet the Criterion for Economic Competitiveness. However, there exist many uncertainties in translating a German design into an economic plant under U.S. conditions.

**Criterion 6: Fuel Cycle Infrastructure****Summary of Framatome Response**

The type of fuel that will be used for the SWR-1000 is similar to fuel used in BWRs operating today. Although advanced assembly geometry has been developed which features a 12 x 12 fuel rod lattice, all fuel assembly materials and components correspond to those employed in existing BWRs.

The current BWR fuel fabrication facilities are suitable for manufacturing future SWR-1000 fuel. Enrichment services for SWR-1000 fuel can be provided by the same enrichment plants that enrich uranium to concentrations required in today's BWRs. Conversion from UF<sub>6</sub> to UO<sub>2</sub> can be accomplished in the conversion plants used today, including FANP's advanced dry conversion facilities. Pellet fabrication and fuel assembly manufacturing can also be done in other existing fabrication facilities, including FANP's facilities in the U.S. and Europe. The fuel produced for the SWR-1000 should have the high reliability levels that are typical for today's BWR fuel.

The U.S. and the European nuclear fuel industry are expected to have reserve capacity to fabricate and supply the required SWR-1000 fuel. There exists considerable flexibility in the reliable supply of fuel for the SWR-1000.

It is anticipated that almost all components used in the SWR-1000 fuel assembly will be proven from previous insertion in BWR cores. Although some components, such as the fuel channel and spacers will have different dimensions due to the transition to the 12 x 12 lattice, the design features and materials will be the same as in current BWR reload fuel design. It will not be possible to irradiate lead test assemblies (LTAs) of the SWR-1000 design in current BWRs due to the different ATRIUM 12 assembly dimensions. FANP expects, however, that there will be no need to develop a special qualification and licensing strategy for the SWR-1000 fuel, since its design features and components resemble those of familiar BWR reload fuel, and the licensing procedure is expected to resemble that for familiar BWR reload fuel.

The SWR-1000 fuel assembly uses Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) and is suitable for the once-through fuel cycle as well as for reprocessing and recycling. Extensive experience is available regarding the on-site storage of LWR spent fuel assemblies. This experience is applicable to SWR-1000 fuel assemblies. FANP will optimize the scope of on-site storage of SWR-1000 fuel assemblies based on the requirements specified by its customers. This applies also to the type of storage, e.g. compact storage in the storage pool, or dry storage. From the experience available today with on-site storage of BWR spent fuel assemblies, FANP concludes that no conceptual engineering problem has been identified or is anticipated.

**NTDG Assessment**

There exist no technical problems in the fuel cycle supply infrastructure, which cannot be closed in time for deployment of SWR-1000 in the U.S. by 2010. SWR-1000 will use a non-standard new fuel assembly design. It will not be possible to perform irradiation testing of a LTA in an

actual reactor, as is the current practice in the U.S. This is likely to present a licensing challenge, possibly requiring testing in an ATR type reactor, although FANP's position is that only thermal hydraulic testing will be needed.

In summary, the unique 12x12 ATRIUM fuel design could pose difficult problems to licensing that fuel for insertion in U.S. reactors. FANP, given its considerable fuel cycle resources, should be able to resolve these problems in time for reactor deployment in the U.S. by 2010. We consider that FANP can meet the criterion of Fuel Cycle Infrastructure.

## **B. GAP ANALYSIS**

### **Overview**

FANP did not identify specific gaps but generally recognized the need for closure of several issues related to certification and detailed design completion.

### **Design Certification**

The SWR-1000 has not been submitted to the U.S. NRC for any review, nor does it have a Design Certification. This constitutes a gap that needs to be resolved in order to allow deployment. The existing design and licensing information has been developed for the European regulatory system, in particular for Germany. A major question arises as to the extent to which the existing SWR-1000 licensing information, safety testing, and non-US certified codes are applicable and useful for NRC Design Certification.

Closure: Apply for and Obtain Design Certification of the SWR-1000 from the NRC.

Estimated Cost: No cost figures were provided by FANP on a total funding request or an annual budget breakdown. FANP indicated it would seek parity with previous U.S. Design Certification programs, however no specific numbers were yet provided.

### **Completion of First-Time Engineering**

The SWR-1000 detailed first-time engineering (FTE) is incomplete. In general, FTE results in about 70 percent design completion and may cost upwards of 500 Million U.S. Dollars (The ABWR design team estimates the total FTE cost of the ABWR as 500 Million Dollars).

The SWR-1000 has already been partially designed, to a completion level higher than required for an U.S. Design Certification. FANP estimates design completion level of 40 percent, which would bring the SWR-1000 design completion effort to similar levels as have been achieved during the U.S. First-Of-A-Kind-Engineering (FOAKE) Program.

Closure: Complete FTE, including all detailed engineering, modify design documentation for U.S. codes and standards; incorporate all changes required by NRC in Certification Process.

Estimated Cost: No cost figures were provided by FANP. The level of effort required will depend on the effort expended on the Finland Fifth Nuclear Plant program. FANP has not yet indicated whether it will seek U.S. cost-share funding for this program.

### **Lead Assembly Testing In a Reactor Environment**

The fuel cycle specific gap related to the SWR-1000 deployment is the irradiation testing, in a reactor environment, of a Lead Test Assembly (LTA) of the new ATRIUM 12 fuel. Core testing under realistic neutron flux conditions may be required for the licensing of a new assembly design. FANP's position is that only thermal hydraulic testing will be required, but FANP has not yet interacted with the NRC on this issue. The testing required may need a focused program in an ATR type test reactor, since a LTA could not be tested in an existing commercial reactor given the incompatible dimensions of the ATRIUM 12 assembly.

Closure: Develop and carry out a LTA test program, possibly requiring a high flux U.S. or European test reactor, in a coordinated program with the licensing authorities.

Estimated Costs: No cost figures for this activity were provided by FANP.

## **C. OVERALL ASSESSMENT**

The requirements for the SWR-1000 design deployment in the U.S. include: FANP early commitment to commercializing in the U.S. market, expanding of the required resources to do so on an accelerated schedule, and overcoming the identified design-specific, as well as the generic gaps. At this time, however, FANP has not provided information on its decision to commit to commercialize the SWR-1000 in the U.S. or details of its commercialization plans. Thus there exists significant uncertainty as to whether the SWR-1000 can be deployed in the U.S. by 2010.

Closure of the design specific gaps will require a concentrated effort in the following areas:

- Design certification by the U.S. NRC – this requires a major effort of code development, qualification and testing. A more comprehensive licensing and cost share plan for this effort is also needed.
- Completion of the detailed design by FANP, which could depend on winning the Finnish fifth nuclear plant order and/or significant U.S. utility interest and demonstrated U.S. market potential.
- A focused effort to resolve the potential fuel licensing issues for the ATRIUM 12 fuel.


Beyond these gap resolution issues remains a basic concern with the FANP commercialization plan. FANP is only now developing its commercialization plan for the U.S. market, to be completed by the end of 2001. It is not clear, at this point, that the SWR-1000 will be chosen as their preferred nuclear technology to be commercialized in the U.S. This decision will also be influenced by FANP analysis of the prospects of the SWR-1000 winning the bid for the Finland fifth nuclear plant.

Commercialization of any foreign nuclear reactor design in the U.S. will require a major commitment of financial and engineering resources. A large global nuclear corporation such as FANP, with several large subsidiaries in the U.S., and with good exposure to U.S. nuclear utilities, could undertake such commitments, when it determines to do so. Considering the challenges in adopting the design to meet U.S. requirements, and in developing an expedited commercialization strategy, it is judged, at this point, that the SWR-1000 is in the “possibly can be deployed in the U.S. by 2010” category.

**Timeline for the SWR-1000**

The timeline for the SWR-1000 follows:

SWR1000 Near Term Deployment Roadmap



## WESTINGHOUSE AP1000/600 DESIGNS

Westinghouse has submitted two plant designs, the AP600 and the AP1000 for evaluation as near term deployment candidates in the U.S.

The AP600 is a two-loop, 600 MWe pressurized water reactor (PWR) with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications to enhance construction, operation, and maintenance. The AP600 design received Design Certification in December 1999.

The approach in uprating the AP600 to the AP1000 was to increase the power capability of the plant within the space constraints of the AP600, while retaining the credibility of proven components and substantial safety margins. The AP1000 power uprating results in 30 percent generating cost reduction relative to AP600 because the increased power is achieved with a small increment in capital cost and without significant loss of design detail. The AP1000 passive safety systems are the same as those for the AP600, except for some changes in component capacities.

The NRC is performing a pre-application review of the AP1000 during 2001. AP1000 Design Certification is expected to be completed by the end of 2004.

The AP1000 and AP600 are both PWR systems whose power trains use technology proven over decades of extensive operating experience in both commercial electricity generation and naval nuclear propulsion. The core, reactor vessel, internals, and fuel are essentially the same design as for present operating Westinghouse PWRs. Canned rotor primary pumps, proven in the naval program and in fossil boiler circulation systems, have been adopted to improve reliability and maintenance requirements. The pressurizer is a conventional design except that it has a larger volume to minimize the need for relief valve actuation. Providing larger design margins has reduced the burden on the components and systems.

The innovative aspect of the design is the use of passive features for emergency cooling of the reactor and containment. The cooling is provided by natural forces such as gravity, natural circulation, convection, evaporation, and condensation rather than on AC power supplies and motor-driven components. All safety-related electrical power requirements are met by Class 1E batteries, eliminating the need for safety grade on-site AC power sources and greatly reducing dependence on off-site power.

The passive emergency core cooling system provides core residual heat removal, safety injection, and depressurization. It includes a 100 percent capacity passive residual heat removal heat exchanger that satisfies the safety criteria for loss of feedwater, feedwater line breaks and steam line breaks. The entire system is located within the containment building, requiring no circulation of reactor coolant outside the containment boundary. The system consists of a combination of cooling water sources: gravity drain of water from two core makeup tanks and a large refueling water storage tank suspended above the level of the core as well as water injected from two accumulator tanks under nitrogen pressure.

The passive containment cooling system provides the safety-related ultimate heat sink for the plant. In a loss of cooling accident, the natural circulation air-cooling of containment is supplemented by evaporation of water flowing by gravity from a tank located on top of the containment building shield. Heat is removed from the containment vessel by the continuous, natural circulation of air so that design pressure is not exceeded and pressure is rapidly reduced.

The use of passive emergency cooling permits substantial simplification of the plant: 60 percent fewer valves, 75 percent less piping, 80 percent less control cabling; 35 percent fewer pumps and 50 percent less seismic building volume as compared to present operational PWRs. Extensive testing of the AP600 passive cooling systems has been completed and supported by independent confirmatory testing by NRC to verify the design and analyses of the passive emergency cooling features.

## **AI. CRITERIA EVALUATION: AP1000**

### **Criterion 1: Regulatory Acceptance**

#### **Summary of Westinghouse Response**

The AP1000 is based largely on the AP600 design that has received design certification (DC) from the U.S. NRC. AP1000 is being designed to meet current U.S. regulations in the same manner as the AP600. The AP1000 safety systems are the same as those for the AP600, except for some changes in component capacities. Westinghouse expresses little doubt that the AP1000 can meet current regulatory requirements.

Significant licensing issues are expected in the NRC review, many of which have already been addressed to some degree by the AP600 DC. These include:

- 20 percent of the AP600 sections of the SSAR will require change.
- The test results and analysis codes accepted by NRC for the AP 600 will be used in support of AP1000 Design Certification application. No additional testing is expected to be required to support AP1000 licensing.
- Applicability of the AP600 safety analysis codes to the AP1000 must be demonstrated. The AP1000 Code Applicability Report was submitted to NRC in justification.
- Applicability of the AP600 PRA to the AP1000 PRA must be demonstrated. The AP1000 is designed to maintain large safety margins for postulated accidents; low risk associated with the AP600 design will be reflected in AP1000 results.
- Acceptance criteria for the AP1000 design (not needed for DC of the AP600) will be based on the same ITAAC Design Acceptance Criteria (DAC) process used for the evolutionary ALWRs.
- Applicability of exemptions granted to AP600 must be extended to the AP1000.

Examples of the more significant safety margins estimated for the AP1000 design are shown in Table I. These and some other margins are lower than AP600 but they still meet NRC's regulatory requirements and, in no case does a particular margin drop below a value that has

already been successfully licensed in a currently operating plant. The most significant margin that is decreased from the AP600 value is the large break LOCA peak clad temperature. As part of its pre-application submittals to NRC, Westinghouse has provided an extensive discussion comparing safety margins between AP600 and AP1000 and expects to identify NRC concerns, if any, prior to beginning the review of its formal application.

**TABLE I: Examples of AP1000 Safety Margins** <sup>(1)</sup>

	Typical Plant	AP600	AP1000
Loss of flow margin to DNBR limit	1-5 percent	15.8 percent	13.6 percent
Feed water line break sub-cooling margin	Greater than 0° F	170° F	140° F
Steam Generator Tube Rupture	Operator action required in 10 minutes	Operator Action not required	Operator Action not required
Large Pipe Break	2000-2200° F	1644° F	1940° F

(1) Based on preliminary AP1000 T&H analyses using AP600 SSAR computer codes

To avoid opening new policy issues, AP1000 will follow the past precedents set by the AP600 review. This should avoid opportunities for delay in the NRC review schedule, since it will limit the ability of NRC reviewers to re-open issues already settled in the AP600 Design Certification.

The AP1000 Design Certification will likely be off the critical path for deployment because projected ESP and COL licensing schedules appear today to extend to 2005.

### NTDG Assessment

The AP1000 has a good regulatory position. There is little doubt that the AP1000 can meet the current regulatory requirements and that a design certification will be obtained. The uncertainty resides in the time it will take, including the necessary public hearings. This uncertainty is ameliorated because AP1000 licensing relies heavily on precedents already established by NRC in their AP600 review, and because it appears that DC is not presently on the AP1000 critical path to deployment. Presently it appears that ESP and COL may be on the AP1000 critical path.

The up-front effort to address the key issues of applicability of the AP600 licensing determinations is an appropriate strategy. The timely resolution of the applicability issues identified through the pre-application review of the AP1000 with the NRC are key to confirming that the design certification schedule will meet the near term deployment criteria.

It is reassuring that Westinghouse preliminary estimates indicate that adequate safety margins remain in the AP1000 design and, in almost all cases, are significantly larger than in present operating plants. But, the magnitude of the regulatory acceptance gap depends strongly on the

magnitude of changes in safety margin from the AP600 to the AP1000. Significant safety margin decreases could reopen issues that are thought to be settled. This could delay the process, particularly if the NRC requires additional tests and code modifications. PCT (Peak Clad Temperature) is important because it is a measure of core-cooling effectiveness in loss-of-coolant accidents. A 300 °F increase makes the ECCS significantly less effective than in AP600. However, the result does not appear to be a fundamental design issue, but one that could be optimized if need be. NRC can be expected to look at this closely.

A significant hedge against the possible need for further testing is the Oregon State facility that was used for AP600 testing and is now being funded under NERI to perform confirmatory testing related to AP1000 plant safety system performance.

The AP1000 can meet Criterion 1. AP1000 is not yet certified, but the pre-application review is in progress. Its licensing position is based on AP600.

## **Criterion 2: Industrial Infrastructure**

### **Summary of Westinghouse Response**

The U.S. nuclear power plant industrial base has been in place for over 40 years. It was developed specifically for light water plant designs and has maintained most of its capability by participation in the international new plant market and by meeting domestic fuel and services supply requirements. Standardized, pre-licensed plants are expected to reduce significantly the complexity of the industrial infrastructure necessary to build new plants.

Plant Design: Westinghouse has successfully used integrated industry resources to design many of the existing commercial PWRs and more recently the AP600. Design support has come from numerous sources. Plant design for more than one plant should be easily facilitated by use of standard designs that are nearly complete.

Equipment Supply: The AP1000 safety systems have fewer pumps, valves, and associated piping in comparison with current or evolutionary plants. Substantial major equipment supplier capability exists worldwide, including many qualified suppliers with the capability to manufacture the major nuclear grade components needed for new plant construction. Westinghouse has identified a long list of domestic and international suppliers of major nuclear equipment. Standardization can provide the buying power to enable build up of domestic equipment supplier capability.

Nuclear (ASME) certification is a key issue with suppliers of smaller components, especially for steel mill piping, and possible Section III heat exchangers and filters. No small U.S. supplier has maintained this certification. Re-establishing supplier capability is straightforward, but depends on determination by the suppliers whether or not the new market can support the expense of re-qualification.

The list of nuclear-ASME-qualified suppliers would grow considerably for highly reliable equipment not requiring a nuclear pedigree. The design of the AP1000 is unique in this respect because the U.S. NRC has accepted control functions, including components, as non-safety, that do not need to meet nuclear-grade requirements. Also, the AP1000 safety systems have less equipment when compared to current or evolutionary plants, reducing qualified supplier capability requirements.

Architect Engineering: A significant A/E capability still exists in the U.S. and elsewhere, and is available for new plant projects. The capability is more than adequate to support engineering of the site interface for a new plant or multiple plants due to the reduced effort required for standardized designs.

Project Management: Assembling a new plant project management team with nuclear experience will be challenging. More than one organization may be needed to provide the talent for a complete project team. Westinghouse anticipates it will need a project team of 100 to 150 people, including site management above the craft labor supervisor level.

Construction Companies: The size and complexity of a large new nuclear plant project will be challenging, and finding capability is a significant issue. The recent experience of building combined cycle power plants and other process plants is applicable, with the exception of the particular QA and QC challenges of nuclear construction. The AP1000 benefits because large portions of the on-site construction capability required for current plant construction, will not be required because of structural and systems modules to be built in manufacturing facilities. An estimated 40 percent of field labor hours will be moved to shops. Also if needed, overseas construction companies could probably be used to fill any gaps.

Long Lead Procurement: Long lead items, such as reactor vessels, steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, integrated head package, turbine generators, certain heat exchangers, and the plant simulator need to be ordered approximately 30 to 36 months in advance of installation.

### **NTDG Assessment**

The reactivation of the nuclear power plant design and construction industry called for by Westinghouse will require firm commitments on the part of many companies to meet near-term deployment schedules. This can be done for one or several new plants, but would probably present difficulties for a larger number of plant starts because of supply limitations. Standard plant designs are a necessary ingredient for success. The standardization policy established in the ALWR Program is being followed.

Equipment supply, given the loss of small U. S. suppliers with ASME Nuclear certification is clearly a problem, but is probably manageable for near-term deployment. One reason is that there are still ASME-qualified suppliers for the major components. Another is that the Westinghouse passive design eliminates many of the active systems and protective functions required in earlier plant designs, with the result that fewer suppliers of small components will be needed. Also regulatory acceptance of some components, formerly safety-grade, as non-safety grade would be helpful, if the NRC implements Option 2 of SECY -98-300. Nuclear safety

qualification of off-the shelf equipment is of potential use. Some use of foreign suppliers will also be helpful.

Project management is a critical skill, and recruiting the 100-150 people will be a challenge. An issue generic to all NTDG plants is the need for a national effort to educate and train the human resource infrastructure to sustain and expand nuclear energy activities.

Obtaining construction capability will also be a challenge, and use of some foreign construction companies may be needed.

The AP1000 meets Criterion 2. Strong international infrastructure is in place. No gaps are unique to AP1000.

### **Criterion 3: Commercialization Plan**

#### **Summary of Westinghouse Response**

The key to successful commercialization of new nuclear generation by 2010 is readiness in several different areas. The main areas requiring progress to meet one or more stages of completion are (1) plant design completion, (2) regulatory approvals of the plant design, to the design certification stage, and construction sites, (3) a project implementation plan including detailed scheduling, (4) reliable project cost projections leading to competitive electrical generation, (5) project participants with defined and integrated scopes of supply who are committed to meeting objectives and estimated costs, (6) reliable supplier chain, (7) adequate experienced engineering, project management and construction workforce, and (8) reliable financing at competitive rates. No one company or institution can satisfy all of the needs generated by the above list. Westinghouse identified areas within its domain of expertise and influence.

Market Opportunities: For the past 25 years the only market opportunities for new plant sales were international customers, including Korea, Japan, and China, with plant offerings in smaller markets in Finland and South Africa. Due to plans to retire their Magnox and gas-cooled reactors over the next 20 years and commitment to reducing greenhouse gases, the United Kingdom could be one of the largest markets for 1000 MWe plants in the next 20 years. A significant small plant market (<700 MWe) will become active after 2005.

The U.S. is just awakening to the future potential of nuclear power and it is difficult to predict the size of the market in the next ten years. The focus will be on generation costs, plant performance, and new and simpler designs. AP1000 meets these objectives. When the first advanced passive plant is deployed, it is possible that many more units will follow.

Plant Design Completion: this is critically important. Emphasis will be on 1) developing a reliable project schedule, 2) generating a complete lowest cost price, 3) gaining NRC acceptance of the plant design, and 4) establishing well-defined boundaries and responsibilities between project participants.

The effort required for AP1000 design completion can be estimated with confidence with reference to AP600, for which the plant design has been completed such that detailed project schedules and substantive vendor quotes can be and have been generated. Completed design detail includes equipment specifications down to the sub-component level, detailed final equipment drawings on all major components, piping and instrumentation drawings for all nuclear and turbine island areas, and detailed module descriptions available for bidding by large systems fabricators.

Approximately 80 percent of the AP600 design drawings apply directly to the AP1000 plant. This high percentage was accomplished by minimizing component and systems design changes to achieve 1000 MWe. This approach has led to an AP1000 footprint that is identical to that of the AP600. Component changes for the AP1000 were accomplished using existing equipment design features most of which have had field duty such as the steam generators, nuclear fuel, reactor vessel and control rod drive mechanisms. For those changes made in the AP1000 plant, new costs were established by utilizing existing quotes or obtaining new ones. Minor changes in pipe sizes, valve flow rates and heat exchanger requirements were also considered in the revised cost estimate. Therefore, as is the case for the AP600, there is a high degree of confidence in the cost estimate for the AP1000.

Regulatory Approvals: A critical factor in the Commercialization Plan is the presumed completion of all regulatory approvals required to initiate construction of the plant at an acceptable site. Three necessary approvals are the Design Certification, the Early Site Permit (ESP) and the Combined License (COL). ESP and COL require owner actions with the NRC. Potential owners are currently exploring the possibility of pursuing ESPs and COLs.

Detailed Construction Scheduling: An extremely detailed project schedule that includes three years from the pour of first concrete to fuel load has been generated for the AP600. Only minor changes are required to make the schedule applicable to the AP1000, with the most significant being the installation of an additional containment ring, which is off the critical path.

Project Planning: Many questions on planning require answers: supply chain capability (addressed in Criterion 2), project costs (addressed in Criteria 4 and 5), and adequate engineering, construction and operations resources, and financing.

Project Financing: This is a critical part of commercialization. The focus will be on the owners, but strong support is needed from the suppliers, the A/Es and the U.S. Government to assure the lending institutions that the project is viable. Needed support includes project risk allocation, project costs and schedule, design completion, project payment structure, experience in new projects and working together. The owners need to address the issues of experienced operations, reliable maintenance, the fuel cycle, waste disposal and decommissioning.

U.S. Government: The U.S. Government has a role in at least three areas: 1) providing timely regulatory review of the plant and site submittals to the NRC, 2) assuring the implementation of waste disposal and spent fuel storage/disposition, and 3) helping develop confidence in lending

institutions by addressing and removing uncertainties associated with long-term government actions.

Introduction of New Technologies: New technologies, especially computer-aided drafting and advanced management information systems, are being applied in other industries and can be applied to design, procurement and construction of AP600 and AP1000 units. New processes and tools can integrate and coordinate the entire team of owner, designer, constructor, fabricators, and suppliers into a cohesive, quick turnaround whole.

Teaming Arrangements: Westinghouse endorses an approach that would bring power companies together to share certain costs of new construction, e.g., first time engineering, procedures development and training, so the first plant buyer would not have to cover all of the first time costs alone. A teaming approach for the designers and constructors can provide the close working relationships needed to minimize costs and resolve problem areas.

### **NTDG Assessment**

NTDG agrees that readiness is required in the list of 8 main areas requiring progress that is shown above. Westinghouse has identified its areas of expertise, but a substantial cooperative effort by other players in the industry is needed as well. Market opportunity is the most critical in this category.

The approach of minimizing change between the AP600 and AP1000 designs is important to achieving timely design completion, but construction planning and schedule uncertainty is introduced because of the AP1000 design differences. Westinghouse has minimized those differences by keeping the footprint and layout of the two designs the same. Although larger components are used in the AP1000 design, these components are based upon designs that have been used in operating plants. Use of virtual construction technology to compare the two designs would improve the understanding of the impact of those differences.

The Westinghouse commercialization plan shared with the NTDG is not as complete as one would expect of an internal strategic action plan that sets forth goals, describes the actions that must be carried out and the activities that are needed to make sales and get underway for timely completion. This is not surprising, because companies do not normally tell their competitors how they plan to do the job.

Westinghouse introduces the possibility of a cooperative effort among power companies, suppliers and constructors but does not seem to weight it heavily in their commercialization plan. A consortium is a well-known concept to reduce individual company risk, which is a very important factor in deciding to build a nuclear plant. NTDG believes that the consortium idea should receive more attention as a possible route to near-term deployment. The consortium idea could also apply on the supplier side, as a way to bring together all of the capabilities needed for plant design, for component fabrication, and for plant construction. It is also possible that a consortium could link together the power producers, the plant suppliers, and long-term electricity supply contracts. An encouraging move in this direction has recently been announced publicly by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. MHI has agreed to participate and contribute toward

completing the AP1000 and would be a participant in actually deploying units. EDF and BNFL are also involved and Westinghouse states that they plan to add a number of other companies over the next year or so.

The AP1000 can meet Criterion 3. It is a mature design but will require substantial financial investment to bring to market.

#### **Criterion 4: Cost Sharing Plan**

##### **Summary of Westinghouse Response**

Westinghouse proposes that DOE cost share generic and plant-specific activities up to a point in time where construction of a new plant can be committed. During this period, a project to deploy a new plant is speculative, and government cost share will be important to attracting potential owners to participate in bringing plant options to market and investing their own funds. This period also involves significant FOAK costs that are nonrecurring. For a new plant design to be competitive, these costs will need to be spread over multiple units in addition to being shared with the Government.

Benefits from stimulating the deployment of new nuclear plants would include royalty income for DOE, based on its prior investments in the ALWR program. It would also assist in making nuclear power a greater contributor to meeting U.S. energy needs, thereby lessening reliance on new fossil units, with their associated pollution and resulting costs to consumers.

Westinghouse is willing to cost share such efforts as it did in the successful ALWR program – including royalty payments for any future funding. Support for current AP1000 design, development, and NRC review activities is being provided by industry (Westinghouse Electric Company, British Nuclear Fuels Limited, EPRI, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Electricite de France, and several other European utilities) and by the U.S. Government through a DOE NERI grant.

The proposed cost sharing is 50 percent by industry and 50 percent by Government. The one exception is the NRC fees for performing the federally mandated reviews associated with ESPs, COLs, and design certifications, where it is proposed that these fees be fully funded by the Government. The industry cost share would be carried in part by Westinghouse and in part by its partners/suppliers.

The total cost estimated by Westinghouse to complete the AP1000 design, identified in their design specific gap analysis, is \$303M. Westinghouse proposes that \$155M be paid by the Government and \$148M by industry. The identified funding is based on an approach that the plant specific detailed design and engineering efforts will be carried out on either (but not both) AP600 or AP1000, depending on Westinghouse reviews with potential plant owners.

## NTDG Assessment

The Westinghouse cost-sharing plan includes a clear statement of costs to be shared by Government and by industry, as well as a rationale for the proposed split. The funding proposed to be shared by DOE and other industrial partners is very large and will be difficult to come by.

It is not clear whether the Federal Government will be willing to provide the substantial amount of cost-share that Westinghouse has proposed. To be successful, Westinghouse will need to be flexible in its cost-sharing approach and should also consider other options, e.g., (1) convince industry to provide more than 50 percent cost share, (2) enlist support of the power companies to help demonstrate a wider industry interest in going forward with the design, and/or (3) develop an alternate commercialization approach that allows some of the design completion steps and their funding to be phased, consistent with key milestones. This approach is further elaborated under the design specific gap analyses, and a conclusion reached that a revised cost-sharing (Table V) of 41 percent Government and 59 percent by industry is more appropriate.

AP1000 meets Criterion 4, since the cost-sharing is altered to increase industry participation, relative to government contribution.

## Criterion 5: Economic Competitiveness

### Summary of Westinghouse Response

Construction Schedule: The construction schedule is important because the interest during construction and the construction overheads add significantly to the cost of power and will to a considerable extent be determined by the time between expending funds for fabrication and construction and the time the plant begins to operate. The standard AP1000 schedule for an Nth plant is 5 years from order placement and 3 years from first concrete pour to fuel load. Having the Design Certification in hand and the simplified AP1000 design will make this schedule possible. The cost estimates (in \$ millions) provided by Westinghouse for the AP1000, rated at 1090 MWe, are shown in Table II.

The overnight capital cost for the first unit is estimated to be \$1.49 billion (or 1,365 \$/kWe). This assumes that the first unit is ordered as part of a pair of units and the costs include procurement costs, construction costs, post-construction costs, contingency, owner's costs, and the first time engineering. If it is assumed that the first time engineering costs are recovered before the first project (e.g., through a cost-shared Government/industry program), then the overnight capital cost for the first unit would drop to \$1.32 billion (or 1,210 \$/kWe). For the Nth-of-a-Kind plant, the learning curve would reduce the overnight capital costs to \$1.13 billion (or 1,040 \$/kWe). The cost estimate is based on quotes and estimates from vendors and standard labor rates for Kenosha, Wisconsin. The production cost (O&M, fuel, and decommissioning) is 1.1 cents/kWh. The total generation cost for an Nth-of-a-Kind unit is estimated to be 3.2 cents/kWh. All costs are in year 2000 dollars.

Table II: AP1000 Cost Estimates

Procurement	676
Construction	406
Post construction	9
Contingency	78
Plant Engineering	338
Owner's cost	150
Sum of first 6 rows	1657
Less <del>of</del> Plant engineering	-169
FOAK overnight cost (FOAK \$/kWe)	1488 (1365 \$/kWe)
Less <del>of</del> Plant engineering	-169
Less Nth plant reduction	-185
Nth plant overnight cost (Nth plant \$/kWe)	1134 (1040 \$/kWe)

## Notes:

- FOAK overnight cost is based on the assumption that the plant engineering cost would be charged to the first two units, each unit bearing half the cost since units would be ordered in pairs.
- Nth plant overnight cost assumes that the plant engineering cost is charged to the first two units; the Nth plant reduction is derived from the learning experience on earlier plants.

**NTDG Assessment**

The Westinghouse financial projections show that AP1000 has lower capital and operating costs than AP600, estimating a total generation cost of 3.2 cents/kWh for AP1000. This is a substantial reduction (about 37 percent) that results from treating the changes as a power up-rate of the AP600 design rather than simply scaling up all of the design features in the plant.

A comparison of the projected generation cost of AP1000 with a new natural gas fired plant shows that AP1000 is competitive in the present market with gas-fired and coal-fired plants. This assumes a natural gas price in the range of \$3 to \$4 million BTU, which has prevailed until increases (which may be temporary) were caused by increased demand for natural gas and inadequate new production and transmission line capabilities electricity shortages in some regions of the U.S. If gas prices rise in excess of normal inflation, the profit margins could be even more substantial.

The key to assuring an adequate return on investment is plant reliability. There is strong assurance of AP1000 operational reliability because the plant design utilizes proven technology, and incorporates the lessons learned from decades of operating experience at U.S. nuclear plants.

The primary uncertainty is in the ability to achieve the capital cost target and to complete construction (from the first concrete pour to commercial operation) in the three years planned. It is recommended that a contingency of 6 months be added to the scheduled construction time for the first unit. The overall time-line can be kept the same by scheduling the total time to obtain a COL at 18 months rather than 24 months and starting site and construction preparations 6 months earlier. Investor confidence has to be gained that the plant will be built on that schedule and within budget. A contribution to building that confidence can be to utilize virtual construction (3D+ time digital portrayals of the construction process) to provide detailed planning and schedule recovery capability as well as to demonstrate the validity of the schedule.

Based on Westinghouse projected costs, AP1000 can meet Criterion 5.

### **Criterion 6: Fuel Cycle Industrial Structure**

#### **Summary of Westinghouse Response**

Production: All of the facilities necessary for fuel production supporting the operation of the Westinghouse AP1000 plant are currently in commercial operation and are supplying fuel for the existing PWR operating plants that is the same as needed in the AP1000.

The enriched uranium supply chain (consisting of uranium ore extraction and refining, UF<sub>6</sub> conversion and enrichment) is characterized worldwide by significant over-capacity from both the conventional sources as well as the sources resulting from nuclear weapons dismantling.

The fuel fabrication portion of fuel supply has excess capacity both within the U.S. and from international sources. Westinghouse has significant available capacity that is currently in lay-up but could be re-activated in a relatively short period of time. The capacity needed to support new plant orders could easily be put into commercial service within the new power plant construction period.

Fuel Qualification & Licensing: No fuel qualification or licensing will be required for the Westinghouse AP1000 plant design, since it uses fuel that is currently licensed and in commercial service.

Fuel Reliability: The fuel required for the Westinghouse AP1000 design is currently in service and is exceeding the industry fuel reliability requirements.

On-Site Spent Fuel Storage: The Westinghouse AP1000 plant design provides for on-site wet spent fuel storage to accommodate the spent fuel resulting from at least 10 years of operation without shipment of spent fuel or fuel consolidation, while maintaining the ability for a full core offload. In addition, on-site dry storage is a clearly demonstrated and feasible option for the interim storage of spent fuel.

**NTDG Assessment**

NTDG agrees with the Westinghouse response. There is no problem in the fuel cycle industrial structure that would hamper deployment of the AP1000. Although there is a plentiful supply of enrichment services worldwide, a generic issue exists in that domestic supply is limited to one relatively old plant. In the longer term, a more robust domestic enrichment supply would be prudent

AP1000 meets Criterion 6. It will utilize conventional fuel.

**A2. CRITERIA EVALUATION: AP600****Criterion 1: Regulatory Acceptance****Summary of Westinghouse Response**

The AP600 received Design Certification from the U.S. NRC in December 1999. This resulted from a seven year review of the AP600 standard plant design review including:

- AP600 Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR)
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment
- Inspections Tests Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)
- AP 600 Test Program and Safety Analysis Codes

The test program results were used to validate the safety analysis codes. The purpose of these codes is to predict the performance of the passive safety features in response to transients and accidents. First-of-a-kind (FOAK) engineering totaled approximately \$190 million and produced over 12,000 design documents and a 3-D computer model of the entire plant that is integrated with both the plant engineering database and detailed 36-month construction schedule. The FOAK work was helpful in assuring NRC that the balance-of-plant safety issues had been adequately addressed.

Westinghouse also identified the need for the Early Site Permit (ESP) and the Combined License (COL), which have not been completed yet. Both require plant owner actions with the NRC.

**NTDG Assessment**

Because the NRC has accepted the AP600 test and analysis codes, and granted AP600 Design Certification, the AP600 has a strong regulatory position. NTDG concurs with Westinghouse that an ESP and a COL are necessary for near-term deployment. Some additional work is needed for Westinghouse to reach agreement with the NRC on details of the ITAAC process. However this is a generic issue that applied to all certified designs that are referenced in a COL. It is reasonable to expect that these needs can be met in time for deployment by 2010.

The AP600 meets Criterion 1; the design is certified.

### **Criterion 2: Industrial Infrastructure**

The summary of the Westinghouse response and the NTDG evaluation for the AP600 are essentially identical to the AP1000 and thus are stated under the AP1000 criteria evaluations.

The AP600 meets Criterion 2, with the same comments provided for AP1000.

### **Criterion 3: Commercialization Plan**

The summary of the Westinghouse response and the NTDG evaluation for the AP600 are essentially identical to the AP1000 and thus are stated under the AP1000 criteria evaluations.

The AP600 can meet Criterion 3. It is a mature design but will require substantial financial investment to bring to market. Because it is already certified, AP600 design completion costs are incrementally (~10 percent) lower than AP1000.

### **Criterion 4: Cost Sharing Plan**

The summary of the Westinghouse response and the NTDG evaluation for the AP600 are essentially identical to the AP1000 except that the design certification effort, (identified at a total cost of \$30 million versus an \$18.7 million government cost-share). Thus the AP1000 criteria evaluations are given under AP1000 Criterion 4.

The AP600 meets Criterion 4. It is recommended that the Westinghouse plan be altered to increase industry participation, relative to government contribution

### **Criterion 5: Economic Competitiveness**

#### **Summary of Westinghouse Response**

Construction Schedule: The construction schedule is important because the cost of power from any plant will, to a considerable extent, be determined by the time between committing funds for fabrication and construction and the time the plant begins to operate. Because the AP1000 follows the design footprint of the AP600, their overall schedules are identical. The standard AP600 schedule for an Nth plant is 5 years from order placement to commercial operation. Having the Design Certification in hand makes this schedule possible. The Westinghouse cost estimates (in \$ million) for the AP600, rated at 610 MWe, are shown in Table III.

TABLE III: AP600 COST ESTIMATES

Procurement	614
Construction	352
Post construction	8
Contingency	69
Plant Engineering	268
Owner's cost	150
Sum of first 6 rows	1461
Less <del>of</del> Plant engineering	-134
FOAK overnight cost (FOAK \$/kWe)	1327 (2175 \$/kWe)
Less <del>of</del> Plant engineering	-134
Less Nth plant reduction	-182
Nth plant overnight cost (Nth plant \$/kWe)	1011 (1657 \$/kWe)

## Notes:

- FOAK overnight cost is based on assumption that the plant engineering cost would be charged to the first two units), with each unit bearing half the cost, since units would be ordered in pairs.
- Nth plant overnight cost assumes that the plant engineering cost is charged to the first two units; the Nth plant reduction is derived from the learning experience on earlier plants.

The overnight capital costs for the first unit are estimated to be \$1.33 billion (or 2,175\$/kwe). This assumes that the first unit is ordered as part of a pair of units and the costs include procurement costs, construction costs, post-construction costs, contingency, owner's costs, and the first time engineering. If it is assumed that the first time engineering costs are recovered before the first project (e.g., through a cost-shared Government/industry program), then the overnight capital cost for the first unit would drop to \$1.19 billion (or 1,956 \$/kWe). For the Nth-of-a-Kind plant, the learning curve would reduce the overnight costs to \$1.01 billion (or 1,657 \$/kWe). The cost estimate is based on quotes and estimates from vendors and standard labor rates for Kenosha, Wisconsin. The production cost (O&M, fuel, and decommissioning) is 1.4 cents/kWh. The total generation cost for an nth-of-a-kind unit is estimated to be 4.7 cents/kWh. All costs are in year 2000 dollars.

**NTDG Assessment**

The Westinghouse financial data show that AP600 has higher capital and higher operating costs than AP1000, citing a total generation cost of 4.7 cents/kWh for AP600 (and 3.22 cents/kWh for AP1000). AP600 has the important advantage of Design Certification, which AP1000 does not yet have, and will not have for several years. Since the projected schedule is the same for the two plants, i.e., 2010, an AP600 order would essentially be a hedge against possible delay of Design Certification of AP1000, assuming that the plant output is not an issue.

A comparison of the generation cost of AP600 with a new natural gas fired plant shows that AP600 is competitive at a price of natural gas between \$5 and \$6 per million BTU with a combined cycle natural gas plant. The conclusion is that AP600 would be competitive with new natural gas power plants if natural gas prices remain at levels of this past winter. If gas prices fall to average levels of the 1990s, AP600 would be unlikely to be competitive.

The key to assuring an adequate return on investment is plant reliability. There is strong assurance of AP1000 operational reliability because the plant design utilizes proven technology, bolstered by infusion of decades of operating experience, that is already being achieved by most of the present U.S. nuclear plants.

The primary uncertainty is in the ability to achieve the capital cost target and to complete construction (from the first concrete pour to commercial operation) in the three years planned. It is recommended that a contingency of 6 months be added to the scheduled construction time for the first unit. The overall time-line can be kept the same by scheduling the total time to obtain a COL at 18 months rather than 24 months and starting site and construction preparations 6 months earlier. Investor confidence has to be gained that the plant will be built on that schedule and within budget. A contribution to building that confidence can be to utilize virtual construction (3D+ time digital portrayals of the construction process) to provide detailed planning and schedule recovery capability as well as to demonstrate the validity of the schedule.

AP1000 can meet Criterion 5. Based on Westinghouse projected costs, AP1000 would be competitive in today's market. The AP600 can meet Criterion 5. The AP600 may be competitive in some U.S. market scenarios.

### **Criterion 6: Fuel Cycle Industrial Structure**

The summary of the Westinghouse response and the NTDG evaluation for the AP600 are essentially identical to the AP1000 and thus are stated under the AP1000 criteria evaluations.

AP600 meets Criterion 6. It uses conventional fuel.

### **B. GAP ANALYSIS FOR AP1000 AND AP600**

The design specific gaps are the tasks to be done by Westinghouse relating to completion of design, licensing, and component tests that are necessary to assure near term deployment of the AP1000 and AP600. The gaps, the needed closure actions, and the costs (in \$ million) estimated to achieve closure are summarized in the tables below. 50-50 cost-sharing between industry and DOE is proposed. The gaps are identical for both the AP1000 and AP600 except that there is no gap for design certification for the AP600.

**Design Certification of AP1000**

Gap: The AP1000 design offers superior economics, but it is not yet certified.

Closure: Obtain Design Certification of the AP1000 from the NRC by the end of year 2004.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE	\$3M	\$6M	\$6M	\$3.7M						\$18.7M
Industry	\$6M	\$3M	\$2M	\$0.3M						\$11.3M
<u>Total</u>	\$9M	\$9M	\$8M	\$4M						\$30.0M

**COL Items Called for in AP1000/600 Design Certification**

Gap: AP600 and AP1000 specific COL items are needed by COL applicants.

Closure: Develop AP600 and AP1000 specific COL items that are not addressed by other gap solutions.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE		\$2M	\$2M							\$4M
Industry		\$2M	\$2M							\$4M
<u>Total</u>		\$4M	\$4M							\$8M

**First Time Engineering**

Gap: AP600 and AP1000 detailed first-time engineering (FTE) are incomplete.

Closure: Complete FTE, including all detailed engineering not covered in other gaps/solutions, project development, vendor selection, and procurement specifications.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE			\$14.5M	\$16.5M	\$19M					\$50M
Industry			\$14.5M	\$16.5M	\$19M					\$50M
<u>Total</u>			\$29M	\$33M	\$38M					\$100M

**Reactor Coolant Pump Prototype Testing**

Gap: AP600 and AP1000 reactor coolant pump (RCP) detailed design and prototype development and testing are needed.

Closure: Develop and test RCP prototype.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE		\$4.0M	\$4.0M	\$2.5M	\$2.0M					\$12.5M
Industry		\$4.0M	\$4.0M	\$2.5M	\$2.0M					\$12.5M
<u>Total</u>		\$8.0M	\$8.0M	\$5.0M	\$4.0M					\$25.0M

**Human Factors and Plant Simulator**

Gap: Human factors engineering and a plant simulator are needed for AP600 and AP1000.

Closure: Complete human factor engineering consistent with approved processes identified in the AP600 SSAR and develop plant simulator. (These steps are also required to support the digital control room gap/solution.)

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE		\$5M	\$6M	\$5M	\$4M					\$20M
Industry		\$5M	\$6M	\$5M	\$4M					\$20M
<u>Total</u>		\$10M	\$12M	\$10M	\$8M					\$40M

**Control Room Design**

Gap: Detailed design of a digital control room is needed for AP600 and AP1000 deployment.

Closure: Complete design of the digital control room consistent with the NRC approved requirements in the AP600 SSAR. (The AP1000 design will be the same. Support for this solution is required from the human factors gap solution.)

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE			\$5M	\$5M	\$5M					\$15M
Industry			\$5M	\$5M	\$5M					\$15M
<u>Total</u>			\$10M	\$10M	\$10M					\$30M

**Squib Valve Development & Testing**

Gap: Certain squib valves used in the passive safety systems of AP600 and AP1000 plants require development and testing of prototypes for deployment.

Closure: Complete development and testing of AP600 and AP1000 prototype squib valves.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE			\$1M	\$1M	\$0.5M					\$2.5M
Industry			\$1M	\$1M	\$0.5M					\$2.5M
<u>Total</u>			\$2M	\$2M	\$1M					\$5.0M

**Environmental Qualification of Selected Equipment**

Gap: Certain safety related equipment used in AP600 and AP1000 plants requires qualifications to be extended for in-containment environs consistent with NRC regulations.

Closure: complete qualification of AP600 and AP1000 safety related equipment.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE			\$5M	\$5M	\$2.5M					\$12.5M
Industry			\$5M	\$5M	\$2.5M					\$12.5M
<u>Total</u>			\$10M	\$10M	\$5M					\$25.0M

**Piping & Module Design**

Gap: Detailed design of AP600 and AP1000 piping and modules is needed for NTD.

Closure: Complete detailed design of AP600 and AP1000 piping and modules.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE			\$1.5M	\$3.5M	\$5M					\$10M
Industry			\$1.5M	\$3.5M	\$5M					\$10M
<u>Total</u>			\$3M	\$7M	\$10M					\$20M

**Standardization**

Gap: Standardization of AP600 and AP1000 plant equipment and commodities is needed for cost effective deployment.

Closure: Complete standardization of AP600 and AP1000 plant equipment and commodities.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE			\$2.5M	\$5M	\$2.5M					\$10M
Industry			\$2.5M	\$5M	\$2.5M					\$10M
<u>Total</u>			\$5M	\$10M	\$5M					\$20M

### Summary of Gap Analyses

**TABLE IV: Total Resources Required for All Gaps**

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	Total
Source										
DOE	\$3M	\$17M	\$47.5M	\$47.2M	\$40.5M					\$155.2M
Industry	\$6M	\$14M	\$43.5M	\$43.8M	\$40.5M					\$147.8M
Total	\$9M	\$31M	\$91M	\$91M	\$81.0M					\$303M

### Design Completion Cost Sharing Evaluation

As stated in the NTDG Cost Sharing Evaluation, the proposed sharing between DOE and industry may not be achievable and therefore an alternative has been developed that relies on more funds from industry in its cost-sharing approach. The alternate cost-sharing approach is based on the following principles:

- Activities necessary to obtain regulatory approval should be cost-shared 50/50 between industry and Government.
- Activities necessary to further the design should be cost-shared in the range of 60/40 between industry and Government, respectively.

There is substantial precedent and justification for Government to provide 50/50 cost-share on activities necessary to obtain regulatory approval. Substantial government cost-share is justified at this stage of a program because NRC licensing is a major hurdle for introducing new technologies and is unique to the nuclear industry. It is in the public interest to encourage industry to bring new, safer technologies before the NRC and assure that a thorough and timely review is supported by the applicant. In addition, regulatory review usually occurs before a potential buyer has placed an order.

In continuing the design of a plant, however, there is a logical basis for assuming that some degree of interest in the design must be provided by potential buyers before proceeding very far into the detailed design effort. A possible vehicle for this could be to absorb all or some of the

\$100 million of the total design completion costs identified to FOAKE among 3 to 5 plants rather than carrying all the cost on the 1<sup>st</sup> plant. AP1000 has the advantage of significantly lower capital cost in \$/kWe compared to AP600.

On the other hand, potential buyers in the deregulated marketplace may not be able to provide a 100 percent commitment to construct a plant until after all of the regulatory approvals and design details are completed. Therefore, it would be appropriate to require greater industry cost-share at this stage of a particular program.

This revised approach is shown in Table V, reflecting 62 percent DOE/38 percent industry cost-sharing on the Design Certification gap and 40 percent DOE/60 percent industry cost-sharing on all other gap closures activities, for an overall cost-sharing of 42 percent by Government and 58 percent by industry.

**TABLE V: Revised Cost Sharing Scenario for AP1000**

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	Total
Source										
DOE	\$3M	\$15M	\$37M	\$40M	\$33M					\$128M
Industry	\$6M	\$15M	\$52M	\$52M	\$50M					\$175M
Total	\$9M	\$30M	\$89M	\$92M	\$83M					\$303.0M

Since the \$30 million for design certification is not needed for the AP600, the cost-sharing pattern would change to show no expenditure in FY 2002 and only \$12 million in FY 2003. The pattern would remain the same as for AP1000 in the subsequent years. The decisions on which of the AP1000 and AP600 designs will be successful will be determined by progress on the early gap closures as well as the marketplace.

### **C. OVERALL ASSESSMENT: AP1000 AND AP600**

The Westinghouse AP600 is based on proven pressurized water reactor technology. Its power train is identical in basic design to the conventional design but with many detailed improvements coming from the extensive operational experience gained worldwide on this system. A key and innovative feature of the AP600 safety systems is the utilization of natural phenomena, such as gravity and compressed gas releases, to assure the availability of cooling water in the case of a loss of coolant accident. These features assure that the cooling water level will not fall below the top of the core in the event of a severe accident and that no operator action is needed in such

emergency conditions for three days. The natural (or passive) emergency cooling systems also have effected a major simplification in the plant by the elimination of the power driven pumps and their associated lines, valves, and controls.

The AP600 was developed by a coalition of industry (domestic and international utilities through EPRI), Westinghouse, and DOE, all of who cost-shared the major effort involved. Highly qualified consultants and university experts made important contributions. The utilities developed a set of owner-operator requirements to guide the design development and assure safety, reliability, and maintainability to an even higher level than is being achieved today.

Validation of the design of the passive safety features has been obtained by extensive testing by the industry in the U. S. and overseas. NRC has carried out independent testing that has confirmed the Westinghouse safety design of the AP600.

With the onset of low natural gas prices and the rate de-regulation of electricity generation, the AP600 economic competitiveness has been weakened. Westinghouse has thus turned to economy of scale to improve its economics by raising its nominal 600 MWe output to 1000 MWe. The AP1000 is basically the same design as the AP600 and follows on the Westinghouse experience in developing its conventional set of standardized nuclear steam supply systems at the 600, 900, and 1200 MWe nominal levels.

The gaps that need to be closed in the time frame to achieve deployment of AP1000 or AP600 by 2010 encompass three major efforts: regulatory, detailed design completion, and market acceptance. The issues that have to be addressed to close the gaps are summarized for each effort.

**Regulatory:** The prime regulatory gap closure needed for the AP1000 is obtaining design certification (DC) from the NRC. Because the design is so firmly based on the already certified AP600, there is little uncertainty that the DC can be obtained. The NTDG has less confidence in the optimistic DC schedule projected by Westinghouse, but notes that this may not be a determining factor in the overall schedule since an early site permit is on the critical path.

There is no gap for AP600 design certification since it has already been granted.

Additional key gap closures in this effort, applicable to both AP1000 and AP600 as well as all designs that choose to seek a COL, is to obtain from the NRC one or more early site permits, a finalized practicable ITAAC process, and a combined construction-operating license (COL). The completed safety design, along with the experience gained to date with the NRC in defining an ITAAC approach related to LWRs, should help to accelerate this gap closure for the AP1000 and AP600.

**Detailed Design Completion:** Completion of the detailed designs on schedule for both the AP1000 and AP600 is fairly assured, assuming the availability of the needed funds, because of the AP600 design work that has been completed to date and its acceptance by NRC through the DC. There is somewhat more uncertainty for the AP1000 because of possible changes in the

license-related design completion arising from the design certification review. Completing the remaining design work for both AP1000 and AP600 is straightforward.

The primary gap in this effort is obtaining the large funding (\$303 million for the AP1000 and \$273 million for the AP600) necessary to complete the design to a high degree (of the order of 90 percent), so as to assure efficient and rapid plant construction. Early investor and sub-supplier interest will be key to obtaining the requisite industry cost sharing. A significant change in political support will be essential to obtain the proposed government cost sharing. An important way of fostering industry and government investment is to focus resources in each phase on closing the gaps, which will best build confidence among the prospective investors.

Market Acceptance: Market acceptance will require that the nuclear plant being offered: (1) is economically competitive and highly reliable so as to produce the income to gain the expected return on investment (ROI) and (2) has investor confidence that it will be built on schedule and within budget.

On the first requirement, the fundamental merit of the AP1000's near-term deployment candidacy is its economic competitiveness under the conservative assumption that gas price increases will remain within the bounds of normal inflation. There appears to be adequate margin in the projected bus-bar generation costs to provide an ROI premium to compensate for the longer time to achieve the ROI as compared to gas-fired units. If gas prices rise in excess of normal inflation, the profit margins will be even more substantial.

The ability of the AP600 to compete broadly in the marketplace depends on a continuation of the high natural gas prices in the range experienced in 2001-2.

There is strong assurance of high operational reliability for both the AP1000 and AP600 because the plant designs utilize the proven technology, bolstered by infusion of decades of operating experience, that is already being achieved by most of the present U.S. nuclear plants.

The second requirement is an important gap to be closed in this effort and applies to both AP1000 and AP600. Obtaining an early site permit(s), a COL, and a practical ITAAC process, as identified under the regulatory phase, is an essential element in gaining investor confidence. Assurance of completion of design to construction-readiness is another key element that can be re-enforced by utilizing virtual construction of the construction process to provide detailed planning and schedule recovery capability as well as to demonstrate the validity of the schedule. The content, skills, and quality assurance requirements to build the plant have been fully developed over the past several decades in building the present fleet of plants. The AP1000 and AP600 can meet the evaluation criteria and close the gaps necessary for deployment.

The NTDG concludes that the gaps in the above three efforts can be closed on a schedule consistent with the near term deployment goal and therefore both the AP1000 and AP600 can probably be deployed in the U.S. by 2010. NTDG does not expect that there will be sufficient resources available to carry both APs to deployment in the 2010 time frame, but that the level of progress in closing the gaps, as well as market considerations, will determine the choice among them at a sufficiently early stage to permit focusing resources on one of them. In any event,

Westinghouse has stated that it only intends to pursue one or the other of them, but not both designs.

### **Timelines for the AP1000 and/or AP600**

The AP1000 Roadmap and associated timelines are given in Chart 1 and 2, below. The schedule and relationship of the other main lines of effort, i.e., Early Site Permits, Combined Licenses, Construction & Startup, Engineering and Procurement, and Key Decision Points, are shown in the following lines.

With the exception of Design Certification, which has already been accomplished for the AP600, this Roadmap applies to AP600. The schedule and relationship of the other main lines of effort are the same as those for AP1000. For deployment by 2010, Early Site Permits and Combined Licenses are on the critical path for both AP1000 and AP600, as is completion of first time engineering

This Roadmap is a broad overall summary of a complex industrial campaign to assemble all the necessary human and material resources, and to focus them on the final goal of building a power plant and putting it into operation at the end of 10 years.

Of the four top level lines that represent the major project activities the first two, Early Site Permits, and Combined Operating Licenses, are normally plant owner responsibilities, with some tasks delegated to the reactor vendor, particularly those that require reactor and plant engineering information to carry out. The next main lines are Construction/Startup, and Engineering/Procurement. The plant owner, reactor vendor, architect-engineer, constructor, component and equipment suppliers, and various consultants are involved in these activities, with their responsibilities defined by contract. At the bottom of the page, under Engineering and Procurement the key decision points are shown: Design Selection, Order Placement, and Construction Commitment. The second page shows a line for the plant buyer/owner's responsibilities, and amendments to Design Certification that incorporate any changes made in the course of final design. A considerable part of the responsibility for this would probably be delegated to the reactor and plant vendor.


The following charts and the top level lines shown thereon, along with some additional information, make up the big picture roadmap of the projects. It is clear that the main lines are not independent of each other. All work on them must be completed on the dates shown in order to complete the project and operate the plant. The lines in fact are strongly interdependent, because of the relationship of each of the lines to the others, i.e., Engineering to the ESP and the COL, and to Construction. Procurement and Construction will in turn affect Engineering when changes occur. These must be recorded and reviewed to make sure that the licenses are not affected by the changes; or, if they are, so that appropriate changes can be initiated.

Generic and specific design gap closures have strong connections with the top-level project lines. Closure of Gaps has the greatest impact on obtaining the ESP and COL, and on Engineering and Procurement. The schedule of Generic Gap ESP work ties directly into the top level ESP


schedule, as does design specific work required to complete the ESP application. Likewise the mostly design specific COL work ties directly into the COL top level timeline. Similarly design specific Gaps 3-10 in the information supplied by Westinghouse tie into the Engineering and Procurement top level timeline.

The charts below, with the gap information tied into it, are roadmaps for the AP1000 and for AP600, with the exception of Design Certification as noted. It is not sufficient, however, for project management and control. Attention to project management detail is absolutely necessary to successful project completion and operation of the plant at the appointed date.

AP 1000 Near Term Deployment Roadmap



AP 600 Near Term Deployment Roadmap



## WESTINGHOUSE IRIS DESIGN

IRIS is an innovative small (100-300MWe) pressurized water reactor design featuring an integrated primary system – that is, all primary system components, including the steam generators, coolant pumps and pressurizer are housed along with the nuclear fuel in a single, large pressure vessel. As such, IRIS offers potential safety advantages, primarily related to the elimination of large-break loss of coolant accident potential. Its small size and modular design may simplify on-site construction and be deployable in areas not suitable for large, monolithic nuclear plants. Evaluation of the IRIS proposal follows:

### A. CRITERIA EVALUATION

#### Criterion 1: Regulatory Acceptance

##### Summary of Westinghouse Response

- a. Licensing is straightforward because IRIS is firmly based on LWR technology, and will comply with current regulatory requirements. Several categories of accidents are not credible. Fuel design is relatively conventional for the Category I plants (i.e., those that would be considered for near-term deployment).
- b. A prototype is not needed. The first IRIS deployment will be the first-of-a-kind (FOAK) plant. Primary reliance will be placed on focused testing.
- c. Risks are primarily institutional, not technical, and hinge on a consortium decision to commit in 2003 (anticipated).
- d. The proposed schedule is to obtain design certification by the end of 2007, with operation commencing in 2010.
- e. There has been preliminary interaction with NRC Commissioners and staff.

##### NTDG Assessment

- a. The submittal overstates the degree to which IRIS is based on proven technology, and it understates the development required to build a practical, cost-competitive IRIS. In principle, IRIS is a conventional PWR and much of LWR/PWR operating experience is applicable, but the IRIS design details are vastly different from all US commercial operating experience with respect to steam generators, pressurizer, reactor shutdown, and in-reactor I&C, to name some particularly important areas. IRIS, with its in-reactor configuration, may require revision of the General Design Criteria.
- b. The first IRIS will be a prototype, whatever else it may be called. The testing is extremely important and will have to be very lengthy and carried out under a variety of non-normal operating conditions to verify the key issues of the reliability and maintainability of the major non-core components within the reactor vessel. Development of practical remote maintenance tooling will be needed.
- c. The risks of achieving success in deployment are identified under Criterion 1 by Westinghouse as primarily institutional not technical. This is a commercial viability issue, not a regulatory acceptance one.

- d. The design needs further development and safety review before one can project a design certification schedule with confidence. The proposed operation schedule (3 years after certification) is not credible.
- e. Preliminary interaction with the NRC is of very limited value, based on ALWR experience

IRIS does not meet Criterion 1. Design certification in the time frame needed to support 2010 deployment is very unlikely, because of the extensive analysis and testing required.

### **Criterion 2: Industrial Infrastructure**

#### **Summary of Westinghouse Response**

Very well qualified, diverse IRIS team:

- Westinghouse / BNFL
- Bechtel
- MHI-Ansaldo / ENSA / NUCLEP

#### **NTDG Assessment**

It is judged that the LWR-based industrial infrastructure is suitable for the IRIS. I&C sensors and transmitters are a possible exception.

IRIS can meet Criterion 2. The international IRIS team, which includes manufacturing capability, has been assembled.

### **Criterion 3: Commercialization Plan**

#### **Summary of Westinghouse Response**

- a. IRIS is based on proven technology LWR technology and therefore the time scale of the FOAK work is reasonable. The IRIS consortium member capability is restated.
- b. There is renewed worldwide interest in nuclear plants, combined with projected very high demand for electricity. Future investment can be expected in new nuclear plants.

#### **NTDG Assessment**

The IRIS concept proposed by Westinghouse is a major innovation of systems and component design that places the steam generator, pressurizer, and vital elements of control and protection systems within the reactor vessel, for which there is little basis in proven PWR technology. Therefore the time scale of work is not reasonable, because of the R&D that will be required to prove safety in both normal operation and under accident conditions, including completion of testing programs before the design can be made final. The testing program schedule itself is overly optimistic. Given the extent of IRIS innovations, it is quite possible that operational

experience on an IRIS test reactor would be required to produce and confirm a final design. These points apply directly to Criterion 2.

IRIS does not meet Criterion 3. The commercialization plan (in time to support 2010 deployment) is unrealistic.

#### **Criterion 4: Cost Sharing Plan**

##### **Summary of Westinghouse Response**

Through 12/2002, existing government cost sharing (via NERI) is in place. An additional \$5M for focused testing is suggested. After 1/2003, (presuming the consortium elects to proceed), government funding will be needed. Cost sharing of 30/55/15 percent (U.S. Government/IRIS consortium partners/foreign Government/organizations) is proposed.

##### **NTDG Assessment**

The cost sharing proposal of 70 percent industry, 30 percent Government appears reasonable although the overall cost estimate is subject to uncertainty because of the innovative features of the design.

IRIS meets Criterion 4. Identified cost sharing would support IRIS engineering, testing, and licensing.

#### **Criterion 5: Economic Competitiveness**

##### **Summary of Westinghouse Response**

The Westinghouse cost estimates for the FOAK and Nth of-a-kind cases are given in the Table below:

**IRIS CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES (\$/kWe)**

	Low	Nominal	High	percent from Nominal
NOAK	687	836	1224	-18 percent, +46 percent
FOAK	746	925	1343	-19 percent, +45 percent

The plant availability factors are estimated to range from 85 percent to 98 percent for the FOAK plant and between 90 percent and 99 percent for the NOAK plant, resulting in a nominal production cost of 10.9 \$/MWh. The nominal total cost of electricity for the NOAK plant is stated to be 23.5 \$/MWh.

### **NTDG Assessment**

Cost estimates need thorough assessment, particularly capital costs because of the loss of economy of scale and operating costs and because of the maintenance issue for in-reactor vessel components. One should not have high confidence in cost estimates until design and regulatory review are further along, and the IRIS safety basis better established.

It is indeterminable as to whether IRIS meets Criterion 5. Westinghouse projections on IRIS costs are highly conjectural; if true, IRIS would be economically competitive, but there is not yet sufficient basis for confidence in the projections.

### **Criterion 6: Fuel Cycle Industrial Structure**

#### **Summary of Westinghouse Response**

Initial core loads (Category I operation) are largely conventional (see gap analysis). No development will be required for manufacture of the higher enriched fuel.

### **NTDG Assessment**

It is agreed that the initial core loads (Category I) are conventional but the subsequent Category II core loads (at ~9 percent enrichment, high burn-up, extended cycle) are well beyond current practice and US licensed manufacture (see Gap analysis). The degree of required development seems understated.

IRIS meets Criterion 6 for initial fuel loads. More highly enriched fuel loads, proposed to be used in later years, would require new manufacturing capability

## **B. GAP ANALYSIS**

The design specific gaps are the tasks to be done by Westinghouse relating to completion of design, licensing, and component tests that are necessary to assure deployment. The gaps, the needed closure actions, and the costs (in \$ million) estimated to achieve closure are summarized below.

### **Safety By Design**

To confirm that the IRIS design provides the high level of safety claimed, correctly simulated testing, using a mockup of the IRIS vessel / containment and associated safety systems, must be carried out. The scope of the testing program is as yet undefined, but the overall magnitude, given needed R&D, looks low.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE		\$5M	\$5M	\$5M	\$3M	\$1M				\$21M
Industry	\$4M	\$3M	\$4M	\$3M	\$5M	\$4M				\$21M
<u>Total</u>	\$4M	\$8M	\$9M	\$8M	\$8M	\$5M				\$42M

### Integral Steam Generator

An extensive test program is needed to demonstrate steam generator (SG) normal operation performance and reliability, and safety functions, (using “reasonably” sized SG module); and the same for in-reactor I&C sensors and transmitters. It may also be advisable to perform integral RV/containment/SG/ emergency HX tests. This test work is central to IRIS feasibility. A very high standard for successful completion is required, given the integral nature of the design (i.e., not much flexibility for later design adjustments, if there are performance problems). The tests could take longer, and be more costly than projected.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE		\$1M	\$1M	\$4M	\$3M	\$1M				\$10M
Industry	\$4M	\$4M	\$7M	\$4M	\$3M	\$2M				\$24M
<u>Total</u>	\$4M	\$5M	\$8M	\$8M	\$6M	\$3M				\$34M

### Maintenance Optimization

Extended (4 year) maintenance shutdown intervals demands extensive evaluation and “multiple solutions”, related to equipment design (to allow ease of inspection), diagnostics, regulatory changes (presumably re in-service inspection), to provide optimized maintenance. Substantial funding (\$26.5M) is projected. This is another area central to IRIS success. It is not just “optimization” – it is more correctly “feasibility”.

The Westinghouse submittal suggests that some part of the solution will be to relax requirements. Caution should be exercised here: the real issue is whole plant reliability, not just safety system reliability or regulatory compliance. A large funding allocation is appropriate but the adequacy of the testing cost projection is uncertain.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE		\$1.5M	\$2M	\$2M	\$2M	\$0.5M				\$8 M
Industry	\$1.5M	\$3M	\$5M	\$5M	\$3M	\$1M				\$18.5M
<u>Total</u>	\$1.5M	\$4.5M	\$7M	\$7M	\$5M	\$1.5M				\$26.5M

**Steam Generator Inspection Procedure**

SG inspection procedures need to be revised to reflect different functions, configuration, and failure modes of the IRIS SG tubes. There are fundamental design differences from present experience with PWR plants (primary circuit is external to the tubes; tubes in compression, not tension). This is an important issue, and is related to the second gap above. SG inspection requirements and methods will, in fact, have to be changed, but the broader issues of materials, SG design details, and SG accessibility for inspection and maintenance need to be addressed. The projected testing cost may be low.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE		\$0.3M	\$0.3M	\$0.5M	\$0.2M	\$0.2M				\$1.5M
Industry	\$0.4M	\$0.3M	\$0.3M	\$0.5M	\$1M	\$0.7M	\$0.5M			\$3.7 M
<u>Total</u>	\$0.4M	\$0.6M	\$0.6M	\$1M	\$1.2M	\$0.9M	\$0.5M			\$5.2M

**System Performance Modeling**

The IRIS integral vessel/coupled small containment requires modeling of system performance under normal and abnormal conditions, as input to the IRIS control system. The plan is to “model the IRIS system response and interaction of different subsystems...” This is a computer-based analytical model, which will require using test data from testing in the first gap. The projected testing cost is subject to uncertainty. Pressurizer faults and control under normal and accident conditions should be carefully studied to determine adequacy of the current concept, functional and design specifications, but this work is not included in the cost estimates.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE		\$1M	\$2M	\$1M	\$0.5M					\$4.5M
Industry	\$1.2M	\$2M	\$1.5M	\$0.5M	\$0.5M					\$5.7M
<u>Total</u>	\$1.2M	\$3M	\$3.5M	\$1.5M	\$1M					\$10.2M

**Internal Control Rod Drive Mechanisms**

The IRIS reactor vessel (RV) configuration causes very long internal control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) drive lines and more CRDMs than a conventional LWR. The plan is to develop and apply, if feasible, an internal electromagnetic or hydraulic CRDM system. This would eliminate the long drive lines and also eliminate RV penetrations, which are possible loss of coolant accident sites). It is not clear whether the long drive lines are an IRIS “technical gap”, or that the designers simply view the internal CRDM as a potentially attractive design improvement. It is also not clear how this relates to Category I vs. II, in that it is not directly related to operating cycle time. The internal CRDMs are not proven technology, and that configuration places a vital safety component in a relatively inaccessible location (i.e., inside the RV).

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE		\$2M	\$3M	\$3M	\$2M	\$2M	(\$2M)	\$1M	\$1M	\$13 (\$16.M)
Industry	\$2.0M	\$2M	\$5M	\$5M	\$3M	\$2M	(\$2M)	\$2M	\$2M	\$19M (\$24.5M)
<u>Total</u>	\$2M	\$4M	\$8M	\$8M	\$5M	\$4M	(\$4M)	\$3M	\$3M	\$31M(\$41M)

( ) indicate additional development – Category II – if necessary

### **Extended Cycle Fuel Operation**

IRIS fuel assemblies will be operating on a 4-5 year cycle (Category I), and later on an 8-10 year cycle (Category II). Design and qualification testing are needed for the cladding, grids and assembly structures. Material testing and post-irradiation exams are needed to confirm adequacy of materials, design and licensing data. No testing is planned to support Category I, but is not clear that no testing is required.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE				\$0.3 M	\$0.3 M	\$0.3 M	\$0.1 M	\$0.1 M	\$0.1 M	\$1.2M
Industry		\$0.5M	\$0.5 M	\$0.7 M	\$0.7 M	\$0.7 M	\$0.4 M	\$0.4 M	\$0.4 M	\$4.2 M
<u>Total</u>		\$0.5 M	\$0.5 M	\$1 M	\$1 M	\$1 M	\$0.5 M	\$0.5 M	\$0.5 M	\$5.4 M

### **Licensing of Higher Enrichment Fuel**

Reload cores will use up to 9 percent enriched fuel, above the level currently allowed for US facilities. Thus, licensing requirement changes will have to be reviewed and approved by NRC and the license production line will have to be designed or modified. This is clearly a Category II gap; not central to IRIS success unless overall IRIS economic success dictates the shift to Category II fuel loads.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE		\$0.4M	\$1M	\$1M	\$1M	\$1M	\$1M	\$1M	\$1M	\$7.4M
Industry			\$0.8M	\$1.5M	\$1.5M	\$1.5M	\$3M	\$3M	\$1M	\$12.3M
<u>Total</u>		\$0.4M	\$1.8M	\$2.5M	\$2.5M	\$2.5M	\$4M	\$4M	\$2M	\$19.7M

### **High Burnup Fuel Demonstration**

High burn-up of Category II IRIS fuel needs to be demonstrated, via prototypical testing. This is clearly a Category II gap; not central to IRIS success unless overall IRIS economic success dictates the shift to Category II fuel loads.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										<u>Total</u>
DOE		\$1M	\$1M	\$1.5M	\$1.5M	\$1.5M	\$0.5M			\$8M
Industry		\$0.5M	\$2M	\$2M	\$3M	\$3M	\$0.5M	\$0.5M	\$2M	\$13.5M
<u>Total</u>		\$1.5M	\$3M	\$3.5M	\$4.5M	\$4.5M	\$1M	\$0.5M	\$2M	\$21.5M

Because of very congested “integral” configuration of IRIS, thorough assessment of RV / internals disassembly, lay-down, fuel removal, inspections, etc is needed, followed by design refinement as called for. This is not included in the cost estimates.

### **C. OVERALL ASSESSMENT**

Along with its potential advantages, the integral primary system configuration introduces significant design and licensing challenges that may be difficult to overcome, particularly in the relatively short time frame established for this near term deployment assessment. In key design details, IRIS is fundamentally different from any reactor licensed and operating in the United States or anywhere in the world. Extensive analysis and testing will undoubtedly be needed as a prerequisite to NRC licensing and commercial deployment in the U.S.

For those reasons, the evaluation team concludes that the IRIS design is not deployable by 2010. This designation does not suggest that the potential advantages of the IRIS concept are unimportant or unachievable – rather, it reflects the daunting challenge of design and licensing of an innovative and unfamiliar reactor configuration in the near term. In that respect, the team also recommends that further consideration of the IRIS concept be assigned to the Generation IV Water Reactor Technical Working Group (TWG).

The following is a brief summary of the NTDG’s assessment of IRIS compliance with the NTD criteria and of identified gaps.

NTDG Criteria Compliance: With respect to Criterion 1, Regulatory Acceptance, it is the NTDG’s view that because of the substantive differences between IRIS and currently licensed reactors, a great deal of analysis and test work will be required to support a successful design certification submittal. The necessary test work will undoubtedly involve extensive computer and large-scale physical modeling, as proposed by Westinghouse. However, the review team believes that full prototype testing, in some fashion, will also be needed. It is the team’s view that the extent, cost and duration of the testing needed to secure regulatory acceptance is significantly greater than predicted by Westinghouse.

The current plans regarding NTDG Criteria 2 and 3 (Industrial Infrastructure and Commercialization Plan) are vague. Because much of the IRIS design utilizes LWR technology, the LWR industrial infrastructure would appear to provide the requisite support except possibly for the special inspection and maintenance features needed in the integral design. The commercialization plan to achieve deployment by 2010 is unrealistic.

Criterion 4, Cost Sharing Plan may have to be adjusted to reflect the increased amount of testing needed compared to the Westinghouse projection. In addition to the lengthier testing required for regulatory acceptance, extensive testing will be needed to satisfy potential investors that the reliability and maintainability of the system will meet present industry performance.

Compliance with Criterion 5, Economic Competitiveness cannot be determined with confidence at this time because of the relative immaturity of the design, and because of the economic importance of the plant maintainability, a key design issue (see the Gap Analysis) for IRIS.

The IRIS Criterion 6, Fuel Cycle Industrial Infrastructure is satisfactory for the Category I fuel load. However, the potential fuel design for subsequent loads (called Category II) will involve higher enrichment and higher burn-up than current fuel designs, and will require substantial development work.


Gap Assessment: Westinghouse identified six gaps applicable to the IRIS “Category I” design, that is the version of the IRIS concept which utilizes nuclear fuel with conventional enrichment levels. These gaps all relate to the needs for development and testing referred to above. They are:

- The IRIS “Safety by Design” concept of integrated primary components, requiring mockup testing and analysis of safety system performance.
- Integral Steam Generator and Steam Generator Inspection Procedure: The IRIS steam generator concept presents very significant technical challenges in operation, maintenance and safety, requiring extensive analytical and mock-up testing. The difficulty of inspecting steam generators of novel design and housed within the reactor vessel must also be addressed through analysis and testing.
- Maintenance Optimization: The IRIS integrated primary system configuration, in combination with the planned four-year refueling cycle, demands extensive evaluation and development of inspection, diagnostic and maintenance methods.
- System Performance: Modeling and /or testing of the integrated reactor vessel and containment are required. In-reactor I&C must also be extensively analyzed and tested.
- Internal CRDM: This gap addresses the objective of considering internal CRDMs as a means of avoiding the very long CRDM drives necessitated by the very tall IRIS reactor vessel. This is a novel design for an important plant control and safety feature, and will require significant development and testing.

Three additional gaps identified by Westinghouse relate to the Category II IRIS utilization of higher enriched, longer life cores. These also present significant difficulty and would require extensive testing, but they are not relevant to near-term deployment considerations.

In summary, the NTDG considers the Westinghouse gap assessment to be a reasonably complete identification of major challenges facing the IRIS designers. In some cases, the NTDG believes that the cost to resolve these issues conclusively will exceed the Westinghouse projection. But regardless of cost, the NTDG does not consider it realistic to project resolution of these gaps, successful IRIS licensing and construction of the first unit in the near term. On that basis, IRIS is not deployable by 2010.

IRIS Near Term Deployment Roadmap



## PBMR PTY. PBMR DESIGN

The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) is a graphite moderated helium-cooled reactor. Heat generated by nuclear fission in the reactor is transferred to the coolant gas (helium), and converted into electrical energy in a gas turbo-generator via a Brayton direct cycle. The PBMR core is based on the German high temperature gas cooled technology and uses spherical fuel elements.

The PBMR core consists of a cylindrical array of 6 cm diameter, spherical elements. The core array is 3.5 m in diameter and 8.5 m high and produces about 268 MWth. The center of the array contains approximately 100,000 unfueled graphite spheres. The outer part of the core contains about 300,000 fuel elements, each containing about 9 grams of fuel, in the form of 9 percent enriched uranium dioxide. The core geometry is established by a graphite reflector, which in turn is contained in a steel reactor vessel. The reactor is refueled continuously by withdrawing fuel spheres from the bottom of the core and returning them to the top. Fuel elements pass through the core from 5 to 10 times during their useful life. Each time an element is removed from the core, burnup and other fuel element characteristics can be measured, and spent fuel can be diverted to on-site, long-term storage.

The fundamental concept of the design of the PBMR is aimed at achieving a plant that has no physical process that could cause a radiation hazard beyond the site boundary. This is principally to be achieved in the PBMR by demonstrating that the integrated heat loss from the reactor vessel exceeds the decay heat production in the post accident condition, and that the peak temperature reached in the core during the transient is below the demonstrated fuel degradation point and far below the temperature at which the physical structure is affected. This effectively would preclude the possibility of a core melt accident. Heat removal from the vessel is achieved by passive means.

The containment concept for high temperature gas reactors (both GT-MHR and PBMR) is distinctly different from the high-pressure containment of light water reactors. For HTGRs there is an additional level of radionuclide containment in the TRISO coated fuel particles used in these reactors. This containment is provided by a SiC coating that is presumed to contain the fission radionuclides during normal operation and during all accident scenarios. A primary system boundary rupture during operation would lead to an initial pressure buildup. The building containment design allows this pressure to be released through filtered vents, which would then close. Analyses suggest that release of radioactivity for any accident scenario is sufficiently small that the emergency planning zone (EPZ) could be set at the site boundary.

The PBMR module is the smallest stand-alone component of the PBMR power generation system. The module is a power station that can produce approximately 110 MW (or more) of electrical power with an overall thermodynamic efficiency of about 40 percent. This module can be used to generate power in a stand-alone mode or as part of a power plant that consists of up to 10 units.

## **A. CRITERIA EVALUATION**

### **Criterion 1: Regulatory Acceptance**

#### **Summary of PBMR Pty. Response**

The Part 52 licensing process for the licensing and construction of PBMR plants will be utilized. An application for ESP is projected for the first of these sites to the NRC in mid-2002. In parallel with ESP review by the NRC, preparation and submittal of an application for construction and operation (COL) of a number of PBMR modules will be pursued for the first site in late 2002/early 2003.

Obtaining the COL prior to design certification will shorten the time to first plant construction and operation because the reviews and hearings associated with the design and site-specific issues can be combined and completed well in advance of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) demonstration plant completion. The US COL application would be submitted after the completion of the detailed design in South Africa; therefore, it will contain complete design and safety analysis information including ITAAC. As the design in the US is anticipated to be identical to the RSA design, it is not expected to have design features that are not demonstrated in the RSA demonstration program. There is potential that the RSA demonstration test plan can be influenced to include those tests required by the NRC. Exelon expects the PBMR to receive design certification after the demonstration unit in RSA and the first US unit have operated successfully.

Technical areas that present a challenge to meeting the licensing schedule have been identified and include: licensing review framework; licensing basis event selection; source term; containment; role of the operator; emergency planning; equipment classification; and prototype testing. In addition, code verification is an important activity that requires timely completion.

#### **NTDG Assessment**

The overall strategy is credible, but the time line is extremely aggressive. The strategy relies on the use of the design and safety analysis developed for an identical unit in the RSA, which serves as a demonstration unit. It uses an early submission of the ESP and COL in parallel without design certification (DC) in order to save time. Because the design is being developed for the RSA demonstration unit, it is anticipated that the COL will contain a comprehensive safety analysis, including a complete plant PRA, that equals or exceeds that necessary for an application for DC. Also it will contain proposed Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC).

This strategy is very challenging, with only two and a half years allotted for completion of the COL, including hearings. That is short based on past experience with safety reviews and the complex and difficult Exelon-identified list of issues to be resolved with the NRC. It is presumed that the regulatory infrastructure issues and the technology expertise within the NRC will be largely resolved before the COL application is submitted. If these are not resolved then

delays in the schedule will be likely. In this regard, cooperation with GA (for licensing the GT-MHR) on the regulatory infrastructure issue is desirable.

Of particular concern for maintaining the schedule is the testing program required to qualify the fuel and the approval of a low pressure, vented containment. Insufficient time is allowed from startup of the fuel facility in South Africa to conduct shake-down tests and properly prepare fuel for irradiation testing before the irradiation tests would presumably begin. Since fuel qualification to standards consistent with the specified source term, EPZ boundary and containment is critical to plant operation, there is a limit to how much one can “rush” the program. Also, there must be sufficient time in the schedule for NRC review of the final results. Since the proposed containment design is a low-pressure citadel type structure with filtered vents for pressure release, this means the fuel is the primary containment barrier, and the fuel testing must demonstrate that this is satisfactory. In addition, there will be licensing issues that must be resolved with the NRC related to using a foreign supplier of fuel.

There is also concern about the timing of completion of the code qualification program. The accident scenarios that must be evaluated, and the NRC requirements for code verification and validation have yet to be worked out with the NRC. Many of the accidents and transients can be anticipated, such as air and water ingress, loss of heat sink, turbine overspeed, seismic events, and rod ejection. The status of this effort within PBMYPty. Ltd. as it relates to the RSA Demonstration has not been identified to the NTDG. The NRC has some codes in development for independent safety evaluation, but it is not clear whether there is sufficient independent code capability to evaluate all the codes required, for example in core physics.

The non-fuels testing program also presents a schedule concern. This includes qualifying the graphite that is used in both fuel and in the reflector, and evaluating absorber materials such as boron carbide that would be used to limit neutron streaming. The time to complete this program and submit a topical report to the NRC seems to allow very little review time for the NRC before the decision is made regarding the COL application. Another licensing area that resulted in lengthy LWR negotiations with the NRC is control room design, and the number of operators needed to operate a plant. This problem is currently being addressed for the RSA plant, but its resolution for the U.S. plant is uncertain. The instrumentation and control design will also be of strong interest to the NRC, although the review should be different from the LWRs because of the different nature of the reactor safety response. In addition, the schedule provides essentially no overlap between the RSA Demonstration unit startup and the issuance of the COL. This would not present a problem as long as prototype testing is not required to resolve any safety issue. In the document “Preliminary Staff Views on PBMR Licensing Plan” (letter of August 23, 2001 from Samuel J. Collins, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulation, NRC, to James A. Muntz, VP of Exelon Generation), it states “Exelon’s licensing plan should not assume that the NRC will issue a combined license prior to completion of all testing that is determined to be necessary to demonstrate the acceptability of a commercial PBMR.” If prototype testing is required to resolve any issue this could delay the issuance of the COL. Finally, it is noted that the use of the COL without Design Certification has less finality to it. Since there is no rulemaking involved, there is the possibility of design changes that could result in the first commercial unit differing from the RSA demonstration unit, and there is greater risk of post-construction intervention.

The schedule presented in Table 1 (Criterion 3) calls for loading fuel in September 2007. The NTDG believes that some delay in this schedule is probable. While a slippage in schedule for licensing delays, construction delays, fuel qualification or technical reasons has financial implications that could impact decisions to proceed, it is possible to tolerate some delay in regulatory acceptance and still have the first commercial unit in operation by the end of 2010. Since the critical path is determined by fuel qualification, and may well extend six to twelve months beyond the schedule presented to the NTDG, even a six-month delay on the COL could be accommodated.

The NTDG believes the PBMR can meet the criterion provided that several challenging technical issues (including fuel issues) can be resolved and demonstrated to NRC satisfaction in the time frame needed for 2010 deployment. U.S. licensing submittal information must be adapted from the German/South African design and test work. Pre-application steps with NRC are in progress.

## **Criterion 2: Industrial Infrastructure**

### **Summary of PBMR Pty. Response**

The industrial infrastructure needed to support the commercialization is already in place internationally with the exception of the fuel manufacturing facility. PBMR Pty. Ltd., which consists of ESKOM, the utility owned by the Republic of South Africa, IDC, BNFL, and Exelon, will provide this capability as well as support the plant development with their own resources and talent, as well as that of consultants. Contracts are in place for detailed design of all major components with credible industrial suppliers and preliminary design of these components is now complete. The suppliers would be capable of producing components for multiple units in a year. PBMR Pty Ltd. has also obtained full access to the German base of high temperature reactor (HTR) technology, experience, and know-how. Key technical specialists have been incorporated into the PBMR team to assure effective technology transfer.

The turbine generator, the fuel, and the pressure vessels are all on the critical path for the first plant. The systems requiring the largest extent of development are judged to be the turbomachinery, the magnetic bearings/auxiliary bearings, and the recuperator. Negotiations are currently underway with several suppliers for the turbine generator and the pressure vessels. The fuel will be produced in a plant in South Africa that is currently under design. It is anticipated that the longest lead-time component is approximately 24 months.

The PBMR will require unique operator training. PBMR is currently designing a control room simulator for this purpose and ESKOM is developing the operator training courses modeled on the INPO systematic training development format. INPO and Exelon will advise ESKOM on the training and procedure development, which would then be used in the US.

### **NTDG Assessment**

The manufacture of major components should be able to meet the criteria for 2010 deployment if the RSA program moves forward according to schedule. The responses state that design

contracts with suppliers of all major components are in place and that one or multiple (up to three) units could be built by 2010. The longest lead component, the pressure vessel, was identified as 18 months to two years. While this seems like a short time, it is based on quotes from the suppliers involved. Ordering of long lead-time materials and components is taking place on a schedule that could achieve fuel loading in late 2005. This is somewhat optimistic for a first plant, even with a construction schedule provided by a reputable architect-engineering firm that supports such a schedule. On the positive side, since the lead-plant in South Africa is identical to the U.S. plant, the major component manufacturers will have experience before producing the U.S. plant components.

One concern regarding PBMR is the lack of an experienced vendor organization with a strong management structure and a depth of technical knowledge in fuels and design. Much of the fuels expertise is provided by consultants from Germany. This provides valuable insights and information, but is not the basis for a long-term commercialization organization. It is important that the partners involved in the PBMR development, including ESKOM, BNFL, IDC and Exelon, put together a suitable vendor organization in the near future with strength in reactor design, safety analysis, and plant licensing.

One of the biggest technology risks is likely to be in the operation of the power conversion system. While components operating individually have operated under similar conditions, there appears to be little or no experience for such a system operating with its high temperatures and vertical mounting of the turbines within the context of a Brayton cycle. The RSA prototype, with two to three years of operation before the startup of the first commercial unit in the U.S., will be critical in providing a demonstration of this new technology.

The NTDG believes the PBMR can meet the criterion. An international team is being assembled. Design contracts are in place for major equipment. There is a need, in the near future, to develop a strong vendor organization that can support both the design and licensing.

### **Criterion 3: Commercialization Plan**

#### **Summary of PBMR Pty. Response**

The commercialization of the PBMR will be accomplished by the construction and operation of a full size demonstration plant in South Africa with concurrent licensing in the US by Exelon. ESKOM and Exelon will place the first orders of commercial units during the demonstration plant construction and startup phases.

Institutional issues that need to be resolved for commercialization include insurance cost per unit under Price-Anderson legislation, and the funding formula related to the Decommissioning Trust Fund.

The table below lists key events and the earliest potential dates for their completion.

Table 1 – Potential PBMR Timeline

Earliest Possible Date	Event	Acting Party
Oct. 2001	Completion of RSA SAR, submittal to NNR	PBMR
Mar. 2002	SAR Rev 0 Approval – permission to construct	NNR
1Q, 2002	Decision to proceed with construction	PBMR
4Q, 2002	Start construction – RSA PBMR Demo Unit	PBMR, Eskom
4Q, 2005	Start non-nuclear testing, RSA Demo Unit	PBMR, Eskom
May, 2005	Load Fuel, RSA PBMR Demo Unit	PBMR, Eskom
May, 2007	Complete nuclear testing, start com. operation	Eskom
Aug. 2002	Submit ESP Application	Exelon
Mar. 2003	Submit COL Application	Exelon
Sept. 2004	Receive ESP	NRC
Sept. 2005	Receive COL	NRC
Sept. 2005	Start approved construction	Exelon
Sept. 2007	Load Fuel	Exelon
Sept. 2008	Complete Nuclear Testing	Exelon
May 2007	Submit Design Certification Application	PBMR
2010	Issue Design Certification	NRC

### NTDG Assessment

The PBMR has a credible and detailed plan for commercialization if the commitment by Exelon, ESKOM and the other partners to keep the schedule is maintained. The actual construction and testing of the design in RSA, assuming it goes forward on schedule, will confirm the economic viability of the design, or at least provide the ability to project ahead to acceptable nth of a kind costs, with fabrication infrastructure in place and operating efficiently on a continuous production schedule.

The success is heavily dependent on the success of the RSA program for design, technology development, operating experience and fuel production. While experience gained from the RSA program impacts all aspects of U.S. commercialization it cannot assure that all problems in licensing in the U.S. and use of new technology will be satisfactorily resolved for commercial use of the PBMR in the U.S. Additional financial issues specific to the U.S. related to insuring nuclear units and in providing for the decommissioning fund also must be resolved to make the small sized units like the PBMR commercially viable. Licensing issues, as described under Criterion 1, could also influence a decision to proceed in the U.S. Thus, while the commercialization plan is strong it does not assure that commercialization of the PBMR in the U.S. will be achieved by 2010.

The NTDG believes the PBMR can meet the criterion since there is already a potential U.S. customer (Exelon) with substantial – albeit conditional – commitment. Presuming successful continuation of the South African project and an Exelon decision to proceed with a U.S. project, the PBMR commercialization plan is credible.

**Criterion 4: Cost Sharing Plan:****Summary of PBMR Pty. Response**

PBMR Pty Ltd. does not request any U.S. Government funding for the design and manufacture of the prototype PBMR module in the RSA, or for the design and manufacture of any PBMR units in the U.S. The recommended use of government funding is for the U.S. Government's fees associated with review of the ESP and COL applications, PBMR design and system education programs, improved gas reactor regulatory framework, code verification, fuel confirmatory testing, and material testing to demonstrate long term reliability.

PBMR Pty Ltd. will spend on the order of \$200 million in the development and \$300 million in the demonstration of the PBMR design. In contrast, the recommended government funding to support the PBMR aggregates to approximately 7.5 percent of this amount during FY 2002 and FY 2003.

**NTDG Assessment**

The PBMR has a workable approach to cost sharing between industry and Government, primarily by virtue of the indicated commitment of PBMR Pty. Ltd. to cover the costs of development (estimated \$500 M, including construction of the first RSA unit) while seeking only minimal U.S. Government funding for costs related to licensing activities, including the NRC confirmatory fuel characterization and test programs. This represents an effective leveraging of U.S. Government funding against industry investment.

The NTDG believes the PBMR meets this criterion.

**Criterion 5: Economic Competitiveness:****Summary of PBMR Pty. Response**

The PBMR would be deployed in increments of 110 MWe, allowing for an improved match to demand growth and utilization of capacity. The owner/investor financial risk is reduced relative to intermediate or large capacity plants. Construction times are short, reducing cost and matching market demand. The PBMR would break-even with a Combined Cycle Gas turbine (CCGT) plant with gas at about \$4.00/ MMBTU.

The table below indicates key economic parameters for the PBMR as currently designed. The costs for major components embedded in this estimate are based on quotations received from commercial suppliers of that equipment.

Table 3 - Approximate Cost Evaluation

	Value
PBMR Module Thermal Rating	268 MWth
PBMR Module Electrical Rating	110 MWe
PBMR Module power conversion efficiency	~40 percent
Modules per Plant	7 to 20
FOAK Development, including Fuel and Demonstration Module (FOAK)	~\$500 M
Mature Plant PBMR Capital Cost Target (NOAK)	~\$1250/kWe
Mature Operation and Maintenance Cost Target	2-3 mills/kWh
Mature Fuel Cycle Cost Target	4-6 mills/kWh
Total Mature Generating Cost Target	~3-3.5¢/kWh

These costs do not include government fees associated with the ESP, COL, or certification process for the PBMR in the US since these are proposed for government support.

### NTDG Assessment

The economic competitiveness of multiple small units vs. a larger unit is a highly controversial topic. Exelon presents the case for use of smaller units, which includes short construction time that gets the electricity on line more quickly with less interest cost; more closely matching electricity production to demand so as not to depress the market with oversupply; and the financing advantages of sequentially building smaller units. This advantage is both through the learning process and the discount that comes with multiple component orders. In addition, the inherent passive safety potentially reduces the cost of safety systems and containment. They have higher fuel utilization than LWRs, and this improves fuel cycle economics. On the other hand, to reach the same power output as a large LWR they require 10 pressure vessels that are the same size as one LWR, and 10 structures. It will be a considerable challenge to have the beneficial cost factors compensate for the added costs. The PBMR projected busbar costs look favorable, but the economic uncertainties of using a new technology are much greater than using technology that has a stronger experience base. Also, the plant design and system costs such as the Power Conversion System (PCS) are not finalized so a realistic cost basis for the FOAK is not yet possible. Exelon indicated an installed cost in the range \$1000/Kwe to \$1700/Kwe, with an “expected value” of \$1250/KWe. The economic competitiveness of the resulting busbar cost is quite different for these cases. As with all new reactor designs the initial units will have higher generation cost, so one should not be surprised by a value that exceeds the “expected value, in both gas-cooled reactor designs, of sacrificing economy of scale in the interest of safety, but achieving economics through efficiency and multiplicity. Multiple unit orders, consistent with the commercialization strategy, will be required to bring the cost down to more competitive levels. The NTDG cautions against over optimism in projecting the electricity cost of relatively untested technology. It is still premature to be confident of the final outcome.

The NTDG believes the PBMR can meet this criterion. However, projected economics are preliminary and have high uncertainty. Satisfactory economics rely on deployment of multiple modules and successful development of the design.

### **Criterion 6: Fuel Cycle Industrial Structure:**

#### **Summary of PBMR Pty. Response**

The PBMR uses TRISO coated fuel kernels embedded into graphite spheres of racket-ball size. The kernels contain  $UO_2$  enriched to between 8 percent and 9 percent U-235. Individual spheres pass through the core from 5 to 10 times during their useful life, and are then placed in long-term storage, without any reprocessing. The PBMR design accommodates the dry storage of spent fuel within the citadel over the lifetime of each module.

PBMR Pty. has selected the reference fuel design from the German AVR 21-2 pebble fuel with  $UO_2$  TRISO coated particles that was developed and tested in the AVR reactor. This fuel was produced over a period of several years and underwent testing at the Julich Research Center in Germany. In the German program, relevant irradiation testing of more than  $2E5$  particles was performed without a single coated particle failure during irradiation. Statistically, that corresponds to a 95 percent confidence level that the coating failure fraction of the reference design fuel is less than  $2E-5$ . Fuel spheres were also subjected post-irradiation to high temperatures to simulate loss of cooling and loss of pressure events. The performance of the fuel under these conditions was well documented and forms the basis for the determination that the selected reference fuel design will be acceptable for use in the PBMR. The manufacturing specifications and test data for this fuel which was manufactured by NUKEM in Germany have been obtained by PBMR and are being used by a team from NUKEM, BNFL and PBMR to design the fuel manufacturing plant and its processes.

PBMR Pty Ltd. has obtained the licenses, fuel design specifications, tooling design specifications, and procedures used by Nukem in the manufacture of fuel for the AVR and THTR plants as well as test capsules for the German modular HTR designs. PBMR fuel will be manufactured in the RSA, by PBMR Pty Ltd. The PBMR manufacturing facility is being developed within the physical plant used for the BEVA LWR fuel manufacturing facility at Pelindaba, RSA. This facility adapts the Nukem base fuel process technology, however, key system aspects such as process automation, quality monitoring, and data management will be updated to current standards. Sources for the enriched feedstock have been identified and negotiations for supply are in progress. A pilot plant startup is scheduled for 2003 with full production by 2005. The initial core and reload fuel for the initial reactor modules proposed for construction in the US by Exelon will be manufactured in the RSA, at the fuel facility to be constructed at Pelindaba, RSA.

The manufacturing processes and Quality Control (QC) parameters used in Germany will be reproduced, in order to ensure that PBMR fuel elements will be equivalent to German fuel elements, and that testing performed on AVR fuel can be incorporated into the body of data supporting the PBMR safety case. The proof of equivalence consists of showing that the qualified PBMR fuel manufacturing process, based on the German fuel manufacturing process,

produces fuel that complies with German fuel performance. Compliance will be demonstrated by using QC techniques and statistical sampling equivalent to those used during manufacture of German fuel.

### **NTDG Assessment**

The PBMR probably can meet the criteria for 2010 deployment although the proposed schedule for U.S. operation calls for fuel loading in September 2007. This date is questionable, based on the expected length of the fuel qualification program. The current schedule calls for PBMR Pty. Ltd. to have a pilot fuel plant in operation in late 2003. Assuming fuel tests begin in mid-2004, fuel qualification is unlikely before mid to late 2008. Of course, there are still uncertainties in meeting this schedule related to successful operation of the fuel production facilities in South Africa and in the resolution with the NRC of fuel testing requirements and QA requirements to meet fuel acceptance criteria for fuel use in the U.S. The relationship of the licensing rationale for the low pressure containment to an acceptable upper limit for fuel failure fraction will need to be resolved with the NRC in the near future. Nonetheless, the schedule has sufficient margin for tuning the fuel production process and for fuel testing to allow U.S. operation of the reactor prior to 2010. In addition to fuel testing it will also be necessary to deal with licensing issues related to having a foreign fuel supplier. The mechanisms for NRC oversight of the QA program will have to be developed.

It is known that certain radioactive fission decay products, especially Ag-110, can diffuse through the SiC layer at operating temperatures. This might lead to contamination of the power conversion system, especially the turbine blades. The presence of Ag-110 was previously seen at Ft. St. Vrain, but was found to be of little consequence. However, the PBMR operates at a higher temperature than Ft. St. Vrain does, so the potential exists that the problem may be worse than found previously. The possible cost consequences are uncertain. It is the view of GA and Exelon that this is primarily a maintenance issue and not a safety issue, and it is being treated as such.

Storage of used fuel for the 60-year plant life is satisfactorily addressed in the PBMR design. Disposal of used fuel in a once-through fuel cycle is facilitated by the SiC coating that provides a fission product barrier not present in LWR fuel. Design features of this system, from both a system and worker safety viewpoint, would be included in the NRC review. However, there is no reason to believe that this would cause any delay.

The NTDG believes the PBMR can meet the criterion. PBMR safety and reliability hinge on a successful fuel test program and high quality fuel manufacture. The current plan includes a program to replicate German fuel design, perform confirmatory testing, obtain NRC license, and produce PBMR fuel. It is noted that the fuel for the initial U.S. unit is to be procured from a foreign supplier, so that licensing concerns regarding such a supplier will need to be addressed.

**B. GAP ANALYSIS**

The design specific gaps are the tasks that need to be done if this technology is to be brought to the marketplace by 2010. They relate to licensing, fuel and materials testing, and computer code verification. Below these gaps are presented along with the closure actions needed and the estimated cost (in \$ million) of achieving closure. Cost sharing specifically related licensing and to confirmatory testing, which is also considered regulatory driven, is requested at a higher rate than 50-50 cost share with industry.

Numerous technical gaps exist as discussed under Criterion 1. Among these are instrumentation and control design, safety analyses, and the power conversion system. These and other FOAK design issues are being addressed by PBMR Pty. Ltd. during their design of the RSA demonstration unit and are being funded by industry. It is estimated that the cost of these efforts is approximately \$200 M. They are not included below.

**Regulatory Framework**

Gap: No gas reactor regulatory framework exists against which to license the PBMR.

Closure: This gap can be resolved by developing a top-down risk-informed gas reactor regulatory framework. This would shorten the Part 52 licensing process and reduce regulatory uncertainty that could prevent the commitment to construction.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										TOTAL
DOE		\$3.5M	\$3.5M							\$7.0M
Industry	\$0.5M	\$0.5M	\$0.5M							\$1.5M
TOTAL	\$0.5M	\$4.0M	\$4M							\$8.5M

**Fuel Performance and Testing**

Gap: Regulator concurrence is needed on coated particle fuel performance characteristics that impact PBMR safety, source term, containment design and length of time to obtain a license.

Closure: To close the gap, it is proposed to perform a particle fuel characterization and test program that allows the PBMR to demonstrate to regulators that its fuel meets specified performance characteristics for safe operation. Testing would be performed on fuel from different countries as well as South Africa to benchmark fuel performance of known high quality fuel.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										TOTAL
DOE		\$10M	\$11M	\$11M	\$8M					\$40M
Industry	\$1M	\$2M	\$3M	\$3M	\$3M					\$12M
TOTAL	\$1M	\$12M	\$14M	\$14M	\$11M					\$52M

NTDG comment: While the total dollar value for fuel testing is reasonable, the funding profile needs to be stretched into FY08 to complete the program.

### **Computer Codes**

Gap: PBMR computer codes used for design and safety analysis need to be verified and validated (V&V) to US standards.

Closure: To close this gap, develop the process by which these safety critical computer codes will be V&V'd and perform the benchmarking required by that process.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										TOTAL
DOE	\$0.6M	\$2M	\$2M	\$1M						\$5.6M
Industry	\$0.6M	\$2M	\$2M	\$1M						\$5.6M
TOTAL	\$1.2M	\$4M	\$4M	\$2M						\$11.2M

### **Materials Research**

Gap: Data are lacking on high temperature and high radiation level performance of some materials to be used in the reactor cavity.

Closure: To close this gap, perform testing on selected materials at temperatures and radiation levels that represent the operating environment in the PBMR.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										TOTAL
DOE	\$1.4M	\$3M	\$2M							\$6.4M
Industry	\$2.5M	\$3M	\$2M							\$7.5M
TOTAL	\$3.9M	\$6M	\$4M							\$13.9M

### **Total Resource Requirements to Close All Technical Gaps**

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										TOTAL
DOE	\$2.0M	\$18.5M	\$18.5M	\$12M	\$8M					\$59M
Industry	\$4.6M	\$7.5M	\$7.5M	\$4M	\$3M					\$26.6M
TOTAL	\$6.6M	\$26M	\$26M	\$16M	\$11M					\$85.6M

### C. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The schedule put forth by Exelon is very aggressive, including a demonstration unit to be completed in South Africa for fuel loading in 2005, a simultaneous ESP and COL application to the NRC with the ESP in 2002 and the COL in 2003, and two and a half years to complete the COL from its submission with the complete safety documentation. Based on this schedule the first unit would start up in 2007 and begin commercial operation in 2008. All the gaps identified for the PBMR, except for the engineering and technical gaps discussed earlier, relate to the licensing process, and include: (a) the development of a gas reactor regulatory framework; (b) safety and design code verification; (c) fuel testing and qualification; and (d) confirmatory material testing. Concurrence by the NRC with the containment design is also needed. In addition, licensing issues related to having a foreign fuel supplier will need to be addressed. The NTDG considers it unlikely that all these issues can be resolved in two and a half years, even with pre-applications meetings. In addition, a startup by 2007 is unlikely because of the length of time for the fuel testing program and fuel qualification. This is the most critical safety issue that exists for gas reactors since the fuel is proposed to be the final containment barrier, and justifies the use of a low pressure vented containment structure and potentially an evacuation zone at the site boundary. Finally, a construction schedule of only 24 months may be realistic for later units, but it is unlikely to occur on the first unit. It will include startup of a modular manufacturing facility and first time assembly and construction at the site. The NTDG believes that a first unit is likely to take three years to complete. While these factors may lead to a delay of 18 to 24 months, the unit should still be operational before 2010.

Design certification will be sought later, after the COL is issued and the RSA demonstration unit begins operation. The demonstration unit in RSA serves as a prototype. Other technologies are pursuing design certification first in order to potentially shorten the licensing time since safety issues would already be resolved before seeking the COL. While this approach has a higher risk for achieving the goal of operation by 2010, for the PBMR it has the potential to succeed because of the strong commitment of Exelon Corporation who would be the first customer in the United States. Exelon is a partner in PBMR Pty Ltd., the company that is developing the PBMR for commercial application, with the first unit to be built in South Africa if the design study shows the economic efficacy of the PBMR and the partners agree by early 2002 to go forward.

There are many uncertainties in the early use of a new technology. Cost estimates are limited by the lack of a complete design and by experience with building and operating a commercial application of the PBMR. Even though a 15 MW experimental reactor operated for 20 years in Germany, the commercial PBMR uses an untested power conversion system based on the Brayton cycle, a direct cycle with gas turbines, one of which is a vertically mounted power turbine on magnetic bearings that drives the generator. Modular construction would be incorporated to minimize construction time.

PBMR probably can be deployed in the U.S. by 2010.

PBMR is unique among the NTDG candidates in that it has an active customer, currently pursuing this design for U.S. application. Nonetheless, deployment by 2010 would require that:


- The South African project continues successfully
- Exelon decides to proceed with a U.S. PBMR project, and commits to early (prior to COL) procurement of long lead-time plant components.
- A successful, expedited ESP/COL schedule
- Resolution of several challenging technical issues, including those related to fuel reliability and the energy conversion system.

Subsequent to the NTDG evaluation, Exelon announced that it intends to delay its decision to proceed with the PBMR by a year, and that one or two technical issues that create uncertainty with regard to PBMR licensability will need to be resolved for Exelon to proceed. The South African demonstration plant has also been delayed by one year. Exelon advises that it still plans to proceed with its ESP application in 2002, but will be delay the COL schedule. This recent development is an example of the uncertainty inherent in the proposed PBMR project schedule which led to the cautious NTDG judgments regarding deployment potential.

### **Timeline for the PBMR**

The roadmap reflects the schedule shown in Criterion 3 but with adjustments based on NTDG judgments. It shows the interconnection of the various tasks necessary to support the schedule, including the gaps and when they are closed. The development of the power conversion system (including design and testing) is shown as being completed by the end of 2002. Non-fuel materials testing and code validation and verification is estimated to be completed in two years and three years, respectively. The relatively short time for code V & V is based on having a simple single-phase system, much simpler than LWRs. Fuel testing and characterization was anticipated by the vendor to be a four-year task, with two years for fuel quality verification. The date for issuing the COL is slightly extended to allow additional NRC review time for materials testing results and code verification results. The NTDG has adjusted the schedule for the fuel test start date. It also notes that additional time for review of the tests may be needed before the NRC qualifies the fuel. The demonstration unit in RSA has allowed extensive time for reactor testing. The times anticipated for regulatory actions and for ordering components and constructing a first plant in the U.S. are also shown. Two critical points are highlighted, the decision on whether to proceed to construction in RSA, which is in early 2002; and the decision, if the first decision is positive, on whether to proceed to construction in the US. This one comes at the end of 2003.

PBMR Near Term Deployment Roadmap



## GENERAL ATOMICS GT-MHR DESIGN

The Gas Turbine – Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) is a graphite moderated helium cooled reactor. Heat generated by nuclear fission in the reactor is transferred to the coolant gas (helium) and converted into electrical energy in a gas turbo-generator via a Brayton direct cycle. The fuel is made up of spherical fuel particles encapsulated in multiple coating layers, including an impermeable coating that contains fission products to temperatures up to 1600° C. These particles are formed into cylindrical fuel compacts and loaded into fuel channels in graphite blocks that are 0.79 meters in height. These blocks are stacked horizontally and vertically to make up an annular core. The core is contained within three boundaries, the primary system boundary, which contains the helium coolant, a chamber that houses the reactor, and the containment/confinement building.

The containment concept for high temperature gas reactors (both GT-MHR and PBMR) is distinctly different from high-pressure containment for light water reactors. For HTGRs there is an additional level of radionuclide containment in the TRISO coated fuel particles used in these reactors. A SiC coating that is presumed to contain the fission radionuclides during normal operation and during all accident scenarios provides this containment. A primary system boundary rupture during operation would lead to an initial pressure buildup. The building containment design allows this pressure to be released through filtered vents, which would then close. Analyses suggest to the designers that release of radioactivity for any accident scenario is sufficiently small that the emergency planning zone (EPZ) could be set at the plant boundary.

The fundamental concept is aimed at building a plant that has high thermal efficiency (48 percent), yet has no physical process that can cause a radiation hazard beyond the site boundary. This is to be achieved by demonstrating that passive heat removal from the reactor vessel through conduction, convection and radiation exceeds the decay heat production in the post accident conditions, and that the peak temperature reached in the core during the transient is below the demonstrated fuel degradation temperature and far below the temperature at which the physical structure is affected. This effectively would preclude the possibility of a core melt accident.

The GT-MHR module generates approximately 286 MWe and can be used to generate power in a stand-alone mode or as part of a power plant that consists of up to 4 modules.

### A. CRITERIA EVALUATION

#### Criterion 1: Regulatory Acceptance

##### **Summary of General Atomics Response**

The General Atomics plan for licensing the commercial version of the GT-MHR is aimed at gaining design certification of the GT-MHR. However, the first and potentially one or more

subsequent modules would be licensed through a combination of early site permitting (ESP) and combined construction / operating licenses (COL).

Consistent with the schedule outlined in Criterion 3, at or about the time of a letter of intent for a plant order (end of 2002) a pre-application safety document will be submitted to the NRC to allow for an early identification and resolution of issues and to minimize the time required for review of an application for COL. Prior to this submittal, the regulatory requirements for the GT-MHR will have been established through early interaction with the NRC. An ESP application will be submitted shortly after the pre-application safety document. It is anticipated that a potential customer for the GT-MHR will prepare the application for an ESP and will submit it to the NRC prior to or at the time of providing a letter of intent for a plant order. An application for a COL and DC would be submitted along with submittal of a SAR and risk assessment in mid 2004. Receipt of a COL is anticipated approximately 36 months later. Also aiding the review schedule would be the establishment of the acceptance testing (ITAAC) that would be performed. It is expected that design certification will be issued after startup of the first module.

### **NTDG Assessment**

The licensing strategy makes use of the design and safety analysis developed for a plutonium burning unit in Russia, which serves as a prototype and makes possible an early submission of a pre-application safety document. Application for a DC made at the same time as the COL application should avoid duplication of NRC review efforts. Because the design is being developed first for the Russian prototype and the relevant aspects are being transferred (Gap 1) to the U.S. for the commercial unit, the COL will contain the same level of safety analysis, including a complete plant PRA, as the application for DC. Also it will contain proposed Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC). To meet their schedule, it will be necessary to have a letter of intent from a first-plant customer by no later than mid- 2003 for the COL application, but the intent letter is desired by the end of 2002 for customer support of the pre-application safety document. According to the GA schedule, there would be one and a half years for pre-COL submission safety review, and two years allotted for NRC review and approval of the COL, up to the hearing stage and 1 year for a hearing following completion of the NRC review.

This strategy is credible but very challenging. The time for review is short based on past LWR experience with safety reviews. Of particular concern for maintaining the schedule are the early identification of a customer, the testing program required to qualify the fuel, the approval of a low pressure, vented containment (features shared in common with the PBMR), and the development schedule in Russia for the power conversion system. The GT-MHR power conversion schedule is somewhat longer than the development schedule in South Africa for the PBMR power conversion system. In addition, the schedule provides one-year overlap between the Russian Prototype unit startup and the startup of the commercial unit, so there is some, albeit limited, opportunity for transfer of operating experience. However, the prototype cannot be used to resolve any safety related issue if a COL is issued. If prototype testing were required to resolve any issue this would delay the issuance of the COL (Letter of August 23, 2001 from Samuel J. Collins, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulation, NRC, to James A. Muntz, V.P. of Exelon Generation regarding NRC Staff view of PBMR licensing plan.) Finally, it is noted that

the use of the COL without Design Certification has less finality to it. Since there is no rulemaking involved, there is greater risk of post-construction intervention.

General Atomics has the advantage of significant experience from the pre-application review of its prior MHGTR design, as well as experience from Ft. St. Vrain licensing activities. Significant GT-MHR engineering development has been completed in several related programs. These include DOE funding of the MHGTR; DOE funding of the GT-MHR up until 1995 for the gas-cooled option for a tritium production reactor; as well as efforts toward the joint initiative with Russia for a gas-cooled reactor focused on burning excess weapons plutonium. The latter program is particularly important, for the design, development and safety analysis that would be transferred to the commercial program is estimated to have a significant value. If this work were performed in the US, the cost is estimated to be \$945 million, but will be done for about one-third this cost in Russia. The design information to be transferred (Gap 1) would be in final design detail. The design must be upgraded to Western standards for licensing purposes. In addition, either joint NRC review of common issues with PBMR or follow-on learning from an earlier PBMR submission would help speed the review process.

There are several issues that need to be resolved to accomplish the NRC review in the scheduled two year time period. Licensing issues shared with the PBMR include: lack of regulatory framework unique to gas reactors; selection of and acceptance by NRC of design basis accidents; policy issues regarding containment, resolution of source term and emergency planning; determination of fuel acceptance criteria with the NRC, establishment of fuel performance requirement in terms of testing, repeatability and QA. Cooperation with PBMR, especially on the regulatory framework issue, but possibly also on others, could potentially benefit both designs. Issues unique to the GT-MHR include: completion of final design documentation that requires the International Program maintain its schedule; and significant cost-sharing funds must be available from DOE for commercial plant design, analysis and fuel fabrication facility development. Based on the gap analysis it does not appear that the COL could be submitted earlier because the design documentation and analyses from both the Russian program and the additional work required by GA will not be ready for the final design before mid 2004. In this context, a listing of some of the technical tasks that are to be completed in the International Program by 2004 but currently represent technology gaps are the following:

- Reactor physics tests to validate the reactor physics codes.
- Thermal hydraulic tests to provide the data needed for flow distributions and core components pressure drops, thermal mixing at the core outlet, core column flow induced vibrations, and verification of core dynamic stability.
- Materials tests on reactor metals and ceramics to obtain supplemental data on material properties.
- Vessel materials tests, particularly on heavy section and welds.
- Reactor core graphite material tests on irradiated and unirradiated graphite specimens.
- Shutdown Heat Exchanger tests for flow behavior and to ISI with an eddy current probe.
- Reactor Cavity Cooling System component and integrated tests for RCCS properties and performance.
- Fuel handling system component and integrated tests.

- Turbomachine tests to verify key performance characteristics including surface coating tests where materials are in contact and subject to movement; flow distribution tests to characterize flow distributions in the compressor and turbine inlet and outlet ducts; and rotor dynamics tests.
- Turbomachine bearing tests to verify the performance of journal and thrust magnetic and catcher bearings.
- Seal tests related to the interface of the turbomachine and interfacing assemblies.
- Recuperator tests to verify the performance characteristics of this counterflow gas-to gas recuperator.
- Handling equipment tests for the turbomachine and generator.
- Precooler/intercooler tests to verify performance and inspectability of these heat exchangers.

This list enumerates the extensive design and testing effort being performed in Russia. Maintaining the schedule so all these efforts can be completed and transferred to the U.S. by 2004 represents a substantial challenge. It is a challenge not only to complete the large number of tasks to acceptable U.S. standards, but also to translate the design, testing, and analysis documents from Russian to English and prepare them in suitable form to be submitted to the NRC for the COL license application.

The NTDG believes the GT-MHR can meet the criterion, provided that several challenging technical issues (including fuel issues) can be resolved and demonstrated to NRC satisfaction in the time frame needed for 2010 deployment. U.S. licensing submittal information must be adapted from the Russian design and test work.

## **Criterion 2: Industrial Infrastructure**

### **Summary of General Atomics Response**

The GT-MHR is currently under development in an International program being performed in Russia for the disposition of surplus weapons plutonium. Both government and industrial organizations from the United States, Russia, France and Japan are sponsoring the development work. The lead Russian organization for the GT-MHR design and development work is the Experimental Machine Building Design Bureau (OKBM); General Atomics (GA) has the lead responsibility for providing technical support from the United States; Framatome from France and Fuji Electric from Japan have also provided support.

A commercialization program (see Criterion 3) has been developed for commercial deployment of the GT-MHR system in the United States and its markets based on utilizing the GT-MHR technology developed in Russia. The organization for commercial supply of GT-MHR plants in the United States is planned to be a consortium consisting of GA, OKBM, one or more domestic Architect-Engineer/ Constructor companies, and other potential organizations participating in development of the GT-MHR. For the first commercial plant in the United States, the commercialization program is based on using equipment suppliers that meet U.S. qualification

requirements. These suppliers will also supply the equipment for the first prototype plant in Russia. However, the commercial plant will be fueled with uranium and a domestic fuel supplier is planned.

### **NTDG Assessment**

The initial commercial GT-MHR units would utilize international suppliers for the major components, especially the Russian companies that are participating in the gas-cooled reactor program for plutonium burning. Meeting U.S. equipment standards will be an on-going challenge and concern for GA. The Russians are likely to have limited experience in meeting the ASME requirements. The development and testing of the technology for the Russian prototype, especially the power conversion equipment, is tied closely in schedule to the commercial program in the U.S. On the one hand, this allows for rapid technology transfer of evolving technology. On the other hand, full scale testing on the power conversion system will be limited because the prototype isn't scheduled to operate until one year before the first commercial unit. A degree of uncertainty in schedule is introduced related to funding uncertainties in the DOE funded International Program. The GT-MHR program may also experience complex relationships with the Russian Government that could result in commercial impediments, e.g. import-export rules. Even without these uncertainties there is a technology risk because of the complexity and lack of operating experience with the power conversion system, especially for a design with the turbocompressors and the power turbine-generator on a single shaft. The primary supplier of the power conversion system, OKBM, has a reputation for quality engineering, but lacks experience in the commercial market, especially in qualification as a commercial supplier in the U.S. Achieving equipment qualification for U.S. use in the time frame for 2010 deployment will be a challenging issue. On top of this, the vendor, GA, has not built a power reactor since Ft. St. Vrain in the 1970s, and they no longer have a strong vendor organization for reactor and system design. This will require that, in addition to obtaining a plant customer, GA must find a partner who can add this strength and experience to their organization, as well as financial resources.

The NTDG believes the GT-MHR can meet the criterion, provided that the Russian industrial infrastructure can be qualified as a commercial supplier in the U.S. This may be difficult to achieve in the time frame required for deployment by 2010. In addition, it must find a partner in the near future to strengthen the engineering and system design, provide an enhanced level of experience in building plants, and to provide industry match resources.

### **Criterion 3: Commercialization Plan**

#### **Summary of General Atomics Response**

The GT-MHR is an effective nuclear power electric generation plant for commercial deployment when fueled with uranium. Because of this, a program has been implemented for commercial deployment in the United States and its foreign markets of the technology being developed in Russia. Schedule-wise, the commercial program closely follows the International program. Key milestones for the International program and the Commercial program are as follows:

**GT-MHR INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM**

Complete design and development	By end of 2004
Obtain prototype construction license	By end of 2005
Complete prototype construction	By end of 2009
Complete prototype demonstration testing	By end of 2010
Start prototype full power operations	By end of 2010

**GT-MHR COMMERCIAL PROGRAM**

Complete regulatory framework	By end of 2002
Submit pre-application safety analysis	By end of 2002
Submit COL and DC applications	By mid 2004
Complete NRC COL review	By mid 2006
Complete COL hearing	By mid 2007
Obtain COL	By mid 2007
Obtain letter of intent for plant order	Desired by end of 2002 (Needed by 4 <sup>th</sup> Q of 2003)
Plant order	By mid 2006
Submit application for ESP	Early 2003
Obtain ESP	Early 2005
Complete fuel fabrication pilot plant	End of 2005
Complete fuel proof tests	End of 2009
Start plant site work	By mid 2006
Start plant construction	By mid 2007
Complete construction, begin fuel load	By end 2010

The engineering tasks necessary for adapting the technology developed in Russia for commercial plant deployment in the US consists of:

- GT-MHR technology transfer (e.g., drawings, specifications, reports)
- Performance of Incremental Design Items (e.g., uranium core, commercial BOP)
- Establishment of uranium fuel fabrication facility
- Plant safety and licensing
- Plant level design and analysis (e.g., utility/user requirements, performance analyses)

This engineering work is to be performed by team members of the GT-MHR supplier consortium. It is anticipated that no new R&D will be needed. All of the necessary development and test work, except for fuel supply proof testing covered under criterion 6, will be performed in Russia as part of the International program.

**NTDG Assessment**

GA has established a utility advisory group with a goal of identifying a first U.S. customer. It is critical to their schedule that they succeed by third quarter of 2003. Their big advantages are leveraging work from the International Program to reduce design and development cost, and their experience from earlier reactor design development and licensing. Nonetheless, there are significant uncertainties in the commercialization plan related to the licensing schedule; the

heavy dependence on DOE funding and schedule adherence for the International Program in Russia; the U.S. funding for the commercial program; and the technology risks related to fuel and to first-of-a-kind power conversion system technology. The time period to successfully develop the commercial plan is rather short in order to have the first plant operating in the U.S. by 2010.

The NTDG believes the GT-MHR can meet the criterion. However, this presumes continued U.S. Government support to the Russian project, timely identification of a U.S. customer and industry partners who will strengthen the engineering organization and provide resources, and technical success with the Russian project.

#### **Criterion 4: Cost Sharing Plan:**

##### **Summary of General Atomics Response**

A table of cost categories and expected cost sharing between Government(s) and private industry for initial development of the GT-MHR for plutonium disposition and subsequent deployment of the GT-MHR for commercial power generation using uranium fuel is as follows:

<u>Cost Category</u>	<b>Government Cost Share</b>	<b>Private Industry Cost Share</b>
GT-MHR Conceptual design	30 percent	70 percent
GT-MHR Design & Development for Pu Disposition	95 percent	5 percent
GT-MHR Prototype Construction for Pu Disposition	95 percent	5 percent
Commercial Plant Design and Analysis	50 percent	50 percent
Technology Transfer for Commercial Deployment	50 percent	50 percent
Commercial Plant Incremental Design Items	50 percent	50 percent
Commercial Plant Safety and Licensing	50 percent	50 percent
Commercial Fuel Development	50 percent	50 percent
Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility	5 percent	95 percent

The rationale behind the planned cost sharing percentages is based on expenditures to date, DOE nuclear energy cost sharing precedents, and nuclear industry investment practices.

#### **NTDG Assessment**

The commercial program relies on U.S. Government cost sharing for licensing, transfer of technology and design from the Russian program, plant design not covered by the Russian program, and fuel development. The rationale for the proposed cost sharing percentages is based on expenditures to date, DOE nuclear energy cost sharing precedents, and nuclear industry investment practices. The GT-MHR has benefited from having its basic engineering development tied to the plutonium disposition program, which is almost fully government funded as a national security issue. This does not, by itself, negate the rationale for cost sharing for developing a commercial unit. Indeed, this has enabled GT-MHR to reduce its requested

government support from DOE by transferring the technology from Russia rather than performing the first-of-a-kind engineering for the commercial reactor.

The major uncertainties include the availability of funds to continue the past government cost sharing precedents, and the identification of the necessary additional industrial participants who will provide the industry cost share. At this time the industry cost share participation is not all identified.

The NTDG believes the GT-MHR meets the criterion. The cost share proposal is predicated on continued U.S. Government support to the Russian project and presumes substantial private sector participation for commercialization.

### **Criterion 5: Economic Competitiveness:**

#### **Summary of General Atomics Response**

The data provided to evaluate the economic competitiveness of the GT-MHR is summarized in the following table:

#### **GT-MHR Data for Economic Competitiveness Evaluation**

##### **Plant Configuration & Capacity Data**

Number of modules/plant	4
Thermal power/module [MWth]	600
Thermal efficiency [ percent]	~48
Net module capacity [MWe]	288
Net plant capacity, [MWe]	1150

##### **Plant Construction Cost**

Site Engineering Cost [M\$]	60
Procurement Cost [M\$]	630
Construction Cost [M\$]	260
Plant Base Cost [M\$]	950
Contingency [M\$]	190
Owners Cost [M\$]	150
Overnight Cost [M\$]	1,290
Overnight Unit Cost [\$/kWe]	1122
NOAK/FOAK Cost	~0.75

##### **Other Plant Costs**

Fixed O&M Costs [M\$/yr.]	30.44
Variable O&M Costs [\$/MWh]	0.64
Fuel Cost [\$/MBTU]	1.27
Expected Plant Lifetime [Yrs.]	60
Nominal Capacity Factor [ percent]	90
Decommissioning Cost [M\$/Yr.]	1.1

As with all new reactor designs the initial units will have higher generation cost. This is a direct consequence, in both gas-cooled reactor designs, of sacrificing economy of scale in the interest of safety, but achieving economics through efficiency and multiplicity. Multiple unit orders, consistent with the commercialization strategy, will bring the cost down to more competitive levels.

### **NTDG Assessment**

The short construction time, estimated to be three years after the four-year construction for the initial unit, is favorable to economic competitiveness since there would be smaller interest costs. In addition, the relatively small cost of the individual reactor modules should make financing easier than for large plants. Other features of the GT-MHR also favor good economics, including high thermal efficiency and high fuel burnup. On the other hand, it will take four pressure vessels and four structures to have the same power output as a large LWR. It will be a considerable challenge to have the beneficial cost factors compensate for the added costs. The projected busbar power cost looks favorable, particularly for the NOAK plants, but the uncertainties are significant. This is based on the lack of a complete design and the lack of experience with the power conversion equipment and the fuel manufacturing production facility. Much of the detailed design work and component technology development and testing will be funded through the International Program. Even with this, and cost-shared funding with DOE to transfer the technology to the commercial program, the initial four-unit plant is estimated to have a nominal capital cost of 1,576 \$/kWe. This not surprising for FOAK technology, but it clearly identifies the need for multiple unit orders to reach a more competitive cost basis.

The NTDG believes the GT-MHR can meet the criterion. However, projected economics are preliminary and have a high uncertainty. Satisfactory economics rely on deployment of multiple modules and successful development of the design.

### **Criterion 6: Fuel Cycle Industrial Structure**

#### **Summary of General Atomics Response**

The GT-MHR uses TRISO coated particle fuel. The reference fuel is TRISO particles containing uranium oxycarbide (UCO) with 19.8 percent enrichment. Test specimens for the reference fuel need to be manufactured for qualification testing.

No coated particle fuel fabrication facilities currently exist in the United States. An automated fuel fabrication pilot plant will be designed and constructed. It is scheduled to begin operation by the end of 2005. Proof test specimens will be fabricated in the pilot plant to qualify the automated fuel fabrication process.

For the first GT-MHR plant(s), the required GT-MHR uranium enrichment can be produced by blending highly enriched uranium down to 19.8 percent enrichment level. Once the demand has been established for these enrichment levels, supply capability for the required enrichments is

expected to be established. There are no unique conversion requirements for the GT-MHR. Worldwide conversion capacity is sufficient to satisfy GT-MHR conversion needs.

Immediately after discharge from the reactor, spent GT-MHR fuel elements are stored dry, in an array of storage tubes externally cooled by water, for an approximate one-year cooling period. After 1 year of cooling, the spent fuel elements are removed from the storage tubes and placed in dry spent fuel storage casks. Loaded spent fuel storage casks are moved to an on-site spent fuel storage yard sized to contain all of the spent fuel storage casks required for the life of the plant.

### **NTDG Assessment**

The fuel supply strategy is to qualify TRISO particle fuel containing uranium oxycarbide (UCO). The fuel supply will come from HEU that is blended down to 19.8 percent enrichment. GA will need to give attention to assuring that a long term, reliable fuel supply is available. The UCO fuel results in high fuel utilization and good fuel cycle economics. Simultaneous with the testing program with existing fuel, an automated fuel production pilot plant would be built in the U.S. by General Atomics that, when qualified for production, would be expanded into a fuel fabrication facility.

The critical issue that is not resolved is the determination, with the NRC approval, of fuel acceptance criteria and a demonstration that the fuel produced and tested meets those criteria. While GA previously used TRISO particle fuel at Ft. St. Vrain, which had a low-pressure containment, the type of containment is quite different from previously approved LWR power plants. Although a body of evidence on radionuclide release from irradiated TRISO particle fuels already exists, the licensing process has not proceeded far enough to make a reasonable determination whether the cost and effort is consistent for use of a low pressure containment for the GT-MHR operating conditions.

In any event, a full fuel-testing program is planned and required using fuel fabricated in the pilot plant. This fuel-testing program is required for NRC to qualify the fuel. This will take approximately four years including the NRC review of the topical report. Such a testing program is critical to the plant operation since the fuel is the main containment for fission products and the barrier to radionuclide release in the event of an accident. The testing program must show that the fuel meets the fuel acceptance criteria. If a low pressure, vented containment is used, then the risk is being taken in building the plant that the acceptance criteria for that type of containment will be met. This risk is necessary to achieve 2010 operation since the fuel testing isn't completed until early to mid 2010.

It is known that certain radioactive fission decay products, especially Ag-110, can diffuse through the SiC layer at operating temperatures. This might lead to contamination of the power conversion system, especially the turbine blades. The presence of Ag-110 was previously seen at Ft. St. Vrain, but was found to be of little consequence. However, the GT-MHR operates at a higher temperature than Ft. St. Vrain does, so the potential exists that the problem may be worse than found previously. The possible cost consequences are uncertain. It is the view of GA that this is a maintenance problem, not a safety problem, and it will be treated as such.

The NTDG believes the GT-MHR can meet the criterion. The GT-MHR safety and reliability hinge on successful fuel development and high quality fuel manufacture. The current plan includes an ambitious program to develop, test, license and produce GT-MHR fuel.

### **B. GAP ANALYSIS**

The design specific gaps are the tasks that need to be done if this technology is to be brought to the marketplace by 2010. They relate to licensing, fuel fabrication and testing, safety analyses, and technology transfer for plant design plus additional plant design and analysis. Below these gaps are presented along with the closure actions needed and the estimated cost (in \$ million) of achieving closure. Cost sharing on a per task basis is requested at a 50-50 cost sharing rate between industry and the U.S. Government.

The technology gaps that are to be filled in the International Program are identified under criterion 1 and represent much of the technical develop effort, FOAK engineering and safety analysis. GA has estimated that the cost of that effort at approximately \$300 M. It is not singled out here, but the results are included in the technology transfer gap.

### **Technology Transfer**

Gap: GT-MHR technology developed in Russia in the International Program needs to be transferred to the United States for the commercial program. A complete detailed design of a GT-MHR plant for plutonium disposition is being prepared in the International program and all of the necessary R&D to validate the design will be performed. For commercial deployment of this technology in the US, a transfer of the technology needs to take place.

Closure: To close this gap, the following activities are required:

- Preparation of System Design Descriptions (SDDs) for the commercial plant systems based on the equivalent documents developed in the International program but incorporating the use of US codes and standards.
- Adaptation of Drawings and Specifications by changing from the use of Russian codes and standards to the use of US codes and standards and any associated design consequences.
- Adaptation of Design and Technology Reports by verification of compliance to US codes and standards.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										TOTAL
DOE		\$3M	\$4M	\$3M	\$2M					\$12M
Industry		\$1M	\$2M	\$3M	\$3M	\$2M	\$1M			\$12M
TOTAL		\$4M	\$6M	\$6M	\$5M	\$2M	\$1M			\$24M

**Systems Design**

Gap: Design of plant systems for commercial deployment of the GT-MHR technology using uranium fuel.

Closure: To close this gap, the design of the following incremental systems is required for the commercial GT-MHR:

- A uranium core design,
- A low pressure, vented (LPV) containment system,
- A reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS) for the LPV containment,
- Conversion from 50 hertz to 60 hertz ac power generation,
- BOP structures and systems for the commercial plant design.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										TOTAL
DOE		\$5M	\$4M	\$4M	\$4M					\$17M
Industry		\$1M	\$4M	\$4M	\$4M	\$3M	\$1M			\$17M
TOTAL		\$6M	\$8M	\$8M	\$8M	\$3M	\$1M			\$34M

**Obtaining a COL**

Gap: Safety and licensing of the commercial GT-MHR aimed at gaining a positive Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the GT-MHR, approval to start construction of the first plant and a design certification of the standard plant.

Closure: The major items that need to be completed to close this gap are as follows:

- Preparation of a licensing plan
- Performance of safety analyses and risk assessment
- Preparation of SAR for COL
- Interaction with NRC through completion of SAR review, SER preparation, and public hearings.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										TOTAL
DOE	\$1M	\$3M	\$2M	\$2M	\$2M					\$10M
Industry	\$.2M	\$1.2M	\$1.6M	\$2.5M	\$2.5M	\$1.5M	\$.5M			\$10M
TOTAL	\$1.2M	\$4.2M	\$3.6M	\$4.5M	\$4.5M	\$1.5M	\$.5M			\$20M

**Fuel Fabrication and Testing**

Gap: No GT-MHR uranium fuel fabrication facility currently exists in the United States. The gap includes the design, construction and qualification of a GT-MHR fuel fabrication process.

Closure: The following activities are required to close this gap:

- Irradiation testing of GT-MHR fuel compacts to proof test TRISO coated particle fuel compacts for GT-MHR performance requirements
- Fuel fabrication QC process improvement
- Fuel fabrication process automation and qualification (pilot plant scale)
- Design and construct a fuel fabrication facility.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										TOTAL
DOE	\$1M	\$4M	\$4M	\$5M	\$5M					\$19M
Industry		\$2M	\$3M	\$5M	\$5M	\$3M	\$3M			\$21M
TOTAL	\$1M	\$6M	\$7M	\$10M	\$10M	\$3M	\$3M			\$40M

NTDG comment: It is unlikely that the fuel-testing program will be completed by the end of FY08. It is likely that additional funds will be required since \$42M may be on the low side. (PBMR indicated that an equivalent program would take \$52M, and a fuels-testing expert supported the higher number.)

**Design Analysis**

Gap: Commercial GT-MHR plant level design and analysis activities including a plant requirements document to be satisfied by the GT-MHR commercial plant and performance of plant level assessments such as economic performance (safety assessments are included in a separate safety and licensing gap).

Closure: The following items are required to close this gap:

- A plant requirements document to be used for preparation of the commercial plant design.
- Plant level economic, proliferation resistance, and spent fuel waste assessments.

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	
Source										TOTAL
DOE		\$4M	\$4M	\$4M	\$2M					\$14M
Industry	\$0.2M	\$1.6M	\$3M	\$3M	\$2.2M	\$2M	\$2M			\$14M

TOTAL	\$0.2M	\$5.6M	\$7M	\$7M	\$4.2M	\$2M	\$2M			\$28M
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### Total Resource Requirements to Close All Gaps

Year	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	TOTAL
Source										
DOE	\$2M	\$19M	\$18M	\$18M	\$15M					\$72M
Industry	\$0.4M	\$6.8M	\$13.6M	\$17.5M	\$16.7M	\$11.5M	\$7.5M			\$74M
TOTAL	\$2.4M	\$25.8M	\$31.6M	\$35.5M	\$31.7M	\$11.5M	\$7.5M			\$146M

The overall development cost is relatively low for development of a new reactor concept, with anticipated total development cost on the order of \$400 M. Most of the remainder is being developed as part of the International Program for a plutonium disposition reactor in Russia.

### C. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The GT-MHR is a promising design being developed in Russia as a plutonium burner. This is an International Program with joint funding and/or participation from DOE and Russia, and companies in Japan and France. This approach has the advantage that much of the design and development effort for the commercial unit can be leveraged from the work being supported in Russia. However, it also means that the U.S. commercial schedule is tied to both the funding and schedule for the International Program, as well as the quality of the work performed and the ability of the Russian equipment suppliers to meet U.S. qualification standards. This introduces a significant schedule risk for the commercial program. Gaps that need to be filled on a cost-shared basis with industry include: (a) technology transfer from Russia for design work and technology development; (b) design of all aspects of the reactor not covered by the Russian design, including the core, containment and balance of plant structures and systems; (c) obtaining a COL; and (d) fuel fabrication and testing. A gap for code verification and validation is not identified on the basis that past work from the MHTGR and the NPR programs, and further physics code tests and safety analyses in Russia, will be sufficient to qualify their codes with little additional effort. Nonetheless, it is important that completion of this task be explicitly built into their schedule to assure the work is completed well before a decision is expected from the NRC on the COL application.

The GT-MHR has chosen a commercialization plan that involves seeking a combined construction and operating license (COL) in parallel with an ESP. Design certification will be sought later, after the first plant serves as a demonstration but an application for DC will be submitted at the same time as the application for COL. The COL schedule is aggressive, with 36 months allotted from submission of the COL application to issuance of the license. Approximately 18 months prior to submission of the COL application, a Pre-Application Safety Document will be submitted. In this time period, the main safety issues such as the fuel qualification and acceptability criteria, acceptability of a low-pressure containment, and an EPZ at the site boundary are planned to be resolved. During the 36 months following submittal of the

COL application, NRC review can focus on the adequacy of the final design, the ITAAC, and a public hearing. Some licensing benefits could accrue to the GT-MHR if the PBMR makes an earlier COL application. (The projected schedules have the PBMR submitting their COL application 18 months earlier than the GT-MHR, coincident with the GT-MHR pre-application submittal). This schedule would seem to fall within the minimum time requirements NRC has indicated for issuing the COL. It would be desirable to have the COL submitted earlier. However, this is unlikely because the documentation required for the COL application is tied to the International Program and to additional DOE funding.

A successful commercialization will require a strong vendor organization with experience in design, engineering and licensing, and who can provide the necessary financial resources for industry match in cost sharing. GA currently does not have these capabilities and it will be necessary to find a partner by the time a customer expresses interest – by mid-2003 – if they are to keep even close to the proposed schedule.

Current cost estimates for an NOAK plant are encouraging. However, there are many uncertainties in the early use of a new technology. Cost estimates are limited by the lack of a complete design and by experience with a building and operating a commercial application of the GT-MHR. Even though a commercial demonstration plant with a steam cycle operated at Ft. St. Vrain in the 1980s, the current design uses an untested power conversion system based on the Brayton cycle with vertically mounted turbines on a single shaft. The Russian prototype will not provide any operating experience because the prototype won't operate until 2009, at the earliest.

Fuel performance under irradiation and safety tests that meets the fuel acceptance criteria remains a central requirement for operation. Because the tests will not be completed until construction is essentially complete, the customer and partners must accept the risk that the fuel will meet the acceptance criteria on schedule.

While the NTDG indicated that each of the criteria could be met, many of them were met marginally. As an overall assessment, the NTDG believes that the GT-MHR “possibly can be deployed in the U.S. by 2010”.

For deployment by 2010, the following will be required:


- Success in the Russian GT-MHR project (in turn, requiring continued U.S. Government support).
- GA must secure, in the near future, adequate investment from prospective customer(s) to fund engineering and licensing applications for the U.S. plant.
- A successful, expedited ESP/COL schedule
- Resolution of several challenging technical issues, including those related to fuel reliability and the energy conversion system.

Deployment could be achieved, however, if a currently interested customer commits to a GT-MHR by 2003, and it finds a partner in the near future to strengthen the engineering and system design, provide an enhanced level of experience in building plants, and provide industry match resources.

**Timeline for the GT-MHR**

The roadmap reflects the schedule shown in Criterion 3 but shows the interconnection of the various tasks necessary to support the schedule, including the gaps and when they are closed. The development of the power conversion system (including design and testing) is performed as part of the Russian development program and is not identified separately. It will be completed by the end of 2004. Gap closure is particularly emphasized in the “Engineering” block, where technology transfer from the Russian program is identified, and where the additional design work for a commercial uranium-fueled reactor is identified. Code verification and validation is not called out because GA believes the codes developed for the MHTGR and NPR programs are largely applicable, although new safety analyses must be performed for the SAR and COL submission, and new reactor physics tests will be performed in Russia. Fuel fabrication and testing gaps are identified and the time for closure is shown. If the fuel meets the acceptance criteria, it allows for full loading by the middle of 2011. A time of three years is shown for NRC review and hearings to obtain a COL. A full 3.5 years is allowed for the initial plant construction. Two critical points are highlighted: receiving a letter of intent to purchase a plant from a plant owner/operator, which is needed by the end of the second quarter of 2003; and the plant order decision by mid-2006. Even with these, the most probable time for fuel loading is mid-2011; however, if an order and partnering with a strong vendor should occur earlier, the schedule could be moved forward to make a late 2010 fuel load.

GT-MHR Near Term Deployment Roadmap



## II-6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### CONCLUSIONS

The following is a summary of the most significant conclusions drawn by the NTDG in the course of their assessment, and as described in this report:

1. New nuclear plants can be deployed in the U.S. in this decade, provided that there is sufficient and timely private-sector financial investment.
2. To have any new nuclear plants operating in the U.S. by 2010, it will be necessary for generating companies to commit to new plant orders by the end of 2003, in order to proceed with preparation of COL applications. This will require very near term action by prospective new plant owner/operators and strong support from the Government.
3. Although conditions are currently more favorable for new nuclear plants than in many years, economic competitiveness in a deregulated electricity supply structure remains a key area of uncertainty with respect to near term deployment potential. The other gaps to near term deployment require attention; in particular, implementing an efficient and effective regulatory approval process for siting and licensing of new plants is an urgent matter, and will require use of new processes in 10 CFR Part 52, that have not been demonstrated in actual practice.
4. There are excellent new nuclear plant candidates that build on the experience of existing reactors in the U.S. and around the world, and that could be deployed in the U.S. in this decade. Readiness for deployment varies from design to design, based primarily on degree of design completion and status of regulatory approval. Those that are the most advanced in terms of design completion and approval status appear to be economically competitive in some scenarios, but not all. Other new nuclear plant designs, which still require licensing and engineering, show promise for improved economic competitiveness.

The design-specific gaps that must be overcome by the gas-cooled candidates to achieve near term deployment are somewhat greater than those facing most of the water-cooled candidates.

5. Achieving near term deployment will require continuing close collaboration between Government and industry. Selections of new projects must be market-driven and supported primarily by private sector investment, but government support is essential, in the form of leadership, effective policy, efficient regulatory approvals, and cost sharing of generic and design-specific one-time costs.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

This Chapter provides specific recommendations in both generic and design-specific categories. Generic recommendations are initially organized to coincide with the Gaps and Issues presented in Chapter II-3. Design-specific recommendations are derived from actions presented in Chapter

II-5. These recommendations are then reorganized and presented in a Phased Action Plan, which is an integrated, success-oriented approach to closing the gaps while taking concrete steps to get new plants under construction. The Phased Action Plan provides a logical and manageable approach to achieving the goals of this Roadmap – multiple plants on line by 2010.

Appendix J to this Roadmap provides a “roll-up” of the resource requirements needed to close site-specific, generic and design-specific gaps that present obstacles to near term deployment. These resource requirements are taken from Chapters II-3 and II-5. The design-specific funding needs in that table are for those designs that the NTDG judges should be candidates for industry-government cost sharing for near term deployment. However, the table does not represent NTDG funding recommendations, since actual government funding levels will be contingent on industry’s ability to assemble the specified cost-share, as explained later in this Chapter.

The electricity shortages that are beginning to appear around the country are creating a sense of urgency. It is appropriate for the U.S. to take the necessary steps to see that nuclear energy options are available in time to support a likely surge in the need for new power plants over the next decade. The United States should be seeking to identify and support opportunities to immediately begin implementation of projects that will lead to the commercial operation of new nuclear plants by 2010. This near term imperative will complement the long-term development of new reactor technologies and fuel cycles via the Generation IV Roadmap.

Building new nuclear plants in the U.S. requires certainty and stability. Government can play a key role in encouraging market interest in new plants, and supporting public private partnerships. New nuclear capacity can and will be built when it makes sense to take the financial risk. Investors must see manageable risks equal or better than alternative sources of power, in the following areas:

- Capital and life-cycle operating costs of new plants
- Regulatory processes for new plants
- Time required to build a new plant, minimizing “time to market”
- Federal policy and technology support commitment

### **GENERIC GAP RECOMMENDATIONS**

Following are recommendations to support resolution of the five generic gaps confronting near term deployment in the U.S., as discussed in Chapter II-3. These recommendations are viewed as very important to successful deployment of new plants by 2010. Because of the urgency of encouraging new orders in the next two years to support deployment by 2010, these recommendations focus on the near term horizon, and on strategic steps that must be taken now to enable near term deployment goals to be realized.

In general, the industry should have the overall responsibility for most of the actions described below. However, government assistance is needed for many of these recommendations to be successful. More important, increased government leadership is needed to help establish the policy, economic and regulatory environment that will allow nuclear energy to compete on a level playing field in a deregulated electricity marketplace with other energy supply options.

**Gap 1: Nuclear Plant Economic Competitiveness**

Recommendations to address the economic competitiveness of new nuclear plants fall into three categories:

- Design-specific recommendations: the major actions to ensure one or more designs are clearly economically competitive this decade are ones that individual vendors must take. These are covered in Chapter II-5 and in Appendix J.
- Generic recommendations that focus on technological advances of value to all applicants. There are a number of technologies that can reduce capital costs and construction times, and that can be made available in the short term that can be applied to certified designs without modifying the design itself, thus ensuring that the DC remains valid. These include enhanced information management systems, virtual construction technologies, advanced instrumentation, controls, and on-line diagnostic monitoring. These technologies may also help reduce capital and operating costs for uncertified designs. Details are discussed in Chapter II-3, with resource needs summarized in Appendix J.
- Generic recommendations that focus on business arrangements, federal treatment of energy investments and regulatory efficiencies that benefit all applicants. These are covered in the next gap related to deregulation, and in later sections in this Chapter.

**Gap 2: Business Challenges of the Deregulated Electricity Marketplace**

The industry needs to develop the business plans and models to facilitate the financing arrangements that will be required to build new plants in a deregulated electricity marketplace. This is a responsibility of industry, and NEI is facilitating this process through its development of an “Integrated Plan for New Nuclear Plants.” (See Attachment 4.)

Execution will need help from Federal and State Governments, who can assist by taking actions in three general areas:

- 1) Establish vehicles for business risk reduction that can be taken to reduce the risks of capital-intensive new baseload generation investment, including nuclear energy. These vehicles should focus on one time costs and market-based incentives, and could include:
  - Provisions for accelerated depreciation to allow quicker recovery of capital investment
  - Negotiated long-term power purchase agreements (e.g., 20 years)
  - Tax credits for investments in new plant design, development, licensing and construction
  - Tax incentives for diversity in fuel supply and/or emission-free generation

All of these measures can be considered for federal action; some can also be implemented at the regional, state, or even local level to provide incentives to address more specific market needs. Both federal and state/local entities have an interest in incentives that support strategic energy and environmental goals and that encourage competition among

a mix of generating options. Many of these incentives can be put in place on a temporary basis – until the investment community has confidence that these plants can be built on schedule and within projected cost.

- 2) Take actions to reduce “time to market” for new capital-intensive projects. In a deregulated market, business decisions to invest in new baseload generation require many years of lead-time prior to construction of the plant. To remain competitive when placed in commercial operation, both pre-construction lead-time and actual plant construction time must be minimized. This requires concerted action by industry to plan and execute new plant projects efficiently, and requires NRC to execute licensing applications for new sites and designs as efficiently as possible, consistent with safety requirements.
- 3) Take actions to ensure energy and environmental policies and regulations are balanced among energy supply options, based on good science, through consistent tax and investment incentive treatment.

Industry and DOE should work together to investigate the costs and benefits of each of the above-recommended provisions, and seek implementation of those deemed appropriate. There are a number of other regulatory and statutory issues that industry has stated need to be addressed that are not directly within the purview of DOE or this NTD Roadmap. These were discussed at the end of Chapter II-3, where some actions, generally encouraged by industry, were presented. No recommendations are provided here. This list of issues included:

- Renewal of the Price-Anderson Act;
- Legislative and regulatory reforms, including changes to the Atomic Energy Act
- Dual or conflicting regulation (e.g., federal radiation protection policy)

### **Gap 3: Efficient Implementation of 10CFR Part 52**

As discussed in Chapter II-3, there are four focus areas associated with this gap. Each is addressed by a separate set of recommendations below. These are consistent with and complement the President’s recommendations in the National Energy Policy: “...expedite applications for licensing new advanced technology nuclear reactors,” as summarized in Chapter II-2. DOE and industry should encourage a process that expedites resolution of open issues with the NRC, standardizes processes prior to applicant submittals, and tests these processes as soon as possible for effectiveness and efficiency. To fulfill the recommendations of the National Energy Policy, the NRC must continue regulatory modernization, including both the creation of risk-informed, performance-based regulations and regulatory guidance, and the assurance of regulatory stability for licensing of new plants. This effort is urgent and important to success.

The first three focus areas described below require essentially complete resolution to achieve near term deployment. The fourth focus area is not an obstacle to near term deployment, but deserves significant attention because of the opportunity it presents for major improvements toward more efficient and safety-focused regulation. This last focus area is included here for consistency and because it should be treated urgently.

**A. The DC process must be expedited to help resolve the “time to market” obstacle to nuclear plant orders in a deregulated market.**

NRC should work with industry to expedite the DC process so that any near term design could reasonably expect to complete the process in three years, including the rulemaking phase, assuming a quality submittal covering all required topics required by the regulations (e.g., full scope PRA for the design). For DC applications that rely significantly on design information from a previously reviewed and/or certified design, the goal should be to complete the process in less than two years.

DOE should cost share the costs of DC with any near-term applicant capable of producing a quality DC submittal and capable of assembling the financing for the industry share.

**B. ESP and COL processes must be demonstrated successfully for new plants to be built. They must be shown to be stable and predictable processes that can be completed efficiently, in no more than 2 years for ESP and no more than 1 year for a COL that references an ESP and DC rule (i.e., for a certified design).**

DOE should cooperate with industry and NRC to achieve these timing goals in a manner that encourages utility investment and development of applications for submittal to NRC as quickly as possible. In order to achieve that response by multiple utilities for multiple nuclear projects, DOE and Congress should agree to provide cost-share support for a sufficient number of ESP and COL applications to demonstrate and establish confidence in these processes for a range of likely scenarios.

The level of Federal commitment to a cost-shared program that is needed to create a sustained and self-supporting industry process of utility applications for new plant licensing should be as follows:

- Demonstrate NRC’s ESP process for a range of likely siting scenarios by providing DOE cost share support for at least two “lead site” applications, and up to two additional ESP applications (total of four) that demonstrate the ESP process for differing siting scenarios, e.g., existing nuclear sites, a possible “greenfield site,” an existing non-nuclear industrial site or a site with an existing nuclear construction permit but no operating nuclear plant. Joint industry-DOE funding for up to four sites is detailed in Chapter II-3 and Appendix J.
- Demonstrate NRC’s COL process for a range of likely licensing scenarios by providing DOE cost share for the first COL application for each near term design that is supported in Phases 2 and 3, including both the first COL application for each certified design, and the first COL application for each uncertified design where the applicant chooses to submit an early COL application. DOE funding would only be requested for those NTD designs that actually garner sufficient market interest to proceed with adequate industry resources to complete the COL process.

**C. Generic guidance must be developed to ensure efficient, safety-focused implementation of key Part 52 processes, including ESP, COL and ITAAC verification**

The industry and NRC should work to provide generic guidance to COL applicants on COL application form and content, COL review processes, and the ITAAC verification process. NRC should also work with industry to ensure that process guidelines are reflected in the NRC's revised Construction Inspection Program. These efforts should ensure safety focused and efficient processes.

**D. In parallel with the above, an overall risk-informed, performance-based regulatory framework should be established for future plants as the basis for NRC design review, licensing and oversight of future plants.**

To increase investor confidence in predictable licensing and stable, efficient regulation, progress is needed toward a new regulatory framework for future plants. This effort would go beyond the ongoing efforts to risk-inform 10 CFR Part 50 for current plants to establish a new regulatory framework that is fully risk-informed and performance-based. This effort promises to enhance the protection of the public health and safety by maximizing the safety focus and efficiency of future plant licensing and regulation. This will be a long term effort, with benefits accruing as various parts of the framework are completed and judged "ready for use" by applicants. Equally important is that progress toward a new regulatory framework will increase the confidence of prospective applicants in the regulatory environment for new plants and encourage business decisions to proceed with new nuclear projects

For all the above efforts addressing Gap #4, the lead responsibility for resolution should be NEI, representing the industry and working with prospective applicants and the NRC. Support should be provided by DOE, individual applicants, and EPRI, per the resource requirements listed in Chapter II-3.

**Gap 4: Nuclear Industry Infrastructure**

Industry and Government should focus attention on both aspects of nuclear energy infrastructure that require reinvigoration:

- Fabrication and manufacturing infrastructure, including major components such as reactor vessels and steam generators, as well as smaller components such as pumps and valves.
- Next generation of scientists, engineers and technicians required to design, build and operate nuclear power plants.

Although these areas are not prepared today to support a large expansion of nuclear energy, they will likely grow as the expansion grows, through the natural process of supply and demand. So to a significant degree, most infrastructure gaps today will take care of themselves. However, longer lead-time issues related to qualified personnel and U.S. fabrication capacity warrant examination to see if anticipatory initiatives are needed to expedite preparation for a significant

expansion of nuclear energy. It is likely that the most urgent infrastructure gap that must be addressed will be adequate qualified construction crews to support multiple plant projects.

Key initiatives dealing with human resources are already underway at DOE, ANS, and NEI. The DOE/Industry NEER Program for University Nuclear Engineering Departments should be maintained and strengthened. This program has had a major impact in improving the educational infrastructure for supplying nuclear engineers and has allowed the departments to enhance the quality of their programs. NERAC has made recommendations on strengthening educational infrastructure in its Long-Term Nuclear Energy R&D Plan and based on the Blue Ribbon Panel on University nuclear program infrastructure needs. Additionally, the ANS Task Force on Nuclear Workforce has identified human infrastructure needs. Important NEI initiatives on infrastructure are described in Attachment 4.

Industry and Government should cooperate on a study of manufacturing and infrastructure capacity, to determine if foreign suppliers can adequately meet U.S. needs in advance of market-driven domestic expansion of these capabilities.

### **Gap 5: National Nuclear Energy Strategy**

It is vital to the future of nuclear energy and in particular to near term deployment of nuclear energy plants, that the Federal Government take a strong, sustained, and results-oriented stance on nuclear energy as a key component of our energy strategy. The President's National Energy Policy was an important step in that direction, but should be expanded to a more comprehensive National Nuclear Energy Strategy, backed up by specific actions and resources.

A National Nuclear Energy Strategy should:

- Clearly explain to Americans why our national security, economic strength, and environmental quality require – and will benefit from – greater reliance on nuclear energy as a primary source of energy in this country.
- Commit the Federal Government to embracing the nuclear energy industry's Vision 2020, which has as its goal the addition of 50,000 MWe of new nuclear generation by 2020, and the addition of 10,000 additional MWe of nuclear generation from efficiency improvements to current plants. This commitment should engage the Federal Government in assuming responsibility for all actions it could take to make this goal a reality, working closely with industry. Note that many of the specific actions that Government should take were listed above as recommendations to close other gaps.
- In the near term, commit the Federal Government to a nuclear energy supply R&D investment strategy that is in balance with that for other energy supply options. This R&D investment should focus on successful demonstration of untested regulatory processes and cost-sharing generic gap closure and the one-time costs associated with design completion.
- Reaffirm the commitment of the Administration to expedite applications for new plants through the NRC, consistent with safety regulations, as called for in the National Energy Policy.

- Commit DOE to enter into market-driven, public-private partnerships to execute those activities that garner the necessary industry support for cost sharing with DOE. This should include jointly funded efforts with NEI, EPRI, or any industry-wide consortium that is created to advance work of generic benefit to all new plant applicants, as well as design-specific consortia established to complete engineering work on a particular design and share the risks of new plant projects.
- Commit DOE to undertake a stronger leadership role in forging a strong consensus among the relevant DOE Offices, scientific and energy policy leaders, and government contractors, toward an integrated and effective national policy on nuclear fuel cycle issues, focused initially on establishing centralized used fuel management. This consensus should include a feasibility and cost-benefit assessment and subsequent prioritization of the various proposals for longer-term technologies that could further improve the management regime.
- Develop a plan of action to expand this Vision 2020 milestone to greater reliance on nuclear energy in the 2030 to 2050 timeframe, based on further advances in nuclear technology, developed under DOE leadership in partnership with industry.
- Seek broad support from Congress for this National Nuclear Energy Strategy.

At its heart, the case for DOE leadership, including a commitment to action and resources, rests on the premise that the Government has an interest in securing the supply of new emission free electrical generation and should be willing to pay part of the cost of expediting it. The importance of nuclear energy to clean air and carbon abatement has been historically unvalued. Without government support, the new capacity would probably be added eventually, but at a much slower pace that would be consistent with market forces and private financing. This could result in shortages of electricity, and reduced economic growth that would attend the shortages. A delay in deploying economically competitive nuclear plants will lead to substantially increased construction of fossil burning power plants, which will lead to increased emissions of air pollutants and greenhouse gases, as well as increased short-term electricity costs to consumers.

Necessary actions by Government are not limited to those recommended above as elements of a National Nuclear Energy Strategy. All recommendations above to close other gaps involve actions that Government should take on its own or in concert with industry.

Appendix J provides a complete “roll-up” of the funding needs identified in Chapter II-3 for site specific and generic gap closure, and Chapter II-5 for design-specific gap closure. It is important to recognize that the NTDG is not recommending full funding of every design-specific item in that table. Rather, the table should be viewed as a Roadmap for successful deployment of those designs the NTDG recommends be considered for public-private cost sharing as near term deployment options. Not all the designs listed in that table will be able to muster the industry cost-share proposed, and thus would not qualify for the full level of federal funding proposed.

The approach being recommended here is thus a market-driven one – proposing that the federal government support those plant project initiatives that are capable of showing sufficient private sector funding to make the initiative viable and capable of facilitating the deployment goal.

**DESIGN-SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS: NEED FOR A DUAL-TRACK STRATEGY**

As described in the NTD Action Paper prepared for DOE in May 2001, the NTDG recommends a dual track approach that encourages public-private investment in both of the following tracks:

- ALWRs, including already certified designs and 1000+ MWe passively cooled designs that are power uprates of already certified designs (or substantially complete passive ALWR designs). This approach offers a substantial near-term opportunity to build new plants with low technological and licensing risk.
- Direct cycle high temperature helium-cooled reactors. Besides the ALWR options, there are other advanced reactor designs with near term potential, including designs currently being developed overseas. This NTD Roadmap identifies designs that have the potential to meet U.S. regulatory and U.S. utility requirements for safety and economic performance, and that have clear potential for near term deployment. By collaborating with other interested parties, it should be possible for U.S. companies to invest in these designs and for the NRC to review and certify these designs with a reduced effort. However, it may be necessary for NRC to follow a more flexible regulatory approach – especially, when reactor technologies with less operating or testing experience are being licensed. Such new designs, especially ones requiring prototype demonstration, might first be licensed by a Combined License for the first units, with the Design Certification coming later.

In order to meet the objectives of this Roadmap, both, not just one of these tracks, must be followed. ALWRs are the most likely options for achieving commercial operation in the shortest amount of time. They involve a lower level of investor risk than gas reactors because the technology is largely proven and the licensing path is more predictable. On the other hand, the gas reactors offer significant potential to improve safety and fuel-cycle objectives, and possibly to overcome the economies of scale with their higher efficiency, and improve on nuclear energy economic competitiveness for the future. However, the technology and market risks are considerably higher, suggesting a more aggressive role for the Government in demonstrating the promise of gas-cooled reactor technology.

The primary reason why both tracks are needed to proceed in parallel relates to the marketplace. Both of these tracks support a robust national energy portfolio, i.e., to ensure a secure energy future under a range of market scenarios. Neither industry nor Government can accurately predict the competitive price of electricity a decade or more into the future, or the demand growth, or the degree to which new environmental regulations will shape the power generation business. Perhaps large baseload plants will offer the best match to future markets because of their economies of scale and ability to service large industrial and commercial regions with significant projected demand growth; or perhaps smaller, modular plants will offer the best match to future markets because of their quicker time to market and ability to match load growth in more manageable increments. Because of the uneven progress by individual states toward electricity deregulation, and because of the large variations in regional demand growth in a country as large as the U.S., it is virtually guaranteed that both large and small nuclear options will be needed to match the markets that will exist in different regions of the country. Smaller

plants are more likely to be needed for deregulated markets, whereas larger plants might better serve markets that have not been substantially deregulated.

The investment strategy required for these two tracks are different, since the technological and licensing risks are much higher for the two gas-cooled reactors evaluated in this Roadmap, i.e., the PBMR and the GT-MHR. In the case of ALWRs, the key needs are improved economics and going through 10CFR52 process; in the case of PBMR and GT-MHR the key needs are in separate effects tests, fuel and material development to satisfy regulatory and investor needs. Therefore, the NTD Roadmap proposes different approaches for these two tracks:

- For ALWRs that are either certified by NRC now or could complete certification on an expedited basis, the need is for an aggressive strategy to support expedited licensing, project decision, and commercial operation. This approach would consist of industry-led initiatives with government cost-share focused on one-time costs.
- For gas-cooled reactors, the NTDG recommends a similar strategy that could support expedited deployment if regulatory issues are resolved in the near term. If regulatory and/or technical issues emerge that require more study before deployment, then industry and DOE should evaluate the option for a demonstration project. Such a project would have major industry input, but might rely more extensively on government support.

Industry and Government should avoid the temptation to make a premature decision to pick one of these two tracks. There is not enough information to judge whether the second track is capable of delivering on its promise, and new plant deployment cannot be delayed for the amount of time required to determine the technological viability and economic competitiveness potential of gas reactors. Therefore, both tracks should be pursued until the relative merits of both tracks are clear. It may turn out that one track proves superior to the other. A much more likely outcome will be that both tracks prove out well and both have an important place in the marketplace because of their respective advantages in different markets.

This dual track approach is more focused than the design selection process of the 1960s and 70s. In that era, five or six vendors offered a variety of designs that were customized to meet the individual preferences of each utility investor. That process helped explore the advantages and disadvantages of a wide range of designs and design features, but it also led to unnecessary complex and costly engineering, operations, training, and regulatory oversight. In the 1990s, the nation's utilities committed to a strong policy of standardization, in order to optimize design, construction, operations and maintenance. That commitment also benefits the NRC, because it allows standardized processes, reduces the number of unique regulatory analyses and licensing actions, and simplifies the training of NRC staff. This commitment remains in effect today, and will facilitate the formation of consortia of owner-operators that order and construct a given standardized design. The benefits of such consortia include leveraging of initial investments, sharing information to improve performance and safety, and sharing engineering/training costs.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PHASED ACTION PLAN**

The recommendations above and the design-specific needs from Chapter II-5 are structured below into a phased approach to better plan and execute those urgent activities that must be undertaken in the next 2-3 years, in order to achieve deployment of new plants by 2010. This phased approach also presents the necessary implementing actions and resource requirements in a manner that better supports industry and Government planning. The basic purpose of phasing is to permit measurement of progress to confirm the value of continued commitment of resources and increasing degrees of industry and DOE investment to achieve deployment.

Three phases are identified below that should be developed further by industry and DOE, as a public-private partnership, into a comprehensive Plan of Action for Near Term Deployment. These phases, particularly Phases 1 and 2 are staggered, i.e., they require significant overlap in order to expedite processes and make most efficient use of resources:

- Phase 1: Regulatory Approvals
- Phase 2: Design Completion
- Phase 3: Construction and Startup

Phase 1 lays the foundation for Phases 2 and 3. It is intentionally structured to ensure a strong basis for realizing the NTD goal of "... making available a range competitive, NRC-certified and/or ready to construct nuclear energy generation options in a range of sizes to meet variations in market need." Since it is not yet clear which NTD options will best match market conditions and regional needs later this decade, it is imperative that generic regulatory process issues are resolved and that regulatory approvals are obtained for an optimum range of siting scenarios and reactor design options. Once this foundation is laid, the market place will judge which options are ready, and which ones best match business plans and investment criteria as they exist 2-3 years from now. Phase 1 is less resource intensive than Phases 2 and 3. However, it must be completed on an expedited basis, and must also be sufficiently robust to support the expected range of market conditions and needs.

Phases 2 and 3 will require substantial investment. Because the one-time costs of design completion are so high, it is likely that industry consortia will form behind those designs that best meet owner/operator specifications, in order to conserve and leverage resources. Federal cost sharing of these focused efforts to complete engineering work will be essential to success.

To deploy these nuclear plant candidates by 2010, a phased plan of action by industry and Government is proposed. This plan completes both the generic regulatory and technical work applicable to and needed by all applicants, and the design specific work needed to deploy NTD designs by 2010, on an industry/DOE cost-shared basis. This phased action plan is focused on the primary gaps to near term deployment: ensuring nuclear plant economic competitiveness and ensuring early and efficient implementation of 10CFR Part 52.

For design specific work, the NTDG believes that a dual track strategy, comprised of public-private investment in both 1000+ MWe ALWRs and 100-300 MWe gas cooled reactors, is essential. The needs of and investment strategy required for these two tracks are different, since the technological and licensing risks are much higher for the gas-cooled reactors evaluated in this

Roadmap. In order to meet the objectives of this Roadmap, it is imperative that both, not just one of these two tracks, be followed.

### **Phase I: Regulatory Approvals**

Objective: Demonstrate and implement the regulatory requirements under 10 CFR 52 that are necessary and urgent prerequisites for NTD applicants, with the following objectives:

- Demonstrate the ESP process for a range of siting scenarios and obtain sufficient early site permits to support industry business plans for new plant orders and construction.
- Obtain design certifications (or FDAs for gas reactors) as needed for those NTD designs to be supported in Phases 2 and 3.
- Develop the necessary generic guidance to ensure the processes to obtain a combined construction and operating license are stable and predictable and efficient. This includes establishing guidance on the form and content of a COL application, developing review guidance, and guidance for the Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) verification and construction inspection programs.
- Obtain on an expedited basis an initial COL for each NTD design to be supported in Phases 2 and 3, in order to demonstrate the process.

Also important to proceed on a best-effort basis, as opportunities to enhance the process and improve investor confidence, are two additional focus areas:

- On a generic basis, make more risk-informed and performance-based the operational requirements within the scope of the COL.
- Establish a risk-informed, performance-based regulatory framework for the above processes.

Schedule: This objective should be met by 2005. Work on the last two items above may take a year or so longer. Since the specific course of action to obtain all necessary regulatory approvals will differ among various sites and designs per industry business plans, it is imperative that the above objectives be developed in greater detail to ensure proper timing and adequate resources. Many of the above objectives must be achieved in 2002 or early 2003 to ensure success. The exception is the new plant regulatory framework, which can proceed as a continuing parallel activity.

Funding: Most of the above activities are to be cost-shared equally by industry and DOE. The total resource requirements (irrespective of funding source) over a four-year period are estimated as follows:

- Generic regulatory tasks (e.g., resolution of generic issues and guidance development for ESP, COL, ITAAC verification, construction inspection, risk-informed regulatory framework): \$13M
- ESP Demonstrations for an adequate range of siting scenarios: \$30M
- DC completion for designs based on previously certified or NRC-reviewed designs: \$30M per design

- COL completion for approved sites and designs: \$10M to \$15M per application (estimate)
- COL completion for designs that defer design certification and seek NRC design approval via COL (e.g., gas reactors): \$100M to \$150M (estimate). Note that because this regulatory approval involves substantial engineering work, this funding estimate bridges into Phase 2 activities and could extend beyond the Phase 1 completion schedule above.

## **Phase II: Design Completion**

Objective: Complete the detailed testing, engineering, and planning necessary to permit start of construction, including:

- Detailed design and evaluation, including first-of-a-kind engineering
- Nuclear and component and plant system testing
- Plant materials testing, if needed
- Fuel development and testing, if needed
- Balance of plant/power conversion system testing, if needed

The focus of this phase is on design specific work in support of those designs with sufficient market interest to obtain the necessary private sector investment, contingent on DOE cost-sharing, to proceed to successful completion and deployment.

In order to achieve the NTD goals discussed above, Phase 2 requires a dual track strategy comprised of both ALWR and gas reactor design options, as follows:

ALWR: At least one design must proceed on an expedited basis through design completion sufficient to support plant order and construction, probably on the basis of multiple projects supported by a consortia of owner-operators and other investors for a family of plants. If the resources permit, the ALWR track should consist of both a currently certified design and a design not yet certified but capable of accelerated DC completion based on prior design engineering and NRC review. If resources do not permit both a certified and a non-certified design project, then a market-driven selection should be made by private sector investors.

Gas Reactor: One or both gas reactor designs must proceed through design completion, depending on market interest and available private sector investment to match DOE cost-sharing. Given the level of testing required to confirm regulatory compliance and commercial performance, it is likely that the best path to success would involve a demonstration project, perhaps at a federal facility. DOE and potential private sector investors should evaluate the feasibility, practicality, and desirability of such a project and develop the commercial objectives that should be achieved by such a project. The evaluation should include consideration of siting such a demonstration project on federal land.

Schedule: This objective should be met for both the ALWR and gas reactor tracks by the end of the year 2007, although earlier completion is possible for some design options. The content and cost of the effort differs among the various designs.

Funding: The funding requirements for Phase 2 vary widely, depending on design-specific needs. This work has been completed for one certified design, and significant work has already been completed for some of the uncertified NTD designs. The cost to complete NTD designs that are not yet certified range from roughly \$150M to roughly \$300M per design. In some cases, private sector investors may be willing to fund design completion at a funding rate significantly above the 50 percent/50 percent-cost share formula applied to Phase 1.

### **Phase III: Construction and Startup**

Objective: Construct, startup, and operate the plants to be economically competitive with alternative power generation options.

Schedule: The plants are to be in commercial operation no later than year-end 2010.

Funding: The private sector will raise the investment necessary to build and operate the plants with the help of environmental credits and other financial incentives of the kind already being applied to alternative generating systems, as discussed below.

### **Executing the Phased Approach: Aggressive Schedules**

This phased approach will be implemented on an aggressive schedule, taking maximum advantage of coordinated efforts by industry consortia (or “family of plant” entities) working together and with Government to achieve earliest possible deployment of each design with sufficient market support to achieve commercial operation.

Measures to achieve aggressive project schedules will include:

- Parallel efforts on regulatory approvals for siting, design approval, and combined license. All of the timelines for NTD designs shown in Chapter II-5 propose significant overlapping of these activities. In many cases, the optimum schedules have been discussed with NEI and/or NRC for feasibility.
- Parallel efforts on Phases 1 and 2, such that detailed engineering work is completed concurrently with (or very soon after) regulatory approvals, in order to support construction start shortly after site permits and COL approvals are in hand. Again, all of the timelines for NTD designs shown in Chapter II-5 propose significant overlapping of these Phase 1 and Phase 2 activities
- Early procurement of many plant components, to ensue timely delivery of long lead-time items (e.g., large vessels), to support completion of detailed engineering, and to support early construction start soon after COL approval.
- Early actions to secure all necessary state and local approvals from all entities as needed. These actions include environmental and other investigations, and preparation and submittal of permit applications.

These aggressive project schedules necessarily require more up-front investment than would be required with more methodical, sequential project planning and execution. As such, projects

implemented on aggressive schedules will require innovative business arrangements, such as consortia among designers, constructors, NSSS and major equipment suppliers, and plant owner/operators, with strong and common incentives to successfully build and operate new plants. Such consortia, to be successful, would include multiple future owner/operators, each willing to build one or more plants, which pool resources and expertise behind a chosen design. This enables cost and risk sharing between a broader investor base, and greater benefits from standardization of common engineering and programmatic efforts, state-of-art construction and operational management systems and equipment to optimize the cost and schedule of multiple plant projects. These teams of owner/operators form what industry refers to as “family of plant” organizations.

The government’s role in making such projects succeed is very important, and includes the critically important step of cost-sharing the one-time costs associated with the phased approach, as well as providing economic incentives (e.g., federal tax credits) as discussed below, to encourage industry investment.

### **Alternate Scenarios and Contingencies**

It is quite possible that the general assumptions taken in developing this Roadmap, which generally follow the standard assumptions that industry and Government (i.e., Energy Information Agency) use for energy planning, could vary widely. For example, the recent attack on the U.S. by terrorists and the subsequent war on terrorism could place energy resources in the Middle East at risk.

An energy crisis, brought about by problems in the Middle East or elsewhere could stress our fossil energy resources and create increased pressure on U.S. energy consumers to achieve greater energy independence and a higher level of electrification of our nation’s commercial, industrial, and transportation infrastructure. Specifically, it is very likely that the nation would shift to higher reliance on electricity and natural gas in the transportation sector, and place greater reliance on coal and nuclear energy in power generation. To accelerate such a shift in energy strategy, the Federal Government might create incentives to support such shifts on an expedited schedule.

If such a need for accelerated nuclear energy plant construction occurred, the NRC would be asked to accelerate licensing procedures as much as possible, consistent with safety requirements. Investment incentives would focus on rapid market response. Design choices for new plants would trend more toward proven technology and choices with very high assurance of rapid deployment with minimum chance of project delays. In such situations, it is likely that designs that are already certified or are near completion of NRC certification would be built. It is also likely that existing nuclear sites would be used for new plant siting, preferably one previously evaluated for the addition of one or more nuclear plants. These strategies would take optimum advantage of existing infrastructure, transmission access, and more rapid site approvals.

Other scenarios should be considered and planned for. They might include wider variations in fossil fuel prices than generally projected, severe delays in NRC licensing of new designs, major shifts in national or global economic conditions, significant changes in trends toward economic

deregulation of electricity, and greater prominence of health and safety issues related to fossil fuel consumption. Each of these scenarios present challenges to a national nuclear energy strategy that must remain flexible and ready to respond with a range of options in both design choices and business approaches to building new plants.

### **PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: IMPLEMENTING A MARKET-DRIVEN APPROACH**

Recent events suggest that a more proactive approach to encouraging new nuclear plant projects is in order. First, the National Energy Policy (NEP) was issued in May 2001 under the direction of Vice President Cheney. The NEP seeks a much more active role for nuclear power than previous government positions. Second, President Bush commissioned a National Climate Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI) in June 2001 to seek technological alternatives for addressing possible global climate changes. In particular, Bush directed that nuclear power be considered as one of the NCCTI alternatives for mitigating carbon emissions. A report addressing the capability of nuclear power (and other alternatives) to provide this carbon emission mitigation is due to the President by the end of 2001. Third, the Congress is becoming more aware of the need to pursue a balanced energy strategy that includes new power generation, in addition to conservation, and is generally supportive of the important role nuclear energy can play. These Federal Government directions suggest that national policies may be emerging that could change the driving forces for new nuclear power, at the same time that marketplace forces suggest increasing private sector interest and investment in nuclear energy.

Examples of such national policy considerations are:

- Maintaining or increasing the share of nuclear power in the nation's energy mix to ensure a reliable future energy supply for the US through diversification of energy sources. Maintaining or increasing the share of nuclear power would seem to require a significant increase in the Government's role compared to current or presently planned actions in stimulating the deployment of new nuclear plants at a faster rate than would normally occur from market-driven forces only.
- Achieving energy independence from foreign sources.
- Providing a sure, technologically proven basis for reducing carbon emissions without incurring serious national economic penalties.
- Support of national defense issues such as utilization of the GT-MHR to burn excess weapons grade plutonium as currently being supported by the U.S. Government.
- Maintenance of the lead role of the US in the international nuclear power community to support a strong voice in the future directions of this technology.

In light of these strategic incentives, the Federal Government should encourage investment in new power plant construction. This should be accomplished by federal funding, on a cost-shared basis with industry, the first time costs of new plants that are generic to the entire industry or generic to families of NTD plants.

The one-time costs that DOE and industry should cost share in the design-specific category fall into two overlapping categories:

- One-time costs of Design Certification for near term deployment capable designs (or equivalent costs for licensing application preparation and review for designs that seek NRC approval via COL without a pre-approved DC), along with a small number of design-specific aspects of the COL application that are also site specific (e.g., ultimate heat sink design).
- One-time costs associated with first-time engineering that is generally beyond the scope of DC but essential to completing a firm cost and schedule estimate, essential for investor decisions.

These one-time costs include those needed to close technology gaps identified in Chapter II-5, and summarized in Appendix J.

There is no single, simple strategy for an early start of nuclear construction. Many different activities need to come together with the right timing and resource priority. Broad-based investment on the industry side will be necessary, and Government willingness and commitment to support a market-driven decision process will be required. For these reasons, a phased approach that relies heavily on industry-Government cooperation is proposed.

### **The Cooperative Agreement**

DOE and industry should create a Government/industry partnership to pursue these objectives. Full exercise of this initiative would cover, on a cost-shared basis, most of the one-time generic costs for each family of plants for each design clearly capable of near term deployment, as well as representative siting situations of generic value to the industry. This initiative will require a modest additional federal investment in nuclear energy research and development.

The challenge is to determine how to best structure this initiative in a deregulated marketplace. Ultimately, the industry should establish a partnership with DOE that shares one-time costs in a manner that is responsive to the marketplace. Experience with the ALWR program suggests that the Federal Government, particularly OMB and Congress, will expect some degree of real, hard-dollar private sector cost sharing as an indication of market interest. Exploiting this desire for industry cost-share is the best way to create the market incentives to encourage the designs most likely to be competitive in the marketplace to come forward for DOE cost-share support. In spite of the pressures of deregulation that limit private sector cost-sharing, the closer industry can come to demonstrating its ability to bring together meaningful private sector investment funds, the more likely the Federal Government should be willing to leverage public funds for success.

Again, based on experience with the ALWR program, the NTDG proposes that DOE and industry use a process similar to that used in the early 1990s to select designs for joint funding under the ALWR FOAKE program. Other processes that could facilitate market-driven resource allocation should also be considered. The ALWR process relied upon broad utility participation in a process that identified the necessary R&D, analyses, process development tasks, and engineering work, and sought broad utility participation on a collaborative basis, to cost-share the costs with DOE under a Cooperative Agreement. That process also relied on industry to select those designs most worthy of joint development with DOE through a utility-managed,

market-driven voting process among the utility funders, which ensured the best designs proceeded. In the case of the ALWR FOAKE program about 15 utilities participated in selecting the designs for cost-shared R&D. In today's marketplace, the likely utility participants would be less than ten. However, this number is still high enough to obtain multiple independent assessments of the merits of each candidate NTD design, and to obtain the benefits of standardization among owner-operators.

This collaborative model could also be used to select representative siting demonstrations of value to the industry, achieve consensus on strategies for resolution of regulatory process issues, and achieve consensus on operational programs for NRC concurrence, on an industry-wide basis. It could then be used as a springboard to create more design-specific consortia of future owner/operators, suppliers, and other investors to proceed ahead on one or more specific construction projects.

This process would provide DOE with the same high integrity competitive decision process that it did in the early 90s, which satisfied its mandate for unbiased contracting decisions. DOE's Cooperative Agreement stipulated a partnership with an organization that exercised a market-driven voting procedure acceptable to DOE.

### **Gas Reactor Demonstration Project**

The gas reactor track discussed above within the Phased Plan of Action introduces the idea of a gas reactor demonstration project. The need for such a project is not yet clear. If gas reactor regulatory issues are resolved expeditiously, and if technical obstacles are resolved quickly to investor satisfaction, then gas reactors could proceed on a phased approach similar to ALWRs. However, if technical or regulatory issues emerge that require more testing than anticipated today, then an approach that better supports such testing via demonstration should be considered.

The needs of the gas reactor options are different than those of the ALWR options. They need all the industry and Government coordination discussed above, e.g., to facilitate closing generic gaps and to establish consortia and public private partnerships to complete first time engineering. They also need a great deal more development of regulatory criteria and licensing processes to deal with new and unresolved questions, some of which are fundamental to the safety case of the gas reactor (e.g., reliance on unique and highly resilient fuel that could obviate the need for traditional defense-in-depth features like the large pressure-tight containment that surround water reactors). Finally, they will need much more first time and confirmatory testing to benchmark analysis codes and verify licensing assumptions.

These additional needs represent a higher level of project risk and a larger R&D component to deployment, in turn suggesting a greater federal role. More federal resources may be required. More reliance on federal test facilities, such as those located at some national laboratories may be required. If a prototype demonstration is deemed necessary for either licensing or commercial reasons, there may be a benefit to siting that demonstration at a federal site (e.g., national laboratory, native Indian reservation). Most national laboratories already have some facilities to support nuclear operations and could expand those facilities to support a demonstration initiative.

Federal sites also present challenges. For licensing purposes, most federal sites are essentially “greenfield sites” or “industrial sites”, which require more extensive analysis and licensing work than existing commercial nuclear plant sites. Existing sites already have a complete safety analysis of the site and full emergency planning and security measures in place to NRC standards, as well as transmission right-of-way, switchyard, maintenance and training facilities, and other supporting infrastructure already in place. Further, many federal siting options are not in a region of heavy and growing electricity demand, and thus are not amenable to siting a large plant such as an ALWR. However, since the gas reactors are smaller, they might well fit within the regional electricity market needs of many federal sites. Finally, Federal siting would raise significant legal issues such as jurisdiction and licensing responsibility.

Siting is only one of many questions that must be resolved to proceed with such a demonstration. Even more urgent are regulatory considerations, especially ones that might require an extensive test program (e.g., for fuel performance) that will take years to plan and execute.

Even though greater federal involvement and support may be required for a gas reactor demonstration project relative to an ALWR project, the importance and value of commercial entities leading the effort and ultimately taking responsibility for owning and operating the facility should be recognized. Establishing project objectives that ensure commercial viability is demonstrated, along with technical viability, are also critical to success. For example, demonstration on a federal site should be done under NRC safety and environmental regulations to facilitate commercial application.

Whatever special considerations might be required to facilitate obtaining the commitments to support a gas reactor demonstration, should be provided on a non-discriminatory basis to commercial sites as well. Ultimately the decision on where to site a plant should be made by the primary investors in the project who will operate the plant on a commercial basis, after the demonstration is completed. The Federal Government should consider offering a federal site but should not require it as a condition for proceeding. DOE and industry should make every effort to structure the arrangements for a gas reactor demonstration in a manner that is highly scrutable. Siting decisions should be based on their merits as they relate to licensability, availability of infrastructure, need for power, and many other factors that could effect the success of the project (see industry’s recently updated Siting Selection Guide).

## DESCRIPTION OF APPENDICES AND ATTACHMENTS

This NTD Roadmap includes twelve Appendices and four Attachments:

### Appendices:

- A. Design Description, Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
- B. Design Description, ESBWR
- C. Design Description, SWR 1000
- D. Design Description, AP 1000
- E. Design Description, AP 600
- F. Design Description, International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS)
- G. Design Description, Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)
- H. Design Description, Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR)
- I. Cost Sharing Rationale. This appendix provides a more complete rationale for the imperative for a public-private partnership approach to attacking the many challenges facing this nation's energy security in the decade ahead, and specifically the many challenges to facilitating an important role for nuclear energy.
- J. Near Term Deployment Roadmap Resource Needs. This table displays proposed tasks and annual funding requirements, along with a short discussion or justification for each task. This table is broken down into broad categories, such as site-specific tasks, generic regulatory and technical needs, and design-specific tasks, and proposes how costs should be allocated between industry and Government.
- K. Background and Source Documents. This appendix provides a high level summary of seven key DOE and industry strategic planning documents related to building new plants. It focuses on goals established by these recent documents.
- L. Reference List
- M. Acronyms

### Attachments:

- 1. Near Term Deployment Group Mission
- 2. Near Term Deployment Group Request for Information
- 3. NEI's "Vision 2020" – Strategic Objectives for Nuclear Energy's Future
- 4. NEI's "Integrated Plan for New Nuclear Plants"

## APPENDIX A: DESIGN DESCRIPTION, ADVANCED BOILING WATER REACTOR (ABWR)

### ABWR DEVELOPMENT

The ABWR was developed in cooperation with the Tokyo Electric Power Company and Hitachi and Toshiba, GE's long time partners in the development of advanced nuclear technology. The stated purpose of the development effort was to design a BWR plant that included a careful blend of (1) the best features of worldwide operating BWRs, (2) available new technologies, and (3) new modular construction techniques. Safety improvements were the top priority. Anticipating the economic challenges that lay ahead, special attention was paid to systematically reducing the capital cost and incorporating features into the plant design that would make maintenance significantly easier and more efficient.

After more than a decade of test and development the first two ABWRs went into commercial operation in Japan in 1996 and 1997, known as Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Units 6 and 7. They are currently in their fifth cycle of operation.

The ABWR was the first design reviewed and certified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 52 (10CFR52). More recently, the ABWR received regulatory approval in Taiwan and a construction permit for two ABWR units at the Lungmen site was issued in March 1999. The two Taiwan units are currently under construction.

### PLANT OVERVIEW

The key design objectives for the ABWR were established during the development program. The key goals, all of which were achieved, are as follows:

- Design life of 60 years.
- Plant availability factor of 87 percent or greater.
- Less than one unplanned scram per year.
- 18 to 24-month refueling interval.
- Reduced calculated core damage frequency by at least a factor of 10 over previous BWRs (goal  $<10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ).
- Radwaste generation  $<100 \text{ m}^3/\text{yr}$ .
- 48-month construction schedule.
- 20 percent reduction in capital cost (\$/kWh) vs. previous 1100 MWe class BWRs.


### SUMMARY OF THE ABWR KEY FEATURES

A comparison of key features of the ABWR to the previous model, known as BWR/6, is shown in Table 1.

**Table 1**  
**Comparison of Key ABWR Features to a BWR/6**

<b>Feature</b>	<b>ABWR</b>	<b>BWR/6</b>
Recirculation	Vessel mounted reactor internal pumps	Two external loop recirculation system with jet pumps inside RPV
Control Rod Drives	Fine-motion CRDs	Locking piston CRDs
ECCS	3 division ECCS	2 division ECCS plus HPCS
Reactor Vessel	Extensive use of forged rings	Welded plate
Primary Containment	Advanced – compact, inerted	Mark III – large, low pressure, not inerted
Secondary Containment	Reactor Building	Shield, fuel, auxiliary & DG buildings
Control & Instrumentation	Digital, multiplexed, fiber optics, multiple channel	Analog, hardwired, single channel
Control Room	Operator task-based	System-based
Severe Accident Mitigation	Inerting, drywell flooding, containment venting	Not specifically addressed
Reactor Water Cleanup	2 percent, sealless pumps in cold leg	1 percent, pumps in hot leg
Offgas	Passive Offgas with room-temperature charcoal	Active Offgas with chilled charcoal filters

The cutaway rendering of the ABWR plant (Figure 1) illustrates the general configuration of the plant for a single unit site in the U.S.



**Figure 1**

**ABWR BUILDING CUTAWAY**

Shown in the foreground is the Reactor Building, and in the background is the Turbine Building. Between them is located the Control Building.

An artist's rendering of the major systems and how they are inter-connected is shown in Figure 2. This shows the reactor, ECCS, containment, turbine equipment and the key auxiliary mechanical systems.




Figure 2. ABWR Major Systems

## Safety Enhancement

Recognizing the desire for the continuous enhancement of safety, one of GE's goals for the ABWR was to reduce calculated core damage frequency by an order of magnitude relative to currently operating plants. The most important design feature contributing to this goal is the adoption of reactor internal pumps (RIPs). These vessel-mounted pumps eliminate large, recirculation piping on the vessel, particularly involving penetrations below the top of the core elevation, and make possible a smaller Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) network to maintain core coverage during postulated loss-of-coolant events.

The ABWR ECCS network was designed as a full three-division system, with both a high and low pressure injection pump and heat removal capability in each division. For diversity, one of the systems, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System, includes a steam-driven, high pressure pump. Transient response was improved by designing three available high-pressure injection systems in addition to feedwater. The adoption of three on-site emergency diesel-generators to support core cooling and heat removal, as well as the addition of an on-site gas turbine-generator, reduces the potential for "station blackout" (SBO). The balanced ECCS system has less reliance on the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function, since a single, motor-driven high pressure core flooder (HPCF) can maintain core safety for any postulated pipe break.

Response to anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) is improved by the adoption of fine-motion control rod drives (FMCRDs), which allow reactor shutdown either by hydraulic or electric insertion. In addition, the need for rapid operator action to mitigate an ATWS is avoided by automation of emergency procedures such as feedwater runback and Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) injection.

Calculated core damage frequency is reduced by more than a factor of ten relative to the BWR/6 design. Furthermore, the ABWR also improved the capability to mitigate severe accidents, even though such events are extremely unlikely. Through nitrogen inerting, containment integrity threats from hydrogen generation were eliminated. Sufficient spreading area in the lower drywell, together with a drywell flooding system, assures coolability of postulated core debris. Manual connections make it possible to use onsite or offsite water systems to maintain core cooling. Finally, to reduce potential offsite consequences, a passive, hard-piped wetwell vent, controlled by rupture disks, is designed to prevent catastrophic containment failure and provide maximum fission product "scrubbing". The result of this design effort is that in the event of a severe accident, the whole body dose consequence at the calculated site boundary is less than 25 Rem. The probability of such an occurrence is calculated at the very low level of  $10^{-9}$ /year.

## Improvements to Operation and Maintenance

With the goal of simplifying the utility's burden of operation and maintenance (O&M) tasks, the design of every ABWR electrical and mechanical system, as well as the layout of equipment in the plant, is focused on improved O&M.

The reactor vessel is made of forged rings rather than welded plates. This eliminates 30 percent of the welds from the core beltline region, for which periodic in-service inspection is required. Since there are ten RIPs on four power buses, the ABWR's recirculation system is quite robust. Pump speed is controlled by solid-state adjustable speed drives, eliminating the requirement for flow control valves and low-speed motor-generator sets. The wet motor design also eliminates rotating seals.

The FMCRDs permit a number of simplifications. First, scram discharge piping and scram discharge volumes (SDVs) were eliminated, since the hydraulic scram water is discharged into the reactor vessel. By supporting the drives directly from the core plate, shootout steel located below the reactor vessel to mitigate the rod ejection accident was eliminated. The number of hydraulic control units (HCUs) was reduced by connecting two drives to each HCU. The number of rods per gang was increased up to 26 rods, greatly improving reactor startup times. Finally, since there are no organic seals, only two or three drives will be inspected per outage, rather than the 30 specified in most current plants.

It was possible to significantly downsize ECCS equipment as a result of eliminating large vessel nozzles below the top of the core. Capacity requirements are sized based on operating requirements—transient response and shutdown cooling—rather than on the need for large reflood capability. Inside the reactor vessel, core spray spargers were eliminated, since no postulated LOCA would lead to core uncover. For transient response, the initiation water levels for RCIC and HPCF were separated so that there is reduced duty on the equipment relative to earlier BWRs. There are three complete shutdown cooling loops, including dedicated vessel nozzles. Complex operating modes of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Systems, such as steam condensing, were eliminated. Finally, heat removal, in addition to core injection, was automated so that the operator no longer needs to choose which mode to perform during transients and accidents.

Lessons learned from operating experience were applied to the selection of ABWR materials. Stainless steel materials which qualified as resistant to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) were used. In areas of high neutron flux, materials were also specially selected for resistance to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC). Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) is recommended for normal operation to further mitigate any potential for stress corrosion cracking. The use of material producing radioactive cobalt was minimized. The condenser uses titanium tubing at sea water sites and stainless steel tubing for cooling tower sites. The use of stainless steel in applications that currently use carbon steel was expanded. These materials choices reduce plant-wide radiation levels and radwaste and will accommodate more stringent water chemistry requirements.

Also contributing to good reactor water chemistry is the increase of the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) capacity to two percent.

The Offgas System was simplified, reflecting lessons learned from operating experience. The charcoal beds are maintained at ambient temperature rather than refrigerated. The desiccant drier was eliminated.

The ABWR Reactor Building (including containment) was configured to simplify and reduce the O&M burden. The containment itself is a reinforced concrete containment vessel (RCCV). Within the containment itself, no equipment requires servicing during plant operation. The containment is significantly smaller than that of the preceding BWR/6. However, primarily due to the elimination of the external recirculation system, there is actually more room to conduct maintenance operations. To simplify maintenance and surveillance during scheduled outages, permanently installed monorails and platforms permit 360° access, and both the upper and lower drywells have separate personnel and equipment hatches. To simplify RIP and FMCRD maintenance, a rotating platform is permanently installed in the lower drywell, and semi-automated equipment was specially designed to remove and install that equipment. The wetwell area is compact and isolated from the rest of containment, thus minimizing the chance for suppression pool contamination with foreign material.

A new Reactor Building design surrounds the containment and incorporates the same functions as the BWR/6 auxiliary, fuel and diesel-generator buildings. Its volume (including containment) is about 30 percent less than that of the BWR/6 and requires substantially lower construction quantities. Its layout is integrated with the containment, providing 360° access with servicing areas located as close as practical to the equipment requiring regular service. Clean and contaminated zones are well defined and kept separate by limited controlled access. The fuel pool is sized to store at least ten years of spent fuel plus a full core. Therefore, the BWR/6-type fuel transfer system has been eliminated.

Controls and instrumentation were enhanced through incorporation of digital technologies with automated, self-diagnostic features. The use of multiplexing and fiber optic cable has eliminated 1.3 million feet of cabling. Within the safety systems, the adoption of a two-out-of-four trip logic and the fiber optic data links have significantly reduced the number of required nuclear boiler safety system related transmitters. In addition, a three-channel controller architecture was adopted for the primary process control systems to provide system failure tolerance and on-line repair capability. A number of improvements were made to the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS). Fixed wide-range neutron detectors have replaced retractable source and intermediate range monitors. In addition, an automatic, period-based protection system replaced the manual range switches used during startup. The man-machine interface was significantly improved and simplified for the ABWR using advanced technologies such as large, flat-panel displays, touch-screen CRTs and function-oriented keyboards. The number of alarm tiles was reduced by almost a factor of ten. Many operating processes and procedures are automated, with the control room operator performing a confirmatory function.

The plant features discussed above, while simplifying the operator's burden, have an ancillary benefit of increased failure tolerance and/or reduced error rates. Studies show that less than one unplanned scram per year will be experienced with the ABWR. Increased system redundancies will also permit on-line maintenance. Thus, both forced outages and planned maintenance outages will be significantly reduced.

Table 2 provides a summary of the ABWR design parameters.

**TABLE 2**  
**ABWR DESIGN PARAMETER SUMMARY**

<b>Design Parameter</b>	
Thermal Power	3926 MWt
Electrical Power	1350 MWe (nominal)
Reactor Coolant Pressure	7.17 MPa (1040 psia)
Reactor Coolant Temperature	287° C (549°)
Core Flow Rate	52.2 x 10 <sup>6</sup> kg/hr (115.1 x 10 <sup>6</sup> lb/hr)
Active Fuel Length	3.7 m
Reactor Pressure Vessel Inner Diameter	7.1 m
Number of Fuel Assemblies	872
Number of Control Rod Drives	205

**APPENDIX B: DESIGN DESCRIPTION, ESBWR****ESBWR Development**

In 1992, GE along with its sponsors at the US Department of Energy (DOE) and several international utilities, designers and research organizations, undertook to design and obtain USNRC design approval for a natural circulation power reactor featuring passive plant safety-systems technology. This effort produced a Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR) describing a 670 MWe predecessor to the current ESBWR. Work undertaken by GE with the support of many European nuclear power design firms, nuclear research labs, utility companies and universities in the period since 1994 has taken this predecessor, SBWR-670 nuclear power plant design, to new uprated power levels.

**ESBWR Features**

The ESBWR plant design relies on the use of natural circulation for the recirculation system and passive safety features to enhance the plant performance and simplify the design. The use of natural circulation has allowed the elimination of several systems. Table 1 shows a comparison of some key plant features for several BWR designs. It shows that the full benefit of natural circulation has been achieved in the ESBWR, allowing the reduction of the number of control blades and control rod drives (CRD's).

**Table 1. Comparison of Key Features**

<u>Parameter</u>	<u>ABWR</u>	<u>SBWR</u>	<u>ESBWR</u>
Power (MWt)	3926	2000	4000
Power (MWe)	1350	670	1380
Vessel height (m)	21.1	24.5	27.7
Vessel inner diameter (m)	7.1	6.0	7.1
Fuel bundles, number	872	732	1020
Active fuel height (m)	3.7	2.7	3.1
Power density (kw/l)	51	41.5	53.7
Number of CRDs	205	177	121

The ESBWR has evolved over the last seven years from the original 670 MWe SBWR taking advantage of the economies of scale, enhancing the natural circulation core flow, retaining the original passive safety features, but adding to the simplification with enhanced safety and economics in mind. The approach to improving the commercial attractiveness of the ESBWR compared to the SBWR was to follow a multi-pronged approach by:

- 1) Enhancing the overall plant performance
- 2) Taking advantage of the modular design of the passive safety systems, and
- 3) Reducing overall material quantities.

The ESBWR design has achieved a major plant simplification by eliminating the recirculation pumps. The use of natural circulation, along with the desire to maintain the same or better plant performance margins, resulted in the following key design features:

- 1) Opening the flow path between the downcomer and lower plenum
- 2) Use of shorter fuel - resulting in a reduced core pressure drop
- 3) Use of an improved steam separator to reduce pressure drops
- 4) Use of a 5m chimney to enhance the driving head for natural circulation flow

The selection of the optimum power level was based on the desire to utilize the synergism between the ABWR and the ESBWR and to utilize existing design and technology from the ABWR - like using the same diameter pressure vessel. With this constraint, the SBWR core circumscribed diameter was increased, using the ABWR vessel diameter and leaving approximately the same size annulus as the earlier SBWR. The ESBWR core was then increased in size by adding fuel bundles to accommodate this increased diameter. The core was increased from 732 fuel assemblies, in the SBWR, to 1020 fuel assemblies, resulting in an optimum thermal power rating of 4000 MWt. The selected power for the ESBWR would have required the addition of 400 fuel assemblies and 92 control rod drives (CRD) compared to the SBWR. However, the use of a new core lattice design reduced the number of CRDs from 269 to 121, better than a 50 percent reduction and 56 fewer drives than the original SBWR.

### **Plant Safety Systems**

The ESBWR safety system design was extended to a higher power level by taking advantage of the modular design approach of the safety systems. The isolation condensers and the passive containment decay heat removal system, utilize simple heat exchangers. Any increase in power level only requires additional heat exchangers or tubes. The Gravity Driven Cooling System (GDCS), is not sensitive to power level and its capacity is primarily determined by containment geometrical considerations.

### **High and Low Pressure Inventory Control**

The ESBWR uses isolation condensers for high pressure inventory control and decay heat removal under isolated conditions. The isolation condenser system has four independent high pressure loops, each containing a heat exchanger that condenses steam on the tube side. The tubes are in a large pool, outside the containment. The steam line connected to the vessel is normally open and the condensate return line is normally closed. The four units are the same size as those previously tested for the SBWR.

The reactor vessel is depressurized rapidly to allow multiple sources of safety and non-safety systems to provide water makeup. Typically in a BWR, rapid depressurization

only results in the loss of half the reactor inventory, allowing the core to remain covered. Consequently, any makeup system has only to provide a slow water makeup to account for loss of inventory resulting from boil-off by decay heat. For the ESBWR, the makeup water flows into the vessel by gravity (GDCS), instead of relying on pumps and their associated support systems. The ESBWR uses the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) to depressurize the vessel. The GDCS pool capacity is primarily determined by containment geometrical considerations. The vessel diameter was increased to 7.1m resulting in an increase of the lower drywell volume, consequently the GDCS pool volume increased by approximately 200 m<sup>3</sup>.

### **Containment Heat Removal**

Containment heat removal is provided by the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS), consisting of four safety-related low-pressure loops. Each loop consists of a heat exchanger open to the containment, a condensate drain line and a vent discharge line submerged in the suppression pool. The four heat exchangers, similar in design to the isolation condensers, are located in cooling pools external to the containment. The heat exchanger unit is only about 35 percent larger than the as-tested PCCS unit. Figure 1 shows a combined sketch of the safety systems.

### **BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES**

The ESBWR Reactor Building has been considerably simplified and reduced in volume, through use of passive systems. The primary safety-grade inventory control system - the isolation condenser - is a simple heat exchanger. The backup low-pressure inventory control system - the gravity driven cooling system (GDCS) - is a fairly small pool of water. The passive containment decay heat removal system consists of modular heat exchangers, requiring no moving parts or valves. Most of the safety systems are now either in the containment or directly above it.

Any other systems in the plant are either non-safety grade or fairly small. This allows a significant reduction of the overall building volumes, especially for the expensive safety category buildings. A reduction of the reactor building volume and footprint has the added benefit of reducing the size of the building which is on the critical path for construction.

The plant design has some added features that allow it to be very flexible in siting at different locations. The design is reasonably robust to account for evolving severe accident requirements by different safety authorities. The design of the plant structures allows application to different seismic requirements. The main access to the building and fuel cask transfer hatch, allow different building embedments - for different site conditions and seismic levels. The main control building location is flexible enough to accommodate differing requirements.




Figure 1. Schematic Diagram of ESBWR Safety Systems

**PLANT PERFORMANCE**

The key design features described above, along with the use of the latest fuel designs, result in a substantial enhancement of the overall plant performance, as summarized in Table 2.

**Table 2  
Comparison of Performance for Various BWRs**

<b><u>Performance Parameter</u></b>	<b><u>Typical BWRs</u></b>	<b><u>SBWR</u></b>	<b><u>ESBWR</u></b>
Average natural circulation flow per bundle [kg/s]	3.5 - 5.0	8.5	12.0
Power/Flow ratio at rated conditions [MW/(kg/s)]	0.25	0.31	0.26
Pressurization rate during fast transients [MPa/s]	0.8	0.4	0.4
Margin to SRV set point during fast isolation event [MPa]	SRV opens	0.52	0.32
Minimum water level following accident [m above fuel]	0.0 *	1.5	2.8
Post accident containment pressure margin [kPa below design]	40	100	160

\* For internal pump plant, for jet pump plant value is -2m

This table shows that the use of natural circulation significantly improved several key performance parameters, while keeping others within the same range as those for forced circulation plants. Additionally, certain design changes made for the ESBWR, allowed the increase in power level from the SBWR without a decrease in margins - in some cases margins actually increased.

- a. The higher average flow per bundle in the SBWR and ESBWR, is due to the unrestricted downcomer and shorter core. The increased flow from SBWR to ESBWR is due to a longer chimney and improved separator configuration.
- b. In general, a reactor is more stable with a lower power/flow ratio. The ESBWR power/flow ratio is comparable to the operating BWRs at rated conditions. This is because the power per bundle is lower for the ESBWR and the natural circulation flow has been enhanced, as described above.
- c. Slower pressurization rates in ESBWR and SBWR, are due to the large steam volume in the chimney and the use of Isolation Condensers (IC). Because of the

slower pressurization rate and the use of IC's, there is adequate margin to prevent any Safety Relief Valves (SRV) from opening.

- d. Due to larger vessels for the ESBWR and SBWR, the water level always covers the core following an accident.
- e. The increase in containment pressure margin from SBWR to ESBWR is due to the relocation of the GDCS pool from the drywell to the wetwell.

The major advantage of the increased margins is the added flexibility the plant design gives the plant operator. These margins can be utilized to optimize fuel management or to modify plant features for individual utility needs without an increase in costs.

Figure 2 shows the major systems for the overall ESBWR plant.




Figure2. ESBWR Major Systems

**APPENDIX C: DESIGN DESCRIPTION, SWR 1000****INTRODUCTION**

Framatome Advanced Nuclear Power (F-ANP) has developed a medium-capacity (approximately 1000 MW<sub>e</sub>) boiling water reactor (SWR 1000) in conjunction with German electric utilities, with the support of European partners. This project is based on experience gained from the operation of proven BWR plants. However, evolutionary development is supplemented by an innovative approach, which entails partly replacing the active safety systems with passive safety features. The passive safety systems utilize basic laws of physics such as gravity, for example, enabling these systems to function without electrical power supply or actuation by instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. In this way, evolutionary developments are supplemented by innovative concepts, which provide enhanced safety benefits.

The SWR 1000 was developed on the basis of the relevant requirements set forth in Germany's nuclear codes and standards, while taking into consideration the recommendations proposed by the French and German reactor safety commissions for the EPR (European Pressurized Water Reactor).

Development at Siemens (now F-ANP) of a new BWR plant concept with an approximate capacity rating of 650 MW began in early 1992. This concept phase was completed in the fall of 1993, while the subsequent consolidation phase reached completion by mid-1995. The following four-year design phase of the SWR 1000, carried out in consultation with the German Reactor Safety Commission (RSK), was completed in 1999. The design phase was concluded with the release of a site-independent safety analyses report, a probabilistic safety analysis report and an analysis of projected erection costs.

In parallel with the design phase, an experimental testing program was conducted at F-ANP's own testing facilities and at other German and European research centers to provide verification of the function and effectiveness of the SWR 1000's passive safety systems.

**DESIGN GOALS****a.) High Safety Standards**

The high safety standard of current nuclear power plants is based, among other factors, on a very reliable and correspondingly complex system of redundant active safety equipment. However, achieving this safety standard entails high investment costs and considerable expenditure for operation and maintenance in terms of both personnel and equipment.

The driving force behind this further development was therefore the search for alternative concepts for enhancing the safety of future nuclear power plants by simpler means.

To achieve this goal, the following requirements were defined for the safety concept:

- Clear and simple systems engineering through consistent use of passive safety equipment
- Increased safety margins
- Good accident control behavior through slower reaction to off-normal conditions
- Increased grace periods (up to several days) after the onset of accident conditions before active intervention by operating personnel is required
- Effect of human error on reactor safety is minimized or avoided entirely
- Much lower probabilities of occurrence for serious accidents with core melt than in present designs
- Compliance with the requirements governing the control of core melt accidents set forth in the July 1994 amendment to the German Atomic Energy Act. This means limiting the effects of a core melt accident to the plant itself, i.e. eliminating the need for emergency-response actions with far-reaching effects such as temporary evacuation or permanent relocation of the local population.
- Optimum Availability
- Application of the wide range of experience gained from plants currently in service by making extensive use of systems and components that have proven themselves in operation.
- Optimization of these systems on the basis of well established operating experience.
- Economic Competitiveness

Future nuclear power plants can only be economically competitive if power-generation costs (i.e. investment costs plus operating, maintenance and decommissioning costs) are no higher than those for BWR and PWR plants of evolutionary designs or for fossil-fired power plants (e.g. coal- or gas-fired units).

Cost reductions are achieved by introducing passive safety equipment and cost savings to almost all plant areas (e.g. systems, components, electrical and I&C equipment and civil structures) are feasible by utilizing one type of component for multiple tasks. This allows equipment standardization. As a result the need to comply with more stringent safety requirements is achieved while competitive electrical generating costs are obtained.

#### d.) Public Acceptance

- Improvement of public acceptance of nuclear power generation through the use of simple, understandable safety technology and verification of control of serious accidents.

### **SWR 1000 BASIC DESIGN FEATURES**

The key design features of the concept are as follows:

- Reactor core with low power density
- Large water inventory inside the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) to ensure good thermal-hydraulic behavior in the event of an accident, i.e. excellent slow-acting accident control capabilities
- Control of transients without coolant makeup in the RPV from an external source
- Large heat storage capacity inside the containment thanks to large water inventories in the core flooding pool and the pressure suppression pool
- Passive equipment for heat removal from the RPV and containment
- Large flooding water inventory available inside the containment for discharge by gravity flow into the RPV following depressurization
- Passive actuation of key safety functions such as reactor scram, pressure relief and depressurization as a diverse means to actuation by the safety I&C
- Passive accident control without power supply, actuation by I&C systems or intervention by operating personnel in the initial days following the onset of accident conditions, and subsequent unlimited heat removal via simple active measures
- Nitrogen-inerted containment atmosphere to preclude hydrogen combustion and hydrogen reactions inside the containment in the event of a serious core melt accident
- Extended containment pressure load-bearing capacity to accommodate the quantity of hydrogen arising from 100 percent zirconium oxidation in the event of a serious accident
- Passive cooling of the RPV exterior in the event of core melt scenarios to ensure retention of the core melt inside the RPV
- Flexible operating cycle length (1 to 2 years) with a mean discharge burnup of up to 65 GWd/t
- High plant availability (> 87 percent/a) thanks to short plant downtimes for refueling, maintenance and servicing
- 48-month plant construction period
- 60-year plant service life.

## PLANT DESCRIPTION

The systems and components are arranged inside the various plant buildings and structures (Fig. 1), creating three delineated structural complexes, which enables the buildings to be constructed in a parallel time frame. The structural complex at the center of the plant comprises the reactor building, the turbine building and the reactor auxiliary building. The second complex contains the switchgear equipment, the systems for radioactive waste treatment and storage, the hot workshop, staff amenities and the entrance to the controlled access area. The third structural complex consists of the plant service systems such as the circulating water supply systems, the emergency diesel generators, the workshops and the

demineralized water system, etc. The first complex is fixed together while the other buildings and systems can be adapted to a specific site.

The plant (Fig. 2) is equipped with a boiling water reactor to generate steam at a thermal output of 2778 MW. The saturated steam produced, which has a pressure of 71 bar, is used to drive a steam turbine which in turn drives a generator, supplying a gross electrical output of 1013 MWe. The steam leaving the low pressure turbine sections is condensed into water in the turbine condensers. This condensate is returned to the reactor by condensate and feedwater pumps via a reactor water cleanup system and a feedwater heating train.

Figure 1 – Site Layout and View into the SWR 1000 Reactor Building




Figure 2 – Power Generation Cycle




Table 1 – Design Parameters

Data		SWR 1000
<b>Overall plant</b>		
- thermal output	MW	2778
- gross electric output	MW	1013
- net electric output	MW	977
- net efficiency	percent	35.2
<b>Reactor core</b>		
- No. of fuel assemblies	-	624 (12x12)
- Total uranium weight	t	119
- Active height of core	m	2.80
- Average power density	kW/l	48.8
- Average discharge burnup	GWd/t	65
- Core throughput	gpm	200000
- Coolant Pressure	psi	1030
- Coolant Temperature	°F	547
<b>Reactor pressure vessel</b>		
- Inside height	ft	76
- Inside diameter	ft	23
- Design pressure	psi	1276
- No. of recirculation pumps	-	6

Data		SWR 1000
<b>Turbine</b>		
- Number	-	1
- Speed	rpm	1800/3600
- No. of HP/LP casings	-	1/3
<b>Containment</b>		
- Inside diameter	ft	105
- Inside height	ft	94
- Design pressure (abs.)	psi	109
- Drywell volume + gas volume of core flooding pool	ft <sup>3</sup>	201000
- Water volume of pressure suppression pool	ft <sup>3</sup>	102000
- Gas volume of pressure suppression pool	ft <sup>3</sup>	194000
- Water volume of core flooding pool	ft <sup>3</sup>	109000
- Plant design life	years	60
- Plant construction period	months	48

**APPENDIX D: DESIGN DESCRIPTION, AP 1000**

The AP1000 is a two-loop, 1000 MWe pressurized water reactor (PWR) with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications to enhance the construction, operation, and maintenance. The AP1000 design is derived directly from the AP600, a two-loop, 600 MWe PWR. The AP600 uses proven technology, which builds on the over 30 years of operating PWR experience. The AP600 design received Final Design Approval from the U.S. NRC in September 1998 and Design Certification in December 1999. The AP600 meets all of the U.S. electric utility requirements including their cost goals. Although the AP600 is the most cost-effective plant ready for deployment, it is still more expensive than the \$1000/kw needed to compete in the United States today. In order to develop a cost competitive nuclear power plant Westinghouse has completed design studies which demonstrate that it is feasible to increase the power output of the AP600 to at least 1000 MWe, maintaining its current design configuration, use of proven components and licensing basis. In order to achieve these objectives the AP1000 has been designed within the space constraints of the AP600, while retaining the credibility of proven components and substantial safety margins. This paper describes the changes made to uprate the AP600 and gives an overview of the plant design. It also summarizes the basis for the AP600 testing program and computer codes being sufficient for the AP1000.

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued Design Certification of the AP600 standard nuclear reactor design in December of 1999. This culminated a 7-year, 110 man-year, and review of the AP600 design, safety analysis and probabilistic risk assessment. The AP600 is a 600 MWe reactor that utilizes passive safety features that, once actuated, depend only on natural forces such as gravity and natural circulation to perform all required safety functions. These passive safety systems result in increased plant safety and have also significantly simplified plant systems and equipment, resulting in simplified plant operation and maintenance. The AP600 meets NRC deterministic safety criteria and probabilistic risk criteria with large margins. The Westinghouse computer codes used to analyze the AP600 were validated against the extensive AP600 test program in accordance with U.S. NRC procedures.

The AP600 meets the EPRI ALWR Utility Requirements including the cost goals. The overnight capital cost for the first AP600 plant is calculated to be between 1300-1500 \$/kW depending on the site selected. Although the AP600 is the most cost effective nuclear power plant ready for deployment, it is still more expensive than the \$1000/kw needed to compete in the United States today. In order to develop a cost competitive nuclear power plant Westinghouse has completed design studies which demonstrate that it is feasible to increase the power output of the AP600 to at least 1000 MWe, maintaining its current design configuration, use of proven components and licensing basis.

The approach to achieving these objectives is to design the AP1000 within the space constraints of the AP600, while retaining the credibility of proven components and substantial safety margins. The arrangement of the reactor, the passive safety systems and the auxiliary systems is the same as the AP600. To increase the output of the reactor, the core, reactor coolant pumps and steam generators have been increased in size. The design of these larger

reactor components are based on components that are used in operating PWRs or have been developed / tested for new PWRs. In order to maintain adequate safety margins, the capacity of the passive safety features have been selectively increased based on insights from the AP600 test and analysis results. Figure 1 shows a section view of the AP1000 and AP600 containments; Figure 2 shows a plan view.

The AP1000 is being designed to meet NRC regulatory criteria in a similar manner to that found to be acceptable for the AP600. The AP1000 is being designed to meet NRC deterministic safety criteria and probabilistic risk criteria with large margins. Westinghouse intends to certify the AP1000 standard plant design under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 52. Preliminary pre-application discussions with the NRC began in 2000.

Some of the high level design characteristics of the AP1000 are as follows:

- Net electrical power is 1090 MWe and nuclear steam supply thermal power is 3415 MWe.
- Rated plant performance is achieved with 10 percent of the SG tubes plugged and with a maximum hot leg temperature of 610°F.
- Safety systems are passive; they provide core and containment cooling for a protracted time without ac power and require no operator actions for 72 hours.
- PRA performance is predicted to be similar to AP600 and well within NRC goals. Core damage frequency of AP600 is 1.7E-7/yr vs. NRC goal 1E-4/yr and large release frequency is 1.8E-8/yr vs. NRC goal of 1E-6/yr.
- Occupational radiation exposure is expected to be below 0.7 man-Sv/yr.
- Overall plant availability is expected to be greater than 93 percent, including forced and planned outages. Less than 1 reactor trip is expected per year.
- The plant is designed to accept a 100 percent load rejection without reactor trip.
- The plant is designed to be simple to construct, operate and maintain with significantly fewer safety and non-safety components, simpler components, and better materials than a currently operating PWR.
- The plant design life is 60 years without the replacement of the reactor vessel. The design provides for the replaceability of other major components, including the SG.
- The design of the major components used for power generation (fuel, internals, SG, reactor coolant pumps, turbine, etc) is based on equipment that has successfully operated in power plants. Modifications to these proven designs were based on similar equipment that had successful operating experience in similar or more severe conditions.

## AP1000 Major Reactor Components

The major differences in the AP1000 core design compared to the AP600 core design are the addition of 12 fuel assemblies, an increase in the length of the fuel assemblies, and additional control assemblies. The extra assemblies and increase in length along with an increase in the linear power density in the core enabled the core power rating to be increased from 1,933 MWt to 3,400 MWt within the same diameter reactor vessel. The number of rod control cluster was increased to 53 in the AP1000 compared to 45 in the AP600. The AP1000 core also incorporates the Westinghouse ROBUST fuel assembly design compared to the Vantage 5-H design of the AP600. The ROBUST design includes guide tubes with increased wall thickness.

The AP1000 core is based on core designs in operation today. The core active fuel length is 14 feet, similar to the XL core designs in operation in South Texas, Doel4 and Tihange3. The linear power density of the AP1000 core is approximately the same as the operating fleet of 3-loop Westinghouse plants. The AP1000 reactor vessel has the same overall diameter and number and size of nozzles as the AP600 vessel. The overall length of the AP1000 vessel has been increased to accommodate the increase in core length to 14 feet. The AP1000 reactor vessel internals are of the same design as the AP600 vessel internals except that the length of the lower internals has increased because of the longer core design. Also, the thickness of the lower support plate has increased to accommodate the heavier AP1000 core which has both additional fuel assemblies (12) and heavier assemblies due to the longer length.

The AP1000 integrated head package design is the same as that of the AP600 except that the overall height has increased to accommodate the longer control rod drives and incore components required for the 14-foot AP1000 core. Internally, the AP1000 integrated head package also accommodates an additional eight control rod assemblies.

The AP1000 steam generators incorporate very similar features. Both units are vertical-shell U-tube evaporators with a triangular pitch tube bundle and integral moisture separating equipment. They both use Inconel-690 thermally treated tube material. To accommodate the higher thermal output of the AP1000 more heat transfer surface is required, thus increasing the shell diameter and height to enclose the larger tube bundle and larger moisture separation equipment required for the higher steam flow. The mass of water stored in the secondary side AP1000 SG has been increased such that it is about 36 percent larger, on a per MWt basis, than that of the AP600 SG. This increased water mass results in a greater heat transfer capability from the reactor coolant system during transients and improves safety margins. Westinghouse has successful experience in building and operating steam generators as large as the AP1000 in a number of plants including Arkansas, San Onofre and Waterford.

The same basic canned-motor pump design is employed in the AP1000 as in the AP600 including the use of a uranium flywheel to provide rotating inertia to extend the flow coastdown. However, the higher thermal power and core power density of the AP1000 requires higher flow and longer coastdown from the AP1000 pumps compared to the AP600 pumps. A variable speed controller was added to the AP1000 pumps to reduce the motor power required when pumping cold reactor coolant. To provide the larger flow rates, the

AP1000 pumps include higher efficiency hydraulics which were scaled down from the Westinghouse APWR reactor coolant pump design. A longer coastdown is obtained in the AP1000 pumps through increased inertia in the flywheel.

The AP1000 pressurizer volume was increased compared to the AP600 to accommodate the larger reactor coolant system volume in the AP1000. This was accomplished by making the AP1000 pressurizer taller while maintaining the same diameter pressurizer as in the AP600. The total volume of the AP1000 pressurizer is 2,100 ft<sup>3</sup> compared to 1,600 ft<sup>3</sup> for the AP600.

The sizes of the AP1000 reactor coolant loop piping are the same as those for the AP600. The elevations of the AP1000 hot and cold legs are also maintained the same as those in the AP600. Table 1 provides a summary comparison of the key design parameters of the AP1000 with those of the AP600.

#### AP1000 Passive Safety Features

The AP1000 is being designed to meet NRC regulatory criteria in a similar manner to that found to be acceptable for the AP600. The AP1000 is being designed to meet NRC deterministic safety criteria and probabilistic risk criteria with large margins. Westinghouse intends to certify the AP1000 standard plant design under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 52.

The AP1000 passive safety features use the same design approach and arrangement as the AP600. The capacities of the AP1000 passive safety features have been selectively increased using insights from the AP600 design, testing, analysis and licensing activities. Two key factors in these insights are the uncertainty in the computer analysis tools and the margin between the calculated results and the licensing limits. These insights indicate that some passive safety features should be increased at least as much as the increase in core power. These insights also indicate that other features do not need to be increased as much.

A summary comparison of key passive safety system design features is provided in Table 2. These key features are discussed due to their importance in affecting the key thermal-hydraulic phenomenon exhibited by the passive safety systems in critical areas.

### **COSTS AND CONSTRUCTION**

In the United States, the Utility Requirements Document for advanced light water reactor plants included a cost goal that was based on the cost of coal generated electricity at the time the document was written. The overnight capital cost for the first AP600 plant is calculated to be much less than the Utility Requirements Document cost goal, between 1300-1500 \$/kW depending on the site selection. It also places the AP600 as the most cost effective nuclear power option available for deployment in the world today. This low cost demonstrates the benefits of the use of passive safety systems and other plant simplifications (Table 3).

However, since that time, the cost of new generating capacity and the overall operating cost of generating electricity has gone down. This is a result of low natural gas prices, more efficient plants in general and the current record breaking reductions in outage times and operating costs for nuclear plants. As a result, the cost of the AP600, is more expensive than the \$1000/kw needed to compete in the United States today.

The affect of the changes that are required to uprate the AP600 to the AP1000 is small on the plants overnight cost. A detailed estimate of each difference from AP600 was applied to the already extensive and validated AP600 cost estimate. This overall cost addition is on the order of 11 percent. The overall power increase however is over 66 percent. The overnight cost per megawatt is greatly reduced.

Westinghouse has designed the AP600 using 3D computer models which allows very detailed quantity calculations. A detailed construction schedule has been developed for the AP600 over eight years using input from a number of design participants. This schedule shows that the AP600 design simplifications and use of modular construction techniques allows for a 36 month duration from start of basemat concrete pour to the beginning of fuel load.

More recently the 3D model has been linked to construction schedule model to develop a 4D (3D plus time) representation of the plant construction and as used this model to review and optimize the construction sequence and schedule. As a result of using this model to study the initial portion of the 36 month construction schedule, that schedule has been reduced by over 4 months.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

The AP1000 is derived directly from the AP600, which uses passive safety features and extensive simplifications to enhance construction, operation, and maintenance. This paper describes the design changes that are most important in uprating the AP600 to 1000 MWe. These design changes are being incorporated into the AP1000 standard plant design that Westinghouse intends to license in the U.S. under 10 CFR Part 52. The AP600 design has already been licensed with the NRC, receiving Design Certification in December 1999.

Preliminary safety evaluations and analysis results, performed on the AP1000, indicate that passive safety features can be successfully applied to a plant of a higher power rating while maintaining large safety margins. Scaling evaluations indicate that the AP600 test program and the analysis codes validated for AP600 should be sufficient to perform the accident analyses for Design Certification of the AP1000 without the need to perform additional testing.

The design evaluations performed on the AP1000 indicate that the design objectives of maintaining the AP600 design configuration, use of proven components and licensing basis can be met and that the AP1000 costs will be competitive in the U.S as well as other parts of the world.

**Table 1 Comparison of Selected Parameters**

	<b>AP600</b>	<b>AP1000</b>
Reactor Power, MWt	1933	3400
Hot Leg Temperature, °F	600	610
Number of Fuel Assemblies	145	157
Type of Fuel Assembly	17x17	17x17
Active Fuel Length, ft	12	14
R/V I.D., inches	157	157
Number Control Rod Assemblies	45	53
Hot Leg / Cold Leg Pipe ID, in	31/22	31/22
Steam Generator Heat Transfer Area, ft <sup>2</sup>	75,000	125,000
Reactor Coolant Pump Flow, gpm	51,000	75,000
Pressurizer Volume, ft <sup>3</sup>	1600	2100

Table 2 Comparison of Passive Safety System Design Features

	AP600	AP1000	Comment
Passive RHR Heat Exchanger			
Type	C-Tube	C-Tube	The AP1000 PRHR HX retains the AP600 configuration and elevations. The heat transfer surface area is increased by extending the horizontal portion of the heat exchanger tubes. The inlet and outlet piping has been increased resulting in higher flow rates.
Surface Area, %	100 %	122 %	
Design Flow Rate, %	100 %	174 %	
Design Heat Transfer, %	100 %	172 %	
Core Makeup Tanks			
Number	2	2	Core makeup tank volume and flow rate is increased to provide additional safety injection flow. A flow control orifice is changed to increase the flow. CMT elevations are maintained at the AP600 level. The duration of CMT injection is maintained similar to AP600.
Volume, ft <sup>3</sup>	2000	2500	
Line Resistance, %	100 %	64 %	
Design Flow Rate, %	100 %	125 %	
Accumulators			
Number	2	2	The accumulators are the same as AP600. Accumulator sizing is based on LBLOCA performance and is affected by reactor vessel volume and core power density. The AP600 and AP1000 employ the same diameter reactor vessel. Although the AP1000 has a higher core power density, there will still be large margins to the peak clad temperature limit of 1204C (2200F).
Volume, ft <sup>3</sup>	2000	2000	
Pressure, psig	700	700	
IRWST			
Volume, gallons	557,000	590,000	The IRWST normal water level is increased by using more accurate level instruments. The higher IRWST water level increases the driving head, which together with larger injection line piping, results in higher flow rates.
Driving Head, %	100 %	108 %	
Line Resistance, %	100 %	32 %	
Design Flow Rate, %	100 %	184 %	
Containment Recirculation			
Line Resistance, %	100 %	39 %	The post accident containment flood up level has been increased by using a higher initial IRWST level and installing check valves in the refueling cavity drain line so that it does not flood. In addition, the RNS pumps are aligned to take suction from outside containment instead of from the IRWST; this change delays the start of recirculation which adds additional margin.
Driving Head, %	100 %	209 %	
Design Flow Rate, %	100 %	231 %	
Time of Recirculation, hr	2.10	2.67	

	AP600	AP1000	Comment
Automatic Depressurization Stages 1-3 RCS connection Configuration Vent Area, %	Top p2r 6 paths 100 %	Top p2r 6 paths 100 %	The first three stages of ADS are the same as AP600. Their sizing basis is to reduce pressure to permit adequate injection from the accumulators and to permit transition to 4 <sup>th</sup> stage ADS.
Stage 4 RCS connection Configuration Vent Area, percent Line Resistance Capacity	Hot Leg 4 paths 100 % 100 % 100 %	Hot legs 4 paths 176 % 28 % 189 %	The 4 <sup>th</sup> stage ADS vent capability is the most important design feature to allow for adequate IRWST/sump injection during long term core cooling. The 4 <sup>th</sup> stage piping has been increased resulting in higher flows.
Containment Diameter, ft Overall Height, ft Design Pressure, psig Net Free Volume, ft <sup>3</sup>	130 189.83 45 1.73 E06	130 215.33 59 2.07 E06	The AP1000 containment volume and design pressures are increased to accommodate higher mass and energy releases. Increasing the shell thickness to 1.75" and using higher strength steel allows for the higher design pressure.
Passive Containment Cooling Storage Tank Volume, gal	580,000	800,000	The PCS water storage tank was increased to accommodate higher flow rates. The PCS flow rates have been increased based on the increase in core power.

AP1000 Simplifications

	<b>1000 MW Reference</b>	<b>AP1000</b>	<b>Reduction</b>
Pumps	280	180	36 %
ASME Valves	2800	1400	50 %
ASME Piping, million m (ft)	33,500 (110,000)	5800 (19,000)	83 %
Cable, million m (ft)	2.77 (9.1)	0.37 (1.2)	87 %
Seismic Building Volume, million m <sup>3</sup> (ft <sup>3</sup> )	0.36 (12.7)	0.16 (5.6)	56 %




Figure 1 – Westinghouse AP1000 and AP600 Plants (Section)




Figure 2 – Westinghouse AP1000 and AP600 Plants (Plan)

**APPENDIX E: DESIGN DESCRIPTION, AP 600**

The Westinghouse AP600 is a 600 MWe Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) with advanced passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications to enhance the construction, operation, and maintenance of the plant. The plant design utilizes proven technology which builds on over 30 years of operating PWR experience. PWRs represent 76 percent of all Light Water Reactors around the world, and 67 percent of the PWRs are based on Westinghouse PWR technology.

The AP600 is designed to achieve a high safety and performance record. It is conservatively based on proven PWR technology, but with an emphasis on safety features that rely on natural forces. Safety systems maximize the use of natural driving forces such as pressurized gas, gravity flow and natural circulation flow. Safety systems do not use active components (such as pumps, fans or diesel generators) and are designed to function without safety-grade support systems (such as AC power, component cooling water, service water, HVAC). The number and complexity of operator actions required to control the safety systems are minimized; the approach is to eliminate a required operator action rather than to automate it. The net result is a design with significantly reduced complexity and improved operability.

The AP600 standard design complies with all applicable U.S. NRC criteria. Extensive safety analysis has been completed and documented in the Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR) and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) submittals to the NRC. An extensive testing program has been completed, and verifies that the innovative plant features will perform as designed and analyzed. PRA results show a very low core damage frequency which meets the goals established for advanced reactor designs and a low frequency of release due to improved containment isolation and cooling.

An important aspect of the AP600 design philosophy focuses on plant operability and maintainability. These factors have been incorporated into the design process. The AP600 design includes features such as simplified system design to improve operability while reducing the number of components and associated maintenance requirements. In particular, simplified safety systems reduce surveillance requirements by enabling significantly simplified technical specifications.

Selection of proven components has been emphasized to ensure a high degree of reliability with a low maintenance requirement. Component standardization reduces spare parts, minimizes maintenance training requirements, and allows shorter maintenance durations. Built-in testing capability is provided for critical components.

Plant layout ensures adequate access for inspection and maintenance. Laydown space for staging of equipment and personnel, equipment removal paths, and space to accommodate remotely operated service equipment and mobile units have been considered as part of the plant design. Access platforms and lifting devices are provided at key locations, as are service provisions such as electrical power, demineralized water, breathing and service air, ventilation and lighting.

The AP600 design also incorporates radiation exposure reduction principles to keep worker dose as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Exposure length, distance, shielding and source reduction are fundamental criteria that are incorporated into the design.

Reducing construction costs of commercial nuclear power plants is essential in order to expand the future use of nuclear energy. Two major components of plant construction cost are the cost of financing during construction and the cost of skilled craft labor needed on site during construction. Modular construction techniques, a design requirement for the AP600, significantly reduce these components of construction cost. Through the use of modular construction, our construction planning has shown that AP600 can be constructed in 36 months from pouring the first concrete to fuel load.

Various features have been incorporated in the design to minimize construction time and total cost by eliminating components and reducing bulk quantities and building volumes. Some of these features include the following:

- The flat, common basemat design selected for the nuclear island effectively minimizes the construction cost and schedule.
- Utilization of the integrated protection system, the advanced control room, the distributed logic cabinets, multiplexing, and fiber optics, significantly reduces the quantity of cables, cable trays, and conduits.
- A key feature of the AP600 plant configuration is the stacked arrangement of the Class 1E battery rooms, the dc switchgear rooms, the integrated protection system rooms, and the main control room. This stacked arrangement eliminates the need for the upper and lower cable spreading rooms that are required in the current generation of PWR plants.
- Application of the passive safeguards systems replaces and/or eliminates many of the conventional mechanical safeguards systems that are typically located in the Seismic Category I buildings in the current generation of PWR plants.

The AP600 is designed with environmental consideration as a priority. The safety of the public, the power plant workers, and the impact to the environment have all been addressed as specific design goals, as follows:

- Operational releases have been minimized by design features.
- Aggressive goals for worker radiation exposure have been set and satisfied.
- Total radwaste volumes have been minimized.
- Other hazardous waste (non-radioactive) have been minimized.

The AP600 Nuclear Power Plant has been designed by Westinghouse under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). The design team includes a number of U.S. and foreign companies and organizations, such as Bechtel, Burns

& Roe, Initec (Spain), UTE (Spain), and Ansaldo (Italy) as architect engineers, Avondale Industries (module design), CBI Services, Inc. (containment vessel design), M-K Ferguson Co. (constructability, schedule, and cost estimation), Southern Electric International (turbine island buildings and systems), ENEA Energy Research Center of Italy (tests of the automatic depressurization system), SIET, SPES Facility in Italy (full-pressure integral passive safety system tests), and Oregon State University (low-pressure integral passive safety system tests).

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has, with a broad participation of numerous countries, developed a Utility Requirements Document (URD) for ALWRs, taking into account the wealth of information related to nuclear power plant safety and operations that has been generated worldwide with commercial nuclear power. The purpose of the URD is to delineate utility desires for their next generation of nuclear plants, and to this end, it consists of a comprehensive set of design requirements for future plants.

Incorporation of the ALWR URD has been a design goal for the AP600 from the design inception, and has continued to be so during the ongoing First-of-a-Kind Engineering (FOAKE) program. The AP600 has a well-defined design basis that is confirmed through thorough engineering analyses and testing and is in conformance with the URD. Some of the high-level design characteristics of the plant are:

- Net electrical power of at least 600 MWe; and a thermal power of 1940 MWt.
- Rated performance is achieved with up to 10 percent of the steam generator tubes plugged and with a maximum hot leg temperature of 600°F (315.6°C).
- Core design is robust with at least a 15 percent operating margin on core power parameters.
- Short lead time (five years from owner's commitment to commercial operation) and construction schedule (3 years).
- No plant prototype is needed since proven power generating system components are used.
- Major safety systems are passive; they require no operator action for 72 hours after an accident, and maintain core and containment cooling for a protracted time without ac power.
- Predicted core damage frequency of 1.7E-07/yr is well below the 1E-05/yr requirement, and frequency of significant release of 1E-08/yr is well below the 1E-06/yr requirement.
- Standard design is applicable to anticipated U.S. sites.
- Occupational radiation exposure expected to be below 0.7 man-Sv/yr (70 man-rem/yr).
- Core is designed for a 24-month fuel cycle assuming an 87 percent capacity factor; capable of a 18-month cycle.
- Refueling outages can be conducted in 17 days or less.

- Plant design life of 60 years without replacement of the reactor vessel.
- Overall plant availability greater than 90 percent, including forced and planned outages; the goal for unplanned reactor trips is less than one per year.


<b>AP600 PLANT COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR FACILITIES</b>			
<b>Systems - Components</b>	<b>AP600</b>	<b>Reference 2L</b>	<b>Reference 4L</b>
Plant design objective	60 yrs	40 yrs	40 yrs
NSSS power	1,940 MWt	1,882 MWt	3,425 MWt
Core power	1,933 MWt	1,876 MWt	3,411 MWt
Net electrical output	600 MWe	620 MWe	1,120 MWe
Reactor operating pressure	2,250 psia	2,250 psia	2,250 psia
Hot leg temp	600°F	616°F	618°F
Steam Generator Design pressure	1200 psia	1100 and 1200 psia	1200 psia
Main feedwater temp	435°F	430°F	440°F
<b>Core</b>			
Number fuel assemblies	145	121	193
Active fuel length	144 in	144 in	144 in
Fuel assembly array	17 x 17	16 x 16	17 x 17
Fuel rod OD	0.374 in	0.374 in	0.360 in
Number control assemblies	45	33	53
- Absorber material	Ag-In-Cd	Ag-In-Cd	Ag-In-Cd
Number gray rod assemblies	16	---	---
- Absorber material	SS-304/Ag-In-Cd	---	---
Average linear power	4.10 kw/ft	5.37 kw/ft	5.44 kw/ft
Heat flux hot channel factor, FQ	2.60	2.34	2.32
<b>Reactor Vessel</b>			
Vessel ID	157 in	132 in	173 in
Construction	forged rings	welded plate	welded plate
Number hot leg nozzles	2	2	4
- ID	31.0 in	29.0 in	29.0 in

<b>AP600 PLANT COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR FACILITIES</b>			
<b>Systems - Components</b>	<b>AP600</b>	<b>Reference 2L</b>	<b>Reference 4L</b>
Number cold leg nozzles	4	2	4
- ID	22.0 in	27.5 in	27.5 in
Number safety injection nozzles	2	2	0
Design fluence	2.0E+19 n/cm <sup>2</sup>	5.0E+19 n/cm <sup>2</sup>	3.0E+19 n/cm <sup>2</sup>
<b>Steam Generators</b>			
Type	vertical U-tube recirc. design	Vertical U-tube Recirc. design	vertical U-tube recirc. design
Model	Delta-75	D Series/F	D5
Number	2	2	4
Heat transfer area/SG	75,180 ft <sup>2</sup>	55,000 ft <sup>2</sup>	48,300 ft <sup>2</sup>
Number tubes/SG	6,307	5,626	4,568
Tube material	I 690 TT	I 600 TT	I 600 TT
Separate startup feedwater nozzle	Yes	Yes and No	Yes and No
<b>Reactor Coolant Pumps</b>			
Type	canned	Shaft seal	shaft seal
Number	4	2	4
Rated HP	#3,500 hp/pump	7,000 hp/pump	7,000 hp/pump
Estimated flow/loop	102,000 gpm	102,000 gpm	100,200 gpm
<b>Pressurizer</b>			
Total volume	1,600 ft <sup>3</sup>	1,000 ft <sup>3</sup>	1,800 ft <sup>3</sup>
Volume/MWt	0.825 ft <sup>3</sup> /MWt	0.531 ft <sup>3</sup> /MWt	0.526 ft <sup>3</sup> /MWt
Safety valves #/size	2 - 6"	2 - 6"	3 - 6"
PORV #/size	no	2 - 3"	3 - 3"
PRT volume	no	1,000 ft <sup>3</sup>	1,800 ft <sup>3</sup>
Auto depressurization	yes	no	no
<b>Turbine Island</b>			
Turbine - # HP cylinder	1	1	1
# LP cylinders	2	2	3

<b>AP600 PLANT COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR FACILITIES</b>			
<b>Systems - Components</b>	<b>AP600</b>	<b>Reference 2L</b>	<b>Reference 4L</b>
Max blade length	47 in	44 in	44 in
Number reheat stages	1	2	2
Feedwater heating stages			
- # LP stages	4	5	5
- # HP stages	2	1	2
Deaerator	yes	no	no
Main feedwater pumps	2 motor driven	3 motor driven	3 turbine driven
Condensate pumps	3	3	3
Condenser tube material	Ti	SS	SS
Condensate polishing	33 percent	0-100 percent	0-100 percent
<b>Containment</b>			
Type	Steel	steel	pre-stressed concrete
Inside dia.	130 ft	105 ft	140 ft
Volume	1.76E+06 ft <sup>3</sup>	1.44E + 06 ft <sup>3</sup>	2.80E + 06 ft <sup>3</sup>
Volume/MWt	910 ft <sup>3</sup> /MWt	768 ft <sup>3</sup> /MWt	821 ft <sup>3</sup> /MWt
Post accident cooling	air and water on outside of steel containment vessel	Component cooling water cooled fan coolers	Service water cooled fan coolers
<b>Safety Injection</b>			
Accumulator - #/volume	2/2,000 ft <sup>3</sup>	2/2,000 ft <sup>3</sup>	4/1,350 ft <sup>3</sup>
Core makeup tank - #/volume	2/2,000 ft <sup>3</sup>	no	no
High head pumps - #	none	2	2
- runout flow	-	800 gpm	600 gpm
- shutoff head	-	2,000 psi	1,800 psi
Low head pumps - #	none	see RHR pumps	see RHR pumps
Refuel water storage tank - #	1	1	1
- location	in containment	ex-containment	ex-containment
- volume	530,000 gal	350,000 gal	350,000 gal
Boron inject tank #/vol	no	1/900 gal	1/900 gal

<b>AP600 PLANT COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR FACILITIES</b>			
<b>Systems - Components</b>	<b>AP600</b>	<b>Reference 2L</b>	<b>Reference 4L</b>
<b>Normal Residual Heat Removal (NRHR)</b>			
Design pressure	900 psig	600 psig	600 psig
Normal RHR pumps - #/design flow	2/1,000 gpm per pump	2/2,200 gpm per pump	2/3,800 gpm per pump
<b>Cooling Water Systems</b>			
Safety-related	no	yes	yes
Component cooling water pumps	2	4	4
Service water pumps	2	4	4
Heat sink	separate mechanical draft cooling tower	separate mechanical draft cooling towers	separate mechanical draft cooling towers
<b>Startup/Auxiliary Feedwater</b>			
Motor pumps - #/flow per pump/safety-related	2/380 gpm/no	2/400 gpm/yes	2/600 gpm/yes
Turbine pumps - #/flow	none/-	1/800 gpm	1/1,200 gpm
Passive RHR HX - #/heat removal/safety-related	1/42 MW/Yes	None/-/-	None/-/-
<b>Chemical and Volume Control</b>			
Purification/Letdown flow - normal	100 gpm	60 gpm	75 gpm
- max	100 gpm	120 gpm	120 gpm
Purification location	IRC	ORC	ORC
RCP seal injection/pump	None	8 gpm	8 gpm
Charging pumps	2 @ 100 gpm	2 @ 160 gpm 1 @ 35 gpm	2 @ 150 gpm 1 @ 90 gpm
- SI use	No	no	yes
- safe shutdown use	no	yes	yes
- continuous oper.	no	yes	yes
Boron thermal regeneration	no	yes	yes
Boron recycle evaporator	no	15 gpm	15 gpm

<b>AP600 PLANT COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR FACILITIES</b>			
<b>Systems - Components</b>	<b>AP600</b>	<b>Reference 2L</b>	<b>Reference 4L</b>
<b>Instrumentation and Control</b>			
Type control room	work station	control boards	control boards
<b>Electrical</b>			
Diesels - #	2	2	2
- safety-related	no	yes	yes
- capacity	4,000 kw	4,600 kw	6,000 kw
IE batteries - total capacity	28,000 AMP-HR	5,700 AMP-HR	4,800 AMP-HR



**Figure 1 – The Westinghouse AP600 Standard Nuclear Plant received Design Certification from the U.S. NRC in 1999**

Figure 2 – The AP600 Passive Core Cooling System





Figure 3 – AP600 Passive Containment Cooling



## APPENDIX F: DESIGN DESCRIPTION, INTERNATIONAL REACTOR INNOVATIVE AND SECURE (IRIS)

IRIS (International Reactor Innovative and Secure) is a modular, integral, light water cooled, medium power (335 MWe) reactor which addresses the requirements defined by the US DOE for Generation IV reactors, i.e., proliferation resistance, enhanced safety, improved economics and fuel cycle sustainability. IRIS is being developed by an international team led by Westinghouse and including at present 18 organizations from 9 countries. Reactor vendors, component designers and manufacturers, architect-engineers, utilities, laboratories and academia are participating. IRIS relies on the proven technology of light water reactors but it features innovative engineering for improved performance.

The major unique features of the IRIS design are:

- five-year long straight burn fuel cycle without shuffling, or partial refueling
- integral primary coolant circuit,
- modular helical tube steam generators,
- internal radiation shields.
- immersed spool pumps,
- safety by design approach, where several accident initiators are eliminated by design
- maintenance shutdown interval no shorter than 4 years

The following represents a description of the major IRIS plant components and characteristics, while design and operation parameters are summarized in Table 1.

### System Configuration

An integral vessel (23.52 m height and 6.45 m outside diameter) houses reactor core and support structures, core barrel, upper internals, control rod guides and drivelines, radiation shields, steam generators, pressurizer, and spool reactor coolant pumps (Figure 1). Such an arrangement eliminates separate steam generators and pressurizer, connecting pipes, and supports. Hot coolant rising from the reactor core to the top of the vessel is being pumped by eight immersed spool pumps into eight helical-tube, once-through steam generators. Currently, conventional out-of-vessel Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) are included in the reference design. However, internal CRDMs are envisioned for reducing the number of vessel penetrations, reducing the vessel height and eliminating some control rod ejection accidents.

### Core and Fuel

In order to stay within the current licensing space, the first IRIS cores will employ standard <5 percent UO<sub>2</sub> fuel and standard PWR fuel assembly design. Reload cores might employ higher (about 9 percent) enriched fuel to achieve longer (8-10 yrs) fuel cycle and higher burnup.

The reference first core design uses UO<sub>2</sub> fuel, enriched to 4.95 w/o in U235, with axial blankets and with lower enrichment at the core periphery. Fuel pellet diameter is 0.366", similar to the Westinghouse 15x15 fuel assembly design. It incorporates 204 fuel rods, 20 guide thimbles for control rods, and 1 central instrumentation tube. Fuel rod diameter is 0.423". Use of soluble boron is reduced, or possibly eliminated. This makes the moderator temperature coefficient more negative, thus contributing to inherent safety. It also allows using a somewhat more open lattice than in current PWRs, with a lattice pitch-to-rod diameter ratio of 1.4. The average discharge burnup is about 40,000 MWd/tU, achieved in a straight burn mode. The active fuel length is 14 feet. The fission products gas plenum length is increased (roughly doubled) compared to current PWRs, thus eliminating potential concerns with internal overpressure. Because of the integral configuration, an increase in fuel assembly length does not impact the vessel height.

The core includes 89 fuel assemblies. To control relatively large beginning-of-life excess reactivity, which is needed to achieve extended core lifetime in straight burn, advanced burnable absorbers are employed, combined with an increased number of control rod assemblies. Control rods are arranged in banks of black and gray control rods, to address safety as well as operational reactivity control requirements. Current design focuses on use of thin B10 fuel pellet coating (Westinghouse type IFBA - Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber) combined with integral erbium or gadolinium, to tailor the reactivity depletion profile as required for a straight burn operation.

### Reactor Safety

IRIS reactor safety relies on "safety by design" approach, which attempts to first eliminate the possibility of accident sequences from occurring, and second, to reduce the severity of consequences and/or the probability of occurrence. The table below summarizes how this is accomplished by engineering the IRIS design features.

Design Characteristic	Safety Implication	Related Accident	Disposition
Integral reactor configuration	No external loop piping	Large LOCAs	Eliminated
Tall vessel with elevated steam generators	Can accommodate internal control rod drives	Reactivity insertion due to control rod ejection	Can be eliminated
	High degree of natural circulation		Either eliminated (full natural circulation) or mitigated consequences (high partial natural circulation)
Low pressure drop flow path and multiple RCPs	N-1 pumps keep core flow above DNB limit, no core damage occurs	LOFAs (e.g., pump seizure or shaft break)	
High pressure steam generator system	Primary system cannot over-pressure secondary system	SGTR	Automatic isolation, accident terminates quickly

	No SG safety valves required	Steam and feed line breaks	Reduced probability Reduced consequences
Once through SG design	Low water inventory		
Long life core	No partial refueling	Refueling accidents	Reduced probability
Large water inventory inside vessel	Slows transient evolution Helps to keep core covered	Small-medium LOCAs	Core remains covered with no safety injection
Reduced size, higher pressure containment	Reduced driving force through primary opening		
Inside the vessel heat removal			

Initial evaluations indicate that out of the eight Class IV accidents considered for the AP-600 reactor design, seven are either eliminated or down-graded to Class III and the only remaining (refueling) accident has a much reduced probability of occurring.

The most innovative feature in terms of enhanced safety of the IRIS design is in the handling of small-to-medium LOCAs, historically the most troublesome accidents. The approach is to reduce the pressure differential between vessel and containment, thus reducing the driving force across the rupture and ultimately the coolant loss, through: a) a high pressure containment, which increases the pressure after the break, and b) an efficient heat removal inside the vessel through steam generators which reduces the pressure before the break. Also, the large water inventory inside the vessel acts as an accumulator. The ultimate result is that for the worst (in terms of size and location) hypothetical LOCA the core remains for several days safely under water without any core water makeup or safety injection.

### Steam Generator

The 335 MWe IRIS unit features eight helical-coil tube bundle steam generator modules. This design is capable of accommodating thermal expansion without excessive mechanical stress, and has high resistance to flow-induced vibrations. The tube rupture event likelihood is significantly reduced due to the fact that the steam generator tubes are in compression (high pressure primary fluid outside the tubes); in addition, the feed and steam piping, isolation valves, and instrumentation are designed for full primary system pressure. Steam generator modules are located in the annular space between the core barrel and the reactor vessel. Each module consists of a central inner column which supports the tubes and the lower feed water header and the upper steam header. The tube coils are 1.64 m in diameter and there are 820 helical tubes (outside diameter 19.05 mm and wall thickness 2.26 mm) arranged in 20 annular rows. The tubes are connected to the vertical sides of the lower feedwater header and the upper steam header. The module headers are bolted to the vessel from the inside of the feed inlet and steam outlet pipe.

## Coolant Pump

IRIS design features a “spool type” pump with the motor and pump consisting of two concentric cylinders, where the outer ring is the stationary stator and the inner ring is the rotor that carries high specific speed pump impellers. As opposed to conventional canned motor pumps, the spool type pump would be located entirely within the reactor vessel eliminating the need for large vessel openings and closure flanges; only small penetrations for the electrical power cables and for water cooling supply and return piping are required. It also provides high inertia/coastdown and high run-out capability, which will contribute to mitigate the consequences of LOFAs. Use of spool pumps is not possible in loop type PWRs because of the pump low developed head, a feature which is no longer limiting in the integral configuration IRIS.

## Maintenance

A three-prong approach is used to overcome regulatory-based and investment protection barriers to achieve the current IRIS operating cycle length goal of at least four years without a maintenance shutdown, to match the long core life: a) if practical, defer inspection and maintenance until the end of the fuel cycle; b) when possible, perform on-line inspection and maintenance; and c) if the two preceding options are not available, redesign the corresponding systems and components to allow for longer operation intervals or online inspection and maintenance. For example, the IRIS team has developed a novel reactor vessel overpressure protection system using paired safety valves which permits on-line testing of one safety valve while the other valve of the pair provides the required overpressure protection. Furthermore, many of the known four-year operating cycle barriers in a typical pressurized water reactor plant, are eliminated due to the inherent IRIS design features. For example, all 18-month reactor coolant pump lubricating oil maintenance actions performed at existing PWRs have been eliminated in IRIS by use of internal spool pumps, which are lubricated by the reactor coolant

## Internal Radiation Shields

The vessel surface activation is significantly reduced due to internal radiation shields located in a 1.5 m wide annular space between the core barrel and the vessel. Carbon steel annuli of 100 mm thickness, with a thin stainless steel cladding and including or not B<sub>4</sub>C, were considered. Composite shields (made of 30 percent vol. carbon steel + 70 percent vol. water, or 20 percent vol. carbon steel with 10 percent boron carbide + 80 percent vol. water) are expected to result in dose of 10<sup>-6</sup> Sv/h at the vessel outer surface, and vessel activation of 10 Bq/g several weeks after shutdown. This has positive implications on workers' exposure as well as on final disposal (the vessel can act as a sarcophagus, with no need for removing the reactor internals).

## Generation Costs

For a site in North America, having three IRIS modules each rated at 335 MWe, Nth-of-a-kind plant cost projections including all lifetime costs and revenues indicate that IRIS is fully competitive with all power options. A staggered construction schedule (projected at 36 months for a first-of-a-kind and 24 months for a nth-of-a-kind) of the modules allows to produce positive case flow from electricity generation in the first module while proceeding with construction of the third module.

Table 1. IRIS Design Parameters Summary

BASIC COMPONENTS		
Reactor Vessel, OD, m (in)		6.45 (254)
Core		
	Number of Assemblies	89
	Rod Array, rods	15x15 square
	Rod OD, mm (in)	10.74 (0.423)
	Reactivity control with control rods, movable absorber rods, Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber coated fuel pellets	
	Number of Control Rods per Assembly	20
	No. of instrumentation tubes per assembly	1
	Fuel rods in a fuel assembly skeleton with grid support	204
	Number of Grids	12
	Total Fuel Assembly Length m (in)	5.18 (204)
	Fuel Assembly Loading, Kg U	542
	UO <sub>2</sub> fuel 4.95 percent (first core), approximately 9 percent (reload cores) enriched	
	Active Fuel Length, m (in.)	4.27 (168)
	Fuel Pellet Diameter, mm (in)	9.3 (0.366)
	Fuel rod average power	3.93 kw/ft
	Target burnup	First core: 40 to 50 GWd/MT-HM
		Reload core: < 90 GWd/MT-HM
DESIGN PARAMETERS		
Reactor Thermal Power, MWt (10 <sup>8</sup> BTU/hr)		1000 (3412)
Reactor Electric Power, MWe		335
Reactor Coolant Flow, kg/s (10 <sup>8</sup> lb/hr)		4481 (35.53)
Reactor Coolant Pressure MPa (psia)		15.5 (2250)
Reactor Coolant Temperature, °C (°F)		
	Core Outlet	330 (626)
	Vessel Outlet	327.9 (622.2)
	Core Average	311 (591.8)
	Vessel Average	309.9 (589.9)
	Vessel/Core Inlet	292 (557.6)
	Steam Generator Outlet	292 (557.6)
Steam Generator		
	Model	Modular Helical Coil
	Number of Modules	8
	Reactor Coolant Pressure, MPa (psia)	15.5 (2250)

	Steam Temperature °C (°F)	310.8 (525.4) (superheated)
	Steam Pressure, MPa (psi)	7.0 (1015)
	Secondary Design Pressure, MPa (psi)	17.24 (2500)
	Steam Flow, kg/s (10 <sup>8</sup> lb/hr) total	535.97 (4.25)
	Feed Temperature, °C (°F)	226.7 (440.1)
	Tube Plugging, percent	10 percent (max)
Reactor Coolant Pump		Submersed Spool Pump




Figure 1. Vessel Layout for the 335 MWe IRIS Plant

**APPENDIX G: DESIGN DESCRIPTION, PEBBLE BED MODULAR REACTOR (PBMR)****GENERAL DESCRIPTION****Technical Design Philosophy**

The fundamental concept of the design of the PBMR is aimed at achieving a plant that has no physical process that could cause a radiation hazard beyond the site boundary. This is principally achieved in the PBMR by demonstrating that the integrated heat loss from the reactor vessel exceeds the decay heat production in the post accident condition, and that the peak temperature reached in the core during the transient is below the demonstrated fuel degradation point and far below the temperature at which the physical structure is affected. This is intended to preclude any prospect of a core melt accident. Heat removal from the vessel is achieved by passive means.

The PBMR module is the smallest standalone component of the PBMR power generation system. The module is a power station that can produce approximately 110 MW (or more) of electrical power. This module can be used to generate power in a standalone mode or as part of a power plant that consists of up to 10 units.

The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) is a graphite moderated helium cooled reactor which uses the Brayton direct gas cycle to convert the heat, which is generated in the core by nuclear fission. The heat is transferred to the coolant gas (helium), and converted into electrical energy by means of a gas turbo-generator. The PBMR core is based on the German high temperature gas cooled technology and uses spherical fuel elements.

Any concern of fire in the graphite core is avoided by showing that there is no method of introducing sufficient oxygen into a high temperature (>1000 C) core to achieve sustained oxidation. This is achieved primarily by the structural design of the reactor structure and building.

The use of helium as a coolant, which is both chemically and radiologically inert, combined with the high temperature integrity of the fuel and structural graphite, allows the use of high primary coolant temperatures (800 to 900 C), which yield high thermal efficiencies. With these high temperatures, the use of a closed cycle gas turbine is justified. This increases the efficiency over a steam plant (from ~35 percent to ~45 percent), thus reducing the unit capital cost. It also removes external sources of contamination of the nuclear circuit, as there is no system with a higher pressure than helium. Without the possibility of leakage into the helium circuit the need for on-line clean up systems to remove water vapor is largely reduced.

**Normal Operation (Figure 1)**

At nominal rated full power conditions helium enters the reactor at a temperature of about 500°C (932°F) and 70 bar (1015 PSIA) and moves downward between the hot fuel spheres. It picks up

the heat from the fuel spheres, which have been heated by the nuclear reaction. The helium then leaves the reactor at a temperature of about 900°C (1652°F).

The helium then moves through the High Pressure Turbine and drives the High Pressure Compressor. Next the helium moves through the Low Pressure Turbine, which drives the Low Pressure Compressor.

The helium then moves through the Power Turbine, which drives the generator.

At this point, the helium is still at a high temperature (~520<sup>0</sup> C) . It passes through the recuperator in this state. Heat is transferred between the high temperature helium from the Power Turbine and the low temperature helium returning to the reactor.

The helium is now cooled by means of a pre-cooler. This increases the density of the helium and improves the efficiency of the compressor.

The helium is then compressed by the Low Pressure Compressor.

The helium is cooled in the inter-cooler. This process increases the density and improves the efficiency of the compressor.

The High Pressure Compressor then compresses the helium.

The cold, high-pressure helium passes through the recuperator where it is pre-heated. The helium then returns to the reactor.

Power output control is achieved by adding (or removing) helium to the circuit. This increases (or decreases) the pressures and mass flow rate without changing the gas temperatures or the pressure ratios of the system. The increased pressure and subsequent increased mass flow rate increases the heat transfer rate, thus increasing the power. Power reduction is achieved by removing gas from the circuit.

The power control system is supplied by a series of helium storage tanks ranging from low to high pressure to maintain the required gas pressure in the circuit. Adjustable stator blades on the turbo machinery and bypass flow are used to achieve short-term control.

During reactor shutdown, residual heat is removed by active and/or passive cooling of the system.

### **KEY FEATURES**

Helium is radiologically inert. The radiation in the core does not activate the gas.

Helium is also chemically inert and can not react with any of the materials that are used in the construction of the PBMR.

The use of Helium in a direct cycle gas turbine based power conversion unit eliminates the requirement for a heat exchanger between a primary and secondary cycle. This improves the efficiency of the plant.

The PBMR fuel is based on a high quality German design of molded graphite spheres containing coated fuel particles. See Figure 2. The fuel particles (kernels) consist of uranium dioxide. Each kernel is coated with a layer of porous carbon, two high-density layers of pyrolytic carbon (a very dense form of heat-treated carbon) with a layer of silicon carbide in between. The porous carbon accommodates any mechanical deformation that the kernel may undergo during the lifetime of the fuel as well as accommodating gaseous fission products released from the kernel without over-pressuring the coated particle. The deformation of the kernel is due to the density changing, which is caused by fission products. The pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide layers provide an impenetrable barrier; containing the fuel and the radioactive products that result from the nuclear reactions. These coated particles are embedded in a carbon matrix as a 50 mm sphere, called the fuel zone. Adding a 5 mm thick fuel free graphite zone makes up the fuel sphere with an outer diameter of 60 mm. The fuel zone contains approximately 15 000 coated particles which contain 9g uranium. A total of 330,000 fuel spheres and 110,000 pure graphite spheres are required for a single core loading.

### **SAFETY DESIGN PROVISIONS**

#### **Physical Barriers against the Release of Radionuclides**

The coated particle is the primary physical barrier against radionuclide release.

#### **Conservatism in Radionuclide Retention**

Although the coated particle is the most important physical barrier against the release of radionuclides, other physical retention mechanisms do exist. These mechanisms introduce a high level of conservatism into the defense in depth approach from an engineering point of view and are mentioned from this perspective. The retention mechanisms are:

- Graphite
- Pressure Boundary
- Reactor Building

Many fuel particles are embedded in the graphite matrix of the spherical fuel elements. This graphite has a high capacity for retaining some fission products (i.e. Sr, Rb, Cs, Ba, and rare earths), but is virtually transparent to others (i.e. noble gases).

The primary gas envelope can also be considered a barrier against radionuclide release. However, for the short-lived fission gases, the dominant removal mechanism is radioactive decay. For the condensable fission products, the dominant removal mechanism is deposition or plate-out on the various helium wetted surfaces in the primary circuit.

The reactor building is a reinforced concrete, vented containment building. No leaktight requirement is necessary for this building. In the event of a break in the primary boundary, it is only the very slight gas-borne activity in the primary coolant and a portion of the activity deposited on the surfaces of the primary system that may be released into the reactor building.

Even if the vent opens, natural removal mechanisms (including radioactive decay, condensation, fallout, and plate-out) reduce the concentration of the radionuclides in the containment atmosphere, reducing off site releases.

### **Accident Prevention and Mitigation**

Simplicity of the reliance on passive safety features and inherent characteristics allow a simple overall PBMR plant design. The PBMR modules are operated as independent units and interaction between them is minimized. The layout of the PBMR eliminates unnecessary components and systems, which simplifies normal and emergency operating procedures, inspection, testing, and maintenance. Reliance on control room and operating staff is minimized, since no operator actions are required to prevent fuel damage. Similarly, errors by the operating staff cannot upset the safety characteristics of the PBMR.


The continuous fuelling of the reactor implies that no excess reactivity is necessary in order to compensate for burn-up effects. Nevertheless, a certain margin is required for reactor control and to compensate for changes in the xenon concentration following changes in reactor power. A fast acting control rod system will serve to keep the reactor within normal operating limits.

Reactor cooling is accomplished by the power conversion unit or by the reactor cavity cooling system. The power conversion unit is an active system that operates during power generation and provides the primary shutdown cooling when available.

In the event active heat removal systems are unavailable, the core design ensures a passive residual heat removal capacity. The core geometry, limited core diameter, low thermal power rating, low power densities, high negative temperature coefficient, and the passive cavity cooling system limit the maximum core and fuel temperatures.

Under these conditions, heat is transferred through the reactor vessel wall by thermal radiation and natural convection to the cooling surfaces of the reactor cavity cooling system. The reactor vessel walls are uninsulated to facilitate this process.

GJB, 8/9/01



Location		Pressure		Temperature	
Schematic	Description	MPa	PSIG	C	F
1	Precooler outlet LP Compressor Inlet	2.6	377	33	91.4
2	LP Compressor Outlet Intercooler Inlet	4.7	682	130	266
3	Intercooler Outlet HP Compressor Inlet	4.7	682	33	91.4
4	HP Compressor Outlet Recuperator Inlet	7.0	1015	100	212
5	Recuperator Outlet Reactor Inlet	7.0	1015	500	932
6	Reactor Outlet HP Turbine Inlet	7.0	1015	900	1652
7	HP Turbine Outlet LP Turbine Inlet	5.7	827	800	1472
8	LP Turbine Outlet Power Turbine Inlet	4.3	624	690	1274
9	Power Turbine Outlet Recuperator Inlet	2.6	377	520	968
10	Recuperator Outlet Precooler Inlet	2.6	377	150	302

**FIGURE 1 - SCHEMATIC / TEMPERATURE & PRESSURE (METRIC & ENGLISH)**

**KEY DESIGN PARAMETERS**

Electrical Power Rating	110 MWe (or more)
Reactor Coolant Pressure & Temperature	See schematic (Brayton Cycle)
Fuel Active Length Core Average Enrichment Burn-up	NA (spherical design) 3.5m Diameter, 8.5 m High 8 percent U-235 80,000 MWd/T
Reactor Vessel	6m Diameter, 20 m High

## APPENDIX H: DESIGN DESCRIPTION, GAS TURBINE MODULAR HELIUM REACTOR (GT-MHR)

### General Description

The Gas Turbine – Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) is an advanced nuclear power system designed to provide very high safety, high thermal efficiency, environmental advantages, and competitive electricity generation costs. The GT-MHR module, Figure 1, couples a gas-cooled modular helium reactor (MHR), contained in one vessel, with a high efficiency Brayton cycle gas turbine (GT) energy conversion system contained in an adjacent vessel. The reactor and power conversion vessels are interconnected with a short cross-vessel and are located in a below grade concrete silo.




Figure 1. GT-MHR Module

Key design characteristics of the Modular Helium Reactor (MHR) are the use of helium coolant, graphite moderator, and refractory coated particle fuel. Helium coolant is heated in the reactor core by flowing through coolant channels in graphite fuel elements. The heated coolant flows through the cross-vessel to the power conversion system. The power conversion system consists of a gas turbine, electric generator, and gas compressors on a common vertically orientated shaft supported by magnetic bearings and recuperator, pre-cooler and inter-cooler heat exchangers.

Figure 2 is a schematic of the coolant flow through the power conversion system. Heated helium from the reactor is expanded through the gas turbine to drive the generator and gas compressors. From the turbine exhaust, the helium flows through the hot side of the recuperator transferring residual heat energy to helium on the recuperator cold side returning to the reactor. From the recuperator, the helium flows through the pre-cooler and then passes through low and high-pressure compressors with intercooling. From the high-pressure compressor outlet, the helium flows through the cold, high-pressure side of the recuperator where it is heated for return to the reactor. Nominal full power operating parameters are given in Table I.




Figure 2. GT-MHR Coolant Flow Schematic

**Table 1. GT-MHR Nominal Full Power Operating Parameters**

Reactor Power, MWt	600
Core Inlet/Outlet Temperatures, °C	491/850
Core Inlet/Outlet Pressures, MPa	7.07/7.02
Helium Mass Flow Rate, Kg/s	320
Turbine Inlet/Outlet Temperatures, °C	848/511
Turbine Inlet/Outlet Pressures, MPa	7.01/2.64
Recuperator Hot Side Inlet/Outlet Temps, °C	511/125
Recuperator Cold Side Inlet/Outlet Temps, °C	105/491
Net Electrical Output, MWe	286
Net Plant Efficiency, percent	48

The gas turbine power conversion system has been made possible by key technology developments during the past several years in: large aircraft and industrial gas turbines; large active magnetic bearings; compact, highly effective gas-to-gas heat exchangers; and high strength, high temperature steel alloy vessels.

The MHR refractory coated particle fuel, identified as TRISO coated particle fuel, consists of a spherical kernel of fissile or fertile material, as appropriate for the application, encapsulated in multiple coating layers. The multiple coating layers form a miniature, highly corrosion resistant pressure vessel and an essentially impermeable barrier to the release of gaseous and metallic fission products. The coatings do not start to thermally degrade until temperatures approaching 2000°C are reached. Normal operating temperatures do not exceed about 1250°C and worst case accident temperatures are maintained below 1600°C. Extensive tests in the United States, Europe, and Japan have proven the excellent performance characteristics of this fuel.


The overall diameter of standard TRISO-coated particles varies from about 650 microns to about 850 microns. For the GT-MHR, TRISO coated particles are mixed with a matrix and formed into cylindrical fuel compacts, approximately 13 mm in diameter and 51 mm long. The fuel compacts are loaded into fuel channels in hexagonal graphite fuel elements, 793 mm long by 360 mm across flats. One hundred and two columns of the hexagonal fuel elements stacked 10 high are arranged in an annular core configuration as shown in Figure 3. Replaceable reflector graphite blocks are provided inside and outside of the active core.

### ***GT-MHR Safety Characteristics***

The GT-MHR safety is achieved through a combination of inherent safety characteristics and design selections that take maximum advantage of the inherent characteristics. These characteristics and design selections include:

1. Helium coolant, which is single phase, inert, and has no reactivity effects;
2. Graphite core, which provides high heat capacity and slow thermal response, and structural stability at very high temperatures;

3. Refractory coated particle fuel, which retains fission products at temperatures much higher than normal operation and postulated accident conditions;
4. Negative temperature coefficient of reactivity, which inherently shuts down the core above normal operating temperatures; and
5. An annular, low power density core in an uninsulated steel reactor vessel surrounded by a natural circulation reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS).



**Figure 3. GT-MHR Reactor Cross Section**

The GT-MHR has two active, diverse heat removal systems, the power conversion system and a shutdown cooling system that can be used for the removal of decay heat. In the event that neither of these active systems are available, an independent passive means is provided for the removal of core decay heat. This system surrounds the reactor vessel and is identified as the reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS). For passive removal of decay heat, the core power density and the annular core configuration have been designed such that the decay heat can be removed by heat conduction, thermal radiation and natural convection without exceeding the fuel particle temperature limit. Core decay heat is conducted to the pressure vessel and transferred by radiation from the vessel to the natural circulation RCCS. Even if the RCCS is assumed to fail, passive heat conduction from the core, thermal radiation from the vessel, and conduction into the silo walls and surrounding earth is sufficient to maintain peak core temperatures to below the design limit. Radionuclides are retained with the refractory coated fuel particles without the need for AC powered systems or operator action. These safety characteristics and design features result in a reactor that can withstand loss of coolant circulation or even loss of coolant inventory and maintain fuel temperatures below damage limits.

The large heat capacity of graphite core structure is an important inherent characteristic that significantly contributes to maintaining fuel temperatures below damage limits during loss of cooling, or coolant, events. The core graphite heat capacity is sufficiently large to cause any heatup, or cooldown, to take place slowly. A substantial time (on the order of days) is available to take corrective actions to mitigate abnormal events and to restore the reactor to normal operations.

### **GT-MHR ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS**

The GT-MHR is projected to be economically competitive with alternative electricity generation technologies. The economic competitiveness of the GT-MHR is a consequence of:

1. The high operating temperature of the modular helium reactor,
2. The use of the Brayton cycle power conversion system,
3. Enhanced safety characteristics,
4. A fuel system highly compatible with automated production processes,
5. The use of a modest module power size and modular design features allowing for a factory fabrication with significant learning cost reductions,
6. Small plant foot print, even for a modular plant,
7. High fuel burnup (>100,000 MWd/MT), and
8. Low operation and maintenance requirements.

The high operating temperature of the GT-MHR coupled with the use of the direct Brayton cycle power conversion system results in a net thermal conversion efficiency of approximately 48 percent. The Brayton cycle gas turbine power conversion system eliminates extensive equipment required by the century-old Rankine steam cycle technology. The enhanced safety characteristics result in reduced needs for safety systems and their associated capital and O&M costs. The net effect of reduced power conversion equipment and fewer safety related systems is reduced overnight construction costs, construction times, and O&M costs and increased reliability, availability and capacity factors.

Economic evaluations of the GT-MHR in comparison to similarly sized alternative generation technologies indicate the GT-MHR to have economic advantages, in terms of cost of electricity generation, to both advanced light water reactor plants and fossil-fired steam power plants and to be competitive with gas turbine, combined cycle merchant plants.

### **Waste Management**

The GT-MHR produces less heavy metal radioactive waste than other reactor options because of the plant's high thermal efficiency and high fuel burnup. Additionally, the refractory fuel coatings are superior barriers for containment of radionuclides. The TRISO fuel particle coating system for containment of fission products under reactor operating conditions, also provides an excellent barrier for containment of the radionuclides for storage and geologic disposal of spent fuel. Experimental studies have shown the corrosion rates of the TRISO coatings are very low under both dry and wet conditions. The measured corrosion rates indicate the TRISO coating

system should maintain its integrity for a million years or more in a geologic repository environment.

**APPENDIX I: COST SHARING RATIONALE**

DOE has established six criteria for designs to be considered as Near-Term Deployment (NTD) options. Criterion 4 states “Cost-sharing between industry and Government – technology plans must include a clear delineation of the cost categories to be funded by Government and the categories to be funded by private industry. The private/Government funding split for each of these categories must be shown along with rationale for the proposed split.” This criterion was considered in preparing this paper and in developing the proposed funding requirements.

The Federal Government has a long history of using public-private partnerships to leverage limited federal funds, to inject market forces into Government R&D prioritization, and to encourage technology transfer of federal R&D investments into the marketplace. DOE has used this strategy effectively in nuclear energy supply R&D, most recently in the ALWR Program.

Cost sharing by Government and industry is a means of accelerating the development of new nuclear plants, by channeling funds to make things happen sooner than they otherwise would by means of industry funding alone. There is incentive for industry to move ahead, but the time to recover investment from it would likely be longer than the crisis of electrical generation allows.

Nuclear generation is in a special category for several reasons. It is a viable candidate for supply of new capacity provided there would be sufficient time available for the nuclear industry to demonstrate the effectiveness of the NRC’s untested Part 52 licensing process for new plants, get site approvals, and build the required new plants. The time and cost associated with resolving licensing issues and obtaining NRC approvals under Part 52 have been enormous, based on the experience of the 1990s. This experience also confirms the risks and uncertainties involved – issues of major concern to investors in today’s deregulated electricity marketplace. These and other challenges prompted DOE to initiate the NTD Roadmap, to seek opportunities to help facilitate new orders through standardized generic issue resolutions, efficiency improvements, and direct assistance to applicants to defray regulatory costs and review fees.

There is another important reason for nuclear generation to play a major role in the required expansion of capacity. That is the potential environmental effect of conventional fossil fuel burning alternatives for new generation capacity: the production of huge quantities of air pollutants and greenhouse gases that nuclear generation avoids. Although the scientific case for global warming and its potential harmful effects has not been proven, the U.S. Government is considering alternatives to the U.N. Kyoto Accord that would support a balanced approach to addressing greenhouse gas emissions – one that does not create severe economic impacts. It is only appropriate that the U.S. aid in the expansion of U.S. nuclear capacity as a cost-effective way to facilitate a global response without serious negative impacts on national economies.

It follows from this analysis that the costs of new plant construction for the first plant in excess of the cost of later plants are candidates for government cost sharing. It is reasonable to expect the excess cost to disappear with plants that follow and if it doesn’t that should be to industry’s account. The better the management of the process, the sooner the excess cost will disappear.

Also, when it is clear that the crisis of generation shortage is under control, the need for government cost sharing disappears.

No.	TASK	DISCUSSION	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Total Ind.	Total DOE	TOTAL	
<b>SITE-SPECIFIC REGULATORY-RELATED TASKS</b>														
S-1	<u>Early Site Permitting (Site Specific)</u> Support of the First-of-a-Kind Demonstrations of Part 52 (Subpart A) at representative U.S. sites. Federal support to be provided on cost share basis, with industry entities providing $\geq 50$ percent funding.	This task will demonstrate the ESP process at an appropriate number of representative U.S. sites with sufficiently unique circumstances so as to examine the more credible situations (e.g., green field sites, existing sites.) Funding estimates based on $\frac{1}{2}$ of sum of each of the following: one green field, one existing non-nuclear site, and two unique variations on existing sites. Includes full NRC review fee reimbursement.	3	7	5						15	---	<b>30</b>	
			3	7	5							---		15
			<b>6</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>									
S-2	<u>COL Application Support (Site Specific):</u> DOE fund, on a cost-share basis, the expense of developing & submitting the first COL application for each NTD design (Limit: one demo per design). Federal support to be provided on cost share basis, with industry entities providing $\geq 50$ percent funding.	Many aspects of a COL application are unique to the design and go beyond the design information approved in the DC (e.g., programmatic issues and programs tailored for each certified design). The first COL applicant for each design will bear the extra burden of gaining NRC approval for many first-of-a-kind licensing provisions that standardized plants of that design will follow. Planning assumptions: no COL applicants in 2002; two applications per year each year in 2003 and 2004; each application takes 2 years. Funding estimate based on $\frac{1}{4}$ the estimated full cost to each applicant for developing and submitting the COL, including full NRC review fee reimbursement.		5	10	10	5				30	---	<b>60</b>	
				5	10	10	5					---		30
				<b>10</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>10</b>							
<b>TOTAL SITE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS</b>			3	12	15	10	5				<b>45</b>	---	<b>90</b>	
			3	12	15	10	5				---	<b>45</b>		
			<b>6</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>10</b>							

**APPENDIX J: NEAR TERM DEPLOYMENT ROADMAP RESOURCE NEEDS** J-1

*This section specifies complete resource needs to close all site-specific, generic, and design-specific gaps, but is contingent on industry agreement to provide the necessary cost-share funds to match potential government funding. As discussed in Chapter II-6, this is not a federal funding request.*

No.	TASK	DISCUSSION	FY	Total	Total	TOTAL							
			02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	Ind.	DOE	

**GENERIC, INDUSTRY-WIDE COST SHARE PROGRAM WITH DOE**

[The following section is intended to address, on a cost-shared basis, the various expenses associated with generic activities of benefit to all NTD designs and all owner-operators investing in these designs. The types of tasks to be undertaken in this generic category include both generic regulatory activities and generic technical activities. The proposition behind this cost-shared category of work is that industry will cost-share this work with DOE on an industry-wide basis, (e.g., via EPRI) as a single, integrated program (similar to NEPO for current plants); and that industry will assume responsibility for prioritizing tasks based on their urgency and generic benefit to near term deployment (e.g., via NEI).  
The task descriptions listed below have been validated by industry as high priority needs. Many are prerequisites (or essential parallel initiatives) to other site-specific or design specific activities. The specific funding needs for each task listed below are less precise, because of the dynamic nature of each issue. It is possible that by the time Federal funding becomes available to this proposed program, a few tasks, as currently defined, may be near completion, based on unilateral industry efforts. However, experience shows that follow-on work in these areas will be needed, and new high priority generic tasks will be identified that need joint industry-DOE funding. Hence the U.S. needs an integrated, multi-year NTD generic issue resolution program with sufficient flexibility to target the most important activities each year in support of building new plants. It is currently envisioned that this program would start in 2003 at \$6M (\$3M DOE, \$3M industry), and would continue each year for 3-4 years. Its continuation would depend on the opportunities for and value of generic activities in relation to site-specific projects.]

**GENERIC REGULATORY TASKS**

G-1	<u>Early Site Permitting (Generic)</u> Resolution of open generic issues with Early Site Permitting, e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Update the Guideline for Preparation of an ESP Application Submittal</li> <li>Review of Part 52, Subpart A for necessary modifications</li> <li>Develop guidance on Part 51 and EIS compliance</li> <li>Review &amp; update Site Selection Criteria Document</li> </ul>	Most of this generic work is a prerequisite to site-specific projects (S-1 & S-2), or will proceed in parallel with site-specific applications and complete as S-1 and S-2 proceed. Much will be done by industry. Some of it is already underway at NEI, under an ESP Task Force, supported by EPRI. At the present time, no DOE funding assistance is needed.	0.5	1	0.5						2	---	2	
												---		0
			0.5	1	0.5									
G-2	<u>Combined License (Generic)</u> Resolution of open generic issues with COL process, e.g., COL form and content; procedures and guidelines to document how ITAAC review and verification will be conducted. Establish an efficient process for construction inspection and ITAAC sign-off.	NEI has the lead for industry work on the generic aspects of this issue. Resolving these issues generically is essential to executing ITAAC on a design-specific basis. A need for DOE assistance is not anticipated at this time.		1	1	1					3	---	3	
												---		0
				1	1	1								

**APPENDIX J: NEAR TERM DEPLOYMENT ROADMAP RESOURCE NEEDS** J-2

*This section specifies complete resource needs to close all site-specific, generic, and design-specific gaps, but is contingent on industry agreement to provide the necessary cost-share funds to match potential government funding. As discussed in Chapter II-6, this is not a federal funding request.*

No.	TASK	DISCUSSION	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Total Ind.	Total DOE	TOTAL	
G-3	<p><u>Generic Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework</u> Develop a new generic regulatory framework, using a risk-informed, performance-based approach that builds on the policies and cornerstones of the new NRC Oversight Process and utilizes the work underway on a risk-informed, performance based regulatory framework for the present nuclear plants. It will establish means to risk-inform new plant processes, and will provide both design requirements and operational/programmatic requirements for future plants. Operational requirements to be addressed include: security, QA, Radiation Protection, Emergency Planning.</p> <p>This is a “fresh sheet of paper” initiative. However, as progress is made, applicants may evaluate the potential for selective implementation of risk-informed regulations, in order to apply them to individual applications.</p>	<p>NEI has the lead for industry in developing this new framework.</p> <p>The DC-related effort is likely to be a new optional regulation (e.g., Part 53) to address the safety design and operating criteria for all design concepts (e.g., LWR, HTGR, LMR), to permit consistent specifications for each design, to be developed in separate Regulatory Guides. Part 53 would seek to develop risk-informed, performance-based requirements for each design concept.</p> <p>This will take about 3 years. Prior to completion, industry would proceed to license new plants based on existing regulations, with later DC / COL applications using this new rule.</p> <p>Progress on NRC’s Option 2 and Option 3 in SECY-98-300 for risk-informing the regulations could be applied here (Option 2 for application of new special treatment requirements to new plants; Option 3 for application of LBLOCA and leak-before-break technology to new plants).</p>	0.5	1	1	1	0.5				4	---	8	
					2	2						---		4
			<b>0.5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.5</b>							

**APPENDIX J: NEAR TERM DEPLOYMENT ROADMAP RESOURCE NEEDS** J-3

*This section specifies complete resource needs to close all site-specific, generic, and design-specific gaps, but is contingent on industry agreement to provide the necessary cost-share funds to match potential government funding. As discussed in Chapter II-6, this is not a federal funding request.*

No.	TASK	DISCUSSION	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Total Ind.	Total DOE	TOTAL
<b>GENERIC TECHNICAL TASKS</b>													
G-4	<u>Advanced information management and virtual construction technologies:</u> This task will develop, with industry on a cost-share basis, an integrated, open-architecture information management system that includes plant design and operating characteristics, as-built conditions, and licensing bases. This is a generic, cost-shared task, based on work already underway. The basic technology is available but it needs to be applied in a more integrated form and specifically to nuclear plants.	This task will construct an integrated, open architecture information management system to govern configuration control for the life of the plant. It will include 4-D virtual construction simulation (3-D plus time) of a plant's construction and module installation. It would be used to plan the construction process, to monitor actual construction, to optimize construction management processes, including ITAAC verification, NRC "sign-as-you-go (SAYGO)" ITAAC sign-offs.		1	2	2	1				6	---	<b>12</b>
				1	2	2	1				---	6	
				2	4	4	2						
G-5	Expand short term R&D on NPP enhancements. Many technologies currently under development for current plants can benefit new plants. This initiative will examine short-term technologies for rapid infusion into advanced plant applications, including: digital I&C, advanced sensors, fiber optics, self-diagnostics, and human performance products. This is a generic, cost-shared task, drawing on prior work done by DOE and industry.	This effort must be focused and limited to only those technology applications that are ready now or will be ready for application within the next several years. It will be limited to technology applications that can provide a direct and cost-beneficial benefit to NTD designs. It will only examine and apply technologies that can be implemented within existing DCs, and will focus primarily on supporting COL issue closure and FOAKE beyond DC and COL scope.	2	4	4	4	2				16	---	<b>30</b>
				4	4	4	2				---	14	
			2	8	8	8	4						
<b>TOTAL GENERIC FUNDING REQUIREMENTS</b>			3	8	8.5	8	3.5				31	---	<b>55</b>
				5	8	8	3				---	24	
			3	13	16.5	16	6.5						

**APPENDIX J: NEAR TERM DEPLOYMENT ROADMAP RESOURCE NEEDS** J-4

*This section specifies complete resource needs to close all site-specific, generic, and design-specific gaps, but is contingent on industry agreement to provide the necessary cost-share funds to match potential government funding. As discussed in Chapter II-6, this is not a federal funding request.*

No.	TASK	DISCUSSION	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Total Ind.	Total DOE	TOTAL
<b>DESIGN-SPECIFIC TECHNICAL TASKS (Note 1)</b>													
D-1	ABWR	ABWR certified, design complete											
D-2a	ESBWR FDA/DC	GE intends to obtain a DC for ESBWR prior to seeking COL applicants and orders.		5	5	5					15	---	<b>30</b>
				5	5	5					---	15	
				<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>							
D-2b	ESBWR FOAKE	FOAKE costs for ESBWR are rough estimates.			10	40	50	40	10		150	---	<b>300</b>
					10	40	50	40	10		---	150	
					<b>20</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>20</b>				
D-3a	AP600/AP1000 FDA/DC	AP1000 DC will be based largely on AP600 DC, obtained from NRC in 1998. Expedited DC should be possible.	6	3	2	0.3					11.3	---	<b>30</b>
			3	6	6	3.7					---	18.7	
			<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>							
D-3b	AP600/AP1000 FOAKE	Includes all items from Chapter II-5 not specifically listed as DC		12	50	51.7	50				163.7	---	<b>273</b>
				9	31	36.3	33				---	109.3	
				<b>21</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>83</b>						
D-4a	PBMR pre-application & FDA (incl. fuel testing)	All PBMR reqts. from Chapter II-5 listed in this row	4.6	7.5	7.5	4	3				26.6	---	<b>85.6</b>
			2	18.5	18.5	12	8				---	59	
			<b>6.6</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>11</b>						
D-4b	PBMR FOAKE	PBMR PTY has provided initial rough estimates for FOAKE.			50	50	50	50			200	--	<b>200</b>
											---		
					<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>					
D-5a	GT-MHR pre-application & FDA (incl. fuel testing)	All GT-MHR reqts. from Chapter II-5 listed in this row	0.4	6.8	13.6	17.5	16.7	11.5	7.5		74	---	<b>146</b>
			2	19	18	18	15				---	72	
			<b>2.4</b>	<b>25.8</b>	<b>31.6</b>	<b>35.5</b>	<b>31.7</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>7.5</b>				
D-5b	GT-MHR FOAKE	GT-MHR FOAKE needs to be covered by joint US program with Russia for Pu-burning design (DOE-MD & Russian budgets)											
					(40)	(40)	(40)	(40)				(160)	
					<b>(40)</b>	<b>(40)</b>	<b>(40)</b>	<b>(40)</b>					

**APPENDIX J: NEAR TERM DEPLOYMENT ROADMAP RESOURCE NEEDS** J-5

*This section specifies complete resource needs to close all site-specific, generic, and design-specific gaps, but is contingent on industry agreement to provide the necessary cost-share funds to match potential government funding. As discussed in Chapter II-6, this is not a federal funding request.*

No.	TASK	DISCUSSION	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Total Ind.	Total DOE	TOTAL
	<b>TOTALS, DESIGN SPECIFIC TASKS</b>		11	34	138	169	170	102	17		641	---	<b>1065</b>
	<b>All numbers rounded off to closest \$ million</b>		7	58	88	115	106	40	10		---	424	
			<b>18</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>27</b>				
	<b>GRAND TOTAL, SITE-SPECIFIC PLUS GENERIC PLUS DESIGN-SPECIFIC FUNDING REQUIREMENTS</b>		17	54	162	187	178	102	17		<b>717</b>	---	<b>1210</b>
	<b>SUMMED IN ROWS FOR INDUSTRY FUNDING, DOE FUNDING, AND TOTAL FUNDING, BY YEAR.</b>		10	75	111	133	114	40	10		---	<b>493</b>	
	<b>All numbers rounded off to closest \$ million</b>		<b>27</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>292</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>27</b>				

All funding levels in \$M.

**APPENDIX J: NEAR TERM DEPLOYMENT ROADMAP RESOURCE NEEDS** J-6

*This section specifies complete resource needs to close all site-specific, generic, and design-specific gaps, but is contingent on industry agreement to provide the necessary cost-share funds to match potential government funding. As discussed in Chapter II-6, this is not a federal funding request.*

**APPENDIX K: BACKGROUND AND SOURCE DOCUMENTS**

The following goals and objectives are quoted from other nuclear R&D planning documents for purposes of providing a basis for the goals of the DOE/NERAC Nuclear Technology Roadmap. For completeness, this listing includes both near term and longer-term goals, and thus provides a resource for both this portion of the Roadmap and other portions.

1. **DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology developed a Strategic Plan for Nuclear Energy in August 2000.** It covered all aspects of DOE-NE's charter. The goal and objective related to nuclear energy supply R&D is as follows:

“GOAL 1 - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Promote the R&D necessary to advance applications of nuclear technologies that improve U.S. energy security, economic vitality, and quality of life.

NE engages in a wide array of scientific, medical and engineering research. Our research is aimed at improving our products (isotopes and power systems), creating the next generation of products, and supporting the R&D community in the long-term exploration of innovative ideas. We have developed the following objectives for meeting this goal:

OBJECTIVE 1: Conduct competitively selected research aimed at enabling the benefits of nuclear power to be available to future generations.”

2. **The DOE “Long-Term Nuclear Technology R&D Plan,”** (July 2000) prepared by NERAC, contains the following goals.

Related to nuclear energy supply R&D:

- Advanced fuel cycle R&D: develop (1) improved performance and advanced fuel design for existing light water reactors (Generation II and III) and (2) advanced fuel designs and related fuel cycle requirements for advanced Generation IV reactor designs.
- Plant operations and control R&D: develop instrumentation, controls, information management and decision making systems for use in nuclear power plants that employ or adapt the latest technological advances in digital instrumentation and controls, communications, and man-machine interface technology including micro-analytical devices and/or “smart” sensors, on-line signal validation, and condition monitoring.
- Nuclear power R&D: develop advanced nuclear reactor technologies that will allow the deployment of highly safe and economical new nuclear power plants that would be a competitive electricity production alternative in the U.S. and foreign markets, while being responsive to environmental, waste management, and proliferation concerns.

Related to supporting U.S. energy, environmental, and economic interests in global markets.  
(DOE Strategic Plan, September 1997, Objective # 4):

- Apply the U.S. technology used to address the above goals to foster increased international trade in U.S. nuclear technologies (Source: Nuclear Energy R&D Strategic Plan, EPRI, June 1997, Corollary Goal # 14).
- Cooperate with foreign Governments and international institutions to develop open energy markets, and facilitate the adoption and export of clean, safe, and efficient energy technologies and energy services. (DOE Strategic Plan, September 1997, Objective 4, Strategy 2). Specifically, support implementation of U.S. Government agreements with Asian-Pacific countries that open enhanced market opportunities for U.S. nuclear industrial suppliers, enabling them to exchange information and export U.S. light water reactor technology and services.”

3. **The Joint DOE-EPRI Strategic R&D Plan to Optimize U.S. Nuclear Power Plants** (November 2000) contains some long-term goals, as follows (note references to earlier DOE & EPRI reports in 1997-99 timeframe):

“Future goal: Provide competitive nuclear energy generation options to meet medium term (5 to 10 years) requirements for adequate and affordable baseload capacity.

R&D Objectives:

1. Maintain a viable nuclear option for future, carbon-free baseload electricity through cooperative technical development activities with U.S. electric industry that would facilitate a U.S. order of an advanced nuclear power plant by 2010 (Source: DOE Strategic Plan, September 1997, Objective 2, Strategy 8).
2. Provide technologies to enable an increasing nuclear share of U.S. generation by 2020.
3. Identify innovative techniques, approaches, and R&D needs to reduce the capital and operating costs of new nuclear plants and the time required to place them in service. (Source: A Strategic Direction for Nuclear Energy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, NEI, May ‘99)
4. Maintain effective, ongoing processes for transfer and application of technologies developed for advanced reactors to meet current plant needs, and for application of solutions developed for current plant issues to enhance future plant options (Source: Nuclear Energy R&D Strategic Plan, EPRI, June 1997, Corollary Goal #13).
5. Evaluate options for further advances in the ALWR designs in the current ALWR program, to meet future contingencies. Possible contingencies that could require a commitment to more advanced ALWR developments include:
  - Future market requirements for passive ALWRs with a smaller or larger than 600 MWe plant electrical output
  - Innovations to improve ALWR electrical production efficiencies.

(Note that longer term advanced reactor design goals and objectives are covered in DOE’s Long Term Nuclear R&D Plan developed by NERAC, and by EPRI’s Electricity Supply Roadmap.)

#### 4. The EPRI Electricity Technology Roadmap (June 99) is a six-volume set:

- Volume 1: Summary and Synthesis
- Volume 2: Electricity Supply
- Volume 3: Electricity Delivery
- Volume 4: Economic Growth
- Volume 5: Environment
- Volume 6: Sustainability

Volume 2, covering all energy supply options, including nuclear, was completed in Jan. 1999. Volume 1, a strategic overview of the entire Technology Roadmap, was completed in July 1999. Both Volumes focus on long-term strategies, in the 2020 and 2050 time frames. Volume 1 calls for a major expansion of non-emitting generation technologies, including both renewable energy and nuclear energy. It proposes that the U.S achieve sustained annual funding levels of \$600M per year by 2010 for nuclear energy R&D aimed at future generation nuclear plants. This figure is intended to represent both industry and government investments to reach roadmap destinations.

Detailed technology destinations and R&D objectives from the EPRI Energy Supply Roadmap (Volume 2) have been factored into the consolidated R&D agenda in this Roadmap.

The “Strategic Bridge Plan for the EPRI Nuclear Power Sector” is just getting underway. This document is intended to form the strategic planning “bridge” between the Energy Supply Roadmap, which looks out 20 – 50 years, and EPRI’s Nuclear Power Sector RD&D Plan, which is a tactical plan that looks out 2-3 years. The Strategic Bridge Plan (SBP) will focus on roughly the 5-10-year timeframe and will form the basis for EPRI strategic funding investments in nuclear energy. It will address both strategic R&D needs for current plants (e.g., running existing plants reliably and cheaply for 60 years; achieving cost-risk-focused decision-making), as well as R&D needs for future plants (e.g., building next plants faster and cheaper; developing new nuclear plant designs). The SBP will be highly integrated with NEI and INPO strategic planning documents, as well as government (i.e., DOE, NRC) planning, in order to leverage public and private sector resources.

**EPRI’s Energy Supply Roadmap** (Volume 2), (January 1999) contains the following priority R&D needs:

“CIRCA-2020 -- Addressing current obstacles that constitute uncertainties that are prohibitive to potential investments in new nuclear plants:

1. Close residual embedded technology gaps, complete cost-effective designs of, and construct the facilities needed to implement the spent fuel management and low-level radioactive waste disposal systems.
2. Investigate and establish which of the many specific deterministic and prescriptive regulations and regulatory decisions applied to nuclear power plant design, construction, inspection, testing, operation, and maintenance are replaceable by

significantly more cost-effective risk-based regulations and decisions, develop technical bases for such risk-based replacements, and negotiate their acceptance for application to future nuclear power plants.

CIRCA 2020 -- essential to both new plants, and continuing and extended high performance of existing plants:

3. Continue the ongoing utility-sponsored technology development, and implement the planned industry/government technology development, designed to reduce the operational costs and enhance the capacity factors of the existing U.S. plants and extend their lives.

CIRCA 2020--most promising tasks to reduce costs of new plants:

4. Adapt advanced electronic information management technologies to create a plant information management system that seamlessly serves the life-cycle of future nuclear power plants.
5. Adapt and apply emerging advanced modular and construction technologies to future nuclear power plants.

CIRCA 2050:

6. Determine the most cost-effective choices for basic features of higher-fuel-utilization nuclear power plants options & their associated fuel cycles, such as fertile material, fuel form, reactor coolant, energy conversion equipment configuration, fuel cycle technology
7. Pursue breakthroughs in high-temperature helium cooled reactor technology that will support temperatures high enough for process-heat applications
8. Determine the most cost-effective & practicable features of the nuclear fusion option and establish and maintain a credible estimate of its economic potential, focusing on establishing viable approaches to materials and engineering challenges in transferring heat from fusion.”

Finally, for historical completeness, the following fourteen ALWR Policies from the ALWR Utility Requirements Document (1991) are provided:

**Simplification.** Simplification is fundamental to the ALWR success. Simplification opportunities are to be pursued with very high priority and assigned greater importance in design decisions than has been done in recent, operating plants; simplification is to be assessed primarily from the standpoint of the plant operator.

**Design Margin.** Like simplification, design margin is considered to be of fundamental importance and is to be pursued with very high priority. It will be assigned greater importance in design decisions than has been done in recent, operating plants. Design

margins that go beyond regulatory requirements are not to be traded off or eroded for regulatory purposes.

**Human Factors.** Human factors considerations will be incorporated into every step of the ALWR design process. Significantly improvements will be made in the main control room design.

**Safety.** The ALWR design will achieve excellence in safety for protection of the public, on-site personnel safety, and investment protection. It places primary emphasis on accident prevention as well as significant additional emphasis on mitigation. Containment performance during severe accidents will be evaluated to assure that adequate containment margin exists.

**Design Basis vs. Safety Margin.** The ALWR design will include both safety design and safety margin requirements. Safety design requirements (referred to as the Licensing Design Basis [LDB]) are necessary to meet the NRC's regulations with conservative, licensing-based methods. Safety margin requirements (referred to as the Safety Margin Basis [SMB]) are Plant Owner-initiated features, which address investment protection and severe accident prevention and mitigation on a best estimate basis.

**Regulatory Stabilization.** ALWR licensability is to be assured by resolving open licensing issues, appropriately updating regulatory requirements, establishing acceptable severe accident provisions, and achieving a design consistent with regulatory requirements.

**Standardization.** The ALWR requirements will form the technical foundation that leads the way to standardized, certified ALWR plant designs.

**Proven Technology.** Proven technology will be employed throughout the ALWR design in order to minimize investment risk to the plant owner, control costs, take advantage of existing LWR operating experience, and assure that a plant prototype is not required; proven technology is that which has successfully and clearly demonstrated in LWRs or other applicable industries such as fossil power and process industries.

**Maintainability.** The ALWR will be designed for ease of maintenance to reduce operations and maintenance costs, reduce occupational exposure, and to facilitate repair and replacement of equipment.

**Constructibility.** The ALWR construction schedule will be substantially improved over existing plants and must provide a basis for investor confidence through use of a design-for-construction approach, and completed engineering prior to initial construction.

**Quality Assurance.** The responsibility for high quality design and construction work rests with the line management and personnel of the Plant Design and Plant Constructor organizations.

**Economics.** The ALWR plant will be designed to have projected busbar costs that provide sufficient cost advantage over the competing baseload electricity generation technologies to offset higher capital investment risk associated with nuclear plant utilization.

**Sabotage Protection.** The design will provide inherent resistance to sabotage and additional sabotage protection through plant security and through integration of plant arrangements and system configuration with plant security design.

**Good Neighbor.** The ALWR plant will be designed to be a good neighbor to its surrounding environment and population by minimizing radioactive and chemical releases.

**APPENDIX L: REFERENCES**

Documents reviewed in the development of this Roadmap include:

1. “Strategic Plan for Nuclear Energy,” DOE Office of Nuclear Energy Science and Technology, August 2000
2. “Long-Term Nuclear Technology R&D Plan,” NERAC, July 2000
3. “Nuclear Energy Industry’s Strategic Plan for Building New Nuclear Power Plants,” eight revisions from Nov. 1990 to Nov. 1998.
4. “Strategic Direction for Nuclear Energy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” NEI, May 1999 – May 2000.
5. “Energy Supply Roadmap” (Volume 2) EPRI, January 1999, and a new complementary document, “Strategic Bridge Plan for the EPRI Nuclear Power Sector.”
6. “ALWR Utility Requirements Document” EPRI, 1991
7. “Joint DOE-EPRI Strategic R&D Plan to Optimize U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” November 2000 (Note this Plan relates primarily to current plants, but does contain long term goals).
8. “National Energy Policy,” Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001
9. Congressional Testimony (R. Hutchinson, Entergy, March 27 and July 17, 2001; Joe Colvin (NEI), 8 May 2001; Oliver Kingsley (Exelon), 8 May 2001; Marv Fertel (NEI), 27 June and 12 July, 2001; Maurine Koetz (NEI), 10 July 2001.

Information on most of these reports can be found in Chapter II-2 or Appendix K.

**Appendix M: Acronyms**

ABWR	Advanced Boiling Water Reactor
AC	alternating current
ALWR	Advanced Light Water Reactor
ANS	American Nuclear Society
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BNFL	British Nuclear Fuels, Limited
BTU	British Thermal Unit
BWR	Boiling Water Reactor
CAD	Computer Aided Drawing
CANDU	Canadian Deuterium (reactor)
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
COL	Combined Operating License
CP/OL	Construction Permit/Operating License
CRD	Control Rod Drive
CRDM	Control Rod Drive Mechanism
DC	direct current
DNBR	Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DOE-NE	DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology
EDF	Electricite de France
EIA	Energy Information Agency (DOE)
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPACT	Energy Policy Act
EPC	Engineering, Procurement and Construction
EPR	European Pressurized water Reactor
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
EPRI	Electric Power Research Institute
ESBWR	European Simplified Boiling Water Reactor
ESP	Early Site Permit
EUR	European Utility Requirements
FANP	Framatome ANP
FDA	Final Design Approval
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FERC	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FMCRD	Fine Motion Control Rod Drive
FOAK	First of a Kind
FOAKE	First of a Kind Engineering
FTE	First Time Engineering
G&A	General and Administrative
GA	General Atomics
GE	General Electric
GE/NE	General Electric Nuclear Energy
GEN IV	Generation IV
GNF	Global Nuclear Fuels

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GRNS	Generation IV Roadmap NERAC Subcommittee
GT-MHR	Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor
HTGR	High Temperature Gas Reactor
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDC	Interest during construction
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
IPP	Independent Power Producer
IRIS	International Reactor Innovative and Secure
ISO	Integrated System Operator
ITAAC	Inspections, Tests, Analysis and Acceptance Criteria
kWe	kilo- Watt Electric
LEU	Low Enriched Uranium
LOCA	Loss of Coolant Accident
LTA	Lead Test Assembly
LWR	Light Water Reactor
MCP	Market Clearing Price
MHI	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
MHTGR	Modular High Temperature Gas Reactor
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOX	Mixed Oxide (fuel)
MWe	Mega Watt electric
MWH	Mega Watt Hour
MWth	Mega Watt thermal
NCCTI	National Climate Change Technology Initiative
NEER	Nuclear Engineering Educational Research
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NEP	National Energy Policy
NEPO	Nuclear Energy Plant Optimization
NERAC	Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee
NERI	Nuclear Energy Research Initiative
NOAK	Nth of a Kind
NOX	Nitrous Oxides
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSSS	Nuclear Steam Supply System
NTD	Near Term Deployment
NTDG	Near Term Deployment Group
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OKBM	Experimental Machine Building Design Bureau (Russia)
O/O	Owner/Operator
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PBMR	Pebble Bed Modular Reactor
PCAST	President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology
PCT	Peak Centerline Temperature
PPA	Power Purchase Agreement
PRA	Probabilistic Risk Assessment

PUC	Public Utility Commission
PWR	Pressurized Water Reactor
QA	Quality Assurance
QC	Quality Control
RFI	Request for Information
RMR	Regulation Must Run
ROI	Return on Investment
RPV	Reactor Pressure Vessel
RSA	Republic of South Africa
RSK	Reactor Safety Commission (Germany)
RTO	Regional Transmission Organization
SBWR	Simplified Boiling Water Reactor
SECY	NRC Office of the Secretary
SER	Safety Evaluation Report
SNF	Spent Nuclear Fuel
SSAR	Standard Safety Analysis Report
SSC	Systems, Structures, and Components
STUK	Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (Finland)
T&D	Transmission and Distribution
TEPCO	Tokyo Electric Power Company
TMI-2	Three Mile Island (Unit 2)
TRAC	Transient Reactor Analysis Code
TWG	Technical Working Group
URD	Utility Requirements Document
USCEA	US Council for Energy Awareness
V&V	Validation and Verification
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators

**ATTACHMENT 1: MISSION OF THE NEAR-TERM DEPLOYMENT GROUP**

The Near-Term Deployment Group (NTDG) shall identify technological and institutional gaps between the current state of the art and the necessary conditions to deploy new nuclear plants in the United States before 2010. In order to meet U.S. near-term requirements for affordable baseload capacity additions by 2010, at least one competitive nuclear energy generation option, NRC-certified and/or ready to construct, must be available by 2005. By 2010, the U.S. needs a range of competitive, NRC-certified and/or ready to construct nuclear energy generation options of a range of sizes to meet variations in market need, supported by sufficient fabrication, construction and human infrastructure to enable simultaneous, large-scale deployment across the U.S. Multiple standardized nuclear power plants should be under construction this decade, with lead plants achieving operational status by EOY 2010.

The scope of the NTDG shall encompass those nuclear power plants technologies that meet the following six criteria:

1. Credible plan for gaining regulatory acceptance - Candidate technologies must show how they will be able to receive either a construction permit for a demonstration plant or a design certification by the U.S. NRC within the time frame required to permit plant operation by 2010 or earlier.
2. Existence of industrial infrastructure - Candidate technologies must be able to demonstrate that a credible set of component suppliers and engineering resources exist today, or a credible plan exists to assemble them, which would have the ability and the desire to supply the technology to a commercial market in the time frame leading to plant operation by 2010 or earlier.
3. Credible plan for commercialization - A credible plan must be prepared which clearly shows how the technology would be commercialized by 2010 or earlier, including market projections, supplier arrangements, fuel supply arrangements and industrial manufacturing capacity.
4. Cost-sharing between industry and Government - Technology plans must include a clear delineation of the cost categories to be funded by Government and the categories to be funded by private industry. The private/Government funding split for each of these categories must be shown along with rationale for the proposed split.
5. Demonstration of economic competitiveness - The economic competitiveness of candidate technologies must be clearly demonstrable. The expected all-in cost of power produced is to be determined and compared to existing competing technologies along with all relevant assumptions.
6. Reliance on existing fuel cycle industrial structure - Candidate technologies must show how they will operate within credible fuel cycle industrial structures, i.e., they must utilize a once-through fuel cycle with LEU fuel and demonstrate the existence of, or a credible plan for, an industrial infrastructure to supply the fuel being proposed.

The NTDG shall report directly to the Department of Energy Near Term Deployment (NTD) Manager and brief and receive advice from the Generation IV Roadmap NERAC Subcommittee as the NTD Manager directs. It shall also maintain a coordination relationship with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Executive Task Force on New Nuclear Power Plants, assuring close cooperation with ongoing industry activities.

Initial Work Product: The primary objective and initial work product of the NTDG is to develop an input to the overall Generation IV Roadmap that identifies all the institutional barriers and technological gaps that could prevent achieving the near term deployment needs discussed above. This input should be prepared on an urgent basis as a stand-alone document for use in spring 2001 to inform federal energy policy makers on urgent needs that could be included in developing national energy policy and energy appropriations. This input could also be used by NEI and industry leaders to prioritize their activities on behalf of a new energy policy, and to plan public-private partnership investment strategies.

This initial NTDG work product shall specifically include recommendations for funding priorities from FY2002 and FY2003. This initial roadmap input shall provide a systematic and defensible basis for future federal and industry investments.

Final Work Product: The NTDG will later expand this initial Roadmap input in support of spring 2001 needs, into a more complete document that provides a more direct and useful contribution to the overall Generation IV Roadmap effort. In order to develop this document, the NTDG will solicit and assess non-proprietary design-specific information from potential suppliers and/or potential customers of reactor technologies that meet the above screening criteria. This information should address how the subject technology meets each of the above criteria, what specific technological and institutional gaps exist which must be addressed to allow successful commercialization of the technology, and the cost, schedule and deliverables that would be required.

Based upon the initial mid-2001 Roadmap input and the design-specific information above, the working group shall also develop and include in this document complete estimates of the resources (schedule and funding levels) required to close the gaps in time to meet the deployment goals (achieving new nuclear plant orders by 2005 and a range of options with robust implementation infrastructure on or before 2010). The estimates will be included in the more complete roadmap for near-term deployment provided as a final report of this Group to the DOE Generation IV roadmapping effort. This document will be complete by 9/30/2001.

Liaison: The NTDG will work closely with other Working Groups in the broader Generation IV program to share information, exchange information and conclusions; and to ensure NTWG work products are useful as an input to longer term Roadmap development.

The NTDG shall be comprised of two co-chairmen from industry with representation from industry, vendors, national laboratories and academia.

**ATTACHMENT 2: NTD REQUEST FOR INFORMATION**

This attachment provides a copy of Sections 1 and 2a of the Near Term Deployment Request for Information, issued by DOE on March 31, 2001. These sections gave respondents the key content information and questions they needed that amplified on the six design criteria and generic gap discussion in Chapter II-1. Other portions of the RFI were administrative in nature and/or provided details on requested format and are not repeated here.

**Section 1:**  
**Request for Information on Specific Candidate Near Term Deployment Options**

**The primary audience for this section is the plant designer or design team (vendors, A/Es, etc.), although owner-operators and others are also invited to provide their inputs and perspectives (e.g., views on validity and priority of evaluation criteria).**

Nuclear design companies or teams are asked to show how their nuclear plant designs (including nuclear systems and power conversion/balance-of-plant systems) satisfy the six screening criteria. The six evaluation criteria are provided below, with an expanded discussion of the specific types of information requested. Responses to each of these six criteria should be as brief as possible (e.g., 2-4 pages each).

For each criterion, the text below provides a description of the specific information requested and/or a series of questions to be answered. It is important that the respondent provide as much relevant information as possible, within the suggested limit above. However, if the specific questions or information requested are not directly applicable to the respondent's design, or the information is not yet available in the form or detail requested, please provide the best available input.

**Criterion 1: Regulatory Acceptance:**

“Credible plan for gaining regulatory acceptance - Candidate technologies must show how they will be able to receive either a construction permit for a demonstration plant or a design certification by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) within the time frame required to permit plant operation by 2010 or earlier.”

For already certified designs, this criterion requires that the respondent provide a credible plan to resolve any remaining design-specific COL issues and to show that any other regulatory considerations (e.g., construction inspection) can be managed so as to permit operation by 2010.

For designs that are not certified, this criterion requires that the respondent provide a credible plan for gaining regulatory approval for the design, to include obtaining a design certification or a construction permit and operating license for a first plant, as well as a credible plan for managing the regulatory aspects of construction, test and start up of the first unit by 2010.

In responding to this criterion, the plan for obtaining a construction permit or design certification should include (but is not limited to) answers to the following:

1. Describe how the technology will comply with current regulatory requirements or a proposed alternative regulatory approach, and summarize the scope of the documentation that will be submitted to the NRC.
2. Summarize the most significant issues expected in the review by the NRC.
3. Identify the most significant risks to completion of the NRC review on schedule, accompanied by explanations of how those risks will be managed, etc.
4. Provide a timeline and identify major milestones in the submittal and the review schedule for conducting the NRC review, including Inspections, Tests, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) implementation during construction.
5. Summarize interactions that have already taken place with the NRC concerning plans for review of the candidate technology.

### **Criterion 2: Industrial Infrastructure:**

“Existence of industrial infrastructure - Candidate technologies must be able to demonstrate that a credible set of component suppliers and engineering resources exist today, or a credible plan exists to assemble them, which would have the ability and the desire to supply the technology to a commercial market in the time frame leading to plant operation by 2010 or earlier.”

(Note: no discussion of fuel cycle infrastructure should be included here, since that is covered under Criterion 6.)

Please answer the following, addressing generic and design-specific issues as well as hardware and personnel issues.

1. Describe the industrial infrastructure in place today to construct one nuclear unit in the U.S. by 2010. If an element of infrastructure is not in place, please identify it and give anticipated dates for when the element is needed and will be in place.
2. Describe the industrial infrastructure in place today to construct multiple nuclear units in the U.S. by 2010. If not in place, please identify the missing element(s) and give the anticipated dates for when the element(s) are needed and will be in place.
3. Identify the top 3-5 generic areas where today’s available infrastructure is not adequate to permit construction and startup of multiple units of your nuclear design. This question is intended to identify common infrastructure needs (e.g., n-stamp valve manufacturers, reactor core physics engineers) that many or most near term deployment options see as important gaps in the nuclear infrastructure. Prioritize if possible.
4. Describe the extent to which structures, systems and components can be constructed, manufactured, or procured according to commercial standards (as opposed to safety grade).
5. Identify the longest lead time component for your design and the time required to manufacture it.

**Criterion 3: Commercialization Plan:**

“Credible plan for commercialization - A credible plan must be prepared which clearly shows how the technology would be commercialized by 2010 or earlier, including market projections, supplier arrangements, fuel supply arrangements and industrial manufacturing capacity.”

Commercialization requires bringing a nuclear power plant based on proven technology to the market with a predictable schedule and within the owner(s) targeted cost. Commercialization also entails meeting the established operating performance requirements so as to meet the shareholders expected return on investment (ROI).

Provide a realistic plan that clearly shows how your design would be commercialized. Include a general description of project responsibilities and financial participation by team members.

**Criterion 4: Cost Sharing Plan:**

“Cost-sharing between industry and Government - Technology plans must include a clear delineation of the cost categories to be funded by Government and the categories to be funded by private industry. The private/Government funding split for each of these categories must be shown along with rationale for the proposed split.”

1. Delineate the cost categories (for all activities, including licensing, engineering, construction, etc.) that you believe should be funded, all or in part, by the Government, and those categories that should be funded by private industry or non-Government sponsors. Identify which private industry organizations (or, at least, types of organizations) would be expected to provide the funding. If funding is already being provided toward your particular design, identify the sources, to the extent possible.
2. For any of the above activities that you suggest receive any government funding, please describe the recommended funding split between Government and private industry and non-government partners, as well as the rationale for the proposed split. The rationale should identify the responsibilities of individual parties that would justify their expenditure.
3. Describe any non-direct cost-share provisions or incentives that you believe the Government should provide, e.g., loan guarantees, tax credits, etc. Identify whether any of these are viewed as necessary to assure success of your candidate technology.

**Criterion 5: Economic Competitiveness:**

“Demonstration of economic competitiveness - The economic competitiveness of candidate technologies must be clearly demonstrable. The expected all-in cost of power produced is to be determined and compared to existing competing technologies along with all relevant assumptions.”

Respondents are requested to provide plant-specific cost data in order to compute the all-in total generation costs of near-term nuclear plants, likely to reach commercial operation by 2010.

Plant Capital Cost Data

The data requested should be provided in units of Million Dollars or \$/kWe in year 2000 dollars. For all the data items requested please provide your nominal value as well as a high-low range around the nominal value. Information is requested here for:

1. Net plant electric capacity, (for modular plants, please specify the configuration and number of modules); plant engineering, procurement, construction (EPC) cost; project startup and development costs; owners costs and contingency; and post construction costs. Please indicate the particular site (or which NERC region) these cost estimates are based upon.
2. Project start date; project development period from order until construction starts; project construction time period; post-construction time period; and commercial operation date.
3. Cost escalation rate during construction, above inflation (inflation assumptions are not required if input is provided in constant year 2000 dollars).
4. For modular plants, if more than one module is expected to reach commercial operation before 2010, please provide the above information request for each module.
5. Please provide the above requested data for the first-of-a-kind (FOAK) plant expected to reach commercial operation by 2010, and for the subsequent Nth-of-a-kind (NOAK) plant. Please specify your definition for NOAK.

First Deployment Costs vs. Nth of a Kind (NOAK) Costs

Please provide your assessment and cost breakdown for the difference between the FOAK and the NOAK plants. The first plant deployment costs are defined as the incremental costs of specific activities that need to be completed to deploy the first nuclear plants in this decade. These would be costs above and beyond those included in the FOAK costs above. Typical costs could include estimates of the following:

- Completing the ESP licensing process,
- Resolving all NRC COL procedural issues and of obtaining the first COL from NRC,
- Resolving any remaining generic licensing issues,
- Reactivating domestic equipment components manufacturing infrastructure,
- Incremental costs of manufacturing long lead-time heavy components abroad,
- Hiring and training A/E and vendor nuclear manpower required for the plant construction and deployment process, and
- Covering any other incremental or contingency costs for the FOAK plant.

Other Plant Cost Components

Other cost components of the total life-cycle generation costs for the near-term plants. These costs can be expressed in cost accounting units such as \$/MWh, \$/Yr.-Yr., or M\$/Yr., all reported in year 2000 dollars. Please provide information for the following cost components:

1. Annual O&M costs and breakdown of annual O&M costs into fixed and variable cost components.
2. Annual fuel costs, and full-load net heat rate.
3. Annual capital addition costs (if any).
4. Expected plant operating lifetime.

5. Projected availability and annual averaged capacity factors.
6. Decommissioning sinking-fund annual payment.
7. Other annual costs such as G&A, taxes

Please indicate if you expect escalation (above inflation) in any of the cost components mentioned above.

**Criterion 6: Fuel Cycle Industrial Structure:**

“Reliance on existing fuel cycle industrial structure - Candidate technologies must show how they will operate within credible fuel cycle industrial structures, i.e., they must utilize a once-through fuel cycle with LEU fuel and demonstrate the existence of, or a credible plan for, an industrial infrastructure to supply the fuel being proposed.”

Respondents should provide answers to the following questions:

1. What fuel production facilities, including enrichment, conversion, and fabrication, now exist or will exist (with a time line for operation) to reliably supply the fuel for reactor operation? Your response should include a review of fuel manufacturing capacity for sufficiency and flexibility to handle unanticipated maintenance, QA problems and fuel design changes, while also meeting the plant requirements for an adequate fuel supply for the plant(s) life.
2. If required, what is the strategy for fuel qualification and licensing?
3. How will fuel reliability be assured (e.g., such that the production facilities will meet QA requirements necessary for the plant to operate reliably and within technical specifications)?
4. What assumptions are made regarding the on-site spent fuel storage capability?

**Section 2:**  
**Request for Information on Barriers to Near Term Deployment Options**

This section identifies all the technical, institutional, and regulatory barriers and gaps that must be addressed to achieve near term deployment. The format for this section is structured for consistency and for assisting in the prioritization, planning, and resource management of actions designed to close these gaps. Respondents are requested to discuss each specific barrier or gap using the format provided below. Each gap analysis response should be limited to 2 pages.

The points addressed under each gap analysis are:

- Gap (short definition of issue)
- Solution or outcome required
- Resource requirements to close gap (total needs, irrespective of source, estimated on an annual basis, FY02-FY10. A simple table to fill-in this data is provided below.
- Responsibility (primary organization(s) and supporting organization(s))
- Anticipated benefits of gap closure in economic and/or schedule terms (e.g., reduction in busbar costs), if feasible. (Note: some gaps are prerequisites that cannot be quantified.)

This section is comprised of two sub-sections:

**SECTION 2A: Generic Gaps and Barriers**

**The primary audiences for this section are owner/operators; although vendors, A/Es, energy policy experts, etc., are invited to provide their inputs and perspectives as well.**

This subsection addresses generic gaps and barriers. These are primarily in the institutional and regulatory areas, but some crosscutting technical gaps (e.g., generic construction technologies) are also included. For this section, significant known gaps are pre-identified below.


Respondents are requested to provide their views and add relevant details to the gap analysis (e.g., costs to close gap, responsibility, benefits, etc.). Respondents are requested to identify and analyze any generic gaps not already noted below. Also, respondents should identify instances, if any, where it is judged that an identified gap has been filled or partially filled by other past or ongoing activities, giving references to the work done in this respect.

This section summarizes six gaps and solutions or required outcomes for each. These gaps and solutions are then transcribed into “Gap Analysis for Near Term Deployment” forms later in this section. Respondents are requested to provide further discussion on each of these gaps and solutions on the forms provided. Respondents are also requested to assign a priority to each solution in the table below, using H for High, M for Medium, and L for Low.

Note that spent fuel management and non-proliferation concerns are considered to be longer term global fuel cycle issues, and are being addressed by the Generation IV Roadmap. Adequate response exists today, or adequate progress is being made on these issues to allow near term new plant construction in the U.S. They are not appropriate issues for this near term gap analysis.

<b>Gap</b>	<b>Solution or Required Outcome</b>	<b>Priority (H, M, L)</b>
Lack of demonstrated process for obtaining an Early Site Permit	1. Develop generic guidance on all aspects of ESP and obtain NRC concurrence in advance of ESP filings	
	2. Demonstrate NRC’s ESP process for each likely siting scenario	
Lack of demonstrated process for obtaining a Combined Construction and Operating License	1. Develop generic guidance on all aspects of COL and obtain NRC concurrence in advance of COL filings	
	2. Demonstrate NRC’s COL process for each NTD design option	
Lack of an appropriate Risk-Informed, Performance-Based regulatory process for licensing decisions	1. Develop risk-informed performance-based regulatory framework for future design certifications of new plants	
	2. Develop a means for streamlined demonstration, regulatory approval, & infusion of new technologies	
Lack of closure with NRC on major COL issues that can affect construction schedule and cost-effective plant operation	1. Establish an efficient process for construction inspection and ITAAC sign-off	
	2. Develop a generic, risk-informed, and appropriate basis for new plant physical plant security.	
	3. Develop a generic, risk-informed regulatory basis for appropriate emergency planning.	
Lack of assurance that nuclear plants will be cost leader in new generation (with focus on generic solutions that will further reduce busbar costs relative to competing options)	1. Adapt advanced fabrication, modularization and construction technologies including time-sequenced virtual construction.	
	2. Adapt and standardize advanced information management system open architectures for life-cycle design, procurement, construction, maintenance, and engineering/licensing management	
	3. Develop standardized advanced man-machine interface systems for plant safety and control, including advanced sensors, programmable controllers, fiber optics, self-diagnostics, and human performance technologies	
	4. Systematically evaluate other opportunities (in addition to those above) to reduce plant construction time. Evaluate technologies, techniques, and human resource opportunities	
Lack of assurance that nuclear plants will be cost leader in new generation (design-specific)	Design-specific refinements – see Section 2 B	

ATTACHMENT 3: NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE'S VISION 2020



## Positioning today's nuclear energy industry to meet tomorrow's energy challenges


**T**he Department of Energy projects the need for about 50 percent more electricity in the United States by 2020. Reasonably priced energy for consumers is the foundation for both economic growth and our quality of life. Beyond the requirement for economical energy, the nation recognizes the need for environmentally responsible electricity. Understanding the vital and necessary role nuclear energy must play in meeting these demands, the nuclear industry commits to make this vision a reality by 2020.

### Vision 2020

Nuclear energy is widely recognized as a safe, reliable, competitive and environmentally sound source of electricity. In the two decades since the turn of the century, 50,000 megawatts of new nuclear generating capacity has been added to the grid. The domestic and international industry supporting the existing and new capacity is robust and competitive.

Policymakers and the public are demanding further increases in the share of sustainable nuclear energy to satisfy economic growth and environmental objectives.

Nuclear technologies are widely used in medicine, food safety, water management and to produce complementary clean fuels such as hydrogen. U.S. leadership continues to be demonstrated in the deployment of nuclear technology on a global basis.




## Strategic objectives for building nuclear energy's future

### From Renaissance to Reality

- Attain prominent, equitable acknowledgement of nuclear energy in national and international energy and environmental policy.
- Maintain excellence in safe, reliable nuclear energy operations and consistent, predictable regulatory processes.
- Attain an integrated, robust nuclear fuel cycle.
- Maximize the value of nuclear energy assets.
- Increase public and policymaker support for nuclear energy and associated technologies.
- Develop the necessary infrastructure and qualified human resources for today and the future.



## Preserving Emission-Free Electricity for Vision 2020



## New Nuclear Capability for Vision 2020

Year	Total Demand	Nuclear Production	% Nuclear
2000	3,802 bkWh	754 bkWh	19.8
	<b>50,000 MW</b>	→ +394 bkWh	New Nuclear Capability
	<b>10,000 MW</b>	→ +79 bkWh	Enhanced Capability
2020	5,305 bkWh	1,227 bkWh	23.1

### Maintaining the nation's clean air

Year	Nuclear Production		Renewable Production		Nuclear and Renewables	% of Total Demand Non-emitting
2000	754 bkWh*	+	362 bkWh	=	1,116 bkWh	29.3
2020	1,227 bkWh	+	444 bkWh	=	1,671 bkWh	31.4

\* bkWh = Billion kilowatt hours

The centerpiece of Vision 2020 is the addition of 50,000 megawatts (MW) of safe, reliable, competitive, environmentally sound and sustainable new nuclear power plant capability by 2020. The number of plants required to do this depends on the size of the plants. If they are 1,000 MW, it will take 50 new plants. If the plants are smaller, it will take more than 50. Production is measured in billions of kilowatt-hours (bkWh). The production number for the 50,000 MW of new capability is obtained by multiplying by the number of hours in a year, 8,760, and multiplying again by the capacity factor. Capacity factor is the amount of power actually produced in a year compared to the amount that could have been produced if the plant ran all year at its maximum power. The overall nuclear fleet has a capacity factor of 90% so 0.9 was used as the capacity factor for the new plants. (50,000 X 8760 X 0.9 = 394 bkWh)

It will take many years to build all of these plants. The nation needs some quicker fixes. Vision 2020 also expects the present fleet of nuclear plants to continue to improve in efficiency. This can come two ways. One is by up-rating.

That is modifying existing plants with more efficient equipment and/or more accurate instrumentation so that a 1,000 MW plant might become a 1,100 MW plant. The second way is by operating more efficiently so there is less time when the reactor is not producing full power. Vision 2020 sets a goal of a 10% improvement in the present fleet which amounts to 10,000 MW of enhanced capability. These improvements can be achieved more quickly than building new plants.

These two changes will result in increasing the share of nuclear energy in the nation's electric supply from 20% to 23%. Together with other renewable production, they will also maintain the non-emitting percentage of electricity production in the U.S. at 30%, thus helping to keep our air clean.

The "Total Demand" and "Renewable Production" numbers in the table for 2000 and the 2020 forecast come from government reports published by the Energy Information Administration.



NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE

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**ATTACHMENT 4: NEI'S INTEGRATED PLAN FOR NEW NUCLEAR PLANTS****Plan Overview**

The purpose of this plan is to support the business decisions on new nuclear plant construction that are expected in the near future. The business entities making the decisions to build new nuclear plants will need sound estimates of costs and schedules. Many of the cost and schedule drivers are design/project specific and well understood; others are based upon external factors that are less certain and affect the confidence in project estimates. This plan is focused on reducing uncertainties related to these external factors to enable informed business decisions on new nuclear plant projects.

The plan to address these external uncertainties is organized into four broad areas of activity:

- **New Plant Economics and Project Structure** – Activities in this area are focused on enhancing the economics of new nuclear plants through energy policy initiatives, innovative project structures, improved capital cost and schedule estimates, and modernizing NRC financial-related requirements.
- **Predictable Licensing and Stable Regulation** – Activities in this area are focused on reducing the “time-to-market” for new nuclear plants by ensuring well understood processes are in place for predictable and efficient licensing, construction, start-up and operation of new nuclear plants. Reducing time-to-market is a key factor in business decisions to build new nuclear plants.
- **Policymaker and Public Support** – Activities in this area are focused on enhancing support for new nuclear plant construction among policymakers and opinion leaders.
- **Nuclear Industry Infrastructure** – Activities in this area are focused on maintaining a robust infrastructure – hardware, technical services and the people that provide them – to support both construction and operation of new plants and continued operation of the current nuclear fleet.

Outside of this plan, concerted, aggressive actions are also underway in other significant areas important to both future and current plants such as ensuring a robust, cost-effective fuel supply and a permanent repository for used nuclear fuel. The intent of this plan is to focus and coordinate industry actions that are uniquely focused on near term deployment of new nuclear plants in the U.S.

This overview identifies the plan objectives and the key supporting actions in progress or planned to achieve those objectives. The plan is dynamic and status reports are issued quarterly that highlight significant progress and developments, challenges ahead, and upcoming meetings.

## **Plan Objectives**

### **Focus Area 1: New Plant Economics and Project Structure**

- 1.1 Identify possible approaches to ownership; risk sharing; capital recovery and reduction of business risks associated with large, capital intensive projects.
- 1.2 Identify changes in policy or legislation that might be necessary or desirable to supplement market forces that influence energy supply choices, and work toward achieving those changes.
- 1.3 Identify ways to reduce engineering, procurement and construction costs, and implement a strategy to achieve those reductions.
- 1.4 Identify and achieve necessary changes to, or clarification of, NRC regulations that apply to new nuclear plants built by unregulated, merchant generating companies.

### **Focus Area 2: Predictable Licensing and Stable Regulation**

- 2.1 Support NEI member applications for early site permits, combined licenses and design certifications for new nuclear plants.
- 2.2 Establish efficient and predictable processes for NRC review and issuance of combined construction and operating licenses under 10 CFR Part 52, verifying operational readiness of completed plants, and authorizing start-up and operation.
- 2.3 Establish an efficient and predictable process for NRC review and issuance of early site permits under 10 CFR Part 52.
- 2.4 Establish a risk informed, performance based regulatory framework for future nuclear power plants.

### **Focus Area 3: Policymaker and Public Support**

- 3.1 Broaden the base of support for nuclear energy, and for new nuclear plant construction, within Congress and the Administration.
- 3.2 Broaden the base of support for nuclear energy, and for new nuclear plant construction, with private sector policy organizations, the financial community, the media and other key publics.

### **Focus Area 4: Nuclear Industry Infrastructure**

- 4.1 Identify future needs and implement a strategy to ensure sufficient qualified personnel and skills to support renewed nuclear plant construction and continued operation of the current plants.
- 4.2 Identify future needs and implement a strategy to ensure sufficient manufacturing capability, engineering services, equipment suppliers, etc., to support renewed nuclear plant construction and continued operation of current plants.

**Key Supporting Actions**

Within each focus area, there is a range of specific activities underway or planned for achieving Plan objectives. These activities are identified below. Detailed schedules and work plans for each activity are maintained by cognizant NEI project managers.

**Focus Area 1: New Plant Economics and Project Structure**

Objective 1.1: Identify possible approaches to ownership; risk sharing; capital recovery and reduction of business risks associated with large, capital intensive projects.

Supporting  
Activities

- 1.1.1 Apply NEI's merchant plant project financing model and use it to help quantify the need for, and value of, new policy initiatives and economic incentives.
- 1.1.2 Examine approaches to risk-sharing and financing of capital-intensive projects that may be relevant for future nuclear power plant projects.

Objective 1.2: Identify changes in policy or legislation that might be necessary or desirable to supplement market forces that influence energy supply choices, and work toward achieving those changes.

Supporting Activities

- 1.2.1 Develop and implement a coordinated industry strategy for providing industry input to energy security legislation (e.g., bills from Senators Murkowski and Domenici, and the Administration).
- 1.2.2 Develop and implement a coordinated industry strategy to achieve renewal of Price Anderson legislation.
- 1.2.3 Identify any changes to the Tax Code for new nuclear plant projects, and implement a strategy to achieve the necessary changes.
- 1.2.4 Develop and implement a strategy to achieve DOE revisions to the Energy Policy Act 1605b program (voluntary carbon emission reductions) that recognize and include avoided emissions at both new and existing plants.
- 1.2.5 Develop and implement a strategy to include new nuclear plants in the electricity generating sources eligible for any economic incentives provided under revisions to the Clean Air Act.

*Focus Area 1, continued*

Objective 1.3: Identify ways to reduce engineering, procurement and construction costs, and implement a strategy to achieve those reductions.

- |                          |  |
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| Supporting<br>Activities | <p>1.3.1 Assess the potential for reduced engineering, procurement, construction, and O&amp;M costs for future plants by applying risk-informed regulation concepts developed for current plants, e.g., risk-informing the scope of applicability of Part 50 special treatment requirements (such as EQ, QA, seismic, etc.).</p> <p>1.3.2 <u>Work with reactor vendors and A/Es to improve cost and schedule estimates for NRC-certified standard plant designs, both in terms of bottom line engineering, procurement and construction costs and certainty in them.</u></p> |
|--------------------------|--|

Objective 1.4: Identify and achieve necessary changes to, or clarification of, NRC regulations that apply to new nuclear plants built by unregulated, merchant generating companies.

- |                          |  |
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| Supporting<br>Activities | <p>1.4.1 <u>Clarify and/or modify NRC requirements that apply to new nuclear plants built by unregulated, merchant generating companies.</u></p> <p>1.4.2 Clarify and/or modify NRC requirements for advanced modular and/or non-light water cooled nuclear plants</p> <p>1.4.3 Modify NRC regulations to accommodate plants consisting of a series of modular reactors.</p> |
|--------------------------|--|

**Focus Area 2: Predictable Licensing and Stable Regulation**

Objective 2.1: Support NEI member applications for early site permits, combined licenses and design certifications for new nuclear plants.

Supporting  
Activities

- 2.1.1 Maintain close coordination of the plan objectives and milestones with efforts to establish appropriate design and licensing bases for gas cooled reactors.
- 2.1.2 Maintain close coordination of the plan objectives and milestones with efforts to modify design and licensing bases for ALWR designs.

Objective 2.2: Establish efficient and predictable processes for NRC review and issuance of combined construction and operating licenses under 10 CFR Part 52, verifying operational readiness of completed plants, and authorizing start-up and operation.

Supporting Activities

- 2.2.1 Develop and achieve NRC endorsement of guidance on the scope of COL ITAAC, in particular, that no ITAAC on operational programs are required.
- 2.2.2 Provide coordinated industry comments on the Part 52 update rulemaking, and identify policy issues to the Commission as appropriate.
- 2.2.3 Achieve clear guidance for future licensees and NRC reviewers on implementation of the ITAAC verification process and NRC construction inspection program.
- 2.2.4 Develop a white paper that describes the interface between new Part 52 requirements and existing Part 50 requirements. Use this paper as the basis for comprehensive Part 52 implementation guidance.
- 2.2.5 Develop and achieve NRC endorsement of guidance on preparation of COL applications.

*Focus Area 2, continued*

Objective 2.3: Establish an efficient and predictable process for NRC review and issuance of early site permits under 10 CFR Part 52.

## Supporting Activities

- 2.3.1 Identify and achieve necessary changes to Parts 51 and 52 to ensure NRC reviews of early site permit applications are safety-focused, predictable and efficient
- 2.3.2 Update the tools from the 1991-92 joint industry-DOE Early Site Permit Demonstration Project
- 2.3.3 Develop guidance that facilitates preparation of ESP applications for new and existing sites and promotes NRC reviews that safety-focused, predictable and efficient
- 2.3.4 Support NEI member ESP applications.

Objective 2.4: Establish a risk informed, performance based regulatory framework for future nuclear power plants.

## Supporting Activities

- 2.4.1 Develop a risk informed, performance based framework for a top down approach to design and operating criteria for future plants, and petition NRC to issue an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
- 2.4.2 Provide coordinated industry input to proposed and final rules leading to establishment of a risk informed regulatory framework for future plants
- 2.4.3 Support NEI member application of a risk informed regulatory framework and development of design-specific implementation guidance.

**Focus Area 3: Policymaker and Public Support**

Objective 3.1: Broaden the base of support for nuclear energy, and for new nuclear plant construction, within Congress and the Administration.

- Supporting Activities
- 3.1.1 Implement a coordinated industry strategy for FY 2002 (and beyond) DOE and NRC appropriations.
  - 3.1.2 Implement a strategy to gain support within the NRC and Congress for an appropriate level of NRC resources dedicated to assuring efficient licensing processes that meet the objectives of Part 52 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
  - 3.1.3 Ensure coordination of industry and DOE activities related to near-term commercial deployment of advanced nuclear plant designs
  - 3.1.4 Work with the DOE Energy Information Administration and provide input to the Annual Energy Outlook to ensure appropriate forecasts related to nuclear energy
  - 3.1.5 Provide information to the House Nuclear Issues Group and Senate Nuclear Caucus on policy changes needed to facilitate new nuclear plant construction

Objective 3.2: Broaden the base of support for nuclear energy, and for new nuclear plant construction, with private sector policy organizations, the financial community, the media and other key publics.

- Supporting Activities
- 3.2.1 Develop an integrated communications plan as the platform for all communications on the industry commitment to new plants and the need for legislative and policy changes.
  - 3.2.2 Communicate to media, financial, state/local/federal, environmental and other key audiences on the benefits of and need for new nuclear plants – “the nuclear imperative” – as well as the business case for nuclear energy as the only competitive, long-haul source of clean, safe, reliable baseload generation
  - 3.2.3 Develop community and coalition support for new nuclear plants in the U.S. through outreach to union groups, chambers of commerce, state and local officials, and others.
  - 3.2.4 Support and leverage media coverage of comprehensive energy policy/legislation and nuclear renaissance.

**Focus Area 4: Nuclear Industry Infrastructure**

Objective 4.1: Identify future needs and implement a strategy to ensure sufficient qualified personnel and skills to support renewed nuclear plant construction and continued operation of the current plants.

Supporting Activities

- 4.1.1 Establish a credible estimate of current and projected staffing demand and supply for the nuclear power generation industry, including generating companies, NSSS designers, architect engineering firms, equipment suppliers, contractors, governmental agencies, and academic institutions.
- 4.1.2 Develop a comprehensive industry staffing plan with specific tasks, lead entities and responsibilities to address any existing or anticipated staffing gaps.
- 4.1.3 Implement a coordinated industry strategy to achieve policy maker support and action on a national and state level for nuclear workforce issues.

Objective 4.2: Identify future needs and implement a strategy to ensure sufficient manufacturing capability, engineering services, equipment suppliers, etc., to support renewed nuclear plant construction and continued operation of current plants.

Supporting Activities

- 4.2.1 Identify the structures, system and component (SSC) needs that will arise as the result of a decision to deploy a series of new nuclear plants in the US market.
- 4.2.2 Survey nuclear operating companies, NSSS designers, architect engineering firms and other segments of the nuclear industry to assess possible gaps in the ability to support renewed nuclear plant construction.